


SĀṆKHYA THOUGHT
IN THE BRAHMANICAL SYSTEMS
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY



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**TO
THE MEMORY OF MY REVERED
FATHER PT. KESHAV RAM**

INTRODUCTION

Subject and its Importance

The present work, as the title indicates, takes an account of the Sāṃkhya system insofar as its doctrines are presented and criticised in the works of the brahmanical systems of Indian philosophy. The importance of this subject and of such a study can never be overestimated.

Sāṃkhya is one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy. Its great antiquity, the authority of its propounder, its rational and realistic approach to and the explanation of the problem of reality are some of the chief reasons which have raised this system to a place of honour in the systems of Indian philosophy. This system is eulogised in the ancient Indian literature and is esteemed as an important system by the exponents of the other systems. (The *Mahābhārata*,¹ stating that there is no knowledge like that of Sāṃkhya, attaches supreme importance to it. Śaṃkarācārya,² the chief critic of Sāṃkhya, allots to it the highest place describing it as the chief opponent (*Pradhānamalla*).) But, for a student of Indian philosophy, still more important is its ideological contribution to the other systems of Indian philosophy and the later religious sects. In spite of the opposition and criticism which the system has encountered, it has penetrated deep into other philosophical systems and the religious sects and has provided a fine basis for their cosmological explanations. In the arena of Indian philosophy, Sāṃkhya represents the first attempts to systematise the explanations regarding the nature of reality, its relation to the empirical world and the means of differentiating between the two on the basis of reasoning. It has showed the strong and the weak points of a particular line of approach to the problem of reality, availing of which other systematists could try new lines of thought or avoid the drawbacks. Thus,

1. *Mbh.* 12.304.2

2. *SB.* 1.4.28

the explanations of certain basic problems offered by the other systematists can be regarded as an advance over the Sāṃkhya as they formulate their own philosophy after considering the pros and cons of the Sāṃkhya analysis of the problem. A study of the treatment of the Sāṃkhya doctrines in the works of the exponents of the other systems, therefore, helps us to some extent to grasp the process of other systems.

The point of supreme significance of such a study, however, is the knowledge of the Sāṃkhya system itself. If we go through the available Sāṃkhya texts, we definitely know a system of Sāṃkhya, but the reading also leaves behind many metaphysical and epistemological problems unanswered by the texts. The earliest authentic work of Sāṃkhya available to us is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Later on, we find the commentaries of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* like the *Yuktidīpikā*, the *Mātharavṛtti*, the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, the *Jayamaṅgalā*, the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, etc. The other important work of Sāṃkhya is the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* which is considered to be of late date. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* gives outline of the Sāṃkhya system in brief. However, many intricacies regarding the means of knowledge, nature of cognising agent, process of apparent union of sentient and non-sentient entities remain unexplained. The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* have not fully explained these problems. They have offered various contradictory explanations of these fundamental doctrines and have rendered them still more difficult for comprehension. The exposition of the problems found in form of *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) in the texts of other systems can be of some help in proper understanding of the fundamentals of Sāṃkhya. It is true that sometimes the critics do not give a faithful presentation of theories of their opponents and, hence, their exposition of the Sāṃkhya doctrines cannot be fully relied upon. It becomes obligatory, therefore, to examine very carefully the presentation of the Sāṃkhya theories in the works of their opponents so that the fundamentals of Sāṃkhya should be free from ambiguity.

Further, the phenomenon of gaps in the 'literary continuity', which is common to all other systems of Indian philosophy, is most prominent in case of Sāṃkhya. Many works of

Sāṃkhya are now lost to us. Up to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's time, we know only of names of Sāṃkhya works and authors besides a few brief references to their views. The other systematists are sometimes found to criticise the doctrines of pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa teachers of Sāṃkhya. Hence, the study of the texts of other systems proves highly useful to know the original form of the doctrines of ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya and their contributions to the Sāṃkhya philosophy. After Īśvarakṛṣṇa and before Vācaspatimiśra, i.e., in the span of four or five centuries we have only the *Yuktidīpikā* and a few other commentaries. Then, there is again a gap of centuries till we come to Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Therefore, the texts of other non-Sāṃkhya systems is the only source for us to know and to reconstruct history of Sāṃkhya thought through the centuries.

Moreover, the exponents of other systems of Indian philosophy have waged a fierce and continuous intellectual warfare with the Sāṃkhyas. The critics have condemned the Sāṃkhya theories on various grounds in order to reduce it to the state of an outmoded thought. The criticism, however, requires further consideration for a thorough grasp of strength and weaknesses of the Sāṃkhya line of thought. The study is, thus complementary which helps us to understand Sāṃkhya in a better perspective.

Notices of the Previous Works

Stray notices of the criticism of Sāṃkhya doctrines have been taken by modern scholars like *Anima Sengupta*, *Udayavira Shastri*, *M.G. Shastri*, etc. References to this criticism of Sāṃkhya are found partly in various works dealing with particular systems like the *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics*, the *Nyāya theory of knowledge*, the *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, the *Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, etc., and in the standard works dealing with history of Indian Philosophy. There are a few articles with some aspects of this criticism such as "Udayana's Criticism of the Sāṃkhya" "References to the Sāṃkhya in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*", "Some aspects of the Sāṃkhya system as viewed by the Vedāntins", "Refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory of creation in the *Brahmasūtra* II.2.1-10 with special reference to the *Sāṃkarabhāṣya* on the same", etc. But, all these points of criticism are not so far presented in a

systematic manner and at one place. The criticism is still awaiting a comprehensive and critical examination too. A comparison of the exposition of the Sāṃkhya doctrines available in the literature of other systems with works of the Sāṃkhyas also has remained a desideratum.

Aim of the Work

Keeping in view the above points, the present work chiefly aims at a comprehensive study of the Sāṃkhya doctrines as expounded in the form of *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) and their criticism in the basic texts of other systems. This is achieved through a comparison of them with the original texts of the Sāṃkhyas and a critical evaluation of the criticism levelled against them. This is further calculated to lay bare the roots of the controversies between Sāṃkhya and the other systems.

Scope of the Work

The study of conflict between Sāṃkhya and the other systems is highly interesting, since the other systems could not remain immune to Sāṃkhya influence and had to incorporate in their philosophy the ideas and basic features of Sāṃkhya. Hence, no student of Indian philosophy, interested in the development of various concepts, can afford to ignore this system which has left its impression on every page of Indian literature. Each philosophical system, however, has its individual differences with the Sāṃkhya systems. The criticism covers a wide range of topics. The presentation and criticism of Sāṃkhya theories by brahmanical systems, viz., Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā as well as those of non-brahmanical systems, viz., Buddhism and Jainism and the other philosophical literature of Śaivism, Pāñcarātra, etc., need detailed consideration.

However, the present study had to be restricted to the brahmanical systems and rest of the literature had to be left out for want of time and space. We are aware that a comparative study of Sāṃkhya with the literature of Śaivism, Pāñcarātra, etc. and the Jain and Buddhist philosophies is a matter of deep and comprehensive research and of great potentiality of results; but that the subject can be made a justice we are obliged to leave it for subsequent research. As, however, the literature of

each of the brahmanical systems also is very vast, it has compelled us to limit the study to a few selected works of each of these systems. In the selection of texts of the brahmanical philosophies, two chief considerations have prompted our choice. We may think of 'Sāṃkhya' in terms of (i) the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa-Sāṃkhya and (ii) Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his successors. So far as the first stage is concerned, we can say that the earlier the brahmanical text, the more valuable its study as it presents the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya and enables us to observe the doctrinal changes, their nature and reason for such a change. Texts which deal with the second phase of Sāṃkhya are valuable as they afford us an insight into the intricacies of problems in Sāṃkhya and their explanation from the Sāṃkhya side. They also enable us to see how far the brahmanical writers are faithful in their presentation and criticism, and to judge their reliability for our information about Sāṃkhya. We have selected as far as possible the Sūtra, the Bhāṣyas and Vārttika besides some celebrated work of each system. The selection of these texts is prompted by the consideration that the Sūtras represent the seeds of the thought, the Bhāṣyas and the Vārttikas indicate its development in a discipline in form of concrete and possible criticisms and the celebrated commentaries afford a picture of a full-fledged system.

Line of Approach

The chief aim of the thesis being the study of Sāṃkhya doctrines in the light of their discussion in the basic texts of other systems, the line of approach followed is essentially comparative analytical and critical. The exposition of Sāṃkhya theories found in the works of other systems in form of *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) are systematically presented and are compared with the original extant texts of the Sāṃkhyas. In order to facilitate a proper understanding of the standard doctrines of Sāṃkhya, a brief discussion of the development of Sāṃkhya and a brief exposition of Sāṃkhya doctrines precedes the main part of the thesis. An attempt is also made to consider the causes of criticism of Sāṃkhya doctrines by their critics and to point out the flaws if any. The analysis of the controversies is intended to reveal the distortion or otherwise of the Sāṃkhya position and the differences in approach of various systems to philoso-

phical problems. In course of such a discussion, the results of studies by other scholars have been taken into consideration in pertinent places.

The controversies cover a wide range of topics of metaphysical, epistemological and logical character. Therefore, a definite arrangement is followed in the discussion. The work presents the material systemwise and topicwise. The chronological order is always kept in view so as to throw light on the development of the arguments of either side. Generally, problems relating to metaphysics are discussed first and are followed by discussions relating to epistemology and logic.

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as *sāmyak kathanam*, i.e., setting forth spirit as distinct from Prakṛti. The tradition of interpreting *sāṃkhya* in the sense of knowledge, which is followed by Śāṃkara and Vijñānabhikṣu is also to be found in the Buddhist literature. Out of two technical terms *pratisāṃkhya* and *apratīsāṃkhya* (*nirodha*) the former refers to the pure or transcendental wisdom which leads to liberation. Devatīrtha Swami⁶ understands the word *sāṃkhya* to mean 'orderly enunciation' and observes that Sāṃkhya is the discipline which signifies orderly enunciation. the term *sāṃkhya* is used in the sense of philosophical reflection. *Amarakośa*⁷ states that the term *sāṃkhya* means discussion and investigation. This meaning of the term *sāṃkhya* is reflected in the etymology of Sāṃkhya as offered by some scholars. Raghunātha Tarkavāgiśa Bhaṭṭācārya⁸ takes the term *sāṃkhya* to mean the consideration of the twenty-five principles and Sāṃkhya as a system dealing with it. Guṇaratna⁹ suggests a peculiar derivation of the term Sāṃkhya. He states that the term Sāṃkhya is read as *Śāṃkhya* and is called so as it is associated with the seer named Śāṃkha, its supposed founder. There is, however, no evidence for this surmise because usually Sāṃkhya is held to be founded by Kapila.

Origin of Sāṃkhya

Sāṃkhya attained the position of a full-fledged philosophical system prior to the emergence of the other systems of Indian Philosophy. The origin of this system falls into oblivion. Traditionally, Kapila is believed to be the founder of the system, but there is no authentic source of information regarding the time, works and nature of the philosophical thought originally expounded by him. Quite a different, and sometimes even diametrically opposite views prevail regarding the origin of Sāṃkhya. Scholars have tried to trace the origin

6. *Sāṃkhyataraṅga*, quoted by Hall in his *Introduction to the SPB*, p. 4
7. *Amarakośa*, p. 33
8. *Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa*, quoted by Hall in his *Introduction to the SPB*, p. 4
9. *Saddarśanasamuccaya*, p. 38

of Sāṃkhya to different periods right from the pre-Vedic age to the *Mahābhārata*.

Garbe¹⁰ and Zimmer¹¹ maintain that Sāṃkhya did not originate from the stock of the Vedic tradition.

Garbe holds that the Sāṃkhya system was formulated in the period between the oldest Upaniṣads and the rise of Buddhism as a reaction against propagation of constant idealism of the Upaniṣads regarding Brahman—Ātman. He does not believe in some pre-classical version of Sāṃkhya and thinks that Sāṃkhya existed as a complete and well-knit system in non-brahmanic, i.e. *Kṣatriya* circles where Buddhism subsequently originated. Zimmer believes in the remote, aboriginal, pre-Vedic antiquity of Sāṃkhya. His view is based upon the close relationship of Sāṃkhya and Yoga with Jainism which is traced back to the pre-Vedic aboriginal Indian antiquity.

There is a set of scholars who trace the origin of Sāṃkhya to the Vedic tradition. (Max Muller¹² holds that Sāṃkhya originated from religious and philosophical thought in the Vedas which gave rise to all shades of Indian thought—orthodox or unorthodox theistic or atheistic. Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta followed parallel courses of their development from a remote past. Dasgupta¹³ thinks that there are two currents of thought in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, viz., the conception of Brahman and the other which considered the world as having a reality as made of water, fire and earth. The former developed into the monistic Vedānta of Śāṃkara and the latter into the Sāṃkhya school which accepts non-sentient material Prakṛti as the cause of universe.

Johnston¹⁴ maintains that starting point of the original Sāṃkhya is represented by the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* which divides the individual into five mortal and five immortal parts. The formation of Sāṃkhya took place at the earliest in the interval

10. cf. Garbe's introduction to his English translation of *Aniruddhavyūtti*

11. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p. 281

12. Max Muller, *The six systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 235

13. *A History of Indian Philosophy* vol. I, pp. 211-212

14. *Early Sāṃkhya*, p. 21

that separates the oldest group of the Upaniṣads from the middle group.

Amongst the scholars who trace the origin of Sāṃkhya to the Upaniṣadic texts, Jacobi¹⁵ maintains that Sāṃkhya had an inchoate form in the *tejobanna* part of the *Chāṇḍyogopaniṣad*. He does not regard Kapila as an inspired founder of new philosophy but only a systematiser who gave a temporarily settled form to earlier speculations circa 800 B.C. He holds that its classical form, as it is preserved in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, was fixed before 500 B.C. Oldenberg¹⁶ finds the beginning of Sāṃkhya in the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads. Keith¹⁷ is of the opinion the Upaniṣads are not an exposition of Sāṃkhya but contain the elements from which, in due course, Sāṃkhya was developed.

J. Dahlmann¹⁸ believes that 'original Sāṃkhya' is found in the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā* and other philosophical sections of the epic. He regards the *Mahābhārata* as the product of one hand and places it in the pre-Buddhist period (700 B.C.) as contemporaneous with the later Upaniṣads. The dualistic classical Sāṃkhya, according to him, is the natural outgrowth of original Sāṃkhya found in the above-mentioned works in the form of the doctrine of 'triuneunity' according to which the highest Absolute (Brahman) sends forth two eternal manifestations—world soul (Hiranyagarbha) and matter or Prakṛti which are opposed to each other in respect to qualities and functions.

This is a digest of the prominent views regarding the origin of Sāṃkhya. A discussion of their merits and drawbacks lies beyond the scope of the present work.¹⁹ It can, however, be

15. cf. S.K. Belvalkar and R.D. Ranade, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 420-4

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Sāṃkhya System*, pp. 5-23

18. S.K. Belvalkar and R.D. Ranade, *op. cit.* pp. 420-4

19. For details of the merits and demerits of these theories, see S.K. Belvalkar and R.D. Ranade, *op. cit.* pp. 424-6; G.J. Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya*, pp. 7-16; K.B.R. Rao, *Theism of Pre-classical Sāṃkhya*, pp. 13-21; and C.T. Kenghe, *The Sāṃkhya of the Bhagavadgītā and the system of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, a comparative study*, Ph. D. Thesis (unpublished), University of Poona.

pointed out by us that the Indian tradition regards Sāṃkhya as a Vedic *darśana*. This conviction is further supported by the evidence of the *Brahmasūtras* which criticise the interpretation of the Upaniṣadic passages offered by the Sāṃkhya as favourable to them. It means that from the point of view of Bādārāyaṇa, the Sāṃkhyas themselves believed that their system is found in these texts. However, in the extant Sāṃkhya under study, the Sāṃkhyas are nowhere found to be anxious for having an Upaniṣadic support for their statements. On the contrary, they join hands with the non-Vedic systems in deprecating the Vedic ideas of sacrifice as a means of permanent happiness, of sacrificial slaughter and state of heaven.²⁰ It is also to be noted that none of the orthodox systems has accused Sāṃkhya of being *nāstika* on the grounds of defying the authority of the Vedas in those matters. With this background, it is difficult to ascertain at this stage the nature of relation of Sāṃkhya with the Vedic and the non-Vedic traditions. That Kapila is traditionally believed to be the originator of Sāṃkhya is not a proof strong enough to lead us to assume that he propounded an altogether new ideology. Kapila may be regarded as a systematiser of stray ideas prevalent in his time some of which can be traced in the Upaniṣads. To these he added a few concepts of his own. Casually, it may also be stated that Sāṃkhya was systematised earlier than the *Mahābhārata*, since the *Mahābhārata* recognises Sāṃkhya as an ancient system and holds it in high esteem.

Development of Sāṃkhya

[The Sāṃkhya system is immensely old. We cannot, however, presuppose the presence of Sāṃkhya as a system of philosophy in Vedic literature. The chief aim of the *Saṃhitās* and the Brāhmaṇa literature is performance of sacrifices. There is nothing specially related to Sāṃkhya in the Philosophical portions of the *Saṃhitās* and the Brāhmaṇas also. The word Kapila occurs once in the *Rgveda* 10.27.16 and once in the *Khila* hymns.²¹ We come across the patronymic word Sāṃkhya in the *Anukramaṇī* as seer of *Rgveda* 10.143. It does

20. SK 2

21. *Khila* 11.7 (given as a variant reading).

not however, prove the existence of Sāṃkhya in the age of the *Rgveda*. As regards the occurrence of Kapila in the tenth *mandala*, Sāyaṇa,²² seems to believe that Kapila is a seer perhaps identical with the founder of Sāṃkhya. This contention of Sāyaṇa, however does not suit the context. The context favours *marut* as the meaning of the term Kapila. The reference to Kapila in the *Khila* hymn as one of the five persons who having no fear from serpents sleep happily is also not sufficient to prove the existence of Sāṃkhya system in the *Rgveda* times, firstly because it gives a meagre account of Kapila and secondly, because the age of the *Khila* hymns is not certain. The mention of Atri Sāṃkhya is also not conclusive to indicate the existence of Sāṃkhya system in the *Rgveda*. (The term Sāṃkhya connected with the seer Atri does not refer to a system of thought, but stands for the family of Atri.²³ The *Sāmavedasaṃhitā* and the *Yajurvedasaṃhitā* also being technical in nature do not provide any evidence regarding the origin and development of philosophical concepts

The Brāhmaṇas also furnish no clear evidence of the existence of Sāṃkhya in them. We come across the word *Kāpileya* in the *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa*,²⁴ but there is no evidence to understand it with reference to the founder of Sāṃkhya. It refers to the clan of Kapila and provides no information about the original Kapila.²⁵ The word Kapila occurs in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*²⁶ and the *Gopathabrāhmaṇa*,²⁷ but it refers to the colour and does not reveal anything with reference to the founder of Sāṃkhya. Thus, we do not find the Sāṃkhya ideas in the text of the *Saṃhitās* and the Brāhmaṇas. If at all we deduce the existence of certain doctrines resembling those of Sāṃkhya from the words and the concepts of these texts, we can infer only the remote origin of the Sāṃkhya doctrines.

It is the concluding portion of the Veda, viz. literature of the Upaniṣads which contains discussion of philosophical

22. Sāyaṇa on *RV* 10.27.16

23. cf. V.G. Rahurkar, *Seers of the Rgveda*, pp. 284-5

24. *Ait. br.* VII. 17

25. P.B. Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of Sāṃkhya school of thought*, p. 7

26. *Śat. br.* XIV 9.4.14

27. *G. br.* 1.25

problems. The seers of the Upaniṣads vividly described their experiences regarding the ultimate reality and various methods to approach it. However, it will not be proper to say that the Upaniṣads represent a single system of thought. Bādarāyaṇa made an attempt to systematise the teachings of Upaniṣads in the *Brahmasūtras* which form the basis for different schools of Vedānta. From the evidence of Bādarāyaṇa himself, it appears that Sāṃkhya teachers also claimed the scriptural support for their doctrines and interpreted the Upaniṣads from their own point of view. We do not find a definite form of Sāṃkhya in the literature of the Upaniṣads also. Again it will not be feasible to assume that Sāṃkhya originated at a particular time independently of the philosophical ideas found in Vedic texts, because we come across a somewhat similar terminology and ideas in them. It cannot, however, be claimed that the philosophical trends found in the Upaniṣads can also be identical with the theories of Sāṃkhya. Though the terminology used by the Sāṃkhyas occurs in the Upaniṣads yet it cannot be said that the Upaniṣads have borrowed these terms from the Sāṃkhyas. The name of the Sāṃkhya system²⁸ and that of its founder²⁹ occurs in the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* which is considered as belonging to a later age in comparison with the other principal Upaniṣads. It is possible to say that there are some hints in the passages of the Upaniṣads which might have been availed by the Sāṃkhyas to formulate their philosophical doctrines. The Sāṃkhyas even go beyond the thought expressed in the Upaniṣads, but the speculations are so intermixed that it is difficult to describe the stage of development with precision. It is in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature that we find a definite stage of Sāṃkhya. Thus, we may broadly mark following three stages in the development of Sāṃkhya : (i) beginning of Sāṃkhya as presented by the Upaniṣads (ii) earlier or the pre-classical Sāṃkhya found in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature and (iii) later or classical stage delineated in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the later works, which marks the third and the last phase of its growth.

28. *Sve. up.* 6.13

29. *Ibid.*

(1) We can point out various trends and speculations in extant Vedic literature which can be looked upon as seeds of some Sāṃkhya doctrines.

In the Vedic Samhitās we may frequently come across prayers for long life, cattle and heaven as reward for performing religious rites. (The notion of suffering which is a major factor to develop philosophical consciousness is found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*³⁰ and the *Chāndogya*³¹ Upaniṣads.)

(Sāṃkara's criticism of Sāṃkhya reveals that some early Sāṃkhya teachers tried to trace dualism which forms central theme of Sāṃkhya philosophy) in the mention of two birds in the *Rgveda* 1.64.20 interpreting them as Buddhi and Puruṣa.³² (Though the Upaniṣads are in favour of idealism and monism and establish supremacy of spirit, yet dualistic tendency is found in the *Praśna* and the *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads side by side with their own classical theism.³³)

An instance of mentioning exact numerical details is to be found in the *Atharvaveda*³⁴ in the description of human body. The variety of enumerations relating to sacrifice can be seen throughout the Brāhmaṇa literature. (Bādarāyaṇa³⁵ suggests that the Sāṃkhyas attempt to find support for their division of elements into twenty-five categories in *Pañcapañca-janāḥ* mentioned in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. Some categories resembling those of Sāṃkhya are enumerated in the *Kaṭha*,³⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*³⁷ *Praśna*³⁸ and the *Śvetāśvatara*³⁹ Upaniṣads.)

Nāsadiya-sūkta in the *Rgveda*⁴⁰ stating that cause of the universe is neither *sat* nor *asat*, suggests undifferentiated nature of the original cause of universe which resembles the Sāṃkhya description of Prakṛti. The *Brahmasūtras* suggest that the

30. *Br. up.*

31. *Ch. up* VII. 22

32. *SB.* 1.3.7

33. For details see K.B.R. Rao, *op.cit.*, pp.97-114.

34. *AV.* 10.2.31

35. *BS.* 1.4.11-13

36. *Ka. up* VI. 5-12

37. *Br. up* VI. 5-12

38. *Pr. up* IV. 8

39. *Śve. up* 1.4

40. *RV* 10.121.1

Sāṃkhyas made an effort to find out reference to their concept of Prakṛti in *sat* mentioned in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*,⁴¹ *ānanda-maya ātman* mentioned in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*,⁴² *antaryāmin* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*,⁴³ *adarśya bhūtayoni*⁴⁴ and *amṛtasya setu*⁴⁵ of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. (It is the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*⁴⁶ which describes *ajā* which is more akin to the Sāṃkhya concept of Prakṛti. The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* uses the Prakṛti⁴⁷, Avyakta⁴⁸ and Pradhāna also.⁴⁹)

Garbe⁵⁰ traces the Sāṃkhya theory of three Guṇas to the *Atharvaveda* 10.8.43. Muir⁵¹ supports the same. (The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*⁵² appears to suggest the rudiments of the theory.) The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*⁵³ speaks of the theory in clear terms. Theory of *guṇapariṇāma* is first mentioned in the *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad*.⁵⁴

The *Puruṣa-sūkta*⁵⁵ of the *Rgveda* indicates basis for personal conception of Puruṣa. The term Puruṣa occurs many a time in the Brāhmaṇas, in the sense of cosmic man. Johnston⁵⁶ suggests that these speculations involving man, developed into the Sāṃkhya concept of Puruṣa because of too closely related factors : (i) an urge to find the ultimate essence of life in man and (ii) an urge to work out a notion of life after death for man. (The unattached and invisible nature of soul as free from

41. BS 1.1.5-11

42. BS 1.2.18-19

43. BS 1.2.18-20

44. BS 1.2.21-3

45. BS 1.3.1-7

46. Śve. up. IV. 5

47. Śve. up. 1.8

48. Ibid.

49. Śve. up. 1.10

50. cf. S.K. Belvalkar and R.D. Ranade, *op.cit.*, p. 415

51. *Original Sanskrit Texts*. vol. V, p. 377.

52. Ch. up. VI. 4.1-4

53. Śve. up. IV. 5

54. Mait. up. VI. 10

55. RV 10.90

56. *Early Sāṃkhya*, p. 18

material qualities is indicated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁵⁷ *Kaṭha*,⁵⁸ *Muṇḍaka*⁵⁹ and *Maitrāyaṇi*⁶⁰ Upaniṣads. Plurality of Puruṣas is suggested in the *Maitrāyaṇi*⁶¹ and *Śvetāśvatar*⁶² Upaniṣads.

(The concept of Mahat can be traced back to the *Rgvedic* concept of *Hiranyagarbha*.⁶³ The indications of this concept are found in the *Kaṭha*⁶⁴, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁶⁵, *Taittirīya*⁶⁶ and *Śvetāśvatar*⁶⁷ upaniṣads.)

(Ahaṃkāra is explicitly mentioned in the *Chāndogya*⁶⁸ and the *Praśna*⁶⁹ Upaniṣads. Van Buitenen⁷⁰ traces the notion of Ahaṃkāra to the ancient cosmological speculations, connecting it with the creation myth in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*.)

(The name and functions of internal and external organs are mentioned in the *Chāndogya*,⁷¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁷² *Kaṭha*⁷³ and *Praśna*⁷⁴ Upaniṣads.)

(The concept of *tanmātrās* is suggested in the *Chāndogya*⁷⁵ and the *Praśna*⁷⁶ Upaniṣads. The *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad*⁷⁷ mentions them by name.

(*Mahābhūtas* are frequently mentioned in course of explain-

57. Br. up. IV. 3.15

58. Ka. up. 1.3.15

59. Mun. up. III.3

60. Mait. up. III.3

61. Ibid.

62. Śve. up. IV.5

63. RV 10.121

64. Ka. up. 13.10-11

65. Br. up. IV. 4.2

66. Tait. up. II.4 and S thereon

67. Śve. up. III.4, 19. IV. 12; VI. 17-18

68. Ch. up. VII.24

69. Pr. up. IV.8

70. Van Beitenen, "Studies in Sāṃkhya II", *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. 77, No 1, January-March, 1957.

71. Ch. up. V. 1.6-12

72. Br. up. III. 9.4 and S thereon

73. Ka. up. 1.3.1-2

74. Pr. up. IV, 8

75. Ch. up. IV. 3.1-2

76. Pr. up. III. 2

77. Mait. up. III. 2

ing the creation even in the earlier upaniṣads like the *Chāndogya*,⁷⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁷⁹ *Aitareya*⁸⁰ and *Taittirīya*.⁸¹

Though there is no direct mention of *Liṅgaśarīra* in the Upaniṣads, yet the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁸² and the *Śvetāśvatara*⁸³ upaniṣads suggest rudiments of the concept

(The *Nāsadiya-sūkta* of the *Rgveda*⁸⁴ indicates the Sāṃkhya theory of pre-existence of cause in effect. The production of *sat* from *asat* suggests causal connection between *vyakta* and *avyakta*. The idea that effect differs from cause in respect of form and not in essence is suggested in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*.⁸⁵)

Thus, we can trace the germs of Sāṃkhya in the ancient speculations which might have been brought together and elaborated into manifold and coherent concepts found in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature. It is, however, not possible to define the stages through which they passed to arrive at this stage.

(ii) The second stage of Sāṃkhya is found in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature. Here, we meet with a fully developed form of the Sāṃkhya which is, however, different from the later or classical Sāṃkhya as delineated in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. For the present purpose, the discussion of the pre-classical form of the Sāṃkhya is divided into the following parts: (A) Sāṃkhya in the *Mahābhārata* (B) Sāṃkhya in the *Ahīrbudhnyasāṃhitā* and (C) Sāṃkhya in the *Carakasāṃhitā*. Though the texts under study in each section do not represent absolutely different stages in the development of the Sāṃkhya, yet they offer glimpses into various important aspects thereof.

(A) Sāṃkhya in the *Mahābhārata*

Among all the systems of philosophy only Sāṃkhya and

78. *Ch. up.* 1.8.4-5

79. *Br. up.* III. 9.7

80. *Ait. up.* III. 1.3

81. *Tait. up.* II. 1

82. *Br. up.* IV. 4.1-3

83. *Śve. up.* 1.11

84. *RV.* 10.129.1

85. *Ch. up.* VI. 1.3

Yoga are specially mentioned with explanation of their doctrines at some length in the *Mahābhārata*. The theories of Sāṃkhya are so scattered and diversely explained that it is difficult to gather points of a coherent system out of them. It is easy to put together without much strain and twist various versions of Sāṃkhya doctrines which contradict each other and none of which is fully accepted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It is also well known that the *Mahābhārata* took a long time to come to its present form. It is, however, difficult to decide as to which parts are earlier and which are later. Consequently the earlier or the later aspects of the philosophical thoughts cannot easily be ascertained. Kapila is repeatedly mentioned as the founder of Sāṃkhya. There is, however, mention of other teachers of Sāṃkhya, like Jaigīṣavya, Asita Devala, Parāśara, Vārṣaganya, Bhṛgu, Pāṇcaśikha, Śuka, Gautama, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Garga, Nārada, Āsuri, Pulatsya, Sanatakumāra, Śukra, Kaśyapa and Rudra-Viśvarūpa⁸⁶, which are probably the followers of Kapila. The teachings of these *ācāryas* are intermixed.

The categories are variously enumerated. In Vasiṣṭha's exposition of Sāṃkhya to Karāla Janaka, the twenty-five categories are enumerated, but *tanmātrās* do not find place in them. They are replaced by *viśeṣas* (objects of senses).⁸⁷ The twenty-fifth category i.e., Puruṣa is said to control over these categories.⁸⁸ Sometimes the categories are stated to be twenty-four when Puruṣa is not regarded as a separate category.⁸⁹ Sometimes the categories are enumerated as twenty-six with the addition of Īśvara in the twenty-five mentioned above.⁹⁰ It is also stated that Īśvara is accepted by Yoga.⁹¹ It suggests that the doctrine of twenty-six categories was held by the followers of Yoga as well as some followers of Sāṃkhya. The objective world is divided into eight *Prakṛtis* and sixteen *vikṛtis*.⁹² Pāṇcaśikha's manner of the classification

86. *Mbh.* 12.306.57-60

87. *Mbh.* 12.294.27-30

88. *Mbh.* 12.294.35

89. *Mbh.* 12.293.49-50

90. *Mbh.* 12.296.17

91. *Mbh.* 12.289.3

92. *Mbh.* 12.294.27-30 and 12.298.10-11

of categories is not strictly scientific but only descriptive. He classifies the categories into five elements, Manas, five senses, five organs of action and power (*bala*).⁹³ He enumerates the objects of senses, nature (*svabhāva*) and consciousness (*cetanā*) as further categories.⁹⁴

The Avyakta is constituted of three Guṇas.⁹⁵ Unlike the system of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, it is also stated that the Guṇas arise from Prakṛti and merge back into it.⁹⁶ Prakṛti creates and annihilates everything when presided over by the highest spiritual principle.⁹⁷ Pāñcāśikha holds that gross material elements develop into the universe independently of any external agency.⁹⁸ It seems that Pāñcāśikha regards Avyakta as unified category of Avyakta and Puruṣa.⁹⁹ The nature of three Guṇas is variously explained as the three constituents and the evolutes of Avyakta¹⁰⁰ or the three *jīvagūṇas*¹⁰¹ or three *bhāvas*, i.e., states of living beings.¹⁰² We do not find support for the theory of mutual interaction and inseparability of the Guṇas. On the contrary, they are stated to be separable.¹⁰³

[Puruṣa is described as an object of inference,¹⁰⁴ beginningless (*anādi*), endless (*ananta*), omniscient (*sarvadarśi*), controller (*niyāmaka*) and devoid of the three Guṇas.¹⁰⁵ Due to its contact with Prakṛti, Puruṣa identifies itself with body through ignorance and appears to be modified by modifications of Buddhi and considers itself as active and creative principle.¹⁰⁶ Regarding the number of Puruṣas it is stated that Sāṃkhya

93. *Mbh.* 12.212.20
94. *Mbh.* 12.212.20
95. *Mbh.* 12.33.2
96. *Mbh.* 12.293.34 and 12.303.9
97. *Mbh.* 12.303.12
98. *Mbh.* 12.212.9
99. *Mbh.* 12. 211.11
100. *Mbh.* 12.210.10, 12.292.27, 12.293.11, 12.306.37, 12.326.21
101. *Mbh.* 12.180.34, 12.233.19
102. *Mbh.* 12.187.14, 12.204.13, 12.209.11, 12.212.29
103. *Mbh.* 12.205.9, 12.245.3, 12.313.28
104. *Mbh.* 12.293.38
105. *Mbh.* 12.293.39
106. *Mbh.* 12.291.43

and Yoga believe in multiplicity of Puruṣas.¹⁰⁷ This led Hopkins¹⁰⁸ to believe that plurality of souls was a feature of the epic Sāṃkhya. P.M. Modi,¹⁰⁹ however, thinks that the epic Sāṃkhya does not establish plurality of Puruṣas. A statement from the *Mahābhārata* suggests that the fact lies midway between the two. Plurality of Puruṣas is not real or transcendental but pertains to the empirical selves. The supreme self appears to assume forms of many selves, focussed as it is through different bodies.¹¹⁰

There are numerous accounts of evolution. At one place, it is stated that Prakṛti gives rise to Mahat. Ahaṃkāra arises from Mahat and gives rise to five gross elements. These are eight prakṛtis. The other sixteen elements are modifications of these only.¹¹¹ At another place, it is stated that Mahat comes out of Prakṛti. Ahaṃkāra arises from Mahat and gives rise to Manas. *Mahābhūtas*, organs of sense and action come out of Manas. The qualities like sound, touch, visual appearance, taste and smell come out of gross elements.¹¹² There is the third account of evolution according to which Mahat arises from Avyakta and gives rise to Ahaṃkāra. The twenty-one *vikāras*, viz., five gross elements five qualities of gross elements, five organs of sense, five organs of action and Manas come out of Ahaṃkāra.¹¹³ Pāñcāśikha believes that senses are of the nature of *Mahābhūtas*.¹¹⁴

It is interesting to note that the *Mahābhārata* sometimes mentions that rebirth is due to accumulation of Rajas and Tamas and liberation is attained through extinction of Rajas and Tamas and the increase of Sattva.¹¹⁵ Pāñcāśikha believes that liberation is attained through detachment which is in turn attained through knowledge.¹¹⁶ In the state of liberation,

107. *Mbh.* 12.338.2
108. E.W. Hopkins, *The great epics of India*, pp.123-4
109. P.M. Modi, *Akṣara*, p. 52
110. *Mbh.* 12.339.10
111. *Mbh.* 12.294.27-9
112. *Mbh.* 12.298.16-22
113. *Mbh.* 12.291.17-28
114. *Mbh.* 12.212.32-3
115. *Mbh.* 12.205.29, 12.313.28
116. *Albh.* 12.308.29

Puruṣa is emancipated from the clutches of Guṇas and becomes one with absolute supreme spirit, the support of all.¹¹⁷ Pañcaśikha holds that Puruṣa, after becoming one with the universal soul loses all opposite characteristics like knowledge, feeling and action. The consciousness arises when jīva is associated with conglomeration of elements and is destroyed with dissociation from it.¹¹⁸

Thus Sāṃkhya, recorded in the *Mahābhārata*, is a conglomerate of diverse views of numerous sects that arose in the system. All the accounts with a few exceptions have in common the theistic tinge as their essential characteristic. The atheistic tinge is observed in Pañcaśikha's account of Sāṃkhya. It differs to a great extent from the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Unlike the classical Sāṃkhya, *tanmātrās* are not included in twenty-five categories. They are replaced by objects of senses. The gross elements are sometimes considered to be evolutes of Manas. Some ācāryas¹¹⁹ hold that Brahman appears in diverse forms. Unlike the classical Sāṃkhya, there is no reference to subtle body or *bhāvas* in the *Mahābhārata*. The doctrine of *guṇapariṇāma* and the *satkārya* do not seem to be spelled out in the *Mahābhārata*.

(B). *Sāṃkhya in the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā*

The *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā* gives the following account of Sāṃkhya which is theistic in nature and different from that found in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

The Sāṃkhyas believe in twenty-seven categories, viz., Viṣṇu, *Kāla* and the twenty-five accepted by the classical Sāṃkhya. Viṣṇu is the highest principle whose will motivated the material cause to evolve.¹²⁰ *Kāla* brings about conjunction and disjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa.¹²¹ The nature of Mahat is peculiarly explained. There are two aspects of Mahat cosmic and individual. In its cosmic aspect it is threefold—*Kāla*, Buddhi and *prāṇas*.¹²² These come out of Sattva, Rajas and

117. *Mbh.* 12.296.13

118. *Mbh.* 12.212.42-3

119. *Mbh.* 12.211.13

120. *AS* VII. 4

121. *AS* VII. 3

122. *AS* VII. 9

Tamas aspects of Mahat respectively. *Kāla* is the gross time having moment (*kṣaṇa*) as its parts.¹²³ In its individual aspect, Mahat is of two forms. The *sāttvika* form of Mahat is virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), detachment (*virāga*) and power (*aiśvarya*). The *tāmasika* form of Mahat is reverse to it.¹²⁴ The nature of other elements is similar to that in classical Sāṃkhya.

The *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā* gives the same order of evolutes in process of evolution as we later find in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The former, however, mentions that Prakṛti evolves into Mahat when presided over by Puruṣa and assisted by *Kāla* and inspired by thought activity of Viṣṇu.¹²⁵ Manas inspired by thought activity of Viṣṇu are said to get associated with each of the *Mahābhūtas* at the time of their evolution from the *tanmātrās*.

The *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā* gives further account of Sāṃkhya ascribing it to Kapila according to which there are sixty *tattvas* (topics). The *tantras* are divided into two *maṇḍalas*. The first *maṇḍala* consists of thirty-two categories called creative principles (*prākṛta*), viz., (1) Brāhma, (2) Puruṣa, (3) *Śakti* (creative power of God), (4) fate (*niyati*), (5) time (*Kāla*), (6-8) three Guṇas, (9) *akṣara*, (10) *prāṇas*, (11) *kartā* (internal organs of sense, (12) *svāmī* (topic on God), (13-17) five organs (18-22) five organs of action, (23-27) five *tanmātrās*, (28-32) five *mahābhūtas*. The second *maṇḍala* consists of *vikṛtis*, viz., (1-5) five *kṛtya kāṇḍas* (6) *bhoga kāṇḍa* (circular enjoyment of fruits of action, (7) *vikṛti kāṇḍa* (circular movements of creation and dissolutions), (8-12) five *kleśa kāṇḍas* (five types of afflictions), (13-15) three *pramāṇa kāṇḍa* (means of knowledge) (16) *khyāti kāṇḍa*, (17) *dharma kāṇḍa* (18) *vairāgya kāṇḍa*, (19) *aiśvarya kāṇḍa*, (20) *guṇa kāṇḍa* (21) *liṅga* (22) *drṣṭi kāṇḍa*, (23) *anuśrāvika kāṇḍa* (24) *duḥkha kāṇḍa*, (25) *siddhi kāṇḍa*, (26) *kāśāya kāṇḍa*, (27) *saṃaya kāṇḍa* and (28) *mokṣa kāṇḍa*.¹²⁶

Thus, Sāṃkhya found in the *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā* being theistic is different from the classical Sāṃkhya, chiefly in its

123. *AS* VII. 10

124. *AS* VII.11-12

125. *AS* VII.7-8

126. *AS* XII.20-9

account of number of categories and process of evolution. The sixty topics recorded by the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* as propounded by Kapila are not all of them discussed in the texts of the classical Sāṃkhya; and also not in the way the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* represents them. It is also difficult to decipher the purpose of the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* behind division of topics into two *maṇḍalas*. As it appears, however, we may conjecture that the end of first *maṇḍala* marks the point of creation where an individual in physical, mental equipment is formed, with the background of cosmic principles, and the topics of second *maṇḍala* signify stepping down so to say of an individual into the world, in world-experience, activity and starts spiritual elevation. Moreover, the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* starts enumeration by placing Brahman at the top of the list which shows that as for the Sāṃkhya scheme of evolution, there was generally nothing objectionable. The only question was what should be the nature of the ultimate principle. The passage from the dualism of Sāṃkhya to the monism of Brahman was very smooth and easy provided Brahman was regarded to be the first and supreme sentient principle.

(C) *Sāṃkhya in the Carakasamhitā*

Caraka has given an account of doctrines of Sāṃkhya in the opening chapter of the *Śārīrasthāna* of his medical treatise, the *Carakasamhitā*. Caraka primarily aims at analysing physical organism which is fit for medical treatment and is prominent in all living beings.¹²⁷

Caraka divides ingredients of universe into two : prakṛtis and vikṛtis. Prakṛtis are eight, viz., Avyakta, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and five mahābhūtas.¹²⁸ Vikṛtis refer to the group of sixteen, viz., five organs of sense, five organs of action, Manas and five objects of senses.¹²⁹ The use of the term *avyakta* has misled scholars¹³⁰ to think that the *Carakasamhitā* propounds *avyakta* as an unified category and that there are in all twenty-four categories only. Here, the term *avyakta*, however, denotes that

127. CS Sār 1.16 and Cakrapāṇidatta thereon

128. CS Sār 1.63

129. CS Sār 1.64

130. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, pp. 215-7; P.B. Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, pp. 99-102

which is imperceptible¹³¹ and stands for two distinct principles-Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Unlike the classical Sāṃkhya, Caraka does not restrict the term *avyakta* to Prakṛti only.¹³² The existence of sentient element as distinct from material world is emphatically asserted on the basis of declaration of the *śruti*¹³³ and inferential arguments.¹³⁴

Caraka recognises two aspects of Puruṣa—transcendental and empirical. The transcendental Puruṣa is called *avyakta* because he is not grasped by senses.¹³⁵ He is without attributes and hence, cannot be known through inference also.¹³⁶ Puruṣa in contact with psychophysical conglomeration is called *vyakta*.¹³⁷ The tradition of the classical Sāṃkhya also expounds nature of Puruṣa in two different contexts—as pure Puruṣa uncontaminated by Prakṛti and evolutes thereof; and Puruṣa amidst evolutes, with temporary pollution of feelings, acts and rewards. Again, as he rises higher towards its innate purity, all matters of supposed agency and involvement of various kinds along with corresponding notions are left behind. This shows that a similar treatment about transcendental and empirical Puruṣa was intended in the pertinent Sāṃkhya texts though without specifying them in terms of Avyakta and Vyakta as Caraka does. The contact has no beginning.¹³⁸ Puruṣa is essentially conscious and inactive but appears to be active on account of its contact with Manas.¹³⁹ Though Puruṣa is omnipresent, yet it knows only through organs. Hence, one cannot cognise sensations of others.¹⁴⁰ He is called knower or witness (*sākṣi*).¹⁴¹

131. CS Sār 1.62

132. cf. B K.R. Rao, *Theism of Pre-classical Sāṃkhya*, pp. 403-4

133. CS Sār 1.45

134. CS Sār 1.39-44

135. CS Sār 1.62

136. CS Sār 1.84

137. CS Sār 1.68

138. CS Sār 1.82

139. CS Sār 1.75-6

140. CS Sār 1.79

141. CS Sār 1.83

Conglomeration of Buddhi, Manas senses and their objects is called Rāśi Puruṣa.¹⁴² Rāśi Puruṣa is thus, the individual constituted of psycho-physical elements who is the subject matter of medical examination.¹⁴³ Fruits of action, knowledge, delusion, pleasure, life, death self-hope, etc., are located in Rāśi Puruṣa.¹⁴⁴ Rāśi Puruṣa, according to P.B. Chakravarti¹⁴⁵ signifies dead body which is always devoid of consciousness.

Caraka gives following account of the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution. Buddhi comes out of Avyakta and gives rise to Ahaṃkāra. The other elements come out of Ahaṃkāra in succession.¹⁴⁶ Each of the succeeding *Mahābhūtas* possesses one additional quality of the preceding mahābhūta,¹⁴⁷ The quality of the *mahābhūta* is prominent in that sense-organ which grasps it.¹⁴⁸ Whereas classical Sāṃkhya states that *tanmātrās* constitute a stage in evolution prior to *Mahābhūtas* Caraka describes them as qualities of *Mahābhūtas* which are superfine. These qualities become 'objects of senses' when they become manifest enough to be perceived.¹⁴⁹

Manas serves fourfold purpose, i.e., determines condition of rise of knowledge by its presence;¹⁵⁰ serves as an agency of thinking, imagination, doubt, etc.,¹⁵¹ decides upon harmful and useful character of an object¹⁵² and controls all organs as well as itself.¹⁵³ Manas is one and atomic.¹⁵⁴

When *jñā*, i.e. empirical self comes to realise that all pains are caused and consequently, non-eternal, and are not due to *ātman*, the false notions regarding self and its possessions are

- 142. CS Sār 1.35
- 143. CS Sār 1.38
- 144. CS Sār 1.37
- 145. op. cit., p. 101
- 146. CS Sār 1.66
- 147. CS Sār 1.28
- 148. CS Sār 1.24
- 149. CS Sār 1.31
- 150. CS Sār 1.18
- 151. CS Sār 1.20
- 152. CS Sār 1.22
- 153. CS Sār 1.21
- 154. CS Sār 1.19

completely left behind. All sensations together with their root causes as well as cognitions, contemplation and resolutions are completely eradicated.¹⁵⁵ The soul attains Brahmahood and there remains no trace of individual existence.¹⁵⁶ The soul transmigrates from one birth to another because of its own virtues and vices.¹⁵⁷

Caraka's account of Sāṃkhya is different from the classical Sāṃkhya. Caraka includes objects of sense into twenty-five categories and does not mention *tanmātrās*. Unlike the classical Sāṃkhya and like the Vaiśeṣikas, Caraka holds that self is endowed with consciousness, will, hatred, happiness, misery, etc., when it comes into contact with mind-body-conglomeration. This led P.B. Chakravarti¹⁵⁸ to opine that the *Śārīrathāna* of the *Carakasamhitā* is an admixture of the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika view. It may also be observed additionally that attainment of Brahmahood by individual Puruṣa, without any subsequent trace of individuality as described by Caraka appears to be a stage of attempt at harmonising Sāṃkhya with the monism of Brahman theory. Unlike the classical Sāṃkhya Caraka further holds that organ of sense is dominated by that *mahābhūta* the quality of which is perceived by it. Dasgupta¹⁵⁹ is of the opinion that the account of Sāṃkhya given by Caraka agrees with the system of Sāṃkhya as propounded by pañcaśikha. B.K.R. Rao¹⁶⁰ supports him. V.M. Bedekar,¹⁶¹ however points out certain differences between the Sāṃkhya account of Caraka and Pañcaśikha and concludes that the Sāṃkhya doctrines of Caraka appear to represent a stage which is comparatively later than that of Pañcaśikha.

There is no extant Sāṃkhya work written during the period intervening between *Mahābhārata* and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the Sāṃkhya system was

- 155. CS Sār 1.52-4
- 156. CS Sār 1.155
- 157. CS Sār 1.77
- 158. op.cit., p. 102
- 159. op.cit., p. 216
- 160. op.cit., p. 413
- 161. V.B. Bedekar, "Studies in Sāṃkhya: Pañcaśikha and Caraka", ABOI, Vol, XXVIII, 1957

handed down to him through a series of teachers¹⁶² regarding whose life and teachings there is no reliable information. Recording the tradition of the Sāṃkhya system, Īśvarakṛṣṇa¹⁶³ states that sage Kapila imparted the teachings of the Sāṃkhya to Āsuri who taught them to Pāṇcaśikha. Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not mention the names of teachers between Pāṇcaśikha and himself, they are supplied to us by the *Yuktidīpikā*¹⁶⁴ as Hārīta, Bāddhali, Kirāta, Paurika, Ṛṣabheśvara, Pāñcādhikarāṇya Patañjali, Vārṣagaṇya, Kauṇḍinya, Mūka, etc. Māthara¹⁶⁵ enumerates besides Hārīta the additional names of Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmiki, and Devala while the *Jayamaṅgalā*¹⁶⁶ mentions names of Garga, Gautama, etc. The name of Kapila, Āsuri, Pāñcaśikha, Devala, Vārṣagaṇya and Garga occur in the *Mahābhārata*.¹⁶⁷ but the *Mahābhārata* discusses teachings of Pāñcaśikha,¹⁶⁸ Devala,¹⁶⁹ and Āsuri¹⁷⁰ only. Available information regarding Hārīta, Kirāta, Ṛṣabheśvara, Kauṇḍinya, Mūka, Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmiki, Garga and Gautama is very scanty. The views of rest of the teachers are mentioned in later literature. The available information, however, is so scanty and puzzling that it is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding their date, personal life and the doctrines propounded by them. A partial record of their teachings is to be found in the ancient texts. They are discussed by us in the subsequent pages in the relevant context.

(iii) *Sāṃkhya in its classical form*

We do not have any systematic record of doctrines of Sāṃkhya in the works prior to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The earliest available systematic exposition of Sāṃkhya with which we are generally acquainted is found in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* which, thus, marks the beginning of the classical Sāṃkhya.

162. SK. 71

163. SK. 70

164. YD. 71

165. MV. 71

166. Jay. 71

167. Mbh 12.306.57-60

168. Mbh 12.211, 212.308

169. Mbh 12.267.

170. Mbh 12.211.13.

We have a very scanty information regarding life and date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. According to the Chinese tradition he belonged to a brahmin family named Kauśika. This tradition believes in identity of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsin.¹⁷¹ Mainkar¹⁷² is in favour of identifying Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vindhyavāsin and also with great poet Kālidāsa. The date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is still uncertain. Scholars have ascribed different dates right from first century A.D. to fifth century A.D.

It is also difficult to ascertain the contribution of Īśvarakṛṣṇa to Sāṃkhya philosophy. He himself states that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is summary of the doctrines taught in the *Śaṣṭitantra*¹⁷³ which is now lost and which would have helped us a lot in determining many important issues—both textual and doctrinal. The number of original *Kārikās* in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is also a controversial point.

The large number of commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* proves its popularity. Following are the important commentaries : *Yuktidīpikā*, *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra*, *Mātharavṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Jayamaṅgalā* and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*. E.A. Solomon has recently edited two commentaries named the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* and the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*. The former, according to the editor, is the earliest of all extant commentaries and also the original one on which Paramārtha's commentary is based. She states that *Mātharavṛtti* is a revised version of the latter commentary edited by her.

A mention should be made of two other important works viz., the *Tattvasamāśasūtra* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. There are several commentaries on the former like *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana*, *Sāṃkhyatattvayathārthyadīpana*, *Sarvopakāriṇī*, *Sāṃkhyasūtravivaraṇa* and the *Tattvasamāśasūtravṛtti*. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* is generally regarded to have been based upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and belonging to a later age. It is commented upon by Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Aniruddha lived round about 1500 A.D. and Vijñānabhikṣu lived in second half of the six-

171. J. Takakusu, "A Study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1905.

172. Kālidāsa—*His Art and Thought*, pp. 6-19

173. SK. 72

teenth century. Aniruddha¹⁷⁴ and Vijñānabhikṣu¹⁷⁵ consider the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* as an original work of Kapila. This led scholars like Udayavira Shastri¹⁷⁶ to hold that the *sūtras* are written by Kapila while some *sūtras* are interpolated. Ramsuresa Pandey¹⁷⁷ severely criticises this theory of Udayavira Shastri.

Having, thus, discussed in brief history and literature of Sāṃkhya, we proceed to give a brief outline of main doctrines of the classical Sāṃkhya. The discussion is based chiefly upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and their principal commentaries.

1. Categories and their classification

The classical Sāṃkhya classifies all objects of universe into twenty-five categories viz., Puruṣa, Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, five organs of sense, five organs of action, five subtle elements (*tanmātrās*) and five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*).

These categories are classified into three groups : (i) evolutes (*vyakta*) (ii) unmanifest state of evolutes (*avyakta*) and (iii) Puruṣa (*jñā*).¹⁷⁸ The classification is based on the order of precedence of cognition. Knowledge of *avyakta* is preceded by knowledge of evolutes. As both of them are meant for other, the other is known through inference to be *ātman*.¹⁷⁹

Again on the basis of causality, these categories are classified into four groups : (i) Productive, i.e., Prakṛti which is the causeless cause of everything, (ii) both productive and product, i.e., Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and five subtle elements (*tanmātrās*) which are products but give rise to other products, (iii) products, i.e., Manas, five organs of sense, five organs of action five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*), (iv) neither productive nor product, i.e., Puruṣa.¹⁸⁰

Here, the question naturally arises as to why gross

174. SSV 1.1

175. SPB 6.70

176. *Sāṃkhya Darśan kā Itihāsa*, pp. 1.170.

177. *Mahābhārata aurā Purāṇon meṃ Sāṃkhyadaraśana*, pp. 65-79

178. SK 2

179. STK 2

180. SK 3

elements (*mahābhūtas*) are considered as products only. Since they give rise to cow, jar, tree, etc., they should be regarded to be both—productive and products. The *Yuktidīpikā*¹⁸¹ supplies three reasons for it. Firstly, productive means that which produces something different in essence. Cow, tree, etc., do not essentially differ from their cause. Secondly, the knowledge of distinction between Prakṛti and the Puruṣa is the ultimate aim of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The knowledge of evolutes leads to the knowledge of Prakṛti through different stages. This purpose is served by the knowledge of objects up to gross elements only. The modifications of gross elements require same aggregate of causal conditions of knowledge as are required by their cause. Thirdly, just as Prakṛti is cognised as cause only, gross elements are cognised as effects only. Hence, the Sāṃkhyas do not feel it necessary to multiply number of categories by accepting cow, pot, etc., as separate categories.

It may again be noted that the Sāṃkhyas also accept the concept of quality, action and generality (*sāmānya*) which are accepted by other systems and are experienced in our daily life. The Sāṃkhyas, however, do not enumerate them separately, since they include them into twenty-five categories only. The way of inclusion is, however, variously explained by the Sāṃkhyas. Aniruddha gives two explanations. (i) The definitions of twenty-five categories are applicable to them also.¹⁸² Garbe¹⁸³ explains it more vividly. The *dravyas* (excluding *ātman* and *Manas*) of the Vaiśeṣikas are included under gross elements of Sāṃkhya. *Guṇa* (quality) and *Karma* (action) are *dravyasvarūpa*, *sāmānya* is *dravyaguṇa-karma-svarūpa*. Viśeṣa is included under Sattva, Rajas, Tamas. *Samavāya* is not accepted by Sāṃkhya. (ii) They are implied by the *mūlaprakṛti*, for the products are of the nature of their cause.¹⁸⁴ Vijñānabhikṣu¹⁸⁵ gives one more explanation by stating that the categories of Sāṃkhya are substances (*dravyas*). The other categories like quality, action and generality, etc., being attributes, are included in substances

181. YD 3 also STK 3

182. SSV 1.125

183. cf. Footnote on 71 p. of his English translation of SSV.

184. SSV. 1.125.

185. SPB 1.61

only for the Sāṃkhyas consider no difference between attributes (*dharma*) and substance possessing them (*dharmin*).

2. Theory of Causation (*Satkārya*)

The theory of existence of effect (prior to causal operation) in cause (*satkārya*), which primarily aims at explaining the relation between cause and effect, plays a significant role in Sāṃkhya metaphysics, especially the existence of *Prakṛiti*, evolution of the cosmos, dissolution of everything into *Prakṛiti*, similarity between evolutes and their cause and their distinction from *Puruṣa*.

The reasons to prove existence of effect (prior to causal operation) in cause are embodied in the following *kārikā* of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*.

Asadakarāṇādupādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt/
Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam//¹⁸⁶

The non-existent (in cause) cannot be brought into existence (*asadakarāṇāt*). Oil comes out of sesamum seeds where it already exists and not from sand.¹⁸⁷ The acceptance of non-production of existent objects would imply undesirable contingency of production of even absolutely non-existent objects like sky-flower and horns.¹⁸⁸ The absolutely non-existent object differs from other objects since the former does not exist in its cause and consequently cannot be produced. Even if existence and non-existence are considered to be properties of a thing it will imply pre-existence of thing. The properties cannot remain without thing.¹⁸⁹

Man selects a particular material (e.g., milk) for desired effect (e.g. curds) (*upādānagrahaṇāt*).¹⁹⁰ Vācaspatimiśra,¹⁹¹ following the *Yuktidīpikā*,¹⁹² interprets the expression *grahaṇa* as 'relation' and argues that effect exists in cause because it is related to the latter. The relation cannot be explained without admitting existence of entities to be

186. SK 9

187. SSS, MV., GB. and STK. 9

188. MV 9.

189. STK 9

190. MV., GB, Jay and SSS. 9

191. STK. 9

192. YD. 9

related. The rejection of specific relation between cause and effect would imply undesirable contingency of production of anything from any other thing.¹⁹³ To remove this incongruity by postulating certain capacity in cause to produce a particular effect only will also lead to the existence of effect in cause. The capacity must be accepted as existent in a particular cause and related to effect. Otherwise, it will lead to the above-mentioned absurdities. This again leads to the existence of effect in cause since capacity cannot be related to some non-existent entity.¹⁹⁴

An effect, e.g., gold, cannot be produced from every cause like silver, glass, dust or sand (*sarvasambhavābhāvāt*).¹⁹⁵ The *Yuktidīpikā*¹⁹⁶ deduces from it identity between cause and effect and argues that effect is different from the efficient cause and non-different from the material cause since it exists in the latter only.)

An agent (e.g., a potter) can create only that product which it is possible to produce from the specific material cause (e.g., jar from clay).¹⁹⁷ The material cause also which is incapable cannot produce effect. The seed with its potency destroyed by fire does not produce a tree.¹⁹⁸

An effect is of the nature of its material cause (*Kāraṇa-bhāvāt*). Barley is produced from seed of barley and rice from seed of rice.¹⁹⁹ The pot which comes out of earth is identical to earth in essence and differs in non-essential factors. The *Yuktidīpikā*²⁰⁰ differently interpreting *Kāraṇabhāva* as causal relation argues that it leads to the acceptance of existence of effect in cause.

It may be noted that Vācaspatimiśra holds that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* adduces three reasons in favour of the doctrine of pre-existence of effect in cause. He considers the expressions *sarvasambhavābhāvāt* and *Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt* as answers

193. STK 9

194. STK 9

195. SSS, GB, and Jay. 9

196. YD 9

197. SSS, MV, GB, and Jay. 9

198. Jay. 9

199. SSS, MV, GB, and Jay. 9

200. YD 9

to the possible objections against second reason, viz, effect is related to cause. The other commentators consider them as independent reasons. Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation seems to be more logical. If third and fourth reasons, mentioned above, are considered to be independent reasons, the third is included in the second. This incongruity cannot be removed by interpreting the term *grahana* as 'going to' as it is interpreted by Gauḍapāda and others, since in that case this argument will again recur in the fourth argument.

It may again be observed that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* aims at establishing the notion of existence of effect in cause prior to causal operation. Production is, in this respect, not creation of something new but manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) of already existent (effect). Similarly, destruction is not total disappearance but absorption (of thing) into its cause. Past and future states of things, states the *Yuktidīpikā*,²⁰¹ were perceived by Pāṇcaśikha, etc. Vācaspatimiśra,²⁰² following the *Yuktidīpikā*,²⁰³ goes a step further in putting forth the following reasons to establish the identity of cause and effect: (a) The effect, i.e. cloth and cause, i.e. yarns, cannot be different because the former inheres in the latter. One object cannot inhere in some totally different object. (b) Yarns and cloth cannot be different since yarns are constituents of cloth and one object cannot be the component of some essentially different object. (c) Cause and effect are not different since there is no conjunction or separation between them. Only distinct objects can be separated or conjoined. (d) There is the quantitative equality between cause and effect. The weight of the yarns is the same as that of cloth.

As regards the point of identity of cause and effect Vācaspatimiśra appears to differ from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Īśvara-kṛṣṇa speaks of a difference between a cause and an effect.²⁰⁴ The two are similar in nature but not essentially identical.²⁰⁵

201. YD 9

202. STK 9

203. YD 9

204. SK 15

205. SK 8

Gross object like pot, etc., may be identical with the *Mahā-bhūtas* but this identity of cause and effect does not hold good in the case of other objects. For instance, the Mahat and the Ahaṃkāra or Ahaṃkāra and Manas cannot be totally identical or otherwise there is no point in postulating different subsequent evolutes. In other words, cause and effect are different stages in evolution as they serve different purposes.

From the exposition of causal relation as given by Īśvara-kṛṣṇa on the one hand, the *Yuktidīpikā* and Vācaspatimiśra on the other, it becomes clear that they are trying to solve the basic problem of identity or difference of effect from cause either in causal state or after production. The Vaiśeṣikas, opting for their difference, devised relation of inherence which resulted in the problem of absolute plurality. The Sāṃkhyas also wanted to avoid the problem of absolute identity (as in Vedānta) which allowed no real change. So, in order to be consistent with the basic duality of Pradhāna and Puruṣa, they favoured identity through and in spite of change and apparent difference when Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of difference from and similarity with cause of effect, he appears to put them on equal par. But Vācaspatimiśra stresses the identity aspect in such a way that continuity of essence is maintained in spite of differences. The differences may be essential for individuality of each product, but they are to be overlooked since they are not so important. Here lies the contribution of Vācaspatimiśra to the exposition of Sāṃkhya thought insofar as he realises the danger in emphasising different aspects of things. Therefore, he focuses the discussion on identity of essence, the cord of which is seen to run through all the evolutes of Prakṛti.

Puruṣa

The Sāṃkhyas explain physical world on the basis of Prakṛti and accept sentient entity called Puruṣa as another ultimate reality which forms the basis of distinction between conscious beings and the material elements.

The existence of Puruṣa is sought through following inferential arguments.

Aggregates of things, e.g., bed, chair, etc., exist for the use of others. Prakṛti, Mahat and the rest of evolutes being composite of the three Guṇas imply existence of the principle

for which they exist.²⁰⁶ It is not sound to argue that one composite may exist for the sake of another aggregate because it would lead to infinite regress. The principle for which all these composites are meant should be beyond three Guṇas and their qualities like ignorance, etc.²⁰⁷

All the objects being composite of the three Guṇas are knowable, non-discriminative and objective. Hence, they presuppose the subject of experience which is sentient and devoid of the three Guṇas.²⁰⁸

All the activities of insentient objects, e.g., chariot, etc., are governed by some sentient being e.g., charioteer. Mahat and the other evolutes, being insentient in nature, imply the existence of controller which is beyond the three Guṇas.²⁰⁹ Puruṣa controls Prakṛti through mere connection on account of which Prakṛti evolves into the universe.²¹⁰ The control, according to Vijñānabhikṣu,²¹¹ means to be related (to Prakṛti) as an enjoyer. The argument deduced from the interpretation of Vijñānabhikṣu recurs in the next argument.

The products of three Guṇas like Mahat and the rest being object of experience (*bhogyā*) point to the existence of experiencer who is above the three Guṇas.²¹² The internal organs also being object of enjoyment and insentient in nature cannot be the enjoyer.²¹³ Though Puruṣa being immutable is not essentially the enjoyer, yet he becomes so only when he comes into contact of Buddhi.²¹⁴ Vācaspatimisra gives an alternate explanation. All objects like Mahat, etc., being objects of observation (*dṛśya*) presuppose some observer (*draṣṭṛ*) apart from them.²¹⁵

206. *MV, SSS, GB and Jay.* 17. also *SS* 1.140

207. *STK*, 17

208. *MV SSS, GB, and Jay* 17.

209. *STK, GB, MV. and Jay.* 17.

210. Vedāntin Mahādeva on *SS* 1.142

211. *SPB* 1.142

212. *MV, GB, Jay and STK.* 17

213. *Jay* 17

214. *SSV.* 1.143

215. *STK* 17

The isolation from Prakṛti is the aim of all activities. This is evidenced by scriptures and efforts of great sages. Hence, there must be some principle beyond the three Guṇas which is supposed to be isolated.²¹⁶ The *Yuktidipikā*²¹⁷ followed by Māthara²¹⁸ and the *Jayamaṅgalā*,²¹⁹ assigns this activity to Prakṛti which evolves for the liberation of Puruṣas.

The Sāṃkhyas deduce from physical, mental and moral distinction found in the living beings that there are as many Puruṣas as the animate individuals and adduce following arguments to prove the same.

The obvious differences with regard to birth, death and organs in different bodies can be explained only by admitting plurality of Puruṣas.²²⁰ Puruṣa, being immutable, is neither born nor dies. The birth, spoken of with reference to puruṣa, signifies his association with new aggregate of organs and gross body, and death stands for severance of Puruṣa from them.²²¹ Māthara²²² explains at length the difference in birth with reference to family, etc.

The activities are not simultaneous in all bodies.²²³ If Puruṣa would be one, movement of one would be common to all individuals.²²⁴ Gauḍapāda takes activity in the sense of kinds of activity, viz., virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*), etc.²²⁵ Though the activities belong to the Buddhi, yet they are attributed to Puruṣa on account of his proximity with the former.²²⁶

Puruṣas are different in different bodies, since there is diversity in their moral equipments caused by diversity of the three Guṇas. The deities and saints abound in Sattva, men

216. *GB, STK and SC.* 17

217. *YD* 17

218. *MV* 17

219. *Jay* 17

220. *SK* 18

221. *STK and Jay* 18

222. *MV* 18

223. *SK* 18

224. *STK* 18

225. *GB* 18

226. *STK* 18

abound in Rajas and beasts abound in Tamas.²²⁷ Diverse effect like pleasure, pain, etc., caused by the Guṇas lead to the acceptance of plurality of Puruṣas.²²⁸ To say that this diversity is caused by diversity of internal organs is not a proper explanation. It needs some other cause, and that is diversity of Puruṣas.²²⁹

Māṭhara²³⁰ and Gauḍapāda²³¹ hold that Puruṣa is one. Some scholars think that Purality of Puruṣas holds good in the empirical state but in the transcendental state Puruṣa is one. From the arguments adduced to prove plurality of Puruṣas, they conclude that Puruṣa appears to be many when he comes into contact with limiting adjuncts like Buddhi and the rest. This, however, does not logically harmonise with the statements of the Sāṃkhya texts. The difference among living beings is real. Plurality of Puruṣas, according to the Sāṃkhyas, is real and not illusory as in the case of Advaita Vedānta. Evolutes like organs, etc., are not false. Falsity pertains to the contact of Puruṣas with them. Organs are manifold and separately belong to every Puruṣa. One single Puruṣa cannot be reflected in all Buddhis. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*²³² remarks that oneness of spirit mentioned in the *śrutis* refers to the identical class character of many Puruṣas and not to absolute oneness.

Puruṣa is opposite in nature to Prakṛti and its evolutes. Prakṛti and its evolutes, being composite of three Guṇas are indiscriminative, object of knowledge, to many Puruṣas, insentient and productive while Puruṣa is discriminative, subjective, uncommon, intelligent (i.e. conscious of pleasure, pain, and non-productive.²³³ Puruṣa being the ultimate reality is having some characteristics similar to Prakṛti. Puruṣa, like Prakṛti, is without cause, omnipresent, immobile, non-component, non-merging, impartite, independent

227. SK and STK 18

228. GB 18

229. SC 18

230. MV 11

231. GB 11

232. SS 1.154

233. SK 11

and eternal.²³⁴ Prakṛti, however, is eternal and mutable while Puruṣa is eternal but immutable.)

The contrast of Puruṣa with Prakṛti helps to determine the nature of Puruṣa. It connotes that Puruṣa is witness of activities of Prakṛti.²³⁵ This, according to Māṭhara,²³⁶ Gauḍapāda²³⁷ and the Jayāmaṅgalā²³⁸ indicates lack of activity, i.e., to act or to restrain others from action, on the part of Puruṣa. It further proves that Puruṣa is of the nature of pure consciousness.²³⁹ It also suggests that the Guṇas as agents are not independent in their activities. Pradhāna acts in order to serve the purpose of the witnessing subject.²⁴⁰ Puruṣa is a spectator²⁴¹ which indicates that he is non-objective and sentient.²⁴² Vijñānabhikṣu points out the difference between witness (*sākṣi*) and spectator (*draṣṭṛ*). Puruṣa is witness with reference to Buddhi and spectator in relation to other evolutes.²⁴³ Puruṣa is nonagent.²⁴⁴ This suggests lack of productiveness,²⁴⁵ desire, aversion, effort, volition etc.,²⁴⁶ and power of inducing others to act in case of Puruṣa.²⁴⁷ Puruṣa is neither material nor instrumental cause of anything.²⁴⁸ Puruṣa is isolated from the three Guṇas and their properties like pleasure, pain, etc.²⁴⁹ Puruṣa is indifferent²⁵⁰ to characteristics of the Guṇas

234. SK 10

235. SK 19

236. MV 19

237. GB 19

238. Jay 19

239. SC 19

240. YD 19

241. SK 19

242. STK 19

243. SPB 1.161

244. SK 19

245. Jay 19

246. SC 19

247. MV 19

248. SK and STK 19

249. SK 19

250. STK 19

or to the activities of the Guṇas.²⁵¹ It also suggests lack of Puruṣa's power of doing good or bad to others.²⁵² Though we find the co-existence of sentience and activity, yet puruṣa is inactive by nature. It appears to be active due to its contact with Buddhi.²⁵³ Gauḍapāda²⁵⁴ and Māthara²⁵⁵ clarify apparent activity of Puruṣa with the following example. As a brāhmaṇa, being taken up along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief, Puruṣa, even though inactive by nature, is mistaken to be agent on account of its contact with the agent. Puruṣa is, states the *Jayamaṅgalā*,²⁵⁶ metaphorically considered to be an agent just as the lord of warriors is metaphorically called a warrior. Thus, Puruṣa, though inactive, is the enjoyer as a child, fire or a tree are enjoyers though doing nothing for themselves.²⁵⁷

How the originally isolated and mere witness comes to appear like knower and experiencer is a crucial problem in Sāṃkhya. Puruṣa experiences and knows objects through modifications of Buddhi when he takes activities of Buddhi as his own just as a king takes the victory and defeat of soldiers to be his own.²⁵⁸ The process of Puruṣa's apparent ownership of activities of Buddhi is variously explained by followers of Sāṃkhya. Vācaspatimiśra holds that the Puruṣa is reflected into Buddhi and thinks the activities of Buddhi as his own. It is intelligised Buddhi which knows and experiences.²⁵⁹ Vijñānabhikṣu holds that Puruṣa is reflected into Buddhi and the intelligised Buddhi is reflected into Puruṣa. Puruṣa knows and experiences objects through this reflection.²⁶⁰ Thus Vācaspatimiśra lays stress on retaining the transcendental isolation of Puruṣa while Vijñānabhikṣu leaves Puruṣa not

251. SK 19

252. SC 19

253. GB 20

254. GB 20

255. MV 20

256. Jay 20

257. Jay 19

258. STK 62

259. STK 5

260. SPB 1.87

better than the empirical self and fails to explain eternally isolated nature of Puruṣa postulated by the Sāṃkhyas.²⁶¹

4. Guṇas

The Guṇas, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas in their state of equilibrium constitute Prakṛti. They are not parts of Prakṛti but identical with it since the Sāṃkhyas hold that Prakṛti is opposite of anything constituted of parts.²⁶² Prakṛti is the name conveniently given to the state of equilibrium of three Guṇas. They are called Guṇas (literally subsidiary or secondary) because they serve purpose of other (Puruṣa)²⁶³ or because they are intertwined like three strands of a rope which binds Puruṣa to world.²⁶⁴

The Guṇas, being supra-sensuous, are inferred from the nature of their modifications. All objects of the universe being possessed of three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion are constituted of three Guṇas possessing these qualities.²⁶⁵ For instance, a single girl young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight for her husband for the qualities of her Sattva become manifest for him, excites feeling of her co-wives for the qualities of her Rajas are manifest for them and deludes the persons who fail to get her because the qualities of her Tamas are manifest for them.²⁶⁶

The Guṇas are described from two perspectives—qualities and motivation for activities. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are of nature of pleasure, pain and delusion respectively.²⁶⁷ (Pleasure indicates simplicity (*ārjava*), softness (*mārdava*), modesty (*hrī*), reverence (*śradhā*), forgiveness (*kṣamā*), compassion (*anukampā*), knowledge (*jñāna*), etc. Pain includes hatred (*pradveṣa*), violence (*droha*), malice, (*matsara*), censure (*nindā*), humiliation (*nikṛtya*), etc. Delusion stands for deceit (*vipralam-*

261. cf. S.K. Saksena, "The Problem of Experience in Sāṃkhya Yoga metaphysics with special reference to Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu", *The Poona Orientalist*, Vol. IV No. 4, January, 1940.

262. SK 12

263. STK 12 and SPB 1.61

264. SPB 1.61

265. Jay 12

266. STK 13

267. SK 12

bha), fear (*bhaya*), impiety wickedness (*kaṭīlya*), imbecility (*kārpanya*), ignorance (*ajñāna*).²⁶⁸ Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are again stated to be buoyant (*laghu*), mobile (*cala*) and sluggish (*guru*) respectively.²⁶⁹ Sattva, Rajas and Tamas perform functions of illuminating objects (*prakāśa*) stimulating other Guṇas (*praytti*) and restraining other Guṇas (*niyamana*) respectively.²⁷⁰ Gauḍapāda²⁷¹ understands them as capacity of Guṇas.

The Guṇas are related to one another in a peculiar manner. They are mutually subjugative, mutually supporting, mutually productive and mutually co-operative.²⁷² Dominance of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas results into dominance of virtue, vice and ignorance respectively as it is observed in case of gods, men and beasts which abound in Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively.²⁷³ Each Guṇa suppresses the other two to become manifest with its own characteristics²⁷⁴ or to perform its specific function.²⁷⁵ The three Guṇas support each other like three sticks standing with support of each other²⁷⁶ or like a binary.²⁷⁷ The act of supporting does not mean that one Guṇa acts as a support for the other, for the Guṇas are all-pervasive.²⁷⁸ It simply means that one Guṇa is helped by others in performing its function.²⁷⁹ The Guṇas are mutually productive.²⁸⁰ The productiveness, according to Māṭhara²⁸¹ and the *Jayamañgalā*,²⁸² refers to the rise of knowledge of the existence of the

268. SC 12 and SPB 1.127

269. SK 13

270. SK 12

271. GB 12

272. SK 12

273. Jay 12

274. GB 12

275. STK 12

276. MV 12

277. GB 12

278. SC 12

279. STK 12

280. SK 12

281. MV 12

282. Jay 12

other Guṇas through dominance of one Guṇa and according to other commentators, refers to the homogeneous modification (*sadrśa pariṇāma*) of the Guṇas at the time of dissolution. Bālarāma Udāsīna²⁸³ differentiates between mutual support and mutual production on the ground that the former refers to dissimilar modification while the latter refers to the homogeneous modification of the Guṇas. The Guṇas co-operate with each other.²⁸⁴ This co-operation refers, according to Gauḍapāda,²⁸⁵ to their mutually consorting and according to others, to mutual concomitance. Māṭhara²⁸⁶ and Gauḍapāda²⁸⁷ consider the act of co-existence as separate mode of relation among the three Guṇas.

Though the Guṇas, thus, possess contradictory characteristics, yet they act in co-operation to accomplish a single purpose, i.e. emancipation of Puruṣa just as wick and oil, opposed to fire by nature, co-operate when in contact with the single purpose of giving light,²⁸⁸ and just as wind, bile and phlegm, though possessing contradictory properties, co-operate for a single purpose of sustaining the body.²⁸⁹

Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the Guṇas are infinite in number. Otherwise, it is impossible to account for minor differences in the individuals. Though the manifestations of the Guṇas are innumerable, yet they are classified into three on account of certain common characteristics found in them.²⁹⁰ He further holds that the Guṇas are substances and not the qualities in the Vaiśeṣika sense. The qualities of the Vaiśeṣikas do not possess qualities but the Guṇas possess qualities like buoyancy, etc. Moreover, unlike the qualities of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Guṇas are capable of conjunction and disjunction.²⁹¹

283. Bālarāma Udāsīna on STK 12

284. SK 12

285. GB 12

286. MV 12

287. GB 12

288. SK 13

289. STK 13

290. SPB 1.127.

291. SPB 1.81

5. *Prakṛti*

The Prakṛti is considered to be causeless cause of objective existence and is defined as the state of perfect equilibrium of three Guṇas.²⁹² The Guṇas are not characteristics of Prakṛti but form the very essence of it.²⁹³

Prakṛti being unmanifest, and consequently subtle and imperceptible, is sought to be proved on the basis of following inferential arguments.

1. An effect is separated from cause (*Kāryakāraṇavibhāgāt*) and as such leads to the supposition of the existence of an ultimate cause from which all the effects emerge.²⁹⁴ The distinction between cause and effect may refer to different purposes served by them. Thus, effects like Mahat and the rest imply existence of a cause of different characteristics.²⁹⁵

2. All the effects merge into their respective causes at the time of dissolution. It proves the existence of such an ultimate unmanifest cause in which all objects can merge and exist in their potential form.²⁹⁶

3. A cause functions only through energy immanent in it. Hence, Mahat, being an effect, cannot be considered as the final cause since it also requires energy or efficacy to develop and the energy comes from its cause.²⁹⁷ This means that the presence of energy is to be interpreted in two ways. In case of the 'First Cause' the energy is inherent in it. In case of the second and the third cause and so on, the energy is acquired from the immediately preceding factor and transferred to the product which is subsequent cause in the series. The energy, thus, may mean 'powerful momentum' contained in basic cause which forces progressive modifications. The energy, according to Vācaspatimiśra,²⁹⁸ however, refers to 'effect existing in cause 'which is' substance potentiality.' It leads to the supposition of a cause having energy of producing everything.

292. SS 161

293. SS 6.39

294. SK and STK 15

295. MV, GB and Jay 15

296. SK 15

297. SK 15

298. STK 15

4. The effects like Mahat and the rest are finite (*bhedā-nāmparimāṇatvāt*) and are, therefore, products. Products necessarily imply a cause.²⁹⁹ Puruṣa cannot serve as this cause because he is immutable by nature. The *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra*,³⁰⁰ Gauḍapāda³⁰¹ and Mādhara³⁰² take finiteness in the sense of numerical measure.

5. The evolutes like Mahat, etc., are homogeneous in respect of possessing three Guṇas (*samanvayāt*).³⁰³ A product invariably associated with that particular nature (-here e.g., three guṇas) has for its cause that which possesses as its constituent. It proves existence of Prakṛti as constituted of the three Guṇas.³⁰⁴ Gauḍapāda³⁰⁵ understands *samanvaya* as 'inference' and argues that seeing Mahat, etc., as possessing three Guṇas, we establish that there must be a cause possessing the three Guṇas.

Prakṛti is neither totally different nor perfectly similar to the evolutes. Prakṛti, like its evolutes, is composed of three Guṇas, an object of enjoyment, common to many Puruṣas, possessed of faculty of producing, i.e., capable to pass into heterogeneous or homogeneous state, un-conscious of pleasure and pain and devoid of self-luminosity.³⁰⁶ Prakṛti, like its evolutes, is indistinguishable.³⁰⁷ It suggests, according to Vācaspatimiśra,³⁰⁸ collective activity (*sambhūyakāritā*). Prakṛti as well as its evolutes are indistinct insofar as they cannot be discriminated from the Guṇas.³⁰⁹ Moreover, being non-sentient, they cannot discriminate.³¹⁰ Prakṛti is dissimilar also to its effects. The effects, unlike Prakṛti, are products³¹¹ and

299. STK and SC 15

300. SSS 15

301. GB 15

302. MV 15

303. SK 15

304. STK, MV, Jay, SSS and SC 15

305. GB 15

306. SK 11

307. *ibid*

308. STK 11

309. GB 11

310. Jay 11

311. SK 10

soluble into their cause.³¹² Prakṛti, unlike evolutes, is all-pervasive and consequently, found in all the *lokas*.³¹³ The all-pervasiveness of Prakṛti, according to Vācaspatiśiṣya,³¹⁴ refers to its existence in evolutes. Cause pervades effect and not vice versa. The evolutes, unlike Prakṛti, are mobile, i.e. migrate to other body.³¹⁵ Vācaspatiśiṣya³¹⁶ takes motion in the sense of physical motion. Vijñānabhikṣu³¹⁷ takes 'motion' in the sense of specific activity and states that evolutes perform their specific activities of determination, etc.; while Prakṛti is the cause of activity in general. The evolutes, unlike Prakṛti, are manifold³¹⁸ in the sense that they are twenty-three in number³¹⁹ or each evolute is multiple in number³²⁰ or different in different cycles of evolution.³²¹ The evolutes, unlike Prakṛti, take their shelter into cause.³²² It indicates that the evolutes stand in relation of components to their cause.³²³ The evolutes, unlike Prakṛti, are indicative (of their cause).³²⁴ Though Prakṛti indicates Puruṣa, yet in contrast to the evolutes, it is not indicative of its cause.³²⁵ The evolutes, unlike Prakṛti, are possessed of constituents like sound, touch, etc.,³²⁶ and are conjunct, i.e., liable to union and disunion.³²⁷ The Guṇas are not liable to conjunction for there is no disunion among them.³²⁸ The evolutes are dependent upon Prakṛti³²⁹ for

312. SK and STK 10
 313. SK and Jay 10
 314. STK 10
 315. SK, Jay, GB, MV SSS and SC 10
 316. STK 10
 317. SPB 1.124
 318. SK 10
 319. MV 10
 320. STK, SSS and SSS 10
 321. SPB 1.124
 322. SK, MV, GB and SC 10
 323. SPB 1.124
 324. SK, STK, Jay and SC 10
 325. SC 10
 326. SK, MV, GB, Jay and SC 10
 327. STK 10
 328. *ibid.*
 329. SK 10

producing further effects³³⁰ or for their existence³³¹ or insofar as they are directly or indirectly controlled by Prakṛti.³³²

Prakṛti is material as well as efficient cause of the universe. It evolves to afford experience and release to the bound soul³³³ and desists from its activities when the purpose is served.³³⁴ Prakṛti is constantly changing since the Guṇas are modifiable by nature. (The change in the Guṇas is twofold-homogeneous (*sarūpa-pariṇāma*) and heterogeneous (*virūpa-pariṇāma*). (The former is towards dissolution while the later towards evolution.³³⁵ Though each of the Guṇas possesses uniform nature, yet they bring about the objects of diverse nature on account of their mutual suppression just as water of cloud having single taste originally is diversely modified into different tastes like sweet, sour etc., as it comes into contact with various modifications of earth and becomes diversely modified into juice of fruits such as palm, coconut, etc.³³⁶

The *Yuktidīpikā* records the view of Paurika, an early teacher of Sāṃkhya, who believed, unlike the other teachers, in plurality of Prakṛtis. He held that there is a separate Prakṛti attached to every Puruṣa. These Prakṛtis evolve into physical bodies and other objects when Prakṛti attached to *Mahātmya* *śarīra* starts to do so and ceases to act with the cessation of the activities of the latter.³³⁷ The *Yuktidīpikā* criticises the theory thus. Firstly, there is no proof for it. Secondly, the purpose of postulating Prakṛti as the source of physical bodies of beings is fulfilled by a single Prakṛti with its unlimited capacity. Thirdly, the concept involves infinite regress. It cannot account for the fact that Īśvara and Yogins can call up several physical bodies by their will. Prakṛti, separately attached to every Puruṣa, cannot generate several physical bodies for him. It is not proper to argue that each body for Īśvara or Yogins is

330. STK 10
 331. SSS 10
 332. SC 10
 333. SK 21, 57, 58
 334. *Ibid.* 59
 335. SK and STK 16 ✓
 336. SK 16
 337. YD 56

generated by some separate Prakṛti because in that case we cannot assume a definite number of Prakṛtis attached to a particular Puruṣa.³³⁸

6. Theory of Evolution

The universe, according to Sāṃkhya, evolves out of Prakṛti, the state of perfect equilibrium of the three Guṇas.³³⁹ Due to inherent autonzation of Prakṛti to serve the purpose of Puruṣa, the state of equilibrium is disturbed³⁴⁰ and there starts process of differentiation and integration of the Guṇas in different proportion.

The evolution of objects follows a definite order. Mahat is the first evolute.³⁴¹ Ahaṃkāra comes out of Mahat.³⁴² The Guṇas take two different courses of development from Ahaṃkāra and produce sixteen objects. Ahaṃkāra is called *vaikṛta*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi* as it is dominated by Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. The set of eleven, viz., five organs of sense, five organs of action and Manas emanates from the *vaikṛta* state of Ahaṃkāra. Five subtle elements (*tanmātras*) come out of the *bhūtādi* state of Ahaṃkāra. The *taijasa* state does not produce anything but energizes both Sattva and Tamas.³⁴³ Vijñāna-bhikṣu differs from it and states that Manas evolves out of the *sāttvika*, organs of sense and action emanate from the *rājasika* and subtle elements (*tanmātras*) evolve from the *tāmasika* aspect of Ahaṃkāra.³⁴⁴ Five subtle elements evolve into five gross elements.³⁴⁵ Vācaspatiśiśra,³⁴⁶ Māṭhara,³⁴⁷ the *Jayamaṅgalā*³⁴⁸ and the *Candrikā*³⁴⁹ hold that each succeeding gross element is produced from the combination of preceding *tanmātras*. Gauḍa-

338. YD 56

339. SS 1.61

340. SK 21, 58

341. Ibid. 22

342. Ibid

343. SK 24, 25

344. SPB 2.18

345. SK 23, 24, 25

346. STK 22

347. MV 22

348. Jay 22

349. SC 22

pāda³⁵⁰ and the *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra*³⁵¹ maintain that each *tanmātra* singly produces the *mahābhūta* related to it.

The *Yuktidīpikā* records some different opinion of Sāṃkhya teachers regarding evolution of *senses* and *tanmātras*. Pañcādhikaraṇa is of the opinion that senses arise out of *mahābhūtas*.³⁵² Vindhyavāsin holds that *tanmātras* along with Ahaṃkāra emanate from the Mahat.³⁵³

This account of evolution up to *mahābhūtas* relates to the evolution of categories which differ from their cause in nature. This is called *lingasarga* or *tattvasarga*.³⁵⁴ To explain further ingredients of the universe Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of creation of corporeal bodies (*bhautikasarga*)³⁵⁵ and that of dispositions (*pratyayas*, i.e. the evolutes of Buddhi) called *pratyayasarga*.³⁵⁶

The corporeal beings are of three kinds—celestial, animal and human beings. These are of eight, five and one forms respectively.³⁵⁷ According to the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, there are six kinds of bodies, viz., generated from moisture (*uṣmaja*) born of egg (*aṇḍaja*), born of wombs (*jarāyuja*), born of will (*saṃkalpaja*) and born of miraculous powers (*sāṃisiddhika*). The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* further explains that gross body, according to some, consists of five elements,³⁵⁸ according to others, of four elements³⁵⁹ and according to some, of one element i.e. earth.³⁶¹

The aggregate of sixteen, i.e., eight dispositions and their results is considered to be creation of Buddhi (*pratyayasarga*) because they are nothing but dispositions of Buddhi. They are broadly classified into four (i) error (*viparyaya*), (ii) incapa-

350. GB 22

351. SSS 22

352. YD 22

353. Ibid. ✓

354. SK 52

355. Ibid. 53

356. SK 46

357. STK 53

358. SS and SPB 5.111

359. SS 3.17

360. Ibid. 3.18

361. Ibid. 3.19

bility (*aśakti*), (iii) contentment (*tuṣṭi*) and (iv) attainment (*siddhi*).³⁶² The first three include virtue and dispositions excluding knowledge which is included in attainment.³⁶³

On account of the disparity of influence of the Guṇas, Buddhi modifies itself into various forms. Each of the dispositions is, therefore, further divided so as to form fifty sub-varieties.³⁶⁴ There are five forms of error, twenty-eight of incapability, nine of contentment and eight of attainment.³⁶⁵

These *pratyayas* do not apparently seem to be related to *bhāvas*, i.e. the dispositions of Buddhi. This led *Keith*³⁶⁶ to opine that the *Kārikās* dealing with *pratyayasarga* are interpolated. This view of *Keith* is not agreed upon by *V.V. by Sovani*.³⁶⁷ The *Yuktidīpikā* speaks of relation between *pratyayas* and *bhāvas* and justifies the discussion of three kinds of creation. The *vyakta* has got three aspects viz., form (*rūpa*), undertaking of initiative (*pravṛtti*) and result of it (*phala*). These are explained by evolution of the *tattvās* beginning with Mahat and ending with *Mahābhūtas*, by *bhāvasarga* and *pratyayasarga* respectively.³⁶⁸

The Guṇas serve as common source of subtle as well as gross elements—physical and psychic. (Since the Sāṃkhyas believe in pre-existence of effect in cause, the evolutes are not a fresh production but are the unfolding of what existed in potential form.)

The particular sequence of objects in process of evolution is to be accepted as it is. *Radhakrishnan*³⁶⁹ does not find any logical foundation in the particular order. However, it may be suggested that the order is based upon quantity of Sattva in different evolutes. We find that the first evolute, Buddhi, has maximum quantity of Sattva and the last evolute *mahābhūtas* have minimum quantity of Sattva. The quantity of Sattva decreases in the succeeding evolutes. In other words, evolution

362. SK 46

363. STK 46

364. SK 46

365. Ibid. 47

366. Sāṃkhya system, p. 105

367. A critical study of the Sāṃkhya system, p. 43

368. YD 45

369. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 274.

proceeds from subtle to gross because the subtlety is a result of profundity of Sattva.

7. Internal and External Organs

The evolutes of Prakṛti are divided into two groups, corresponding to two stages in evolution, viz., psychic and physical, on the basis of their nature and functions. The first stage consists of internal and external organs which perform their psychological functions in addition to their cosmic function and are therefore, called *karāṇas*. The second stage consists of subtle and gross elements which perform only cosmic functions.

The cosmic aspect of Buddhi is called Mahat which produces Ahaṃkāra.³⁷⁰ In its cognitive aspect, it is called Buddhi. It is defined as definite cognition³⁷¹ or resolution to act.³⁷² Buddhi assumes eight forms, viz. of virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), non-attachment (*vairāgya*) and lordly power (*aiśvarya*) when dominated by Sattva and of vice (*adharma*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), attachment (*rāga*) and absence of lordly powers (*anaiśvarya*) when dominated by Tamas.³⁷³ These eight are aspects of Buddhi, according to Gauḍapāda,³⁷⁴ and characters of Buddhi according to Vācaspatiśiṣya.³⁷⁵ Buddhi is the receptacle of all mental dispositions (*saṃskāras*),³⁷⁶ recollection (*smṛti*) and thinking (*cintana*).³⁷⁷ It is the direct means of Puruṣa's experience and release.³⁷⁸ Though Buddhi is insentient in nature, yet it appears to be sentient on account of its contact with Puruṣa.³⁷⁹

Ahaṃkāra in its psychical aspect is defined as egoism (*abhimāna*) in the form of notion of 'I' and 'mine'.³⁸⁰ In its

370. SK 22

371. SK, MV, SSS, GB. 23

372. SK, STK and SC 23

373. SK 23

374. GB 23

375. STK 23

376. SS 2.42

377. Ibid. 2.43

378. Ibid. 2.46

379. SK 20

380. Ibid. 24

cosmic aspect it gives rise to organs and subtle elements.³⁸¹ The mental dispositions (*saṃskāras*) are attributes of Ahaṃkāra but are ascribed to Buddhi on the basis of non-difference between cause and effect.³⁸² The activity also belongs to Ahaṃkāra since the agent proceeds to activity subsequent to the notion of 'I' and 'mine'.³⁸³ Through Ahaṃkāra only, Puruṣa wrongly regards itself to be an agent.³⁸⁴

The Manas performs characteristic function of ideation (*saṃkalpa*),³⁸⁵ or desire to act or not to act.³⁸⁶ It ponders over the relation of specific properties to substance and transforms indeterminate perception (offered by senses) into determinate. It determines the functions of senses.³⁸⁸ (Manas is an *in dṛiya* because it is similar to *indriyas*³⁸⁹ insofar as it also originates from Ahaṃkāra,³⁹⁰ or has a distinctive function like other *indriyas*³⁹¹ or is the characteristic mark of Indra or *ātman*.³⁹² Manas partakes of the nature of both-an organ of sense and of action,³⁹³ because its function and activity is so channelled as to correspond with activity of the respective organ—whether sense-organ or organ of action. Moreover, it directs activity of different organs in the sense that it makes a choice of an organ for a particular function,³⁹⁴ and regulates it when it is active.³⁹⁵ It can have this double character of organ of sense and action without incurring any contradiction just as a single person, Devadatta for example can act like a wrestler

381. SK

382. SPB 6.52

383. *Ibid.* 6.54

384. SS 9.64

385. SK 27

386. SPB 2.30

387. STK 27

388. GB 27

389. SK 27

390. STK, MV, GB, and SC 27

391. SSS 27

392. Jay 27

393. SK 27

394. GB 27

395. SSV, 2.40

and a cowherd.³⁹⁶ Manas is neither eternal,³⁹⁷ nor all-pervasive³⁹⁸ nor atomic.³⁹⁹ It is of medium size and partite and as such can come into contact with several senses at a time.⁴⁰⁰

The external organs are divided into two-organs of sense and organs of action. The organs of sense are located in eye, ear, skin, tongue and nose and organs of action are located in voice, hands, feet, excretory organ and organ of generation.⁴⁰¹ The senses are supra-sensuous and imperceptible powers located in external physical and perceptible organs. They are, however wrongly identified with their substratum like eye-ball, etc.⁴⁰²

The plurality of organs does not bring about chaos. Each organ has its own field of activity and does not encroach upon that of others. Eye, ear, skin, tongue and nose apprehend visual appearance, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively. Similarly, organ of speech, hands, feet, excretory organ and organ of generation perform the function of speaking, taking, walking, excretion of filth and the sensual gratification respectively.⁴⁰³ Each of the internal organs also has its own distinct function. The circulation of five vital airs is common function of internal organs.⁴⁰⁴ Māthara⁴⁰⁵ and Gauḍapāda⁴⁰⁶ hold that this function pertains to all the organs alike—both the external and internal. One organ acts in harmony with the act of other and their act is prompted by mutual intentions.⁴⁰⁷ The functions performed by organs are of three kinds—seizing (*āharaṇa*), retaining (*dhāraṇa*) and illuminating (*prakāśana*).⁴⁰⁸ Vācaspati-miśra,⁴⁰⁹ the *Jayamaṅgala*⁴¹⁰ and the *Sāṃkhya-*

396. MV 27

397. SS 5.72

398. *Ibid.* 5.69

399. *Ibid.* 5.71

400. SPB 5.71

401. SK 26

402. SS 2.23

403. SK 28

404. *Ibid.* 29

405. MV 29

406. GB 29

407. SK 31

408. *Ibid.* 32

409. STK 32

410. Jay 32

*candrikā*⁴¹¹ ascribe the act of seizing to organs of action, act of retaining to internal organs and act of illuminating to organs of sense. Gauḍapāda⁴¹² holds that the act of seizing and of retaining belong to organs of action while the act of illuminating pertains to organs of sense. Māṭhara⁴¹³ assigns the act of seizing to organs in general, the act of retaining to Ahaṃkāra and the act of illuminating to Buddhi. According to Paramārtha,⁴¹⁴ the act of seizing belongs to internal organs, the act of illuminating to organs of sense and the act of retaining to organs of action. The modern scholars like Davies,⁴¹⁵ Har Datta Sharma⁴¹⁶ and Mainkar⁴¹⁷ favour the idea that the three functions are common to all the organs.

Internal organs are considered to be more important than external organs since the former deal with (apprehension of) objects in past, present and future while the latter function in present time only.⁴¹⁸ That is why, internal organs are compared to gate-keeper and the external to gates.⁴¹⁹ This comparison, according to Paramārtha,⁴²⁰ suggests that internal organs dominate external organs and, according to Vācaspatmiśra,⁴²¹ the external organs are mere instruments of internal organs.

Among the internal organs also, supreme importance is attached to Buddhi, since it accomplishes enjoyment and release for Puruṣa through instrumentality of other organs.⁴²² The other organs, acting like a lamp, reveal objects and present them to Buddhi.⁴²³ The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* adds that Buddhi is the

411. SC 32

412. GB 32

413. MV 32

414. SSS 32

415. Har Datta Sharma's note on SK 32

416. Ibid.

417. T.G. Mainkar's note on SK 32

418. SK 33

419. Ibid. 35

420. SSS 35

421. STK 35

422. SK 37

423. Ibid. 36

highest organ because it is receptacle of mental dispositions⁴²⁴ and agent of meditation, which is the noblest of all the functions of organs.⁴²⁵

The *Yuktidīpikā* records some different views of ancient Sāṃkhya teachers regarding number, functions and magnitude of organs. Organs are twelve according to Patañjali,⁴²⁶ eleven according to Vindhyavāsin⁴²⁷ and Vārṣaganya⁴²⁸ and ten according to Pañcādhikaraṇa.⁴²⁹ Patañjali does not consider Ahaṃkāra a separate category but places it under the category of Buddhi.⁴³⁰ According to Vindhyavāsin⁴³¹ the function of deservation (*saṃkalpa*), egoism (*abhimāna*) and determination (*adhyavasāya*) is one. Patañjali⁴³² holds that *karaṇas* always act from within and there is no external cause to activate them. Pañcādhikaraṇa's view is contrary to it.⁴³³ According to Vārṣaganya, inspiration for activity comes from Prakṛti when the organs function abnormally, but in ordinary course they act of their own.⁴³⁴ As regards the magnitude of organs, Vindhyavāsin, unlike all other teachers, believes that they are all-pervasive.⁴³⁵

8. Subtle body (*Sūkṣma Śarīra*)

In addition to the perishable, gross and visible body which is partly resulting from the union of the elements and partly born of the parents, the Sāṃkhyas postulate subtle body which accompanies the soul till liberation and serves as a link between two births.⁴³⁶ Internal and external faculties like

424. SS 2.43

425. Ibid. 2.43

426. YD 32

427. Ibid. 22

428. Ibid.

429. Ibid.

430. YD 3

431. Ibid. 22

432. Ibid.

433. Ibid.

434. Ibid.

435. Ibid.

436. SK 39

Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas and organs must have some receptacle during the time intervening between death and rebirth. Hence, the Sāṃkhyas believe in undiversified subtle elements as the substratum of organs during the time of transmigration.⁴³⁷ Thus the subtle body is an aggregate of Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, faculties of organs and five subtle elements.⁴³⁸ Vijñāna-bhikṣu does not enlist Ahaṃkāra and considers it as included in Buddhi itself.⁴³⁹ Paramārtha⁴⁴⁰ considers Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra and five subtle elements only as the components of subtle body.

The distinction between bound and released Puruṣa depends upon its association with and dissociation from subtle body. The subtle body is the receptacle of mental dispositions which cause migration of Puruṣa,⁴⁴¹ and is distinctly associated with each Puruṣa⁴⁴² and is eternal⁴⁴³ insofar as it accompanies the soul till the rise of discriminative knowledge.⁴⁴⁴ Hence, it serves as the ground for personal identity of a Puruṣa in various births. It is the first evolute of Prakṛti, i.e., is produced earlier than gross elements.⁴⁴⁵ The subtle body is related to different gross bodies in accordance with the dispositions located in them like an actor who enters upon the scene in different forms.⁴⁴⁶ Being subtle and devoid of definite form, it is wholly unimpeded⁴⁴⁷ and unconfined to states of beasts, men or gods.⁴⁴⁸

The subtle body acts for the purpose of giving experience and liberation to Puruṣa when it assumes activity through aggregate of external body.⁴⁴⁹ In the absence of gross body,

437. SK 41

438. Ibid. 40

439. SPB 3.9

440. SSS 40

441. SK 40

442. SC 40

443. SK 40

444. GB, SSS and Jay 30

445. SK 40

446. Ibid. 42

447. Ibid. and STK 40

448. GB, MV, Jay and SSS 40

449. SK 42

i.e., in the time intervening between death and rebirth it does not fulfil the said purpose.⁴⁵⁰ The experience belongs to subtle body. That is why, there is no experience for a dead body.⁴⁵¹

The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*⁴⁵² mentions that subtle body is atomic in size. Vijñānabhikṣu⁴⁵³ opines that it is not possessed of parts. It is atomic means that it is limited in magnitude.

The *Yuktidīpika* records different views held by various teachers regarding constituents and nature of the subtle body. Pañcādhikaraṇa differently names it as *Vaivarta śarīra* but does not mention its constituents clearly. He mentions the organs separately which get associated with Puruṣa when he enters new birth.⁴⁵⁴ It indicates that subtle body, according to him, is constituted of eight factors—the three internal organs and five subtle elements. According to Patañjali, subtle body differs in each birth. At the time of death, the subtle body pushes internal organs from behind so that they may get themselves in touch with parental seed of the next birth and disappears. The subtle body again arises in the next birth.⁴⁵⁵ Vindhyavāsin does not believe in the existence of subtle body. According to him, senses are all-pervasive and assume their functions when associated with respective gross bodies.⁴⁵⁶

Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that there is an additional third kind of body called the *Adhiṣṭhāna śarīra*. It is composed of subtle form of gross elements (*sūkṣma pañcamahābhūtas*) and supports the subtle body during the time intervening between death and rebirth.⁴⁵⁷

9. Theory of Bondage and Release

The ultimate end or the summum bonum of human life is the absolute cessation of pain⁴⁵⁸ which is not the state of

450. SK 40

451. SSV 3.8

452. SS 3.14

453. SPB. 3.14

454. YD 39

455. Ibid.

456. Ibid.

457. SPB 3.11

458. SK 1

pleasure, but is neutral one—no pain, no pleasure. Puruṣa is initially pure and consequently intrinsically free, yet he experiences pain when he erroneously identifies himself with Buddhi and assumes the characteristics of a doer and an enjoyer.⁴⁵⁹ This is the state of bondage because he cannot escape the results of acts supposed to be performed by him. The bondage of Puruṣa and his experience of pain is not real or caused but merely a notion. Puruṣa being unaffected by the three Guṇas, apparently seems to be bound just as a crystal, not really tinged with the colour.⁴⁶⁰ In reality, bondage belongs to Prakṛti.⁴⁶¹ Bondage is the activity of Prakṛti towards the non-discriminating Puruṣa and liberation is the cessation of the activity.⁴⁶² It is the active agent which is bound or liberated. That is why, the Sāṃkhyas hold that Prakṛti binds herself by herself.⁴⁶³ The bondage, though really belonging to Prakṛti, is ascribed to Puruṣa due to non-discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa just as victory and defeat, actually belonging to solidiers, are ascribed to king due to their false identification.⁴⁶⁴ Bondage and release are neither natural to Puruṣa⁴⁶⁵ nor caused but arise out of *upādhis* and, hence, are apparent or phenomenal.⁴⁶⁶

Bondage is the result of non-discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.⁴⁶⁷ Prakṛti includes its effects, as a cause implies its effects too.⁴⁶⁸ The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* criticises the causes of bondage posited by others, viz., Puruṣa's relation to time and space,⁴⁶⁹ physical conditions (*avasthā*),⁴⁷⁰ actions,⁴⁷¹

- 459. SK 20
- 460. SS 6.28
- 461. SK 62
- 462. SSV 3.72
- 463. SK 63
- 464. STK 62
- 465. SS 1.7-8
- 466. SPB 1.19
- 467. SK 44
- 468. SPB 1.57
- 469. SS 1.12-3
- 470. Ibid. 1.14
- 471. Ibid. 1.16

Prakṛti,⁴⁷² *avidyā* (in Vedantic sense),⁴⁷³ subconscious impressions (*vāsanās*)⁴⁷⁴ and the movement of Puruṣa, i.e., its migration to other body.⁴⁷⁵

(Like all other systems of Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhyas also hold that liberation is attained through true knowledge,⁴⁷⁶ which is described by the Sāṃkhyas as the knowledge of twenty-five principles⁴⁷⁷ or direct knowledge of self⁴⁷⁸ or realisation of the distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.⁴⁷⁹ Moreover, like other systematists the Sāṃkhyas also think that mere verbal knowledge acquired through hearing and reading without direct knowledge of the ultimate principle, does not suffice for liberation.⁴⁸⁰ Such a knowledge arises through repeated meditation of the twenty-five principles.⁴⁸¹ In fact, Puruṣa is essentially immutable and has no real relation with knowledge. The discriminative knowledge arises in Buddhi and is related to Puruṣa through reflection.⁴⁸² Knowledge of truth is the only means of liberation. The other means like Vedic rites,⁴⁸³ actions⁴⁸⁴ and combination of acts and knowledge⁴⁸⁵ are rejected by the Sāṃkhyas. Prakṛti desists from its activities in case of a person having this knowledge. The apparent union of Puruṣa and Buddhi is destroyed and Puruṣa attains to its intrinsic nature of an indifferent passive witness free from the taints of Prakṛti.⁴⁸⁶ The state is that of cessation of threefold pain⁴⁸⁷ which is

- 472. SS 1.18
- 473. Ibid. 1.20
- 474. Ibid. 1.27
- 475. Ibid. 1.48-9
- 476. SK 44
- 477. MV and GB 44
- 478. SC 44
- 479. STK and Jay 44
- 480. SPB 1.59
- 481. SK 64
- 482. SPB 1.58
- 483. SK 2
- 484. SSV 3.25
- 485. Ibid. 3.26
- 486. SK 65, 68
- 487. STK 68

described by Gauḍapāda as the state of 'Puruṣa alone'.⁴⁸⁸ Vijñānabhikṣu holds that liberation is annihilation of suffering with its substratum, viz., *Citta*.⁴⁸⁹ The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* elaborately criticises the state of liberation postulated by other systems and establishes that liberation is not destruction of special qualities (*viśeṣaguṇocchitti*) as held by the Naiyāyikas⁴⁹⁰ or movement of soul to the supramundane space (*viśeṣagati*) as held by the Jainas⁴⁹¹ or total disappearance of objective forms assumed by the momentary consciousness caused by the influence of external objects (*ākāroparāgacchitti*) as held by the Buddhists⁴⁹² or annihilation of everything (*sarvocchitti*)⁴⁹³ or annihilation of entire diversification of universe consisting of cognition and cognised held by the Mādhyamikas⁴⁹⁴ or joining of part with the whole, i.e., soul with Brahman⁴⁹⁵ or attainment of the objects of enjoyment in heaven⁴⁹⁶ or attainment of supernatural powers⁴⁹⁷ or the attainment of the rank of Indra and other gods.⁴⁹⁸

The body does not dissolve immediately after attainment of knowledge. The self continues in an embodied state on account of past impressions of acts, just as wheel continues to rotate even after the cessation of potter's instigation on account of past momentum.⁴⁹⁹ The state of Puruṣa is called embodied emancipation (*jīvanamukti*). Paramārtha, however, finds no reference to embodied emancipation in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The acts which have not commenced to bear fruits are rendered ineffective by knowledge. The body

488. GB 68

489. SPB 1.1

490. Ibid. 5.75

491. SS 5.76

492. Ibid. 5.75

493. Ibid. 5.78

494. Ibid. 5.79

495. SPB 5.81

496. SS 5.80

497. Ibid. 5.82

498. Ibid. 5.83

499. SK 67

continues to exist on account of acts which have commenced to bear fruits (*prārabdhakarmas*) and which are to be exhausted by experience. Knowledge does not destroy virtue and vice apportioned to present life because they are destroyed after they attain full maturity in their moment of presence.⁵⁰⁰ The actions performed in the liberated state do not lead to further birth, since virtue, vice, etc., which cause acts to bear fruits, are rendered powerless to produce any fruit. That is so because erroneous notion of agency which is the connecting link between Puruṣa and the fruit disappears. The acts produce the fruits only when accompanied by ignorance, egoism, love, hate, etc. Just as a seed sprouts only when soil is watered.⁵⁰¹ When the fruits of acts which have commenced to bear fruits are experienced⁵⁰² and all the dispositions are exhausted,⁵⁰³ the subtle as well as gross bodies get dissolved and the soul attains to disembodied isolation (*videhamukti*). According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the emancipated while still embodied, possesses moderate discrimination and has the experience in the form of continuation of bodily life on account of persistence of traces of dispositions. The person of intense discrimination, however, has no worldly experience or bodily existence.⁵⁰⁴ Instructions regarding the highest reality are imparted by such embodied liberated persons of the first category.⁵⁰⁵

10. Epistemology

The right knowledge of twenty-five categories which leads to the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is the path of overcoming *ajñāna*. It is obligatory to know the means of knowledge because the right knowledge of objects depends upon the means of valid knowledge.⁵⁰⁶

Before discussing the means of knowledge, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of knower and means of knowledge.

500. GB 67

501. STK 67

502. Ibid. 68

503. GB 68

504. SPB 3.77, 78

505. Ibid. 3.79

506. SK 4

Vācaspatimiśra defines *Pramāṇa* as 'modification of *Buddhi* (*buddhivṛtti*), the object of which is not either doubtful (*sandigdha*), or perverted (*viparīta*), or known (*adhigata*)'. This definition excludes all forms of knowledge, such as doubt (*saṁśaya*), misconception (*viparyaya*), remembrance (*smṛti*) and the like which cannot be regarded as authoritative as they are vitiated by one or the other fault mentioned above.⁵⁰⁷ The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*⁵⁰⁸ defines *Pramāṇa* as that which is most conducive to determination of something which has not been (previously) in contact with both (sense and object, i.e. perception) or with one of the two (others, i.e. inference and valid testimony). Vijñānabhikṣu⁵⁰⁹ further remarks if right knowledge is held to be located in *Puruṣa*, the *Pramāṇa* is modification of *Buddhi* and if knowledge is considered to be located in *Buddhi*, the *Pramāṇa* is the contact of sense with object.

The absolute dualism of Sāṃkhya has made it difficult to explain the nature of knower. The early texts of the Sāṃkhyas lay more emphasis on explaining the transcendental

507. STK 4

508. SS and SSV 1.87

The reading of the sūtra *dvayorekatarasya Vāpyasannikṛṣṭārthaparicchittih pramā* appears to be in need of more consideration. The two words *dvayoh* and *asannikṛṣṭa* appear to have no clear meaning for the commentators. Aniruddha interprets *dvayoh* as of *indriya* and *artha*, supplies *vidyamānyoh* and applies it to *Pratyakṣa*. He interpretes *asannikṛṣṭa* as *aparcichinna*, i.e. *anadhigata*. Vijñānabhikṣu understands *dvayoh* the 'two' as *Puruṣa* and *Buddhi*. Moreover, he understands *dvayoh ekatarasya* as not giving three alternatives but only two (either of the two) in which case use of *vā* is purposeless. Besides, *sannikṛṣṭa* is used regularly in the sense of 'in the contact' and not as *adhigata*. A different interpretation of the word *dvayoh* may be forwarded viz. *indriyamanasoh* so that the three varieties of right knowledge corresponding to three *pramāṇas* can be included in the definition.!

509. SPB 1.87

and unattached nature of *Puruṣa* as well as the objective nature of *Prakṛti*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁵¹⁰ simply mentions that *Buddhi* seems to possess the nature of *Puruṣa* and *Puruṣa* appears to possess the attributes of *Buddhi* on account of union. The process of the apparent exchange of attributes is left unexplained. The commentators have made an attempt to explain. Vācaspatimiśra holds that *Puruṣa* is reflected into *Buddhi*. Consequently, *Buddhi* becomes intelligised and acts like a sentient entity. The intelligised *Buddhi* is locus of enjoyment, knowledge and activity.⁵¹¹ The empirical knowledge (*vṛtti-jñāna*) belongs to *Buddhi*. *Puruṣa* appears to be knower on account of his non-distinction from *Buddhi*.⁵¹² Vijñānabhikṣu rejects the theory of Vācaspatimiśra on the ground that the view is based upon mere logic and contradicts the authority like Vyāsa, etc. He opines that there is a reciprocal reflection of *Puruṣa* into *Buddhi* and of *Buddhi* into *Puruṣa*. It is through this reflection that *Puruṣa* knows the objects.⁵¹³ The theory of Vācaspatimiśra retains the transcendental isolation of *Puruṣa* while the theory of Vijñānabhikṣu leaves *Puruṣa* not better than the empirical self and cannot account for the isolated (*kevalin*) nature of *Puruṣa*.⁵¹⁴

The Sāṃkhyas prescribe three means of knowledge- Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony.

The perception precedes all other *Pramāṇas* for it is accepted by all the systems of thought and all the other *Pramāṇas* depend upon it.⁵¹⁵ Perception is defined as definite cognition (*adhyavasāya*) of an object brought about by senses in contact with them (*prativīṣaya*).⁵¹⁶ Vācaspatimiśra

510. SK 20

511. STK 5

512. *Vidyattoṣiṇī* on STK 4

513. SPB 1.87

514. Cf. S.K. Saksena, "The Problem of Experience in Sāṃkhya-Yoga Metaphysics with special reference to Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu", *The Poona Orientalist*, Vol. IV, no. 4 January, 1940.

515. STK 5

516. SK and STK 5

explains that the term definite cognition (*adhyavasāya*) excluded doubt, the expression object (*viśaya*) excludes wrong knowledge (*viparyaya*) and the condition, viz., contact of sense with object distinguishes Perception from memory, and other kinds of knowledge arising out of Inference and Verbal testimony.⁵¹⁷ The *Yuktidīpikā* takes the compound *Pratīviśayādhyavasāya* as *ekaśeṣa* and tries to prove the applicability of the definition to the perception of happiness, misery and the like which do not come in contact with senses, and the perception of the Yogins.⁵¹⁸ The Sāṃkhyas believe in Yogic perception too. The Yogins can perceive object like subtle elements (*tanmātras*) which are not the object of sense-perception of ordinary people. The perception of Yogins does not depend upon contact of their external organs with objects. Buddhi of Yogins can come into contact with objects existing in their causal state.⁵¹⁹

Vācaspatimiśra describes process of Perception thus. The external sense, having perceived an object gives it to Manas which analyses and synthesises its qualities and connects the objects with them. Manas presents it to Ahaṃkāra which connects it with self-notion and delivers it to Buddhi.⁵²⁰ Thus Perception depends upon contact of senses with object on the one hand and with the internal organ on the other. When the object is clearly visible or when one feels fear or the like, contact of external sense with object and internal organ is simultaneous. In the perception of the object the characteristics of which are not clearly visible, the functions of four, i.e., three internal organs and the external sense is sequential.⁵²¹ According to the *Yuktidīpikā*,⁵²² however, the theory of simultaneous operation of senses, is not accepted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He regards it as the *prima facie* view and rejects it in favour of his own view of

517. STK 5

518. YD 5

519. SS 1.90-91

520. STK 30

521. Ibid. 30

522. YD 30

sequential function of senses. Māṭhara,⁵²³ followed by Aniruddha,⁵²⁴ remarks that operation is successive, but it seems to be simultaneous. The operation is so rapid the sequence is not perceived. The hundred petals of lotus, for instance, are pierced successively but they seem to be pierced simultaneously on account of swiftness of operation.

Vācaspatimiśra believes in two stages of Perception—indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). The former is a general apprehension of object without a notice of its particular features like the apprehension by a baby or a dumb person. The determinate perception is apprehension of an object with its generic and specific characteristics.⁵²⁵ Vijñānabhikṣu emphasises sensed cognition character of both the determinate and the indeterminate perception and cites in support the view of Vyāsa. He further argues that determinate perception is necessarily a product of the sense-activity as there is no reason why senses should not produce it.⁵²⁶

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* defines Inference as knowledge derived from the knowledge of sign (*liṅga*) and signate (*liṅgi*).⁵²⁷ Vācaspatimiśra elaborates the definition stating that Inference is the knowledge derived from the knowledge of invariable concomitance between sign (*vyāpya*) and signate (*vyāpaka*) and the knowledge of presence of sign on subject (*pakṣadhar-matājñāna*).⁵²⁸

Māṭhara,⁵²⁹ Gauḍapāda⁵³⁰ and the *Jayamaṅgalā*⁵³¹ state that sometimes signate (*liṅgi*) is inferred from sign (*liṅga*) as cuckoo is inferred from its voice and sometimes sign is inferred from signate as voice is inferred from cuckoo.

The *Jayamaṅgalā* enumerates seven kinds of relation between sign and signate—(i) master and servant, (ii) original and its modification, as between barley and *saktu*, (iii) cause

523. MV 30

524. SSV 2.32

525. STK 27

526. SPB 2.32

527. SK 5

528. STK 5

529. MV 5

530. GB 5

531. Jay 5

and effect, as between cow and calf, (iv) pot and its possessor, as between medicant and the *trivṣṭabdhā*, (v) association, as between *cakra* bird and its mate, (vi) opposition, as between cold and hot and (vii) object and the being for which it is meant, as between an object of enjoyment and its enjoyer.⁵³²

Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that Inference is of three kinds.⁵³³ The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* take them as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and follow *Nyāyabhāṣya*⁵³⁴ in explaining them. Vācaspatimiśra,⁵³⁵ following the *Yuktidīpikā*,⁵³⁶ divides Inference into two—*vīta* (affirmative) and *avīta* (negative). The *vīta* is *śeṣavat*. He divides the *avīta* into *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and explains the three on the analogy of *Nyāyabhāṣya*.⁵³⁷ Aniruddha⁵³⁸ divides Inference into six, viz., *anvayin* (having positive reason) *vyatirekin* (having excluding reason), *anvayavyatirekin* (having reason which can be stated positively as well as negatively), *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

As regards the members in a syllogistic reasoning Māṭhara mentions that some hold that there are three *avayavas* of Inference—subject (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) and instance (*dṛṣṭānta*).⁵³⁹ It is not clear, in this case, as to whether Māṭhara refers to the entities forming the basis of an Inference or verbal statement of them as specially related in a particular Inference. He⁵⁴⁰ further states that some hold that the *avayavas* are five, viz., *pratijñā*, *apadeśa*, *nidarśana*, *anusandhāna* and *pratyāmnāya*. These correspond to the five *avayavas* recognised

532. Jay 5

533. SK 5

534. NB 1.15

535. STK 5

536. YD 5

537. For details see A.B. Dhruva, "Trividham Anumānam or A Study in Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5" *Proceedings and transactions of the First All India Oriental Conference, Poona*, 1919.

538. SSV 1.100

539. MV 5

540. Ibid

by the Naiyāyikas and accepted by the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*.⁵⁴¹ This indicates, adds Aniruddha,⁵⁴² that sign should possess five characteristics, i.e. existence in the subject (*pakṣadharmatva*), existence in all positive instances (*sapakṣasattva*) non-existence in negative instances (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*), absence of contradictory reason (*asatpratipakṣatva*) and absence of counterbalancing reason (*abādhitaviṣayatva*). Māṭhara refers to first three of these as conditions of valid reason.⁵⁴³ Inference is based upon *vyāpti* which is defined as invariable association between sign and signate or invariable association of sign alone with signate.⁵⁴⁴ This implies that *vyāpti* is not known by single observation but it is known through repeated observation of invariable concomitance between sign and signate without any instance where sign can be observed without signate.⁵⁴⁵ Māṭhara states that *vyāpti* is twofold—based upon similarity (*sādharmya*) and based upon contradiction (*vaidharmya*).⁵⁴⁶ These are positive and the negative instances in *vyāpti*. Māṭhara⁵⁴⁷ refers to thirty three fallacies in Inference. These are nine of the *pakṣa*, fourteen of reason and ten of instance. Such a division of fallacies is not found anywhere in the texts of Indian philosophy.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines valid testimony (*āptavacana*) as revelation (statement) of an authoritative person.⁵⁴⁸ The mention of *āpta* excludes pseudo-revelation (*āgamabhāṣā*) such as assertions of Buddhists, Jains and materialists which are invalid on account of their internal contradictions, lack of sufficient basis, illogical statements and their acceptance by only a few and beastlike persons such as Mlecchas and others.⁵⁴⁹ Generally this proof is confined to scriptures by the teachers of Sāṃkhya. Māṭhara⁵⁵⁰ and Gauḍapāda⁵⁵¹ include the asser-

541. SPB 5.27

542. SSV 5.27

543. MV 5

544. SS 5.29

545. Ibid. 5.28

546. MV 5

547. Ibid.

548. SK 5

549. STK 5

550. MV 5

551. GB 5

tion of holy teachers also in valid testimony. Sāṃkhyas do not consider sentence as *pramāṇa* but the knowledge of meaning from it.⁵⁵²

The Vedas are not composition of a human author.⁵⁵³ They are not composed by *Īśvara* because existence of *Īśvara* is not proved.⁵⁵⁴ The liberated also, being indifferent and inactive, are not the author of the Vedas.⁵⁵⁵ Though the Vedas are of impersonal origin, yet they are not eternal because the Vedas themselves speak of their origin.⁵⁵⁶ Objects of impersonal origin are not necessarily eternal. Though the sprouts are impersonal, yet they are non-eternal.⁵⁵⁷ The statements regarding eternality of the Vedas refer to continuity of their identical form revealed to seers in different cycles of the world.⁵⁵⁸

The knowledge derived from Vedas is self-proved in its authority (*svataḥpramāṇa*) as the Vedas are impersonal in origin and consequently free from defects and imperfections noticed in case of impersonal agencies.⁵⁵⁹ Their validity does not depend upon announcer's knowledge, etc.⁵⁶⁰

The relation between word and its meaning is that of expressive and expressed. Their relation is known, states Vācaspatiśra,⁵⁶¹ by perceiving an experienced person directing the other to perform certain action and seeing the latter acting according to the direction of the former. Aniruddha⁵⁶² and Vijñānabhikṣu⁵⁶³ mention two additional means, viz., instructions by competent person (*āptopadeśa*) and occurrence of the word in co-ordination of another familiar word (*prasiddhapadaśamānādhikaraṇyam*).

552. STK 5

553. SS 5.46

554. SPB 5.46

555. SS 5.47

556. Ibid. 5.45

557. Ibid. 5.48

558. SPB 5.45

559. STK 5

560. SPB 5.51

561. STK 5

562. SSV 5.38

563. SPB 5.38

(The Sāṃkhyas do not accept scriptures blindly.) The means for removal of threefold suffering laid down by the scriptures such as sacrifice, etc., are severely criticised.⁵⁶⁴ Hence, *Radhākrishnan*⁵⁶⁵ remarks, "The Sāṃkhya avoids the appearance of being an innovation by its acceptance of the scriptures as a means of knowledge. It, however, never, openly opposes the Vedas, but adopts the more deadly process of sapping their foundation" (by such a criticism).

Each of the *pramāṇas* has its own specific scope of function and there is no commingling of different *pramāṇas*. The objects apprehensible by senses such as earth and the like are known through Perception. The non-sensible objects like *Prakṛti* and the rest are cognised by Inference and those which cannot be known even by Inference, i.e. objects like the land of Uttarakurus, nymphs in heaven, etc., are the objects of valid testimony.⁵⁶⁶

The Sāṃkhyas admit the above three as independent *pramāṇas*. All objects are cognised through these three only.⁵⁶⁷ The acceptance of any additional *pramāṇa* involves undesired cumbrousness (*gaurava*). All additional *pramāṇas* posited by other philosophical schools are included by the Sāṃkhyas under these three only.⁵⁶⁸

The knowledge derived from Analogy (*upamāna*), states Vācaspatiśra,⁵⁶⁹ is either verbal or inferential or perceptual according to the circumstance in which the object is known. Gauḍapāda⁵⁷⁰ and the *Jayamaṅgalā*⁵⁷¹ include it under verbal testimony. Māthara,⁵⁷² the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*⁵⁷³ and vijñānabhikṣu⁵⁷⁴ include it under Inference.⁵⁷⁵

564. SK 2

565. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, P. 302

566. SK and SC 6

567. SS 1.88

568. KS 4

569. STK 5

570. GB 4

571. Jay 4

572. MV 4

573. SC 4

574. SPB 1.88

575. For details see *Upamāna in Indian Philosophy* pp., 119-22

The Presumption (*arthāpatti*) posited by others to reconcile two apparently inconsistent facts is included under Inference by the Sāṃkhyas.⁵⁷⁶ Absence (*abhāva*), according to the *Jayamaṅgalā*,⁵⁷⁷ Vācaspatiśra⁵⁷⁸ and Vijñānabhikṣu,⁵⁷⁹ is a form of Perception. Gauḍapāda⁵⁸⁰ includes it under verbal testimony and Maṭhara⁵⁸¹ includes it under Inference.

The Probability (*sambhava*) is included under Inference by Vācaspatiśra⁵⁸² and under Verbal testimony by Gauḍapāda⁵⁸³ and the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*.⁵⁸⁴

Tradition (*aitihya*) is a mere continuity of a rumour. Vācaspatiśra⁵⁸⁵ states that it is open to doubt and consequently is not a *pramāṇa*. If the first speaker is known to be a trustworthy person, it will be considered to be a case of valid testimony. Gauḍapāda,⁵⁸⁶ the *Jayamaṅgalā*⁵⁸⁷ the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*⁵⁸⁸ include it under Verbal testimony. Māṭhara⁵⁹⁰ includes it under Inference.

Imagination (*pratibhā*) posited by some to know the knowledge of speaker is included under verbal testimony by Gauḍapāda⁵⁹¹ and under Inference by Māṭhara.⁵⁹²

576. STK 5

577. Jay 4

578. STK 5

579. SPB 1.88

580. GB 4

581. MV 4

582. STK 5

583. GB 4

584. SC 4

585. STK 4

586. GB 4

587. Jay 4

588. SC 4

589. SPB 1.88

590. MV 4

591. GB 4

592. MV 4

CHAPTER II

SĀMĀHYA AS PRESENTED IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

Sāṃkhya has met with a scathing criticism at the hands of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas. Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems are taken together for the present discussion since their consideration of Sāṃkhya theories is similar in many respects. The earliest text of the Vaiśeṣikas, viz., the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda does not refer to Sāṃkhya, the dominating philosophical system of that age. It is due to the fact that the Vaiśeṣika system was in a stage of formation at that time and as such did not find much scope for refutation of rival theories. Praśastapāda also primarily aims at explaining the philosophical thought contained in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda and his interest does not extend to the examination of the other systems. Later commentators of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* like Udayana and Śrīdhara undertake the task of refuting the Sāṃkhya doctrines opposed to their own system. The Naiyāyikas refute the theories of Sāṃkhya right from the very emergence of their system. The *sūtras* of Gautama do not explicitly refer to the theories of Sāṃkhya but provide hints for criticism of Sāṃkhya theory of Ahaṃkāra as the source of sense-organs, denial of *adṛṣṭa* and existence of effect in cause prior to manifestation. It is Vātsyāyana, the commentator of the *sūtras* of Gautama, who vehemently criticises Sāṃkhya for the first time. Vātsyāyana received much doctrinal background from his predecessors. Hence, he could have ample scope to refute the theories of other systems too. He rejects the Sāṃkhya theory of source of sense-organs, eternality of Buddhi and its agency with respect to desire, aversion, effort pleasure, pain and knowledge, location of sound, denial of *adṛṣṭa* and pre-existence of effect in cause. Thus, Vātsyāyana even in his work chiefly devoted to epistemology and logic, raises only the metaphysical theories of Sāṃkhya for refutation.

This indicates that the Sāṃkhya system was primarily concerned with metaphysics and had not perhaps thoroughly explained the epistemological problems in its earlier stage. It is Uddyotakara who criticises for the first time the epistemological theories such as the definition and kinds of inference which are ascribed to Sāṃkhya by Vācaspatiśra. Uddyotakara further introduces for refutation the metaphysical theories of Sāṃkhya like nature of eternity, relation of part and whole and origin of the universe. Vācaspatiśra further takes up for refutation the Sāṃkhya theory of eternity of all objects, acceptance of the two ultimate realities simultaneously and the nature of *ajñāna* which is cause of bondage. He explains the epistemological theories of the Sāṃkhyas referred to by Uddyotakara. Jayantabhaṭṭa continues to criticise the metaphysical theories of the Sāṃkhyas. In addition to the theories mentioned above, he refers to the theory of number of internal organs, bondage of Puruṣa on account of Prakṛti, nature of Puruṣa in the state of liberation and nature of generality (*sāmānyā*). By the time of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the Sāṃkhya stand with reference to the means of knowledge was crystallized. That is why, Jayantabhaṭṭa lays emphasis on criticism of the Sāṃkhya epistemology too. He criticises the Sāṃkhya theory of definition of *Pramāṇa*, number of *Pramāṇas*, definition of perception and process of perception of sound. The later commentators of the *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* continue to criticise these theories of Sāṃkhya and add only a few more points of criticism. Thus, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas criticise almost all the aspects of Sāṃkhya system.

1. Theory of Causation

The Sāṃkhya theory of existence of effect in cause prior to causal operation is severely criticised by the Naiyāyikas. Vātsyāyana raises the issue in his usual style of raising some doubt and speaks of a view according to which effect exists latent in cause. His commentators ascribe the view to Sāṃkhya and criticise it extensively.

In form of *pūrvapakṣa* Vātsyāyana¹ records following arguments as adduced by the exponents of this theory. There is restriction with reference to causal relation of objects. A

1. NB. 4.1.48

specific product comes out of a specific substance only. For example, one brings clay and not threads for fashioning a pot.

Uddyotakara's criticism displays that the supporters of the theory may favour it for the following additional reason also. The object which does not exist (in cause) cannot be brought into existence. That is why horns do not grow on a donkey's head.²

Jayantabhaṭṭa states that the Sāṃkhyas may put forth following additional arguments in support of their theory. (i) Acceptance of non-existence of effect in cause will lead to the unfavourable contingency of production of effect even after its final destruction (*pradhvanisa*). Thus, there would be no difference between absence of object after its final destruction and their absence before production.³

(ii) If the effect is not admitted to be existent in causal form, causal operation will be without substratum.⁴ (iii) Non-existence of effect in cause implies production of effect from destruction of cause. It will lead to the absurdity of production of existent from non-existence. It cannot therefore, account for the fact that jar is produced out of lump of clay which is destroyed just before the production of jar while the long destroyed lump of clay is not capable of producing jar.⁵ (iv) Jayantabhaṭṭa's remarks⁶ against the Sāṃkhya theory reveal that the Sāṃkhyas may again argue that the effect exists in cause in so far as both cause and effect are identical.

Śrīdhara quotes the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and explains it thus. The Sāṃkhyas may put forth following arguments in favour of their theory of pre-existence of effect in cause. (i) Non-existent (in cause) cannot be produced. Sky flower cannot be brought into existence. The object which is produced necessarily exists in its cause. That is why, oil cannot be produced from sand. (ii) An effect exists in the causal form for there is a definite relation between cause and effect. If effect would be produced without being related to its cause, every object would have

2. NV, p. 487

3. NM Part II, p. 63

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.* p. 66

been produced from every cause. Since, the relation requires both the relata, effect should exist in cause. Moreover, it may be asked as to whether the efficacy to produce a particular effect exists everywhere or in the specific cause. The former alternative implies the undesired contingency of production of every effect from every cause while the latter alternative proves existence of effect in causal form. (iii) Cause and effect are identical in nature. Hence effect should be admitted as existent whenever cause exists.⁷

Uddyotakara records different views regarding causal relation held by the exponents of the theory of *satkārya*. He explains these views with the help of an example of threads and cloth. Some hold that cloth is nothing but thread only. They believe in identity of cause and effect. According to others, cloth is threads arranged in a particular form. Others again hold that cloth exists in the form of threads. According to some the characteristics appear and disappear but effect and cause are essentially non-different. Some hold that cloth is threads endowed with a distinctive capacity.⁸

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas adduce following arguments to controvert the theory of the Sāṃkhyas.

The specification of a particular cause for a particular effect is not conclusive to prove existence of effect in cause. The formation of the very concept of a specific cause proves that effect is produced. The knowledge of cloth, for example, cannot arise before production of cloth.⁹ The agent selects particular cause for a specific effect because he knows the capacity of cause to produce specific effect.¹⁰

An effect cannot exist in cause for it is illogical to speak of production of an object which is already existent.¹¹

The effect is non-existent before its production since production and destruction of objects are actually perceived.¹²

7. NK, pp. 341-2

8. NV, p. 488

9. NB 4.1.50

10. NVTT, p. 622

11. NB 4.1.48

12. NS 4.1.49

Uddyotakara adduces following additional arguments against the theory of the Sāṃkhyas:

The acceptance of the theory of *satkārya* will imply futility of all worldly efforts. One strives to obtain the desired objects and to avoid the undesired ones. According to this theory, however, there is nothing non-existent and consequently to be obtained or to be avoided.¹³

If the theory of *satkārya* is admitted, there would be no purpose to be served by five premises of a syllogism as well as the means of knowledge leading to liberation. Knowledge, according to this theory, is ever existent. If it is argued that the *pratijñā*, etc., are resorted to for destruction of ignorance which forms cause of bondage, it will not solve the problem. Ignorance which is not born, cannot be destroyed.¹⁴

The theory of pre-existence of effect contradicts the definition or nature of cause and effect. Cause literally means that which produces effect and effect literally means that which is produced. The effect which is produced by means of causal operation cannot be existent prior to its production. The Sāṃkhyas may argue that causal operation can be spoken of with reference to the object already existent. In the expression like '*Keśān kuru*' (i.e dress the hair), the action does not imply non-existence of effect. This illustration also, states Uddyotakara, is not capable of establishing pre-existence of effect in cause. The particular arrangement of hair, brought about by causal operation, does not exist prior to the manifestation. The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that non-production of absolutely non-existent object proves the existence of object in cause. This argument of the Sāṃkhyas, states Uddyotakara, is based upon wrong notion of non-difference between absolutely non-existent object and the object which is merely 'pre-non-existent.' The absolutely non-existent object like horn of a donkey is not produced due to absence of its cause and not because of its non-existence. The object which has a cause is produced and not otherwise. The Sāṃkhyas contradict their own theory of existence of effect in causal state, if they

13. NV, p. 486

14. Ibid,

maintain that horns of donkey are absolutely non-existent.¹⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa's reply to the argument of non-production of absolutely non-existent object is different. He states that this argument is based upon misunderstanding of the theory of *asatkārya*. The exponents of the theory maintain that that which is produced is non-existent. It does not, however, mean that that which is absolutely non-existent is produced.¹⁶

If effect is supposed to exist in cause, there will be no need of instrumental cause. The functions of instrumental cause will be futile. The Sāṃkhyas may argue that instrumental cause will be used for attaining the already existing object just as spade is necessary for getting water which is already existing in earth. Uddyotakara criticises this plea on the ground that activity of spade is not meant for getting water but to remove the obstruction, i.e., earth's crust. The effect of act of digging, viz., removal of earth's crust, does not exist prior to operation of spade. The Sāṃkhyas are represented as arguing further that instrumental cause is accepted for manifestation of effect which was latent in cause. This will also, states Uddyotakara, not improve the case. The manifestation which does not exist in cause will be considered to be produced. The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that manifestation is not produced. It is simply the situation of cause abiding in the form of effect. Uddyotakara criticises this argument also on the ground that situation, i.e., particular arrangement brought about by causal operation will be considered as non-existent prior to causal operation.¹⁷

Uddyotakara extends his criticism to all different views regarding causal relation that are based on the theory of *satkārya*. The view that cloth is nothing but threads with particular arrangement is criticised on the ground that this theory admits that threads devoid of particular arrangement serve as cause of cloth like other causes such as loom and the like. It is illogical to hold that cloth exists in threads only. Uddyotakara intends to say that if cloth is supposed to exist in its cause, it should equally exist in loom, etc., which also serve as cause of cloth. Thus, the other views, such as that cloth

15. NV, p. 487-88

16. NM Part II, p. 64

17. NV, p. 489

exists in threads or that change pertains to appearance and disappearance of qualities are also refuted.¹⁸

Vācaspatiśrī adduces following additional arguments against the theory of *satkārya*.

This theory will imply emergence of everything from everything even in the system of Sāṃkhya. Pradhāna, according to them, is the common source of every object. Objects exist in their potential form in Pradhāna. Hence, there is no rule as to production of a particular object from a particular cause only, and at a particular time. All objects would come out of everything at all the times.¹⁹

The Sāṃkhya view of causation is not supported by scriptures too. In the *antyeṣṭi* ceremony, the *mantra*, viz., 'May the eye go to sun, etc.....' recited by the side of dead body, indicates absorption of elements into their causes and cause is reduced to a state in which product ceases to exist. The scripture supports what is established by reasoning. Thus, the scripture does not refer to existence of effect in cause.²⁰

Jayantabhaṭṭa adduces some more objections against the theory of Sāṃkhya.

While criticising the argument that causal operation will be without substratum if effect is not supposed to be existent in cause, he says that an agent proceeds to activity only when he has in his mind causal relation between a particular cause and effect. Knowledge regarding this causal relation is attained through observation of activities of elderly persons.²¹

The argument that non-acceptance of the pre-existence of effect will imply production of existent from non-existent is thus criticised. Cause and effect cannot exist in the same substratum because two corporeal objects cannot have the same locus. It does not, however, mean that existent comes out of non-existent. The term 'cause' implies production of effect from existing material cause.²²

18. NV, p. 488

19. NVTT, p. 622

20. Ibid. p. 520

21. NM Part II, p. 66

22. Ibid.

The argument of Sāṃkhya based upon identity of cause and effect is groundless. Perception proves that cause and effect possess different characteristics.²³

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the form in which effect is supposed to exist in cause. The pitcher does not exist in the cause in its present form with its capability of carrying water. Otherwise, causal operation will be useless; secondly, if it functions, activity of efficient cause will never cease. There will be nothing which being accomplished the causal operation will cease.²⁴ It is also illogical to say that pitcher exists in the form of clay. If it is supposed to exist in the form of clay, it should not give up its clay form. But it is observed to the contrary that clay gives up its original shape and turns into the shape of pitcher.²⁵

Jayantabhaṭṭa extends his remarks against the opinion of the Sāṃkhyas that an object potentially exists in form of power (*śakti*) and is made manifest by causal operation. Jayantabhaṭṭa states that the statement of the Sāṃkhyas that effect is manifested is in itself absurd. The manifestation may be supposed to be either different from the object manifested or identical with it. The former alternative implies impossibility of the statement that effect is manifested. The manifestation may be regarded either as existent or as non-existent in cause. The former alternative leads to futility of causal operation while the latter alternative goes against the theory of *satkārya*.²⁶ The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the meaning of 'manifestation'. It can be explained either as arrangement into the form of effect or appearance (*Pratīti*) of effect. The former alternative implies production of arrangement of parts. For the sake of argument, if this arrangement also is considered to be existent, it will imply futility of causal operation. The second alternative will contradict the theory of Sāṃkhya also for it is commonly observed that an object comes into existence only subsequent to causal operation.²⁷ The statement of the Sāṃkhyas that

23. NM Part II, p. 66

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. p. 64

26. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

effect exists in the form of capacity also, says Jayantabhaṭṭa, is absurd. The capacity may either be different from or identical with effect. The first alternative implies that effect exists in the form of something else and consequently, effect cannot be regarded as existent in cause. The second alternative implies that effect comes out of effect. This is, however, absurd. Moreover, it will contradict the common experience that power is different from effect.²⁸ The capacity may again be considered to be impermanent or permanent. The former alternative is not possible because such a subtle and non-eternal power is not perceived. The eternity of capacity would mean that effect is perceived at all the times. This, however, goes against the common experience.²⁹ The Sāṃkhyas may argue that the power exists in both the effect and the cause just as it exists in both the word (*vācaka*) and its meaning or just as it exists in illuminator and the illuminated i.e., lamp and object illumined, i.e., pot. The effect, therefore, must exist as substratum of power. Jayantabhaṭṭa objects to it on the ground that the power is assumed where it is perceived. It exists in cause in the absence of effect. It does not, therefore, require the existence of effect which is not perceived. It is assumed in illuminator and object illumined or word and meaning since both the factors are existent.³⁰

Śrīdhara proceeds to criticise the argument adduced in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* to establish pre-existence of effect. He states that the argument that non-existent objects like sky-flower do not exist is based upon a wrong notion of identity between absolute non-existent and the object which is non-existent before production. The sky-flower is non-existent by nature while the object like jar is characterised by existence and non-existence. It is non-existent before production but existent after origination. The qualities of existence and non-existence characterising the same object do not imply contradiction. Both these qualities subsist in an object successively at different times. It may again be asked as to how qualities can be ascribed to non-existent object. Śrīdhara replies that non-

28. NM Part II, p. 64

29. Ibid. p. 65

30. Ibid. p. 65

existent qualities can be ascribed to non-existent object only while existent qualities are ascribed to existent object.³¹ There is a Sāṃkhya argument that effect should be related to cause otherwise the rule that particular effect comes out of a particular cause only will not hold good. This is criticised on the ground that the necessary connection between cause and effect does not necessarily imply co-existence of the two. Cause has got power of producing a particular effect. Cloth can be produced from threads and not from mud. The Sāṃkhyas may, however, ask as to why the particular cause has got power of producing a particular effect only. Śrīdhara contends that the same question, viz., 'Why the cloth exists in threads only', may be raised against the Sāṃkhyas too. Here, the Sāṃkhyas may answer, "It is the nature of a particular cause to produce a particular effect." The same argument can be adduced by the Naiyāyikas also. It is ascertained by positive and negative invariable concomitance that a particular cause is capable of producing a particular effect. That is why a particular cause is selected to get particular effect.³² The argument based upon identity of cause and effect is groundless as it is based upon incorrect generalization. The difference between cause and effect is directly perceived. Moreover, if cause and effect are supposed to be identical, the whole world will be identical with its cause, i.e., Pradhāna and consequently imperceptible.³³

Śrīdhara further argues that the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain as to why effect is not perceived in spite of presence of all conditions of perception. Here, the Sāṃkhyas may argue that non-perception of effect is due to its non-manifestation. Hence, Śrīdhara further poses a question as to what the non-manifestation means. If it is considered to be the absence of form capable of performing activities, it will lead to *asatkāryavāda*, as the form which was not existent in the beginning is brought into existence. The non-manifestation may again be said to be the absence of cause of manifestation like operation of weaver etc., as the absence of operation of eye is the cause of non-manifestation of cloth. This also, states Śrīdhara, is

31. NK, p. 342-3

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

illogical. The causal operation would also be admitted to be always existent and consequently effect would always be perceived in its actual form. If it is argued that the operation remains invisible, it will further involve absurdities arising from production of manifestation.³⁴

This theory of pre-existence of effect forms the central issue in the system of Sāṃkhya. It has drawn the attention of other schools especially the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika since the time of their emergence. The argument regarding specification of cause and effect recorded by Vātsyāyana is not directly adduced by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* gives this argument.³⁵ The argument regarding non-production of absolutely non-existent object recorded by Uddyotakara can be traced to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.³⁶ The various types of causal relations listed by Uddyotakara cannot be traced in the available texts of the Sāṃkhyas. His record of these causal relations throws light on the fact that there were five prominent views regarding relation of cause and effect prevalent among the followers of *satkāryavāda*. Some views regarding causal relation resembling to these are found in the *Yogabhāṣya*. Vyāsa states that modification pertains to property (*dharma*), time (*lakṣaṇa*) and condition (*avasthā*).³⁷ The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* holds that effect exists in cause but does not specify the type of relation existing between cause and effect. The argument regarding the causal operation recorded by Jayantabhaṭṭa is not found in the ancient texts of the Sāṃkhyas. Śrīdhara's account of the Sāṃkhya theory is based upon the *Sāṃkhyatatvakaumudī*. He follows Vācaspatimiśra in adducing three arguments to propound the existence of effect in cause. The other commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, however, think that Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forth five arguments. Śrīdhara again follows Vācaspatimiśra in interpreting the Sāṃkhya theory of causation in favour of identity of cause and effect, though it goes against the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*³⁸ which explicitly states that

34. NK, pp. 341-2

35. SS, 1.115

36. SK, 9

37. YV 3.13

38. SK 8, 15

cause and effect are similar in nature but not identical. The thesis of identity of cause and effect is the result of non-acceptance of inherence (*samavāya*) by the Sāṃkhyas. Cause and effect are inseparably related. There can be no separable relation through inherence (*samavāya*) while the Sāṃkhyas do not admit inherence. Hence, they have to explain inseparability of cause and effect on the basis of identity.

The Sāṃkhyas have made an attempt to answer these objections of the Naiyāyikas and to maintain that effect does exist in cause in potential form and is manifested by means of instrumental cause. The main objection of the Naiyāyikas relates to existence or non-existence of manifestation. The manifestation is, of course, brought about by instrumental causes. This according to the Naiyāyikas, implies the non-existence of effect (earlier to production). The Sāṃkhyas hold that this incongruity is involved in the Nyāya theory of origination too. The origination also may be considered to be existent or non-existent prior to causal operation. The first alternative will imply the futility of causal operation. The second alternative implies undesired incongruity of infinite regress for the Naiyāyikas will have to admit origination of origination and so on and so forth.³⁹ Moreover, even if there are innumerable manifestations, there is no fault since manifestations follow one another continually as is the case with seed and sprout. The state or form is changed, but the essence remains the same.⁴⁰ The *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* remarks that even if effect is existent, causal operation will not be futile. The objects are eternal. Their capability of being used, however, is barred by Tamas. The causal operation leads to the manifestation of this capacity just as jewel dispels darkness and brings the object into light so that it may be used.⁴¹

The controversy seems to be rooted in the difference of opinion regarding production. Production, according to the Naiyāyikas, is real. This leads them to believe in fresh production of totally new effect. That is why, the Naiyāyikas consider

39. *STK* 9 and *SS* 1.123

40. *SPB* 1.122

41. *SC* 9

action (*Karma*) as an independent entity and indulge into more details regarding the classification of causes. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, do not consider production as real. It does not mean that production is illusory according to Sāṃkhya, but it is meant only to give a new shape to the causal substance. The emergence of a new shape does not go against the Sāṃkhya theory because they do not hold that the shape also existed earlier. Thus, there is no futility of causal operation and the instrumental causes also. This leads them to believe in existence of effect in cause.

2. Eternity of all objects

Vātsyāyana criticises the view that all objects are eternal. Vācaspatiśra ascribed the view to Sāṃkhya.

The upholders of the theory of eternity of all objects argue, states Vātsyāyana, that objects are nothing but the five material elements (*bhūtas*) which are indestructible in character. Thus, all objects are also eternal.⁴²

This view is criticised on the following grounds :

Objects are not eternal because the cause of their production and destruction is directly perceived.⁴³ The Sāṃkhyas may controvert the argument on the ground that the characteristics of elements continue to exist in material objects too. The elements are eternal. Hence, objects also being non-different from elements should be regarded as eternal.⁴⁴ This argument of Sāṃkhyas, states Vātsyāyana, is not tenable. Firstly, cause and the fact of production of qualities similar to those of cause, are directly perceived. This disproves eternity of objects. Secondly, the effort of an agent presupposes non-eternity of objects. An agent acts to produce the desired objects. Thirdly, composite (*avayavī*) being liable to production and destruction, cannot be eternal in character. Fourthly, the reason, viz., objects being identical with material elements are eternal in nature is inconclusive as it cannot apply to sound, motion, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion which

42. *NB* 4.1.29

43. *NB* 4.1.30

44. *NB* 4.1.31

are not material in nature. Thus, the reason cannot prove eternity of these objects. Sāṃkhyas are further presented as arguing that perception of production and destruction of objects is false like the perception of objects in dream. Vātsyāyana controverts this argument by stating that this is applicable to the perception of material objects too. The perception of objects can also be regarded as unreal like the cognition of objects in dream. Here, the Sāṃkhyas may argue, states Vātsyāyana, if objects are considered to be unreal like the objects known in dream, all practical activities of beings come to an end. Vātsyāyana controverts this argument also on the ground that unreality of production and destruction would also imply absence of agent's inclination to accomplish the acts.⁴⁵

Uddyotakara adds that the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain purpose of their assertion. Their statement may aim at either proving the fact which is not accomplished or disproving the fact which is proved. If the former, the nature of object to be proved cannot be explained. If the object to be accomplished is supposed to be the knowledge of eternity of all objects, it will be contradictory to say that objects are eternal but the knowledge of their eternity is produced and, hence, non-eternal. The second alternative cannot be accepted as eternity of objects is not intended to be disproved.⁴⁶

Vācaspatimiśra adds that objects produced out of elements are different from the elements characterised by eternity. The difference between the elements (i.e., *paramāṇus*) and objects is commonly observed. The elements are imperceptible while objects are perceptible. The eternity pertains to *paramāṇus* and not to the objects produced out of them.⁴⁷

This view of eternity of all objects is not explicitly stated in the Sāṃkhya texts available to us. Even the elements (*bhūtas*) are considered to be destructible by the Sāṃkhyas.⁴⁸ The destruction is, however, their absorption into cause. That is why *Phaṇibhūṣaṇa* thinks that Vācaspatimiśra's attempt to ascribe this view to the Sāṃkhyas can be justified on the basis

45. NB 4.1.32

46. NV, p. 472

47. NVTT, p. 607

48. Cf. SK 10

of the Sāṃkhya theory that effect exists in its cause even after its disappearance.⁴⁹ This attempt of Vācaspatimiśra further presupposes the identity of cause and effect since objects are supposed to be identical with the elements. The attempt of Vācaspatimiśra is hardly justifiable. It is not admitted even by the Sāṃkhyas that elements are eternal. Hence, the identity between objects and elements does not lead to the eternity of all objects. Vācaspatimiśra further tries to justify this statement by interpreting the term *bhūta* as *paramāṇu*. This also cannot be interpreted in accordance with the Sāṃkhya theory because the Sāṃkhyas do not believe in the *paramāṇus* as the ultimate reality. Moreover, the term '*bhūta*' used even by Gautama, in this context, does not mean *paramāṇus*.

3. Nature of non-eternity

Uddyotakara introduces for criticism the view that non-eternity means extreme concealment from view, of an entity which once acquired the characteristics necessary for being apprehended.⁵⁰ Vācaspatimiśra⁵¹ ascribes it to Sāṃkhya.

The view is criticised thus. The statement of the Sāṃkhyas that an object is not perceived in presence of conditions valid for perception, is meaningless. It will lead to non-perception of everything and, thus, will contradict the fundamental doctrine of Sāṃkhya that there is no object which is absolutely not perceived.⁵² Vācaspatimiśra explains it more vividly. All objects, according to the Sāṃkhyas, are not different from Prakṛti out of which they evolve. Some or the other evolutes of Prakṛti are perceived at the times and serve as indication for existence of Prakṛti. Thus, no product of Prakṛti can be said to be absolutely unperceived, since all the products are not different from Prakṛti.⁵³

The disappearance of an object implies introduction of something new. In the theory of the Sāṃkhyas, however, something new cannot come into existence.⁵⁴ There is there-

49. Vide Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya's notes on NS 4.1.29 in his *Nyāya Philosophy* Part IV, p. 37

50. NV, p. 283

51. NVTT, p. 442-3

52. NV, p. 283

53. NVTT, p. 443

54. NV, p. 283

fore, no possibility of disappearance of anything in the theory of the Sāṃkhyas. If the particular qualities causing disappearance are supposed to be produced, it will contradict the Sāṃkhya theory of non-production of an object which does not exist in cause. If production of qualities causing disappearance is again considered to be existent, there will be no scope for disappearance of objects even earlier to introduction of qualities causing disappearance.⁵⁵

Udayana points out another absurdity involved in the Sāṃkhya definition of non-eternity. If destruction is considered to be disappearance only, it would be difficult to explain the nature of final release. The Sāṃkhyas prescribe total destruction of ignorance, passion, etc., for release. The Sāṃkhya view of destruction, however, implies impossibility of total destruction. Hence, there will be no final release, since ignorance continues to exist in some form or the other.⁵⁶

The presentation of the Sāṃkhya view of non-eternity is in conformity with the Sāṃkhya theory of causation. The Sāṃkhyas hold that nothing is absolutely destroyed. Destruction is absorption into cause. Production is also manifestation of an object. Vācaspatiśra's statement that products are not different from Prakṛti is based upon his view that cause and effect, according to the Sāṃkhyas, are identical.

Udayana's argument about ignorance (*ajñāna*) seems to be based upon a distortion or wrong understanding of ignorance in the scheme of evolution and liberation. According to the Sāṃkhyas, ignorance (*ajñāna*) is one of the properties of Tamas, just as Sattva and Rajas are supposed to possess a set of properties peculiar to each of them. When evolution proceeds, ignorance gets associated with subsequent evolutes in proportion to Tamas involved in combination of the three Guṇas and is, thus, also associated with Buddhi. When Puruṣa comes into contact with such a Buddhi, constituted of three Guṇas, he is said to be in contact with ignorance (*ajñāna*) and, hence, in a state of bondage. The liberation of Puruṣa means his freedom

55. *NVTT*, p. 443

56. *Ganganath Jha's* note on *NV* 2.2.13

from contact with Buddhi and naturally the separation from contact with Buddhi and also the separation from ignorance (*ajñāna*). Looked at it from this point of view, the question of destruction or origin of ignorance (*ajñāna*) does not at all arise for the Sāṃkhyas, because Tamas neither arises, nor is destroyed. Hence, if at all, the expressions of rise and destruction are to be used with reference to ignorance (*ajñāna*), they can be only in context of an individual and rise and loss of contact of Puruṣa with Buddhi. This is a position which can be deduced from the available Sāṃkhya texts which, however, do not approach the problem in this manner.

4. Evolution of Universe :

The Naiyāyikas criticise the Sāṃkhya theory (i) of Pradhāna evolving into universe independently of some sentient principle, (ii) of existence of Pradhāna as source of universe and (iii) of process of evolution. The first issue is raised by Uddyotakara and the second and the third by Jayantabhaṭṭa.

(i) Uddyotakara states that Pradhāna, according to the Sāṃkhyas, evolves into universe independently of some sentient principle and is governed by the purpose of Puruṣa which urges it to evolve into universe. The purpose of Puruṣa is twofold : Puruṣa's acquisition of objects of enjoyment like sound, etc., and the realisation of distinction between the Guṇas and Puruṣa. Both of the purposes cannot be served without evolution of Pradhāna.⁵⁷

Uddyotakara raises following objection against the theory of the Sāṃkhyas :

The objects like Pradhāna and paramāṇus, being non-sentient, as axe, etc., act only when governed by some intelligent agent, Pradhāna, thus, cannot evolve into universe independently of any sentient entity.⁵⁸

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of cause of initial activity of Pradhāna. Puruṣa's purpose of obtainment of objects like sound, etc., and perception of distinction between

57. *NV*, p. 457-8

58. *NV*, p. 457

the Guṇas and Puruṣa cannot serve as the cause urging Pradhāna to evolve because the purpose does not exist anterior to Pradhāna's evolution.⁵⁹

Here, the Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing that the non-existent can never be brought into existence and the existent can never be destroyed. Hence, the purpose of Puruṣa also can be supposed to be existent even prior to the activity of Pradhāna.⁶⁰

Uddyotakara points out several absurdities involved in this argument of the Sāṃkhyas. Firstly, if the purpose is supposed to be existent even prior to the activity of Pradhāna, it will not be sound to say that Pradhāna evolves for accomplishment of Puruṣa's purpose. No one strives for the object already attained by him.⁶¹ Secondly, it would imply the ceaseless activity of Pradhāna. Purpose of Puruṣa, the cause of the activity of Pradhāna, will always be present. Consequently, Pradhāna, will never cease to act.⁶² If it is argued that Pradhāna does not evolve even in presence of purpose of Puruṣa it will invalidate the assumption that purpose of Puruṣa is the cause of evolution of Pradhāna. The cause of the evolution is the factor the presence and absence of which causes Pradhāna to evolve and the cessation of the evolution respectively.⁶³

The Sāṃkhyas are again presented as arguing that the purpose does exist prior to the evolution, but, being obstructed, it does not activate Pradhāna, in the state of dissolution.⁶⁴

This plea of the Sāṃkhyas, argues Uddyotakara, implies impossibility of Pradhāna's evolution. There is no factor to cause removal of this obstruction. The obstruction cannot remove itself. Thus, the obstruction, being permanent, will always obstruct the activity of Pradhāna.⁶⁵

59. *NV*, p. 458

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*

Pradhāna, according to Sāṃkhya, is equilibrium of the three Guṇas. The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain as to how Pradhāna comes out of this state. Pradhāna, being insentient, cannot come out of this state and enter into the state of mutual subordination and superordination of the Guṇas so as to enable itself to evolve into particular effects. The Sāṃkhyas may argue that the relation of mutual subserviency (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*) among the three Guṇas causes Pradhāna to evolve. This also, argues Uddyotakara, does not solve the problem. The relation of dominance and subservience among the Guṇas, being non-existent earlier to the activity of Pradhāna, cannot serve as a cause of Pradhāna's evolution.⁶⁶

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the motive of Pradhāna's evolution. The Sāṃkhyas hold that Pradhāna evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa, viz., experience of objects like sound and the rest and realising the distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Here, it may be asked as to whether the objects, etc., which are meant for Puruṣa, are produced or not. The first alternative contradicts the Sāṃkhya view that the non-existence cannot be brought into existence and the second alternative leaves no purpose to be served by Pradhāna's evolution and thus, contradicts the fundamental position of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna evolves in order to serve the purpose of Puruṣa.⁶⁷

Uddyotakara's account of the Sāṃkhya theory that insentient Pradhāna evolves into the universe without any superintending principle is in conformity with the Sāṃkhya theory. The Sāṃkhyas⁶⁸ hold that Pradhāna is active and Puruṣa is immutable. Pradhāna evolves into the universe on account of unconscious automation inherent in it, so as to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. This purpose of Puruṣa is two-fold—acquisition of objects like sound and the rest, and liberation.

The objections raised by Uddyotakara are common to the opponents of Sāṃkhya. Śaṅkarācārya⁶⁹ also raises these

66. *NV*, p. 458

67. *Ibid.*

68. *SK* 21

69. *SB* 2.2.1, 2.2.8

objections against the Sāṃkhya theory. There is, however, a basic difference between the criticism of Uddyotakara and Śaṅkara. Uddyotakara establishes the existence of God while Śaṅkara proves the sentient nature of the material cause. As a matter of fact, the controversy is rooted in the supposition of Sāṃkhya that activity pertains to insentient principle only. This supposition leads the Sāṃkhyas to hold that Pradhāna is material as well as efficient cause of universe and there is no other principle to activate it.

The issue of the purpose of evolution needs a thorough investigation in the system of Sāṃkhya. Besides the questions as to whether the twofold purpose is simultaneously sought to be served in the context of the same individual or many individuals or sequentially, the real problem is how far it is necessary to attribute a purpose to the process of evolution. When Uddyotakara raises the issue of existence of the purpose prior to Pradhāna's evolution and when Śaṅkara raises the additional question as to how gross and non-sentient Prakṛti can have a *prayojana* which can really belong to a sentient principle, they appear to have in mind this basic problem. The Sāṃkhyas describe evolution as a natural process motivated from within the evolving principle; in order to leave Puruṣa free from flows of activity, ignorance and real enjoyment. Hence, it sounds logical that there is no purpose for evolution. Originally, perhaps, the Sāṃkhya view of evolution might have been like this. Prakṛti, in which forces of evolution are inherent, naturally evolves successively. It is the initial and the first stage without any reference to any external principle (*bhoga* or liberation of any one). Puruṣa, who is naturally free and above uncontainment comes to be encircled by the evolutes of Prakṛti. There is rise of wrong notion of 'I' and 'mine', enjoyment and consequent agency and retribution of activity. It is at this stage, when Puruṣa supposes himself to be the agent, acts and looks forward to fruit of acts, that the data for enjoyment are found essential. So, that is *Bhoga*. Again, worldly experience is the cause of disgust with the world, the discrimination, the knowledge, the detachment and liberation. At this stage, from the point of view of the subject, it is justified to say metaphorically that Prakṛti has a purpose. A parallel case is the Nyāya thesis that body and sense-organs,

etc., are placed at the disposal of soul as media of enjoyment, which also signifies the second stage. Hence, it is worthwhile to see as to how far, excepting Īśvarakṛṣṇa the Sāṃkhyas would claim to ascribe the purpose to Pradhāna, if it is not in metaphorical manner as explained above.

(ii) Jayantabhaṭṭa states that existence of Pradhāna is sought to be proved by the Sāṃkhyas through the inference based on analogy. All objects are constituted of the three Guṇas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. This is proved through inference. All objects of the universe—mobile and immobile are found to be endowed with pleasure, pain and indifference which form the nature of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. The fact that all objects perform the act of illumination, motion and restraint also leads to the same conclusion. Illumination, motion and restraint are found as the activities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. It is observed that objects endowed with common qualities originate from a common material cause constituted of these qualities. Pitcher, dish, etc., having the common property of clay, have clay as their material cause. Worldly objects, being endowed with the three qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference should originate from the composite of these qualities. Thus, the composite of these qualities which forms the cause of universe is equilibrium of the three Guṇas and is technically called Prakṛti. The existence of Prakṛti is further proved through the reasons like finiteness of evolutes, etc.⁷⁰

Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises this position of Sāṃkhya thus. The argument that objects being composed of the three Guṇas presuppose a common cause constituted of the three Guṇas is not capable to prove the existence of Prakṛti. Here, the reason viz., being composed of the three Guṇas, is invalid. Pleasure, pain and indifference, being properties of sentient beings, cannot be ascribed to insentient object. No one will believe that jar, cloth and cart are endowed with qualities like pleasure, pain and indifference. Moreover, power of illumination, movement and restraint are observed in sentient object only. It is illogical to ascribe it to insentient objects. In this way, the existence of Prakṛti cannot be inferred

on the basis of reasons like logical continuance (*samanvaya*) and others.⁷¹

Jayantabhaṭṭa's account of the Sāṃkhya inference to prove the existence of Prakṛti is in conformity with the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.⁷² The argument against the existence of Pradhāna, adduced by Jayantabhaṭṭa, is also to be found in Śaṃkarācārya's⁷³ criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory where it is dealt with at length.

(iii) Jayantabhaṭṭa records the Sāṃkhya view of process of evolution thus. Mahat evolves from Pradhāna. Ahaṃkāra comes out of Mahat and gives rise to five cognitive organs, five conative organs, Manas and five subtle elements. The gross elements arise from the subtle elements.⁷⁴

Jayantabhaṭṭa points out following absurdities in the process of evolution postulated by Sāṃkhya. The opinion that Mahat comes out of Pradhāna, the equilibrium of the three Guṇas is based upon tradition peculiar to Sāṃkhya and is not supported by any proof. The magnitude of cause should be less than the magnitude of effect and not vice versa. The cause of jar, i.e., its components, which serve as support of jar, are less in magnitude than jar. The supposition of larger magnitude of cause serves no purpose.⁷⁵

The view that Ahaṃkāra comes out of Buddhi and evolves into Manas, organs and tanmātras is a sign of bewilderment of Sāṃkhya. The Buddhi is cognition of objects and Ahaṃkāra is also a variety of Buddhi, a special form of cognition, viz. 'I-notion'. It is absurd to hold that objects come out of such a cognition.⁷⁶

The view that objects come out of composite of pleasure, pain and indifference is strange. It is commonly observed that pleasure, pain and indifference arise from objects and not

71. NM Part II, p. 63

72. SK 15

73. SB 2.2.1

74. NM Part II, p. 59

75. Ibid. 52

76. Ibid. 65

vice versa.⁷⁷

Jayantabhaṭṭa's account of order of evolutes in the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution is based upon the Sāṃkhyakārikā.⁷⁸

The Sāṃkhyas do not, however, take into consideration the issue of magnitude in the way, Jayantabhaṭṭa presents it. Pradhāna being non-manifest and subtle, the question of its magnitude does not arise. On the other hand, when the Sāṃkhyas say *bhedānām parimāṇāt*, they intend to point out that each evolute being finite in time and space has its own individuality.

Jayantabhaṭṭa's objection against the evolution of Ahaṃkāra and the other objects is rooted in the controversy regarding the nature of Buddhi and Ahaṃkāra. The Sāṃkhyas regard Buddhi and Ahaṃkāra to be substances while the Naiyāyikas hold them to be form of cognition. Therefore, Jayantabhaṭṭa appears to understand the principle of Buddhi exclusively in its knowledge aspect and overlooks its significance as a cosmological principle.

Jayantabhaṭṭa calls tanmātras as Guṇas. This statement needs further investigation. While objecting to the evolution of objects from the composite of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, Jayantabhaṭṭa seems to take the Guṇas of Sāṃkhya in the sense of qualities as the term *guṇa* is understood in the system of the Naiyāyikas. The Guṇas, according to the Sāṃkhyas, are the substances and not mere qualities.⁷⁹ In fact, as a matter of convenience, the Guṇas are said to be three only, and are put together under three main heads, though they are infinite.

5. Concept of Buddhi :

The Naiyāyikas attack the Sāṃkhya concept (i) that Buddhi is eternal in nature, (ii) is the locus of desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain, and (iii) is the agent of knowing.

(i) Vātsyāyana criticises the Sāṃkhya view of eternity of Buddhi. He, however, clarifies that the examination of eternity of Buddhi is not an examination of eternity of knowledge

77. NM Part II, p. 63

78. SK 22

79. SPB 1

because non-eternity of knowledge is proved on the basis of our daily experience. The discussion, therefore, relates to the speculation of Sāṃkhya that *Buddhi*, which forms the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) of *Puruṣa*, is eternal.⁸⁰ The Sāṃkhyas hold that *Buddhi* is eternal since it is possible if the recognising principle is permanent. Otherwise, how can the object be recognised by one who is different from the knower?⁸¹ Vācaspati-miśra further adds that only that which is modifiable can recognise. *Puruṣa*, being immutable cannot undergo modifications. *Buddhi*, on the other hand, is capable of undergoing modification and as such can be the agent of recognition.⁸²

Vācaspati-miśra's explanation of the statement of problem is somewhat different. According to him, Vātsyāyana does not intend to discuss eternity or non-eternity of *Buddhi*, but aims at criticising the existence of *Buddhi* apart from the function of internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*). The subject of eternity of *Buddhi* is introduced as a preliminary issue to arrive at this conclusion. If *Buddhi* were eternal, it would be something different from transitory cognitions which appear and disappear. If non-eternity of *Buddhi* is proved, there will be no scope for postulating any universal thinking principle apart from cognition.⁸³ The eternity of *Buddhi* cannot be considered as the main issue because the Naiyāyikas do not accept existence of such a principle. It is, therefore, not sound to discuss the character of an object the existence of which is doubtful.⁸⁴ Vācaspati-miśra seems to think that non-eternal *Buddhi*, in that case, can be equated with fleeting cognitions. There is then, no permanent principle underlying the successive cognitions, as held by Sāṃkhya.

The Naiyāyikas adduce following arguments against the Sāṃkhya view of eternality of *Buddhi*.

The Sāṃkhya argument that *Buddhi* is eternal since it, recognises objects is not valid. Here, probans (*hetu*) is involved with the fallacy called *sādhyaśama* since, like eternality of *Buddhi*

80. NB 3.2.2

81. *Ibid.*

82. NVTT, p. 536

83. *Ibid.* 533

84. *Ibid.* 536

the view that *Buddhi* recognises objects is unproved. 'Recognition', being an act of sentient entity, cannot belong to *Buddhi* which is non-sentient. The probans proves eternity of cogniser (i.e., self) and not that of instrument of recognition (i.e. *Buddhi*).⁸⁵

Now, the Sāṃkhyas may argue even if *Buddhi* is not cogniser, it may be considered as eternal, since it is the source of knowledge. Knowledge is modification of *Buddhi* into the form of the object cognised and modification is not different in essence from modified thing.⁸⁶

The Naiyāyikas controvert this plea on the ground that non-difference between the cognition and its source would imply the presence of cognition at all the times, since the source being present, its modifications will also be present. This will lead to the absurdity of simultaneity of all cognitions.⁸⁷

According to the Sāṃkhyas, *Buddhi* and its modifications are identical. Hence, disappearance of cognition, i.e., cessation of the modification of *Buddhi* would imply destruction of *Buddhi* itself. The Sāṃkhyas cannot overcome this difficulty by admitting eternity of the source but non-eternity of its modification since it will contradict the fundamental doctrine of identity between modification and its source.⁸⁸ Moreover, the doctrine of non-difference between modification and its source cannot account for succession in rise of different types of knowledge.⁸⁹ Cognitions of different nature, i.e., cognition of colour, odour cannot emanate from one substratum only. One and the same source cannot be transformed into all types of cognition.⁹⁰

The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that *Buddhi* is an instrument of knowledge and serves as an internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) as is the case with *Manas* in the theory of the Naiyāyikas. Hence *Buddhi* can be regarded to be eternal like *Manas*.⁹¹

85. NB 3.2.3

86. *Ibid.* 3.2.4

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.* 3.2.5

89. *Ibid.* 3.2.6

90. *Ibid.* 3.2.8

91. *Ibid.* 3.2.3

Vātsyāyana points out following absurdities in the supposition of the Sāṃkhyas. The reason forwarded by the Sāṃkhyas for proving eternity of Buddhi is not satisfactory. The eternity of Manas also cannot be proved on the basis of recognition. Manas is an instrument in the act of recognition and recognition is possible even when one instrument is replaced by another. That is why, an object perceived with the left eye is recognised through the right eye. Similarly, Buddhi of Sāṃkhya, being an instrument in the act of recognition, cannot be eternal because it recognises objects.⁹² Moreover, if Buddhi is held to be similar to Manas in respect of serving as an internal organ, all-pervasiveness of Buddhi will involve other absurdities. It will imply simultaneity of all cognitions. The internal organ, being all-pervasive, cannot move. So, there is no restriction that it may come into contact with one organ only and cause the cognition of the respective object alone. On the other hand, it will come into contact with all the cognitions simultaneously. All cognitions, therefore, will emanate simultaneously since there is no factor to account for the sequence of cognitions.⁹³ Vācaspatiśra puts the argument somewhat differently. Buddhi of Sāṃkhya is an agent. An agent is seen to perform many activities at a time. Buddhi will bring into operation all organs at a time and it will result into simultaneity of all cognitions.⁹⁴ To avoid this difficulty the Sāṃkhyas may suggest that the internal organ, though connected with all objects, is attached to a particular object and knows that object only. The Naiyāyikas reject it on the ground that the attachment pertains to Puruṣa and not to the internal organ.⁹⁵ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that modification of Buddhi is one and identical with Buddhi but seems to be different on account of its contact with different objects through different senses just as a rock crystal seems to be many as it comes into contact with many coloured substances in succession.⁹⁶ The Naiyāyikas object to this plea also on the ground that there is no proof

92. NB 3.2.3

93. Ibid 3.2.8

94. NVTT, p. 538

95. NB 3.2.8

96. Ibid. 3.2.9

to support that modification is one only. The diversity in case of crystal is apparent only while diversity in cognitions is real.⁹⁷

We have no means to ascertain the text of the Sāṃkhyas on which Vātsyāyana relies for his presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory. His statement that the Sāṃkhyas consider Buddhi as internal organ can be justified on the authority of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.⁹⁸ In this respect, it should be observed that Vātsyāyana seems to hold that Buddhi is the only internal organ according to Sāṃkhya. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*,⁹⁹ however, enumerates three internal organs. The *Yuktidīpikā*¹⁰⁰ mentions the view of Vindhyavāsin that the functions of ideation, self-notion and determination are really one. Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his successors opine that they are different and, therefore, assign them to three different internal organs. It is, therefore, possible to suggest that Vindhyavāsin accepted one internal organ, as he does not distinguish the nature of these functions and that is the view which comes closer to the one presented by Vātsyāyana. The idea of non-difference between modification and its substratum is not especially mentioned in the extant texts of Sāṃkhya. However, it does not go against the intentions of the Sāṃkhyas. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* speaks of *vṛtti* with reference to internal organs,¹⁰¹ organs¹⁰² and Guṇas¹⁰³ In all these cases Īśvarakṛṣṇa suggests non-difference between modification and its substratum. Buddhi, according to Sāṃkhya, is not only the form of knowledge, but a substance, since Ahaṃkāra evolves out of it and since no entity can evolve from an idea. Buddhi is defined as 'determination' (*adhyavasāya*).¹⁰⁴ The determination is nothing but the modification of Buddhi in the form of object cognised. Vācaspatiśra also remarks that the determination is the characteristic function of Buddhi and

97. Ibid.

98. SK 33

99. Ibid.

100. YD 22

101. SK 29,30

102. Ibid. 28,31

103. Ibid. 12

104. Ibid. 23

Buddhi is not different from it. The definition is so coined as to suggest the intention of the Sāṃkhyas, viz., non-acceptance of difference between an agent and its function.¹⁰⁵ The Sāṃkhya definition of Ahaṃkāra also points to the same conclusion, Ahaṃkāra is defined as egoism (*abhimāna*)¹⁰⁶ which is nothing but the *vr̥tti* of Ahaṃkāra itself. *Vr̥tti* of organs is spoken of as simple awareness of objects like sound, etc.¹⁰⁷ An organ, according to the Sāṃkhyas, is not the gross visible part of body, but it is a subtle imperceptible force which is located in every visible organ.¹⁰⁸ It is the imperceptible part which assumes the form of object connected with it. Thus, the modification of an organ into the form of object is not different from the organ. The description of the three Guṇas is also based upon the notion of non-difference between modification and its substratum. The Guṇas give rise to pleasure, pain and indifference¹⁰⁹ which also form their essential nature. Thus, Vātsyāyana's presentation of the Sāṃkhya view regarding essence of Buddhi is in conformity with the position of the Sāṃkhyas, but as far as the characteristics of Buddhi are concerned, it goes against the theory of the Sāṃkhyas known to us. Vātsyāyana states that the Sāṃkhyas consider Buddhi to be all pervasive and eternal while the extant texts of Sāṃkhya propound limited magnitude and non-eternity of Buddhi.¹¹⁰ Sudarśanācārya¹¹¹ thinks that Vātsyāyana is wrong when he states that Buddhi is eternal according to Sāṃkhya. He makes a reference to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* statements '*hetumadanitya-mavyāpi*'¹¹² and '*prakṛter mahān*'¹¹³ which when put together lead to the deduction that Buddhi, being an evolute, has a cause and, therefore, non-eternal and finite. From the chronological

105. STK 23

106. SK 42

107. *Ibid.* 28

108. SS 2.23


109. SK 12

110. *Ibid.* 10

111. *Prasannapadā* on NB 3.2.1.

112. SK 10

113. *Ibid.* 22



standpoint, however, it may not be plausible that the Sāṃkhya-*kārikā* was available to Vātsyāyana for reference. It is, therefore, not worthwhile to attribute such a mistake to him so long as we have no further evidence to conclude that the Sāṃkhya text which probably Vātsyāyana used as the basis also held or did not hold such a view. It is evident that the followers of the classical Sāṃkhya would never accept such a position and then it is easy to discard Vātsyāyana's statements as a piece of wrong information. But it may help us to probe into the problem of development of Sāṃkhya if we look at it from a positive point of view. In the present state of our knowledge, however, only two possibilities remain for us—either to opine that the source on which Vātsyāyana relied was not an authentic one or that it is now lost to us.

The arguments against the theory of non-difference between modification and its substratum may be controverted by the Sāṃkhya on the following grounds.

As regards 'the identity of modification and its substratum implies simultaneity of all cognitions', the Sāṃkhyas may say that though Buddhi is able to perceive all objects at a time, yet it does not do so as knowledge arises only when Buddhi is dominated by Sattva. Hence, knowledge does not arise when Buddhi is dominated by Rajas or Tamas.¹¹⁴

The argument that the theory of non-difference between modification and its substratum implies destruction of Buddhi when there is no knowledge, does not stand before logic. The disappearance of modification does not imply disappearance of its substratum. The disappearance of waves, for example, does not mean destruction of water.

The argument that different cognitions cannot arise from a single object can be refuted by the Sāṃkhyas thus. The objects are reflected into Buddhi. Though knowledge is differentiated by corresponding to reflection of different objects caused by different senses, yet knowledge in general is called *buddhivṛtti*, just as sprout coming forth with the help of earth,

114. *Vidvatto'pī* 5

water, air, etc., is called sprout of seed and not that of earth, etc.¹¹⁵

As a matter of fact, the controversy regarding non-difference between modification and its substratum is rooted in non-acceptance of attribute, action, etc., as separate categories by the Sāṃkhyas. The Naiyāyikas differentiate between act and its agent-substratum, as well as attribute and its locus since they admit function, attribute, etc., as separate categories while the Sāṃkhyas include them in the twenty-five categories which are substances in nature.¹¹⁶ That is why, instead of accepting the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), the Sāṃkhyas believe in identity of act and its substratum as well as attribute and its substratum.¹¹⁷

(ii) Vātsyāyana criticises the view that desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain are properties of 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Vācaspatiśrī ascribes this view to Sāṃkhya.

Vātsyāyana¹¹⁸ states that awareness, according to the exponents of this view, belongs to Puruṣa while properties like desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain are located in Buddhi. Vācaspatiśrī supplements it with a vivid interpretation from a different point of view. The consciousness of Puruṣa is immutable but appears to be diverse and liable to rise and disappearance when it is reflected in Buddhi modified into the form of object. This reflection of Puruṣa into Buddhi is called knowledge or function of Puruṣa. Thus, act of knowing and resultant cognition are said to belong to Puruṣa while desire, aversion, etc., are stated to be properties of Buddhi. This explanation of Vācaspatiśrī implies that knowledge belongs metaphorically to Puruṣa on account of its contact with Buddhi.

Udayana agrees with Sāṃkhya in holding that *adrṣṭa* or latent form of past acts are located in agent. He, however, expresses his disapproval of the Sāṃkhya theory that agency belongs to Buddhi which is intrinsically unconscious, and that

115. *Vidvattoṣiṇī* 5

116. *SPB* 1.61

117. *Ibid.* 5.100

118. *NB* 3.2,34

119. *NVTT*, P. 568-9

the conscious principle. i.e., Puruṣa is inactive. Udayana¹²⁰ gives a detailed explanation of the theory from Sāṃkhya viewpoint. The Sāṃkhyas believe in two ultimate realities — Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa is immutable, non-agent and constituted of pure consciousness. Prakṛti, on the other hand, is insentient and modifiable. Prakṛti evolves into objects of the universe. Buddhi is the first evolute. The evolutes of Prakṛti are meant for experience of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is not directly and naturally related to objects. If it were its nature to be related with them, the nature being eternal, Puruṣa would always be related to objects and it would lead to impossibility of release. Prakṛti also does not directly cause the experience of Puruṣa. Prakṛti being eternal will cause experience of Puruṣa for ever and it may again lead to impossibility of release. The objects also are not naturally related to Puruṣa. Otherwise, all objects would be perceived simultaneously and then non-perception of so. objects cannot be accounted for. Puruṣa comes into contact with objects indirectly through senses. Puruṣa, however, does not have direct contact with senses; otherwise all objects would have been perceived all the time. Hence, the Sāṃkhyas have postulated Manas which serves as a connecting link between senses and Puruṣa. This much supposition is not sufficient to explain all states of experience. In dream, sometimes one identifies oneself with tiger, etc., and does not think oneself to be a man. The "T" notion, however, persists even in this state. The existence of this sort of egoism leads the Sāṃkhyas to believe in Ahaṃkāra. The existence of physiological functions like respiration, etc., even in the state of dreamless sleep, when the functions of Ahaṃkāra become dormant, leads the Sāṃkhyas to admit another psychic apparatus, i.e., Buddhi. The experience and their impressions located in Buddhi become limiting adjunct of Puruṣa. Due to non-apprehension of difference between Buddhi and Puruṣa, the former erroneously appears to be sentient and the latter seems to be an agent. Thus, Buddhi has three aspects correspondingly as it is influenced by Puruṣa, object and modification of an object and *upalabdhi* is contact of Puruṣa with this modified form of Buddhi, just like contact of face with mirror when the former is reflected

120. *NKu*, p. 169-74

into the latter. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, virtue and vice belong to *Buddhi*. Thus, *Buddhi* is intrinsically insentient as it undergoes modification. Consciousness is innate in *Puruṣa*. Hence, it is immutable.

The Naiyāyikas controvert this position of Sāṃkhya on the following grounds.

Knowledge, desire, efforts, etc., are experienced as co-existing. A person cognises an object, then he makes an effort to obtain that object which is pleasurable, and to get rid of that which is painful. The desire, etc., being properties of cogniser and intelligent agent, cannot belong to insentient principle like *Buddhi*.¹²¹ Udayana elaborates this argument as follows. The Sāṃkhyas may argue that agency, though belonging to *Buddhi*, erroneously appears to belong to *Puruṣa*. Hence, the sentient entity seems to be agent. Udayana points out that this is not tenable since it goes against our common experience of co-existence of activity and sentience. The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that *Buddhi*, being an evolute, is insentient. This, however, is rejected on the ground that the same argument can hold good against agency of *Buddhi* too. The Sāṃkhyas argue further that the nature of effect follows the nature of cause. *Buddhi* being the evolute of insentient *Prakṛti*, cannot be sentient. It is active because its source is also active. Udayana points out several absurdities in this argument of Sāṃkhya. Firstly, it cannot be proved that agent is produced. Secondly, if agency is supposed to exist in subtle form in *Prakṛti*, attachment, etc., will also be considered as existing in the same. *Prakṛti* will be supposed to possess all characteristics of *Buddhi*. Consequently, there will arise unfavourable contingency of oneness of *Prakṛti* and *Buddhi*. Thirdly, pot, etc. will be regarded as possessing attachment, etc., found in their cause.¹²²

If desire, etc., would belong to *Buddhi*, they would not be visible because desire, etc., present in one person are not perceived by another person.¹²³ Moreover, properties of internal

121. NB 3.2.43

122. NKu, pp. 175-7

123. NV, pp. 437-8

organ cannot be perceived by senses.¹²⁴

The theory of Sāṃkhya implies impossibility of release and creation. If *Buddhi* is considered to be eternal, it will always bind *Puruṣa* and if it is considered to be non-eternal, there will be no possibility of bondage at all because there will be no factor like impressions of past actions, etc., to cause bondage of *Puruṣa*. If it is argued that *Buddhi* is eternal and it will not bind *Puruṣa* after cessation of residual subconscious impression (*vāsanā*), it will not solve the problem. In that case, it is of no use to postulate two separate categories like *Buddhi* and *Pradhāna*; *Buddhi* in its dormant state can be called *Prakṛti*. Moreover, there would be no need of postulating three internal organs. One and the same *Buddhi*, with its diverse functions, can be called by different names as vital air is given different names in accordance with its various functions. The Sāṃkhyas may further state that location of knowledge in *Puruṣa* will imply modifications in *Puruṣa* because the substratum of attributes, being non-different from attributes, necessarily undergoes change. This argument of the Sāṃkhyas, states Udayana, is groundless because the difference between attributes and their substratum is directly perceived. The attributes may change but substratum remains the same. Hence, immutability of *Puruṣa* is not violated.¹²⁵

The knowledge (*jñāna*) of *Puruṣa*, referred to by Vātsyāyana, should be understood as *Puruṣa*'s awareness of self-existence as explained above. Perhaps, Vācaspatiśra takes for granted Vātsyāyana's interpretation, but he proceeds with his own additional explanation for the obvious reason that it omits the reference to awareness of anything external to *Puruṣa*. That is also why Vācaspatiśra does not reiterate the aspect of self-awareness contained in *jñāna* that fully belongs to *Puruṣa*. Vācaspatiśra speaks only of awareness of everything external to *Puruṣa*. The theory that *Buddhi* erroneously seems to be sentient and similarly *Puruṣa* erroneously seems to be active is the cherished doctrine of Sāṃkhya.¹²⁶ Udayana's report regar-

124. NVTT, p. 569

125. NKu, pp. 177-9

126. Cf. SK 20

ding the necessity of the sense-organs, Manas, Ahaṃkāra and the Buddhi in the process of knowledge, and the function of the Manas is the further clarification of the Sāṃkhya theory.

The Sāṃkhya theory of activity of insentient principle, as explained above, is based upon certain positions axiomatic for the Sāṃkhyas. The desire, activity, etc., are ascribed to Buddhi by the Sāṃkhyas to retain immutable and transcendental nature of Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhyas bifurcate the principles at the very start into sentient and insentient, assign all properties liable to and bringing about change to the insentient and, thus, save the sentient principle from any possible change. The same is achieved by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with a different solution. They make a clear cut distinction between substance and attributes and while the attributes change, the substance remains unaffected so that the soul is not involved in any material change due to rise and disappearance of its qualities.

(iii) Vātsyāyana records that knowledge (*jñāna*), according to Sāṃkhya, is function of Buddhi while awareness (*upalabdhi*) is the function of soul which is sentient but inactive.¹²⁷

Vācaspatimiśra explains it thus. Though Buddhi, composed of the three Guṇas, is insentient in nature, it knows objects as it receives light of consciousness from Puruṣa when it comes into contact with the latter. This is like the Moon which having no light of its own, becomes luminous and illumines other objects with the light of the Sun received by it. Moreover, Puruṣa cannot be knower, since knowledge implies modification and Puruṣa being immutable cannot undergo modifications. Buddhi which is eternal as well as modifiable can function as knower.¹²⁸ Thus, qualities like knowledge, virtue (*dharma*) vice (*adharma*) recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), etc., generally attributed to the soul by others are ascribed to Buddhi by Sāṃkhya.¹²⁹ Puruṣa, as held by Sāṃkhya, is the substratum of consciousness while knowledge is located in Buddhi.

127. NB 1.1.15

128. NVTT, p.234

129. Ibid. p.317 also NM Part II, p.61

The Naiyāyikas attack this view of Sāṃkhya on the following grounds :

Knowledge, being characteristic of sentient entity, cannot belong to Buddhi which is intrinsically non-sentient. Otherwise, Buddhi will become sentient. Consequently, it will lead Sāṃkhya to the absurdity of admitting two sentient entities in one and the same body.¹³⁰ Hence, the view of the Sāṃkhyas that Buddhi becomes sentient and Puruṣa becomes active on account of their close contact does not stand before logic.¹³¹ Moreover, in that case, it will be difficult to explain the nature, specific character and role of Puruṣa which is intrinsically sentient. If it is argued that it is Puruṣa that becomes conscious (*cetayate*) and it is Buddhi that knows, it will not improve the case, because the basic idea contained in the roots such as to know, to be aware, to see, to apprehend is identical. If the Sāṃkhyas maintain that Buddhi makes things known and Puruṣa knows, it will contradict their position that Buddhi knows.¹³²

In this context, Uddyotakāra adds one more argument to prove that Buddhi cannot be characterised by knowledge. Buddhi is an instrument in process of knowing and the instrument cannot be substratum of action.¹³³ Vācaspatimiśra elaborates the argument by stating that an instrument is invariably connected with activity. Hence, what Uddyotakāra means is that the instrument cannot be the substratum of principal action (i.e., the act for accomplishment of which the instrument is taken) though the secondary action is located in it. The principal act of cutting, for example, belongs to the agent while secondary actions of rising and falling upon wood belong to axe. Thus, act of knowing, being principal, belongs to the self and not to Buddhi, the instrument of cognition.¹³⁴

Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa point out the flaws in the opinion of the Sāṃkhyas that Buddhi becomes sentient on account of Puruṣa's reflection in it. Vācaspatimiśra argues that Buddhi cannot reflect the consciousness of Puruṣa in the

130. NB 1.1.15

131. NM Part II, p.62

132. NB 3.2.3

133. NV, p.399

134. NVTT, p.537

way the Moon reflects light of the Sun, for Puruṣa being non-modifiable cannot be reflected in Buddhi.¹³⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa elaborates this point. The act of reflecting may either belong to Buddhi or to Puruṣa. It is, however, impossible in case of both. Puruṣa, being non-modifiable, cannot be reflected into Buddhi. If Buddhi is supposed to be reflected into Puruṣa, it will be difficult to explain the nature and function of Puruṣa. Moreover, it will contradict the fundamental standpoint of Sāṃkhya that Puruṣa is seer by nature.¹³⁶ If Puruṣa is supposed to be intrinsically seer, there will be no need of its reflection in Buddhi.¹³⁷ If Puruṣa is supposed to be endowed with natural power of seeing, Puruṣa will never be perceived separately and it will be difficult to discriminate between the qualities of Puruṣa and Buddhi. Hence, their distinction will never be cognised.¹³⁸ Here, the Sāṃkhyas may argue that the distinction between Puruṣa and Buddhi is obvious. Puruṣa is sentient and enjoyer in contrast to Buddhi which is non-sentient and an object of enjoyment. This solution, however, cannot alleviate the absurdities arising from ascribing of knowledge to the insentient element.¹³⁹

The criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory reveals that the Sāṃkhyas differentiate between locus of empirical knowledge (*vyrttiñāna*) and the transcendental pure consciousness which is really hinted at by the Sāṃkhyas. For this purpose only the Sāṃkhyas postulate that Puruṣa which is intrinsically inactive, appears to be agent; and Buddhi which is intrinsically non-sentient appears to be sentient.¹⁴⁰ The later Sāṃkhyas like Vijñānabhikṣu hold the theory of reciprocal reflection in order to ascribe empirical knowledge also to Puruṣa.¹⁴¹

The Naiyāyikas' remark that awareness (*upalabdhi*), according to Sāṃkhya, belongs to Puruṣa while empirical knowledge (*vyrttiñāna*) characterises Buddhi, is the further clarification

135. *NVTT*, p.234

136. *NM* Part II, p.61-2

137. *Ibid.* p.62

138. *Ibid.*

139. *Ibid.*

140. Cf. *SK* 20

141. Cf. *SPB* 1.99

of the ambiguous position of Sāṃkhya on the issue of knowledge. The term *upalabdhi*, according to Vācaspatiśrī, signifies Puruṣa's reflection in Buddhi.¹⁴² This *upalabdhi* is again stated to be the knowledge (*jñāna*) of Puruṣa.¹⁴³ Hence, it may be suggested that the term *upalabdhi* stands for Puruṣa's awareness of its own existence. The knowledge (*jñāna*) of Puruṣa also means the same. This is the contribution of the Naiyāyikas to clarify the theory of Sāṃkhya.

The controversy between the Naiyāyikas and the Sāṃkhyas regarding locus of empirical knowledge is rooted in their difference regarding the nature of empirical self. Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya is immutable and of the nature of pure consciousness while the soul in the theory of the Naiyāyikas is the knower and the agent.

6. Theory of external and internal organs

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas criticise the Sāṃkhya view about (i) the nature and composition, (ii) definition of senses and also (iii) number of senses in consequence. They also object to (iv) the Sāṃkhya view of number of internal organs. Vātsyāyana¹⁴⁴ refutes the view that senses, being all pervasive, do not originate from elements (*bhūtas*). The view is ascribed to Sāṃkhya by his commentators. Udayana¹⁴⁵ criticises definition of *indriya* offered by Sāṃkhya, Vācaspatiśrī¹⁴⁶ introduces for purpose of refutation the view that the organs of action (*Karmendriyas*) are *indriyas*. Jayantabhaṭṭa¹⁴⁷ attacks the Sāṃkhya view about number of internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇas*).

(i) Vātsyāyana puts forth the opponents' view that senses emanate from *avyakta*.¹⁴⁸ The commentators of Vātsyāyana, viz., Uddyotakara and others, interpret the term *avyakta* as *Ahaṃkāra*.¹⁴⁹ The arguments likely to be adduced by the

142. *NVTT*, p.233-4

143. *NB* 3.2.34

144. *Ibid.* 1.1.12, 3.1.32-51, 3.1.61

145. *Kir*, p.183

146. *NVTT*, p.531

147. *NM* Part II, p.65

148. *NB* 3.1.32

149. *NV*, p. 373

Sāṃkhyas in support of their theory are stated as follows. The senses cannot come out of elements because the former are all-pervasive.¹⁵⁰ The Sāṃkhyas cite the case of visual organ and argue that the visual organ perceives objects of all magnitudes, large as the mountain and small as the banyan seed. This is possible only if visual organ be all-pervasive in character. Material elements can pervade objects equal in magnitude to themselves. If the visual organ is assumed to be composed of elements, it would be incapable of perceiving objects that are bigger or smaller than itself in magnitude.¹⁵¹ Jayantabhaṭṭa¹⁵² adds that the senses perceive the objects placed at a distance and this also leads to conclusion that the senses are all-pervasive. The all-pervasiveness of senses implies that they are not composed of material elements, but are the evolutes of all-pervasive Ahaṃkāra. Jayantabhaṭṭa¹⁵³ further states the Sāṃkhya argument that elemental substances like lamp, etc., manifest themselves as well as other objects. The senses, however, reveal other objects only. Hence, the senses cannot be derivatives from elements.

The Naiyāyikas refute the view of the Sāṃkhyas on the following grounds.

The view of the Sāṃkhyas that senses are evolutes of Ahaṃkāra is based upon wrong notion of character of senses. The perception of objects of all sizes does not necessarily imply all-pervasive character of visual organ. The object is perceived in its entirety due to a particular kind of contact of visual organ with the object.¹⁵⁴ The rays issuing forth from visual organ, pervade the whole object and, thus, parts of visual organ come in contact with parts of object.¹⁵⁵ Vācaspatimiśra¹⁵⁶ lays down four varieties of this contact, viz., (i) contact of parts of organ with parts of object, (ii) contact of parts of organ with entire object, (iii) contact of organ as a

150. NB 3.1.32

151. NB 3.1.33

152. NM Part II, p.49

153. Ibid.

154. NS 3.1.34

155. NV, p.376

156. NVTT, p.522

whole with parts of object and (iv) contact of the whole organ with entire object. The fact that perception of an object is caused by the contact of visual rays with the object is supported by our daily experience. When the visual rays proceeding towards the object are obstructed by something like a wall, etc., intervening between the two, there is no contact of the rays with the objects and the object is not perceived. It is similar to the lamp-rays, which being obstructed, do not illumine an object. If the senses were all-pervasive, perception would not be obstructed by the intervening object.¹⁵⁷

Sāṃkhyas are presented as objecting to this argument on the ground that visual rays, presupposed by the Naiyāyikas, do not exist at all. If visual rays would exist, they would have been perceived like rays of lamp.¹⁵⁸ Non-perception of a perceptible object, implies its non-existence.¹⁵⁹ Its acceptance through inference, adds Vācaspatimiśra, would be equal to acceptance of man's horn.¹⁶⁰

To this objection, the Naiyāyikas reply that non-perception of an object, the existence of which is deduced inferentially, does not prove its non-existence.¹⁶¹ Though upper surface of moon and lower surface of earth are not perceived, yet their existence cannot be disproved.¹⁶² Though the rays issuing forth from eye are not perceived, yet they can be inferred as medium of contact of visual organ with the object in process of visual perception. The nature of a substance differs from that of qualities. Sometimes, the substance is not perceived when its parts are mixed with some other substance, though qualities of the former are perceived. For instance, atoms of water are not perceived while their quality of coolness is perceived.¹⁶³ A substance along with its colour is perceived when the substance is constituted of parts and its colour is manifest.¹⁶⁴ In the case

157. NB. 3.1.34

158. NS 3.1.35

159. NV p. 377

160. NVTT, p. 523

161. NS 3.1.36

162. NB 3.1.36

163. NS 3.1.37

164. NS 3.1.38

of light, there is diversity of characteristics. Sometimes, light becomes visible along with its colour and touch as is found in the case of sun-rays. In some cases, the light has its colour manifest, but touch latent as in the case of light of lamp. Sometimes, light has touch manifest but colour latent as in the case of light in contact with heated water. Sometimes, colour and touch of light remain latent as it is observed in the case of visual rays. Thus, visual rays are not perceived because their colour and touch are not manifest.¹⁶⁵ The non-manifestation of light and colour of visual rays serves a particular purpose. The organs, being meant for experiencing the fruit of merits (*dharma*) and demerits (*adharma*) incurred by the beings are constituted accordingly to suit the purpose.¹⁶⁶ That is why, touch and colour of visual rays are kept latent. Therefore, they do not burn the objects exposed to them and also cannot obstruct the vision like a screen between eye and object.¹⁶⁷ Gautama records the opinion of some other *ācāryas* regarding the cause of non-perception of visual rays. Some hold that light of visual rays is not perceived because it is overpowered by some other light, as the light of meteor (*ulkāprakāśa*) is not seen because it is outdone by the sun light.¹⁶⁸ Others maintain that perception of object is caused by manifestation of their colour by external light falling upon them. The absence of such an external illumining light, in the case of eye which is itself a form of light, causes the non-perception of its colour.¹⁶⁹ These opinions are, however, discarded by Gautama. He holds that possibility of being aided or being subdued by external light arises only when colour is manifest. The colour of visual rays is not manifest and, therefore, the rays are not perceived.¹⁷⁰ Gautama adduces one more argument to prove existence of visual rays. The presence of visual rays is actually observed in the case of eyes of animals like cat and others

165. NB 3.1.38

166. NS 3.1.39

167. NB 3.1.39

168. NS 3.1.40

169. NS 3.1.42

170. NB 3.1.43

moving in dark.¹⁷¹ Against this argument, the Sāṃkhyas may say that as the species of human being and that of these animals are different, their organs also have different characteristics. Therefore, it is not conclusive evidence to prove the presence of rays in eyes of a human being. Vātsyāyana alleviates this objection on the ground that such a difference of character regarding eyes of animal and man cannot be admitted because the act of perception is hindered by obstruction of a wall, etc., in both the cases.¹⁷² Hence, organs are not all-pervasive and as a result cannot be regarded as evolutes of Ahaṁkāra.

The visual organ should be regarded as a material substance since, like all material objects, visual rays are obstructed by intervention of wall and the like. This sort of obstruction is not possible in the case of non-material and all-pervasive objects.¹⁷³

To this argument, the Sāṃkhyas may object that visual rays are not obstructed by the objects like crystal, etc. This argument, therefore, fails to prove the material nature of senses.¹⁷⁴

This objection, according to the Naiyāyikas, is based upon non-valid invariable association (*vyāpti*). The material light of Sun also is not obstructed by glass, etc. There are some objects which do not obstruct light. The light of Sun is not obstructed by jar etc., since the effect of sunlight is found in case of the objects contained in jar.¹⁷⁵ The example of obstruction of visual rays by wall, etc., proves the material character of visual organ.¹⁷⁶ The obstruction, however, depends upon the nature of intervening object. This may be clarified by the following instance. Water and mirror having a particular colour, viz., bright whiteness coupled with transparency (*prasāda*), can reflect the object placed before them. But, wall which is not endowed with this particular quality cannot do so.¹⁷⁷

171. NS 3.1.44

172. NB 3.1.44

173. NS 3.1.46

174. NB 3.1.47

175. NB 3.1.48

176. NS 3.1.49

177. NS 3.1.50

The Sāṃkhyas may further argue, adds Uddyotakara, that obstruction does not disturb all-pervasiveness of senses. The senses are all-pervasive but their function is obstructed by wall, etc. This, argues Uddyotakara, is absurd from the point of view of Sāṃkhya because the Sāṃkhyas do not admit existence of an organ apart from its function. Uddyotakara further points out the absurdities involved in the Sāṃkhya theory of non-difference between organ and its function. Firstly, rise and disappearance of function would imply rise and disappearance of organ. If, for the sake of argument, function is considered to be eternal, organs would also be eternal. If organs are held to be eternal, the terms cause and agent would be meaningless. Secondly, non-difference between the respective organs and their functions would lead to the undesirable contingency of simultaneous perception of all objects, because the simultaneous existence of all organs would cause their simultaneous function.¹⁷⁸ Vācaspatimiśra¹⁷⁹ observes that though the Sāṃkhyas hold that while eating a big rice cake one may have various kinds of knowledge simultaneously, yet they accept succession in cognition also arising from successive function of senses. The successive knowledge would not be possible if we accept the simultaneous function of senses as well as non-difference between sense and its function.

Since each of the senses (e.g., eye) is constituted of one element (i.e., fire) it has the capacity to make manifest special quality of that element present in other things (e.g., colour) because it is a principle that the presence of an element in a thing enables that thing to manifest corresponding special quality in other things. The diversity of the nature and function of senses, i.e., the law of manifestation of a particular quality by particular sense only, cannot be explained by accepting a common source for all the senses. If all senses would have come out of a common source, each of them would be capable of manifesting all objects having different elemental qualities.¹⁸⁰

Uddyotakara adds that senses are elemental because they offer resistance like other elemental objects such as jar etc.¹⁸¹

178. *NV* p. 374-6

179. *NVTT* p. 522

180. *NB* 1.1.12 and 3.1.61

181. *NV* p. 382

The organ of hearing also is elemental in nature, since it illumines objects brought into its contact as is the case with other senses which come out of elements.¹⁸²

There is a Sāṃkhya argument that senses cannot be derivatives of elements as they do not manifest their own qualities. Jayantabhaṭṭa refutes it by saying that manifestation of their own qualities by senses is not expected because these qualities belong to their constituent elements. They are senses because they have this characteristic, etc. In other words, the presence of these qualities is presupposed in them and, hence, qualities need no further manifestation. So, there is no invariable relation between 'being a sense' and 'manifesting one's own qualities'.¹⁸³

This criticism reveals the fact that senses, according to Sāṃkhya, are not gross and visible physical organs but the power located in them. What are commonly called as senses are visible marks of their 'power centres.' The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* also clarifies that senses are super-sensuous.¹⁸⁴ The gross organs cannot directly originate from Ahaṃkāra.

Vātsyāyana's statement of the Sāṃkhya view that senses come out of Ahaṃkāra is in conformity with the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*¹⁸⁵ and other Sāṃkhya texts available to us. The statement that the Sāṃkhyas consider senses to be all-pervasive goes against the Sāṃkhya position as it is known to us. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*¹⁸⁶ explicitly mentions that the evolutes of Prakṛti are limited in magnitude. It cannot, however, be stated that the Sāṃkhya theory recorded by Vātsyāyana is fictitious. Vindhyavāsin, as quoted by the *Yuktidīpikā*,¹⁸⁷ held that senses are all-pervasive in nature. Moreover, the *Yuktidīpikā*¹⁸⁸ records the arguments that senses originate from Ahaṃkāra since they are all-pervasive in nature. That is why they can come into contact with the object at a distance. Vātsyāyana

182. *NV*, p. 282.

183. *NM* Part II, p. 52-3

184. *SS* 2.23

185. *SK* 22 also *SS* 2.20

186. *SK* 10

187. *YD* 22

188. *YD* 38

might have come across this sort of opinion somewhere. The available Sāṃkhya texts are silent about the controversy regarding existence of visual rays and do not make any statement for or against. Vātsyāyana's remark that the Sāṃkhyas do not believe in existence of visual rays can be said to be a further clarification of the Sāṃkhya view about visual organ.

It may, however, be noted that some Sāṃkhya teachers maintained that senses are elemental (*bhautika*) in nature. Pañcādhikaraṇa, as recorded by the *Yuktidīpikā*,¹⁸⁹ holds that senses originate from elements. The *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra*¹⁹⁰ contains statements of both the views in different places. In some places it is put forward that senses originate from respective elements which they grasp, while at others the author seems to uphold that they emanate from Ahaṃkāra.¹⁹¹

Uddyotakara's criticism¹⁹² implies that senses, according to Sāṃkhya, are eternal. The eternity of senses, however, is not supported by the texts of the Sāṃkhyas available to us. On the contrary, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*¹⁹³ explicitly negates eternity of evolutes of Prakṛti.

The Sāṃkhyas have tried to defend their theory from the severe criticism of the Naiyāyikas. The *Yuktidīpikā* refutes the theory of elemental origin of the senses based upon apprehension of qualities of their respective elements as material cause. The theory, argues the *Yuktidīpikā*, implies the undesirable contingency of origin of water from earth because water serves as the means of manifesting smell.¹⁹⁴

The *Yuktidīpikā* further argues that senses cannot originate from elemental objects since, unlike senses, elemental objects like pot, cloth, etc., are not capable of perceiving other objects.¹⁹⁵

The Sāṃkhyas try to justify their theory on the scriptural

189. YD 22

190. SSS 8,10,15,26,56

191. SSS 22,27,36

192. NV, p. 375

193. SK 10

194. YD 26

195. Ibid.

basis arguing that the scriptures teach that senses originate from the Ahaṃkāra.¹⁹⁶

*Udayavira Shastri*¹⁹⁷ adduces following arguments in favour of the theory of Sāṃkhya. (i) It is unscientific to suppose that senses come out of the elements. Ahaṃkāra gives rise to twofold evolutes—means of cognition and objects to be cognised. The means carry more importance than the objects. Hence, senses cannot be held to be the products of elements. (ii) The senses can illuminate the objects due to density of illuminating principle, i.e., Sattva. If they were to be products of elements which abound in Tamas, they would not be capable of illuminating the objects. Here, it may be observed that the first argument presupposes origination of the senses from Ahaṃkāra and the second argument presupposes that the organs abound in Sattva. Both of these presuppositions are not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas.

As a matter of fact, the controversy regarding source of senses is rooted in certain presuppositions of the Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas. According to Sāṃkhya, position of every object in the scheme of evolution depends upon the quantity of Sattva. Hence, they are considered to be the evolutes of Ahaṃkāra. The Naiyāyikas trace the origin of physical world from *paramāṇus* and do not accept the existence of categories like the Buddhi and Ahaṃkāra. Hence, they hold that senses come out of the elements.

(ii) Udayana criticises the definition of *indriya* offered by the Sāṃkhyas, viz, "*indriya* is that which evolves from Ahaṃkāra abounding in Sattva," or "It is that which serves the purpose of the spirit (Indra)."

Udayana states that the first definition is not valid, since it is based upon the hypothesis that organs originate from the Ahaṃkāra which is not established. The second definition is too wide. It is applicable to all the limbs of body which equally serve the purpose of soul.¹⁹⁸

We do not come across any definition of *indriya* in early Sāṃkhya texts like the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Vācaspatiśrī defines

196. SS 2.20

197. *Sāṃkhya Siddhānta*, pp. 287-88

198. Kir, p. 183

indriya as that which originates from the Sāttvika form of Ahaṃkāra.¹⁹⁹ The first part of Udayana's criticism is directed against this definition of *indriya*. The second definition recorded by Udayana is, however, not given by Vācaspatimiśra. It seems to be based upon a distortion of Vācaspatimiśra's statement that *indriyas* are called so because they are sign (liṅga) of Indra of Ātman.²⁰⁰ The statement of Vācaspatimiśra is of the form of etymology of the term *indriya* and is not intended as a definition. Hence, the criticism of the second definition, which is not accepted even by Sāṃkhya, is at best a further clarification of Udayana's own understanding about Sāṃkhya, but it has no relevance to the Sāṃkhya view.

As a matter of fact, the definition of *indriya* offered by Vācaspatimiśra is a result of certain presuppositions as it is based upon the cosmological position of Sāṃkhya. That is why it is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. Nor is the definition acceptable to Vijñānabhikṣu,²⁰¹ since it does not fit in with his scheme of process of evolution. He maintains that Manas arises from the Sāttvika form of Ahaṃkāra. His definition of *indriya* is, that which is the physiological instrument arising from Ahaṃkāra.²⁰² This is also based upon the notion that *indriya* originates from Ahaṃkāra and as such does not supersede the definition offered by Vācaspatimiśra. Modern Indian scholars find the Sāṃkhya definition of *indriya* inadequate. Udayavira Shastri²⁰³ thinks that an *indriya*, according to Sāṃkhya, is that which comes in direct contact with the object to be cognised. Manas also comes into contact with the object in the case of memory. This definition comes nearer to the intention of the Naiyāyikas. Considering it from the Sāṃkhya point of view, the definition involves the fault that it is not applicable to organs of action which are considered as *indriyas* by Sāṃkhya. Thus, we would have no valid Sāṃkhya definition of *indriya* if we reject the one offered by Vācaspatimiśra and accepted in its essential part by Vijñānabhikṣu.

199. STK 20

200. Ibid.

201. SPB. 2.18

202. SPB. 2.19

203. Sāṃkhya Siddhānta, pp. 279-80

(iii) Vācaspatimiśra objects to the view that organs of action (*Karmendriyas*), viz., speech (*vāk*), hand (*pāṇi*), feet (*pāda*), excretory organ (*pāyu*) and organ of generation (*upās-tha*) are regarded as *indriyas*. Jayantabhaṭṭa,²⁰⁴ Śrīdhara²⁰⁵ and Udayana²⁰⁶ ascribe this view to Sāṃkhya. Jayantabhaṭṭa further states that the Sāṃkhyas regard organs of action as *indriya* on the ground that they perform specific functions.²⁰⁷

The Naiyāyikas offer criticism of this view in the following manner. The organs of action cannot be called *indriya* because the definition of an *indriya* does not apply to them. *Indriya* is defined as direct instrument of cognition which is located in animal organism (*śarīra*) and which is not defiled by impressions (*saṃskāras*). The organs of action are not the direct means of cognition.²⁰⁸

As a correction the Sāṃkhyas formulate another definition of *indriya* which may equally be applicable to organs of action, namely, that which performs specific function (*asādhāraṇa karma*) and depends upon animal organism (*śarīrāśritam*).²⁰⁹ The organs of action also perform the specific functions of speaking (*vacana*), handling (*ādāna*) walking (*vihaṇa*) excretion (*utsarga*) and gratification (*ānanda*).

This alternate definition of *indriya* involves following absurdities. Firstly, even this definition is not applicable to organs of action (*Karmendriyas*) as claimed by Sāṃkhya. It is wrong to say that organs of action perform specific functions. The acts of handling, walking and excretion can be performed with curved hands, etc.,²¹⁰ which amounts to saying that the function assigned to one organ can be performed by other organ also. Secondly, the definition is too wide. It is applicable to throat (*kaṇṭha*), heart (*hṛdaya*), stomach or liver (*āsaya*), etc.,

204. NM Part II, p. 54

205. NK, p. 44

206. Kir, p. 183

207. NM Part II, p. 54

208. NVTT, p. 531

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid. also NM Part II, p. 54

since they also perform specific physiological functions of swallowing.²¹¹ Thirdly, the Sāṃkhyas will have to admit many *indriyas* located in one organ of action in accordance with the number of functions performed by one single organ. The organ of generation, for example, performs the act of giving pleasure as well as that of excretion.²¹² Fourthly, the definition lays down certain features which are not found in the nature of the organ of speech. As a matter of fact, there is no organ which produces word. The word originates from union or disunion of articulatory points as it is observed as originating from union of drum and the stick. The nature of sound differs in accordance with place of articulation.²¹³

On the basis of the arguments stated above, Jayantabhaṭṭa concludes that body is endowed with various limbs which help the soul to experience the fruits of past deeds. The number of organs should not, therefore, unnecessarily be increased by regarding each limb as an organ.²¹⁴

It is true that the Sāṃkhyas regard the organs of action (*karmendriyas*) as organs (*indriyas*). The argument, recorded by Jayantabhaṭṭa, that the Sāṃkhyas admit organs of action as *indriyas* because they perform specific functions, is not found in the texts of the Sāṃkhyas available to us. The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* enumerates organs and their functions.²¹⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa seems to deduce from these statements of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* that the Sāṃkhyas define an *indriya* as 'that which performs a specific function'.

*Anima Sengupta*²¹⁶ thinks that the controversy regarding number of organs can be inferred from the statements of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* too. She is of the opinion that the 24th and the 25th *kārikā* speak of eleven organs while in the 32nd *kārikā* organs are stated to be thirteen in number. This opinion of *Anima Sengupta* seems to be based upon the misunderstanding

211. *NVTT*, p. 531 also *NM* Part II, p. 54

212. *NM* Part II, pp. 54-5

213. *NM* Part II, p. 55

214. *Ibid.*

215. *SK* 28

216. *Classical Sāṃkhya, A Study*, pp. 26-7

that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* does not differentiate between *karaṇas* and *indriyas*. The 24th and the 25th *kārikā* speak of the *indriyas* while the 32nd *kārikā* speaks of *karaṇas*. Thus, the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* speaks of thirteen *karaṇas*²¹⁷ and eleven *indriyas*.²¹⁸ The *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra* according to Sāṃkhya are *karaṇas* and not *indriyas*. Hence, there is no scope for a difference in views regarding the number of *indriyas* in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

In fact, the controversy regarding number of *indriyas* is rooted in the controversy of definition of *indriya*. The Sāṃkhya definition of an *indriya* is based upon its cosmological position while the *Naiyāyikas* hold that an *indriya* is necessarily direct means of cognition. The Sāṃkhyas call evolutes of *Sāttvika Ahaṃkāra* as *indriyas*.

(iv) The Sāṃkhyas believe in thirteen *karaṇas*. Ten of them are external and three internal.²¹⁹

Jayantabhaṭṭa objects to this view of the Sāṃkhyas thus. The Sāṃkhyas unnecessarily raise number of internal organs to three. *Manas* alone is sufficiently competent to act as an internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra*, postulated by the Sāṃkhyas as internal organs are not organs at all. *Buddhi*, being "knowledge", is an effect and cannot function as an instrument. Similarly, *Ahaṃkāra* is also an object of knowledge and not the instrument.²²⁰

The criticism applies well to the system of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*. *Vindhyavāsin*,²²¹ an ancient teacher of Sāṃkhya, appears to believe in one internal organ.

The crux of the problem lies in the difference of opinion between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya systems with reference to the nature of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra*. *Buddhi*, according to the Sāṃkhyas, is a substance and not the mere cognition as held by the *Naiyāyikas*. Some of the functions and the qualities, ascribed to the soul by the *Naiyāyikas*, are ascribed to *Buddhi*

217. *SK* 32

218. *SK* 24, 26-8

219. *SK* 33

220. *NM* Part II, p. 55

221. *YD* 22

other letters.²³⁰

Vācaspatimiśra ascribes the view to Sāṃkhya and adds that letters, according to them, continue to exist even when they undergo modifications. This modification does not imply destruction of letters just as the modification of earth into pots and the modification of gold into ornaments does not imply destruction of earth and gold respectively.²³¹

The view of Sāṃkhya is criticised on the following grounds.

Modification means giving up of some part or character and the introduction of some new character while the intrinsic nature of the substance remains as before, e.g., when gold is modified into the ornaments, its character of gold persists even in the state of modification. Thus, there is basic continuity of object even after its modification. This cannot, however, be inferred in case of letters replaced by other letters. When the letter *i* is replaced by *y* in the expressions like *dadhyatra* (i.e. *dadhi+atra*), the *i* sound does not persist in *y*.²³²

The letters *i* and *y* are different on account of difference in their place of pronunciation called effort; *i* is pronounced with open articulation (*vivṛta*) and *y* with slightly touched articulation (*iṣat sparśa*). Hence, these letters, being different from each other in character, cannot be modification of each other. If *y* were the modification of *i*, their place of pronunciation would have been the same.²³³

Utterance of *y* does not presuppose the utterance of *i*. Hence, *y* cannot be modification of *i*.²³⁴

The modified form of a letter does not differ from its form when it is not supposed to be modification. The effort involved in pronouncing the letter *y* in *yatate* (when it is not considered to be modification of some letter) and in *dadhyatra* (when it is said to be modification of *i*) is the same. Hence, there is no factor to decide that *y* is modification of *i*. The

230. NB. 2.2.40

231. NVTT, p. 463

232. NB 2.2.40

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid.

original letter should be different from that which is regarded to be modification of some letter.²³⁵

In actual usage *i* is not perceived as being modified into *y*. On the contrary, *y* is perceived as replacing *i*. In case of modification, on the other hand, modification is actually perceived. Vācaspatimiśra explains it more vividly. Unlike letters, milk is perceived as modified into curd. The absence of perception of modification in letters disproves the theory of their modification.²³⁶

If letters are really modified into others, they may stand in relation of original and its modified form, and cause and effect. Both of these relations, however, are not found in the case of the replacement of letters. Hence, one letter cannot be accepted as modification of some other letter.²³⁷

One group of letters cannot be held to be modification of some other group of letters. The \sqrt{as} and \sqrt{vac} cannot be accepted as modifications of *bhū* and *brū* respectively. The acceptance of modification in these cases would imply futility of rules of grammar prescribing replacement of letters. Similarly, there cannot be modification in case of single letter too.²³⁸

The character of original causes continues to be present in modifications too. The transformation always follows the nature of original cause. It does not hold good in case of letters. Shortness (*laghutva*) or length (*dīrghatva*) of *i* does not affect its modifications.²³⁹

Against this objection, the Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing that modifications need not fully correspond to their causes. The modifications may be smaller than, equal to or larger than the cause.²⁴⁰ Vācaspatimiśra gives following instances to explain it. The big banyan tree emanates from the smaller seed but from a coconut seed, bigger than banyan seed, a tree comes up which is smaller than banyan tree, but equal in proportion with another coconut tree.²⁴¹

235. NV, p. 307

236. Ibid.

237. Ibid.

238. Ibid.

239. NB 2.2.41

240. NB 2.2.42

241. NVTT, p. 465

There is no regularity regarding the original and transformed forms of letters. I can be said to be the cause of *y* in the expressions like *dadhyatra*. Sometimes, *i* takes the place of *y* in the expressions like *vidhyati* derived from the root *vyadha*. In case there is modification, there is the uniformity of rule as regards the relation of cause and its modification. The cause is always the cause and gets modified, the corresponding effect is always the modified form of the cause and they never change their status in their mutual context. For instance, milk is cause of curds because milk is modified into curds and not vice versa.²⁵⁴

Here, the Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing that the irregularity regarding cause and effect is constant in case of letters and this irregularity itself can be regarded as a kind of regularity.²⁵⁵

To this also, the Naiyāyikas object that the irregularity though constant cannot be regularity because regularity and irregularity, being contradictory, cannot pertain to the same object.²⁵⁶

The Naiyāyikas give their own opinion regarding the change in the grammatical operation. In the case of letters they admit no modification to imply the causal relation. The change, actually perceived in case of letters, can be divided into following groups: (a) introduction of a fresh property, (b) dropping of some form, (c) diminution in respect of some vowel, (d) enlargement of vowel, (e) curtailment of form as *staḥ*, (f) augment of vowel.²⁵⁷

It is difficult to ascertain source of the theory of the Sāṃkhyas presented as the *Pūrvapakṣa*. No available text of Sāṃkhya mentions that sound exists in substance endowed with other qualities, odour and the like. Besides, no text of Sāṃkhya states that word is modified into another word in grammatical operations. The works of Sāṃkhya, available to us, do not maintain that words are eternal. The Sāṃkhyā-

254. NB 2.2.56

255. NB 2.2.57

256. NB 2.2.58

257. NB 2.2.59

rikā²⁵⁸ explicitly states that effects of Prakṛti are non-eternal. The Vedas are also not considered to be eternal by Sāṃkhya.²⁵⁹ Though Sudarśanācārya²⁶⁰ observes that the theory criticised belongs to Mīmāṃsā, it creates another problem. The Mīmāṃsikas do not favour the doctrine of *Parīṇāma* in the first place. Secondly, the extensive arguments to prove eternal character of sound, as based on a thorough application of the theory of *Parīṇāma* are to be expected only from the Sāṃkhyas who own the theory as the archstone of their system. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to hope to trace the source of entire discussion in some other Sāṃkhya text supposed to be lost to us. The discussion presents an aspect of Sāṃkhya which is not known so far in this light.

8 Non-difference between components and Composites

Uddyotakara criticises the Sāṃkhya theory that composite is not fundamentally different from components (*avayavas*) from which it is produced. Though Uddyotakara does not explicitly ascribe the view to Sāṃkhya, modern scholars consider it to be a statement of the Sāṃkhya view.

The Sāṃkhyas are presented as putting forth the following reasons to prove non-difference between composites (*avayavī*) and components (*avayavas*).

(i) The relation of component and composite cannot subsist between two entities of entirely different nature. A cow cannot be component of a horse. On the other hand, cloth, which is composed of yarns, is of the nature of yarns.²⁶¹

(ii) A composite cannot be different from components because the latter constitute parts of the former. A part cannot be essentially different from whole. The part of sky, for example, is not different from sky.²⁶²

(iii) Components are not different from the composite for they form the material cause of the former. No substance can be produced out of a totally different substance, e.g., man cannot be produced from a cow, a horse or an elephant.²⁶³

258. SK 10

259. SS 5.48

260. *Prasannapadā* on NB 2.2.40

261. NV, p. 217

262. NV, p. 226

263. *Ibid.*

(iv) Components are not different from their composite insofar as they are not the components of some object other than their own composite. Things, different from one component, are found to be component of other objects. Yarns, for example, which are different from chariot, are components of cloth. Yarns are, therefore, not different from cloth.²⁶⁴

(v) Composite is not different from components because there is a restriction with reference to the place occupied by them. Components of one object cannot occupy the place of production of some other object of a different nature. A cow cannot be produced in the place occupied by a horse.²⁶⁵

(vi) A composite is not different from components for both of them are composed of the same substance. Difference between two objects depends upon the difference of their components. A wheel, for example, differs from a jar because it is composed of components other than those of jar.²⁶⁶

(vii) An object, which produces something different from the object already present at the production, differs from the latter. Yarns are different from mat for they produce something other than mat. Yarns, on the other hand, do not produce something else but cloth which is not different from yarns.²⁶⁷

(viii) A composite is not different from components for it results from conjunction of its own components. An object differs from the thing which is not the result of conjunction of components of that object. Mat is different from cloth because it does not result from conjunction of those threads from which cloth is produced.²⁶⁸

(ix) A composite is not different from components as they possess same qualities. If components were different from composite, the latter would be without qualities since composite cannot have qualities of some object totally different from it. The qualities of horse cannot be produced from qualities of cow.²⁶⁹

264. *Ibid.*

265. *Ibid.* p. 227

266. *NV*, p. 228

267. *Ibid.*

268. *NV*, p. 229

269. *Ibid.*

(x) The admission of difference between composite and components will lead to non-perceptibility of object. The composite would subsist in perceptible (whole) and imperceptible (component, atoms) and would, therefore, be imperceptible just as the conjunction of mother and womb is imperceptible because it subsists in perceptible mother and imperceptible womb. The composite is perceptible. Hence, it cannot be different from composite.²⁷⁰

(xi) A composite is not different from components because there is neither conjunction (*samyoga*) nor disjunction (*aprāpti*) between the two. The distinct objects, for example, a cow and a horse have disjunction and conjunction.²⁷¹

(xii) Components are not different from composite because they do not bring about an effect of a different weight and other qualities such as colour, etc. A cause does not produce qualities in effect other than its own.²⁷²

These arguments of Sāṃkhya are criticised on following grounds:

The first reason has no probans (*hetu*) to prove non-difference between components and composite. "To be components" cannot be probans proving non-difference because it involves self-contradiction. If yarns are not supposed to be different from cloth, they cannot be said to be components of cloth. The very concept of composite implies difference between composite and components.²⁷³

The second reason also is defective in many respects. Firstly, it is too much restricted in scope and has neither similar nor dissimilar instance. Secondly, if component is considered to be cause of composite, the probans becomes contradictory because components imply the existence of composite as a separate entity. The instance of space (*ākāśa*) is unproved (*asiddha*) because space (*ākāśa*), being all-pervasive, has no part.²⁷⁴

270. *NV*, p. 233

271. *Ibid.*

272. *NV*, p. 234

273. *NV*, p. 217

274. *NV*, p. 226

The third reason is invalid. Firstly, the probans is too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*). Secondly, the probans is contradictory (*viruddha*). It is observed that effect is different from its cause. Cloth, for example, is totally different from loom, etc. If the argument is interpreted as an object cannot be produced from different object, it will be meaningless just like the statement that the cloth is produced from cloth.²⁷⁵

The fourth reason involves self-contradiction. Components cannot be identical with composite. A component cannot be its own component. Hence, it requires some composite other than itself. Otherwise, it ceases to be a component.²⁷⁶

The fifth reason also is too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*) and contradictory (*viruddha*). Components, i.e., yarns cannot themselves be produced in the place occupied by them. Nothing can be produced in a place where it exists earlier. The production out of yarns requires something else as the produced.²⁷⁷

The sixth reason is also too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*) and contradictory. The expression, viz., 'composite is composed of components', implies difference of composite from components.²⁷⁸

The seventh reason also is too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*) and contradictory (*viruddha*). Yarns cannot produce themselves. Hence, composite which is produced should be considered to be different from components.²⁷⁹

The eighth reason also is too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*) and contradictory (*viruddha*). The statement that cloth is produced from conjunction of yarns implies that conjunction, yarns and cloth are different from one another.²⁸⁰

275. *NV*, p. 227

276. *Ibid.*

277. *Ibid.*

278. *Ibid.* p. 228

279. *Ibid.*

280. *NV*, p. 229

The ninth reason also is too restricted in scope (*asādhāraṇa*) and contradictory (*viruddha*). The reason that qualities of composite are produced from qualities of components implies difference between composite and components.²⁸¹

The tenth reason is contradictory (*viruddha*). The statement regarding imperceptibility of composite and perceptibility of components implies distinction between the two. The reason that the conjunction of imperceptible and perceptible objects, causes non-perception of the object is inconclusive. If it would be true, snow-ball formed by small imperceptible snow particles on the summit of Himālaya would have been imperceptible as the snow-ball has imperceptible snow particles as its components which subsist on perceptible mountain.²⁸²

The eleventh reason involves logical flaw. In the reasoning, subject (*pakṣa*) is the 'composite' while reason, viz., 'the absence of conjunction and disjunction' is connected only with conjunction and disjunction, and being unrelated to *sādhya* fails to prove it. Moreover, we find the examples which lead to contrary result. Serpent-coil is not in conjunction with its cause, yet it is different from it. Even in the theory of Sāṃkhyas, the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are distinct but there is no conjunction or disjunction among them. In the same way, Prakṛti and Puruṣa are distinct, but there is no conjunction or disjunction between them.²⁸³

The last reason also does not prove non-difference between composite and components. It can prove absence of effect of different weight but not of weight or composite itself. From denial of water, the denial of jar or the parts of jar does not follow. If weight is considered to be indicative of qualities like colour, etc., the reason will be contradictory because it speaks of production of effect which is different from the cause.²⁸⁴ The colour of composite is actually different from that of its components as held by the Naiyāyikas and the

281. *Ibid.*

282. *Ibid.* pp. 229-30

283. *Ibid.* p. 233

284. *Ibid.* p. 234

Vaiśeṣikas. That is why, they have postulated variegated colour (*citrarūpa*) as a distinct variety of colour.

Taking into consideration the third argument, the Naiyāyikas appear to misunderstand or distort the Sāṃkhya position. The relation of cloth to loom is different from its relation to threads. The loom is instrumental cause and the threads, the material cause and even Sāṃkhyas would not have claimed non-difference of loom and cloth.

As a matter of fact, the controversy regarding relation of composite and components is rooted in non-acceptance of inherence (*samavāya*) by Sāṃkhya. The Naiyāyikas postulate inherence (*samavāya*) as a special variety of relation and hold that composite is related to its components through it. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, do not believe in inherence (*samavāya*) and consequently, maintain that composite is partly different from and partly identical with its components. It is an entity apart from its components but not different from them. The composite possesses certain new qualities not found in its components and performs different functions than its components, but it is identical with its components insofar as they are inseparable.

The controversy as regards relation of composite and components has deeper roots and is embedded in the problem of causation. The Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas try to interpret it from different standpoints, basing their arguments on certain characteristics of the phenomenon called causation. For instance the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas completely analyse a certain particular totality of causes and conditions, that produces a particular effect and in spite of different degrees of their invariability, accord them a status of equal importance. Naturally, they attach more significance to the difference on different planes which they claim to be a fact of experience. Thus, from their criticism of the Sāṃkhya view, the following varieties of differences emerge, as the basis of their explanation of causation. (i) Conceptual difference relating to the concept of composite and components; (ii) difference of verbal denotation corresponding to the concepts; (iii) functional difference which has an important bearing on practical activity; (iv) difference as

proved by perception and (v) qualitative difference. Because of these manifold differences, which belong to different planes such as mental, verbal, practical and the like, it is more sound to forego the idea of identity and to make a statement of causality as based on relations. Causality without relation is not possible. It is also because of these differences or appearance of something different from the preceding one, causality can be described as a process involving activity of the existent to bring about the non-existent.

The Sāṃkhyas, however, realise difficulties in explaining satisfactorily as to how composite and components come to be related. The very necessity of supposition of a unique relation called *Samavāya* which is "eternal relation of the never-separated" proves absurdity in the thesis maintaining difference. To say that it is a relation, that it is eternal, but having a beginning, and that the two are never joined or never separated is either to miss the essential nature of relation or to understand by a technicality which is but a product of imagination.

The Sāṃkhyas, therefore, uphold the identity of essence. A thing or a product can be looked upon as constituted of essential and secondary or variable factors. By emphasising continuity of essence and importance of non-difference of material cause, the Sāṃkhyas advocate 'relationless causality which is a continuous forward process and by eliminating difference explain a backward movement, viz., return to the cause. As a result, there being no relation, the terms 'composite and component' do not carry for them that significance which they do for the Naiyāyikas. They say that even in effect state it is possible to look deeper and to identify the causal material. They are, consequently saved from the troubles of "potsherds" after destruction of a jar as a totally new product and a net of relations among primary and secondary categories as well as difference of space occupied by cause and effect. The Sāṃkhyas do not deny difference altogether. Rather, they appear to be opposed to absolute difference. This is clear from the illustration of material cloth, cow and horse, wheel and jar, which they forward as exponents of the *prima facie*. The quantitative agreement of cause and product also supports their case as also occupation of some space occupied by them. The later theory of threefold *pariṇāma* viz. *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa*

and *avasthā*, displays their standpoint as regards the clear-cut division of essential and the secondary factors. It is not difficult to guess which set of arguments, viz., that in favour of identity or that in favour of difference is logically prior, though chronologically the Sāṃkhyas may be said to be the predecessors of the Naiyāyikas. The series of reasons which the Sāṃkhyas adduce against difference definitely show that the Sāṃkhyas had given deep thought to the thesis which subsequently came to be the central idea in the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and which formed the *prima facie* view for the first enunciation of the Sāṃkhya theory.

9. Generality (*sāmānya*)

Jayantabhaṭṭa states that the Sāṃkhyas mean by generality (*sāmānya*) similarity of form (*sārūpya*).²⁸⁵

Jayahtabhaṭṭa objects to the view on the ground that 'generality' (*sāmānya*) is different from similarity of form (*sārūpya*), since both are not co-existent. The latter is found even in the absence of generality (*sāmānya*). There is similarity of form, for instance, between a cow and a *gavaya*, though both of these are different in respect of their class character.²⁸⁶

In the extant texts of Sāṃkhya, the term *sāmānya* is not used in a technical sense as accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The term occurs in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*²⁸⁷ in sense of 'something common to all.' Jayantabhaṭṭa's criticism seems to be directed against Vindhyavāsin²⁸⁸ who is reported to hold that *sādṛśya*, *sārūpya*, and *sāmānya* have same denotation. The idea that generality (*sāmānya*) is similarity (*sādṛśya*) is found in the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*²⁸⁹ too. What the Naiyāyikas call '*sāmānya*' the Sāṃkhyas call '*sārūpya*' and the choice of expression is a sign of their approach to facts of experience and its interpretation. The Sāṃkhyas refuse to allot the same status to common characteristics, which the Naiyāyikas, as staunch

285. NM Part II, p. 204

286. *Ibid.*

287. SK 6,11,29

288. Cf. *Sāṃkhya Darśana kā itihāsa*, pp. 531-2

289. SS 5.93

realists, claim for it. The most important consideration for Sāṃkhya is the possibility or otherwise of reducing any mental or material object finally to Prakṛti on the same par with other evolutes. At best, therefore, Sāṃkhya would sanction it a 'notional existence'. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas are pluralists and can accept as many things to be real as they are convinced about on grounds of experience. Therefore, they lay down 'generality', in the list of *padārthas*, in order to ensure perfect correspondence between experience and the external objects of experience.

10. Specific Number of objects (*Sāṃkhyakāntavāda*)

Vātsyāyana refutes different views which assert that things of world can be finally reduced to a definite number of ultimate categories amongst which Vācaspatiśrī enlists the Sāṃkhya division of Prakṛti and Puruṣa alongwith the Buddhist classification of five skandhas and the fourfold division of Pāśupatas.²⁹⁰

Vātsyāyana criticises this view on the ground that it is not possible to prove that number of entities is absolutely limited. The objects can be cognised through means of knowledge. This implies acceptance of means of knowledge as a separate category.²⁹¹ Vācaspatiśrī adds that no object can serve as the means of its own cognition. There is nothing like self-cognition. Even knowledge and lamp are to be known by others.²⁹² If the means of cognition is held to be non-different from the object cognised, limitation of number of objects cannot be proved without an additional adequate proof which is, however, absent.²⁹³

The upholders of the view may controvert this argument, states Vātsyāyana, by arguing that means of cognition is a part of object to be proved. The part is employed as the means of proving object. Hence, *Pramāṇa* need not be accepted as a distinct category.²⁹⁴ Vātsyāyana rejects the plea on the ground

290. NVTT, p. 616

291. NB 4.1.41

292. NVTT, p. 617

293. NB 4.1.41

294. NB 4.1.42

that parts within one object are not admissible to these who believe in specific number of objects. The Vedāntins (advaitins) for example, believe in one reality only. Hence, *Pramāṇa* cannot be a part of it. Similarly, *Pramāṇa* cannot be part of either of the ultimate realities accepted by the dualists. The limitation of objects to a specific number may be assumed with a view to minimising indefinite number of diversities caused by distinct properties of objects. But, that contradicts the common experience of infinite distinctions that are proved by various means of knowledge. If limited number of objects is supposed to correspond to distinctions in objects caused by their common and specific properties, it will defeat the purpose of limiting objects to a specific number. Vātsyāyana concludes that the belief in specific number of objects will not give rise to right knowledge of objects which is the direct cause of liberation.²⁹⁵

The Sāṃkhyas believe in two ultimate realities, viz., Prakṛti and Puruṣa and do not accept means of knowledge as a distinct category. They enumerate twenty-five categories which are substances (*dravyas*).²⁹⁶ The *pramāṇa* according to them, cannot be a distinct category, since it is function of Buddhi²⁹⁷ which is not different from Buddhi. All objects, excepting Puruṣa, are ultimately soluble in Prakṛti. Hence, the ultimate realities are Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

11. Denial of destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*)

The Naiyāyikas criticise the Sāṃkhya view that formation of body is not due to destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*).

Vātsyāyana records the Sāṃkhya view thus. Production of body from elements is due to 'non-perception'. The 'non-perception' is twofold — non-perception of objects as well as the non-perception of difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. After accomplishment of this perception, purpose of material substances is fulfilled and they cease to produce any other body.²⁹⁸ The evolution of Pradhāna into Mahat and other evolutes, adds Uddyotakara, is meant for soul's purpose of seeing the perce-

295. NB 4.1.43

296. SPB 1.61

297. STK 5

298. NB 3.2.68

ptible.²⁹⁹ Vācaspatimiśra explains the Sāṃkhya theory more vividly. The formation of body is not due to destiny but due to functioning of Prakṛti. Prakṛti, which is modifiable by nature, evolves into body through its inherent nature independently of *dharma*, *adharma*, etc. The *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., remove obstacle to evolution of Pradhāna, just as the removal of barrier by farmers causes flow of water from one field to another. Prakṛti evolves into evolutes by its very nature just as water flows to the lower level by its intrinsic nature. It is stated also — 'removal of barrier of Prakṛti is just like the removal of barrier of field'.³⁰⁰

This view of Sāṃkhya is criticised on following grounds. Without admitting destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*), innumerable distinctions found in birth of all beings cannot be explained. If destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is not admitted as located in different bodies, all souls would have all bodies. All souls being homogeneous and all substances being alike for all bodies, there is nothing to restrict a particular body to a particular soul.³⁰¹

The theory of Sāṃkhya leads to impossibility of freedom of soul from body. The material substances, which are supposed to bind the soul, are never destroyed. Consequently, body would never be separated from the soul. Release can be possible only if the factor of destiny is admitted as cause of rebirth. The end of destiny through experience of its results can lead the soul to release.³⁰²

If destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is not admitted to be cause of body, liberated souls would be dragged to rebirth. The non-perception, which is supposed to cause production of body, exists even in the state of liberation. Thus, the condition for birth would ever be fulfilled.³⁰³

The Sāṃkhyas may set aside this objection on the ground that body is formed so long as distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is not perceived. After it is perceived by the soul, the purpose of material substances to form the body is accompli-

299. NV, p. 442-3

300. NVTT, p. 582-3

301. NB 3.2.68

302. *Ibid.*

303. NB 3.2.68

shed and they do not form another body. Hence, the liberated souls will not be born again.³⁰⁴ To this also, the Naiyāyikas object that the elements are perceived to produce body even though their purpose of being perceived by the soul is already accomplished in earlier births. Moreover, bodies are produced again and again but do not cause awareness of difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Hence, production of these bodies, produced earlier to perception of difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, should be regarded as purposeless.³⁰⁵

The Sāṃkhya may further argue, adds Uddyotakara that 'non-perception' means 'particular urge to be perceived' existing in elements. Due to absence of this desire, elements do not form body for liberated souls.³⁰⁶

This also, states Uddyotakara, does not stand logically. The desire cannot exist in state of Prakṛti-equilibrium of the three Guṇas. Hence, it cannot be supposed to be cause of Pradhāna's evolution. If it is argued that Pradhāna being omnipotent has the desire also, it will imply impossibility of final release. Pradhāna being omnipotent, possesses perception too. Hence, desire which co-exists with perception in Pradhāna will always inspire Pradhāna to evolve. The presence of perception in Pradhāna will again imply impossibility of evolution. Moreover, according to Sāṃkhya, that which exists never ceases to be. Hence, the desire to be perceived will persist even after perception of difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa and, consequently, release would not be possible. The Sāṃkhya theory further implies incongruity of co-existence of two contradictory things—perception and desire to perceive.

If 'non-perception' is interpreted as 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*), it will again be open to following objections. The term *ajñāna* may mean either 'absence of knowledge' or 'wrong knowledge.' The former alternative will lead to impossibility of final release insofar as absence of knowledge of ordinary objects will be there even after cessation of activities of Prakṛti. If the Sāṃkhyas attempt to prove existence of Buddhi and wrong knowledge earlier to evolution of Prakṛti on the basis of the theory that

304. NB, 3.2.68

305. Ibid.

306. NV, p. 443

objects are ever present, it will again imply impossibility of final release as wrong knowledge would always be present. Further, if the Sāṃkhya theory that 'objects are ever present' is admitted, the right knowledge will also be admitted as existent. Consequently, it will not be proper to say that Pradhāna evolves for soul's accomplishment of right knowledge.³⁰⁷

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of evolution of Pradhāna. If it is held that Prakṛti acts for manifestation of objects which exist in non-manifest forms, it will involve various absurdities. It can naturally be asked whether manifestation exists prior to activity of Prakṛti or not? The first alternative will mean absence of purpose for evolution. The second alternative necessitates further consideration, viz., whether manifestation is production of new qualities or not. The first alternative will contradict the Sāṃkhya theory of manifestation. The second alternative cannot explain perceptibility and imperceptibility of objects. If manifestation is not regarded as introduction of new qualities, objects should be perceived even prior to activity of Pradhāna.³⁰⁸

Vātsyāyana's account of the Sāṃkhya theory that Prakṛti evolves into universe so that it may be perceived by Puruṣa and after accomplishment of the purpose Prakṛti desists from creating new bodies is in accordance with the Sāṃkhya texts available to us.³⁰⁹ The statement of the Naiyāyikas that Pradhāna evolves into universe independently of *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., deserves further consideration. The Sāṃkhyas do believe in *bhāvasarga* consisting of *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., which determines the next birth.³¹⁰ They maintain that diversity of creation is due to diversity of destiny.³¹¹ They further hold that by attainment of knowledge, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., become devoid of causal potency and the acts do not lead to further birth.³¹² The theory of Sāṃkhya fails to explain diversity in different beings in the initial stage of creation. Hence, the

307. NV, p. 443-4

308. Ibid. p. 444-5

309. Cf. SK 21,61,67

310. Cf. SK 40,43

311. Cf. SS 3.10

312. Cf. SK 67

Sāṃkhyas propound that creation is beginningless.³¹³ The Sāṃkhya view as presented by the Naiyāyikas does not seem to be hypothetical. This view might have been propounded by some exponent of Sāṃkhya, since it is based upon a text quoted by Vācaspatiśra and not available to us.

12. Theory of Bondage and Liberation

Vācaspatiśra criticises the Sāṃkhya view of (i) nature of knowledge, means of liberation. Jayantabhaṭṭa and Śrīdhara oppose the Sāṃkhya theory (ii) that Prakṛti binds and liberates Puruṣa which is inactive by nature. Jayantabhaṭṭa also criticises the Sāṃkhya theory of (iii) nature of soul in the state of liberation.

(1) Vācaspatiśra records the Sāṃkhya view thus. Knowledge is the means of liberation. It is the cognition of difference between Sattva (Prakṛti) and the Puruṣa.³¹⁴

This view of the Sāṃkhyas, states Vācaspatiśra, is not logically sound. The assumption presupposes existence of Prakṛti which is inferred on the basis of the wrong notion of effect prior to its production (*satkāryavāda*). Thus, existence of Prakṛti is not proved. Therefore, the theory of the nature of knowledge based upon the wrong hypothesis of existence of Prakṛti has no justification.³¹⁵

Vācaspatiśra's statement regarding the Sāṃkhya view of means of liberation is based upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*³¹⁶ which declares that liberation is attained through knowledge. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is, however, silent about nature of the knowledge leading to liberation. Vācaspatiśra explains it as the knowledge of distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Other commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* slightly differ from him.³¹⁷

Vācaspatiśra's criticism about the nature of knowledge is chiefly directed against two hypotheses, viz., existence of Prakṛti and the theory of existence of effect prior to its produc-

313. Cf SS 3.62, 6.67

314. NVTT, p. 639

315. *Ibid.*

316. SK 44

317. See p. 61

tion. Both of these theories are criticised by the Naiyāyikas and, hence, are separately considered by us.

(ii) Jayantabhaṭṭa states that Prakṛti, according to Sāṃkhya, is independent and Puruṣa is inactive in process of bondage and liberation.³¹⁸ Prakṛti acts for bondage and liberation of Puruṣa.

The view is criticised on the following ground. It implies impossibility of liberation. Prakṛti is insentient and active in contrast to Puruṣa who is intelligent and inactive. The Prakṛti would always bind Puruṣa because there is no factor to restrain it.³¹⁹ It cannot be maintained that Prakṛti desists from binding that Puruṣa who has no inclination towards Prakṛti because Prakṛti which has not relinquished its curiosity like a newly married bride would continually bind Puruṣa.³²⁰ It is the very nature of Prakṛti to evolve into universe. Prakṛti will never remain in contact of Puruṣa and there is no factor to restrain it from binding Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhyas hold that Prakṛti evolves into universe so that it may be seen by Puruṣa. The quality of being 'seer' (*draṣṭā*), however, does not cease even in the state of liberation. Hence, Prakṛti would always evolve to serve this puruṣa.³²¹ If it is argued that Prakṛti will desist from its activities to bind the Puruṣa whose purpose of seeing Prakṛti is fulfilled, it will not improve the case. Prakṛti, being insentient, cannot work with this sort of restraint towards the liberated soul.³²² As regards the Sāṃkhya view that Pradhāna evolves so that Puruṣa may attain knowledge and ceases to evolve after the fulfilment of this purpose, Jayantabhaṭṭa³²³ and Śrīdhara³²⁴ remark that it entails impossibility of liberation. The insentient Prakṛti cannot discriminate between Puruṣa possessing knowledge and those not possessing knowledge and, hence, will continue to bind each Puruṣa. The theory of Sāṃkhya implies the

318. NM Part II, p. 117

319. *Ibid.*

320. *Ibid.*

321. *Ibid.* p. 62

322. *Ibid.*

323. *Ibid.*

324. NK, p. 8

impossibility of bondage also. There is no factor to bind Puruṣa in the first stage of creation.³²⁵

The statements of Jayantabhaṭṭa and Śrīdhara that bondage and liberation, according to Sāṃkhya, pertain to Puruṣa, deserve further consideration. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* speaks of liberation with reference to Prakṛti³²⁶ as well as Puruṣa.³²⁷ Rāmānuja³²⁸ finds contradiction in these statements of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. In fact, bondage and release belong to Prakṛti and are metaphorically ascribed to Puruṣa. From the practical standpoint Puruṣa is said to be bound or liberated, but from the real standpoint, that which is bound or liberated is Prakṛti. Vācaspatimiśra better clarifies the position thus. Bondage, though really belonging to Prakṛti, is ascribed to Puruṣa owing to non-discrimination between the two just as victory and defeat, actually belonging to soldiers, are ascribed to the king due to their false identification.³²⁹ The statement that Prakṛti is independent to bind Puruṣa also deserves further consideration. Though it is stated that Pradhāna evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa,³³⁰ yet it is also held that Prakṛti is not totally independent to bind Puruṣa. "Ignorance" on the part of Puruṣa is a pre-condition for Prakṛti to be effective as a binding agency.³³¹ Prakṛti desists from its activity towards the Puruṣa who has attained knowledge.³³²

The Sāṃkhyas are, perhaps, not ignorant of the possible objection, and they have tried to supply an answer to it while observing consistency with their basic hypothesis. They assume the inner urge to evolve to be always present in Prakṛti which relieves them from necessity of presupposing some extraneous cause giving rise to initial action, for which the Naiyāyikas posit the factor of *adrṣṭa* and Īśvara. Then, this activity is

325. NM Part II, p. 62

326. SK 21 62,63

327. Ibid. 56,57

328. RB 2.2.9

329. STK 62

330. SK 21,56,57

331. Ibid. 44

332. Ibid. 64,65

either to stop or to progress for which the Sāṃkhyas posit the factor of presence and absence of knowledge. When there is no knowledge, evolution continues. Knowledge is thus barrier to the flow of Prakṛti. The quotation given by Vācaspatimiśra makes this point clear. The *nimitta* is said to be not a *prayojaka* of Prakṛti but a breaker of barrier and the illustration of 'water—flow' is highly explanatory.

(iii) Jayantabhaṭṭa's criticism reveals that the Sāṃkhyas hold that Puruṣa exists in the form of pure consciousness in the state of liberation.

Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises the view of Sāṃkhya thus. The consciousness, like pleasure, pain, etc., is adventitious quality of soul and not the essential nature. Hence, soul cannot be constituted of consciousness in the state of liberation.³³³ Moreover, consciousness is defined as ability to see. Act of seeing cannot be ascribed to soul in the state of liberation because means of seeing such as senses, etc., do not exist in that state. The absence of act of seeing leads us to the conclusion that soul is not conscious in the state of liberation.³³⁴

The extant texts of the Sāṃkhyas are silent about the nature of soul in state of liberation. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* states that Puruṣa attains to its intrinsic nature of an indifferent witness free from the taints of Prakṛti when liberated.³³⁵ It does not however describe in positive terms that intrinsic nature. Jayantabhaṭṭa's criticism further clarifies the Sāṃkhya position. The controversy is rooted in the nature of soul presupposed by both the systems.

13. Definition of *Pramāṇa*

Jayantabhaṭṭa objects to the definition of *Pramāṇa* offered by Sāṃkhya. Jayantabhaṭṭa states that the Sāṃkhyas define *Pramāṇa* as function of Buddhi (*Buddhivṛtti*). Jayantabhaṭṭa explains it saying that the function of Buddhi means modification of Buddhi in the form of an object and act of tinging Puruṣa when he comes into its proximity. Puruṣa witnesses

333. NM Part II, p. 80

334. NM Part II, p. 81

335. SK 68

the object through modification of Buddhi.³³⁶ Cakradhara adds that awareness of object as given by modification of organs in the form of object is *Pramāṇa* of the variety of *nirvikalpajñāna* and the subsequent modification of Buddhi following that is *Pramāṇa* of the variety of *savikalpajñāna*.³³⁷

The view of Sāṃkhya, states Jayantabhaṭṭa, is not convincing. Mahat which knows (*jānāti*) cannot be aware of the object because it is non-sentient in nature and Puruṣa who can be aware of objects, cannot know because, being immune to modification, it cannot be modified into the form of an object. Knowledge, etc. are not found in Puruṣa and awareness cannot belong to Buddhi. Thus, it implies two substrata of knowledge. Knowledge belongs partly to Puruṣa, partly to Buddhi and completely to none.³³⁸ Moreover, the theory of Sāṃkhya implies impossibility of knowledge. They maintain that Buddhi seems to be sentient and Puruṣa to be an agent due to close contact of the two. In reality, however, Buddhi is non-sentient and Puruṣa is inactive. The knowledge cannot arise through false appearance. Jayantabhaṭṭa accuses the Sāṃkhyas of joining the group of *sākāravādins*, the Buddhists who advocate that (i) it is the cognition which assumes the form of an object, therefore, (ii) what we directly perceive is always the form of cognition (iii) through which we can infer the form of object or (iv) that, since it is always the objective form of cognition that is perceived, there is no perception and a proof for existence of external objects.³³⁹

Jayantabhaṭṭa raises objections against the definition of *Pramāṇa* as worded by the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*.³⁴⁰ The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*³⁴¹ defines *Pramāṇa* as that which is most conducive to determination (*paricchitti*) of an object which is not already cognised by either of the two. The part of the definition

336. NM Part I, p. 24

337. NMGB, p. 15

338. NM Part I, p. 24

339. *Ibid.*

340. STK 5

341. SS 1.87

'not cognised by either of the two' is subject to manifold interpretation. Aniruddha³⁴² interprets it as not cognised either by the direct means of knowledge, i.e., perception or the indirect means of knowledge, i.e., inference and verbal testimony. Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation³⁴³ is quite different therefrom, viz., which is not previously cognised either by Puruṣa or Buddhi. Thus, in brief, *Pramāṇa* is cognition of an object which is not previously cognised. Cakradhara unnecessarily tries to find out a reference to *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* forms of knowledge. These are stages in perception and have nothing to do with *Pramāṇa* in general. That is, perhaps, because of the anxiety of realists to include 'determinate knowledge' into valid means of knowledge against the followers of Dinnāga who refuse to accept it as such, with the only exception of inference. Even the verses quoted by Vācaspati Miśra³⁴⁴ to establish the division into *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* restrict these stages to perception.

The definition is not acceptable to Jayantabhaṭṭa on account of certain presuppositions of Sāṃkhya such as modification of knowing principle into the form of object known and ascribing knowledge to Buddhi.

14. Number of *Pramāṇas*

The Sāṃkhya view regarding number of *Pramāṇas*, states Jayantabhaṭṭa, is untenable. The Sāṃkhyas accept three means of knowledge, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda³⁴⁵ and reject Upamāna as a distinct means of knowledge. This view of the Sāṃkhyas, however, does not stand before logic. The totality of causal conditions (*sāmagrī*) and resultant knowledge constitute determining factors for types of the means of knowledge and the causal conditions of Upamāna cannot be included into any of the other *Pramāṇas*.³⁴⁶

The statement the follows Sāṃkhyakārikā which explicitly

342. SSV 1.87

343. SPB 1.87

344. STK. 27

345. *Ibid.* also NM Part I, p. 26

346. NM Part I, p. 26

establishes only three *Pramāṇas*, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda. It remarks that the other *Pramāṇas* accepted by others are included into these three only.³⁴⁷ The inclusion of Upamāna into the three *Pramāṇas* is variously explained by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and others. Gauḍapāda³⁴⁸ and the *Jayamaṅgalā*³⁴⁹ include it under Śabda. Māthara,³⁵⁰ the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*³⁵¹ and Vijñānabhikṣu³⁵² include it in Anumāna. According to Vācaspatimiśra,³⁵³ the knowledge derived from Upamāna is either verbal or inferential or perceptual. The knowledge in the form 'as cow so the *gavaya*' is arrived through Śabda. The knowledge that 'the term *gavaya* denotes an object resembling cow' is inferential. The knowledge that 'the animal perceived is similar to cow' is inferential. The knowledge is purely perceptual also insofar as the similarity between cow and *gavaya* is directly perceived.

As regards the number of *Pramāṇas* it may be observed that though the number varies with different systems; in case of those who include them to minimise the number, they accept the process necessary for such a knowledge and present them in such a way that they can be classed in the same category.

15. Definition of Pratyakṣa

Uddyotakara followed by Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises the Sāṃkhya definition of Pratyakṣa.

In form of *pūrvapakṣa* Uddyotakara states that some define Pratyakṣa as function of ear and the other (sense organs).³⁵⁴ Vācaspatimiśra ascribes this definition to Vārṣaganya, a teacher of Sāṃkhya, and remarks that the function

- 347. SK 4
- 348. GB 4
- 349. Jay. 4
- 350. MV 4
- 351. SC 4
- 352. SPB 1.88
- 353. STK 5
- 354. NV, p. 43

of sense organs signifies "the primary abstract apprehension (*ālōcanamātra*) through five sense-organs modified into the form of objects."³⁵⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa states that Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines Pratyakṣa as 'definite knowledge of objects' (*prativṣayā-dhyavasāya*).³⁵⁶

The definition given by Vārṣaganya, states Vācaspatimiśra is not correct as it is applicable to doubtful knowledge, etc.³⁵⁷ Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of Pratyakṣa, states Jayantabhaṭṭa is too wide (*ativyāpaka*) as it is applicable to other *Pramāṇas* like Anumāna which are also means of definite knowledge.³⁵⁸ Jayantabhaṭṭa further states that Rājā tries to limit the scope of the definition by explaining 'prati' and, thus, the definition refers only to Pratyakṣa which comes to mean as definite knowledge derived through proximity'.³⁵⁹ This interpretation also, according to Jayantabhaṭṭa, fails to exclude inference, etc., from the scope of the definition insofar as proximity is found also in case of Anumāna; etc. There is no difference in knowledge arising in terms of 'this is pot' and 'this mountain is fiery'.³⁶⁰ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that qualifications used to define the other *Pramāṇas* will differentiate Pratyakṣa from them. Anumāna arises through knowledge of Probans (as qualified by invariable concomitance) and Śabda requires word. This is also unsatisfactory since knowledge of Pratyakṣa, in this case, will presuppose knowledge of Anumāna and Śabda.³⁶¹

The definition of Pratyakṣa ascribed to Vārṣaganya by Vācaspatimiśra is in accordance with Vārṣaganya's statement recorded by the *Yuktidīpikā*.³⁶² Vācaspatimiśra's explanation suggests that Vārṣaganya considers Pratyakṣa as the means of *nirvikalpa jñāna* only. Jayantabhaṭṭa's presentation of Sāṃkhya

- 355. NVTT, p. 155
- 356. NM Part I, p. 100
- 357. NVTT, p. 155
- 358. NM Part I, p. 100
- 359. *Ibid.*
- 360. *Ibid.*
- 361. *Ibid.*
- 362. YD 5

view of Pratyakṣa is based upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and its explanation by Rājā. We do not have any authentic source of information regarding the identity of Rājā though Jayantabhaṭṭa's statement makes it certain that Rājā is some commentator of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. An identical interpretation of 'prati' as given by Rājā is also forwarded by the *Yuktidīpikā*.³⁶³ That is why, R. C. Pandeya³⁶⁴ thinks that Rājā is the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* which is also known as *Rājavārttika*. Any more information regarding Rājā requires further investigation.

It is, however, a point worth independent consideration as to why early Sāṃkhya writers do not make explicit statement of sense-object contact in their definition of Pratyakṣa. The awareness of importance of this 'contact' in process of Pratyakṣa is to be noticed in very early works such as the *Jaiminīsūtras*,³⁶⁵ the *Nyāyasūtras*³⁶⁶ and the like. So, we cannot say that early teachers of the Sāṃkhya did not know this concept or that they could not phrase the phenomena properly. The omission, therefore, appears to be intentional, though it is a matter of deep probing and a question yet unsolved. The later Sāṃkhyas also do not approve this definition of Pratyakṣa. The definition of Vāṛṣaganya is rejected even by the *Yuktidīpikā*³⁶⁷ on the ground that it is not applicable to supra sensuous perception of Yogins. Vācaspati-miśra takes the term *prativīṣaya* occurring in the beginning of definition of Pratyakṣa offered by the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in the sense of 'sense-organ in contact with the object'.³⁶⁸ When the later Sāṃkhya teachers explain the earlier definition with the help of such a reference to 'contact', they are definitely adding something of their own in view of the necessity to maintain their realists' position against the Buddhist idealists of the school of Dinnāga.

363. YD 5

364. Cf. R. C. Pandeya's Introduction to his edition of the *Yuktidīpikā*, pp. xiii-xiv

365. MS 1.1.4

366. NS 1.1.4

367. YD 5

368. STK 5

16. Perception of Sound

Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises the Sāṃkhya theory of process of perception of Sound.

The Sāṃkhyas, states Jayantabhaṭṭa, explain the process of cognition of Sound thus. The function of auditory sense (*śrotravṛtti*) reaches the place where sound originates and is modified into the form of sound.³⁶⁹

This view of Sāṃkhya, states Jayantabhaṭṭa, leads to following absurdities. Firstly, it cannot account for non-perception of sound originating at distant place.³⁷⁰ Secondly, this theory implies the undesired contingency of perception of sound obstructed by wall, etc. The function of the auditory sense being incorporeal and consequently all-pervasive, should reach and perceive the sound obstructed by thick wall, etc.³⁷¹ Thirdly, it cannot explain the common experience of non-perception of sound caused by flow of air in opposite direction.³⁷² Fourthly, this view implies the undesired contingency of presence of auditory sense everywhere. There is no difference between act and its agent in the theory of Sāṃkhya. Hence, all-pervasiveness of function of the auditory sense implies presence of auditory sense everywhere.³⁷³

Jayantabhaṭṭa's presentation throws considerable light on the Sāṃkhya theory of perception in general and the cognition of sound in particular. The definitions of perception found in the early texts of Sāṃkhya mention that in case of perception the object is perceived through contact of sense-organ. Vāṛṣaganya, as recorded by Uddyotakara, defines perception as the function of sense-organs.³⁷⁴ Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that perception is the knowledge of object.³⁷⁵ This is explained by Vācaspati-miśra as the perception is knowledge of objects

369. NM Part I, p. 197

370. *Ibid.*

371. *Ibid.* p. 198

372. *Ibid.*

373. *Ibid.*

374. NV, p. 43

375. SK 5

through the contact of sense-organs with the objects.³⁷⁶ The process of contact of sense organs with the object is, however, left unexplained. Jayantabhaṭṭa makes it clear saying that the sense-organ reaches the object to perceive it. He states that the function of sense-organs, according to Sāṃkhya, reaches the object. The function of sense-organs is the sense-organ itself for the Sāṃkhyas do not consider any difference between function and agent. The presentation of Sāṃkhya position, however, goes against the theory of later Sāṃkhyas like Vijñānabhikṣu³⁷⁷ that Buddhi reaches the object through sense-organs. The Sāṃkhyas hold, states Jayantabhaṭṭa, that the auditory sense reaches the sound to perceive it. This view of the Sāṃkhyas differs from the Naiyāyikas in two respects. Firstly unlike the Sāṃkhyas the Naiyāyikas hold that sound reaches auditory sense and not vice versa. Secondly, auditory sense perceives sound, according to the Naiyāyikas, through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) while the Sāṃkhyas think that auditory sense perceives sound through contact (*saṃyoga*). There is no factor in the theory of Sāṃkhya to prevent perception of sound originating at a distant place or obstructed by wall, etc., or obstructed by flow of air in the opposite direction. The last objection of Jayantabhaṭṭa pertains to the Sāṃkhya theory of non-difference between function and its agent.

17. Definition of Inference

While criticising the view of other schools on inference, Uddyotakara refers to a definition, viz., Inference is that where existence of an object is inferred from the relation perceived earlier.³⁷⁸ Vācaspatimīśra ascribes the definition to Sāṃkhya and states that here the relation refers to that between *Sādhana* and *Sādhya*. The definition, thus comes to 'Inference is that where existence of an object is inferred from concomitant relation existing between *sādhana* and *sādhya* supported by a stronger pramāṇa, viz. Perception.'³⁷⁹

376. STK 5

377. SPB, 1.87

378. NV, p. 57

379. NVTT, p. 194

The definition is criticised thus. Inference cannot take place only through the knowledge of relation between the *sādhya* and *sādhana*. It requires other factors as well.³⁸⁰ The Sāṃkhyas cannot alleviate the objection by interpreting perception of relation as perception of invariable concomitance because mere perception of invariable concomitance without probans, etc., cannot lead to inference.³⁸¹ Otherwise, there will be inference even without seeing probans and invariable concomitance.³⁸² The invariable concomitance is the subject of perception prior to inference. The Sāṃkhyas may interpret *sambandha* occurring in the definition as *hetu* (probans) and state that inference arises through perception of *hetu*, invariable concomitance of which with *sādhya* is already perceived. In this case also the term *ekasmāt* will be purposeless. Moreover, the definition is not applicable in the case of inference of touch through colour. The invariable concomitance between touch and colour is not perceived because they are objects of different senses and hence, not identical. If the Sāṃkhyas argue that touch and colour are perceived as inhering in a single substance, it will contradict their fundamental doctrine of rejection of inherence (*samavāya*). Moreover, touch and colour cannot have the relation of location and the object located in it because colour does not exist in touch and vice versa.³⁸³

The definition criticised by Uddyotakara is recorded by the *Yuktidīpikā*³⁸⁴ as adduced by some Sāṃkhya teacher preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Udayavira Shastri³⁸⁵ is in favour of ascribing it to Vārṣaganya. He argues that Uddyotakara has criticised Vārṣaganya's definition of perception in the earlier section and proceeds to criticise Vārṣaganya's definition of Inference in the present section. The definition insofar as its wording is concerned, does not refer to *pakṣa* where *sādhya* is to be proved

380. NV, p. 57

381. *Ibid.*

382. NVTT, p. 195

383. *Ibid.*

384. YD 1

385. Sāṃkhya Darśana kā Itihāsa, p. 511

and as such appears to have as its subject matter proving probandum. This may be regarded as an indication of the relatively early date of the definition on the basis of following consideration. Vācaspatiśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāyikā*³⁸⁶ records two following views regarding the subject-matter of inference which are criticised and rejected by Diñnāga (i) from smoke another property, viz., fire is inferred or (ii) from smoke the relation of fire and its locus is inferred. The definition comes closer to the first view against which Diñnāga establishes his own view that 'the subject as qualified by probandum' forms the subject-matter of inference. This view, propounded for the first time by Diñnāga, signified an improvement over the earlier ideas and became generally accepted in the logic of all systems. Hence, the conclusion regarding the early date about the definition.

18. Sevenfold Inference

Vācaspatiśra attacks the Sāṃkhya view of sevenfold inference. The Sāṃkhyas, states Vācaspatiśra, divide inference into seven on the basis of sevenfold inferential mark in the relation in *vyāpti*. The seven kinds of relation are: (i) measurement, (ii) cause, (iii) contact, (iv) opposition, (v) association, (vi) master and servant, (vii) killer and the killed.³⁸⁷

Against the view of the Sāṃkhyas, Vācaspatiśra states that it is illogical to postulate these relations in *vyāpti*. The theory does not account for temporal factor as for instance, in the case of opposition. The rain is said to be opposed to contact of cloud with wind. The past rain, however, is not opposed to contact of cloud with wind. On the contrary, the past rain is favourable to the contact of these two. The future rain also is not opposed to the present contact of cloud with wind. Similarly the past victory of mongoose is not opposed to the past defeat of snake. The future defeat of snake is also not opposed to the future victory of mongoose. Hence, the opposition cannot serve as an inferential mark or the relation in *vyāpti*.³⁸⁸

386. *NVTT*, p. 180

387, *Ibid.* p. 165

388. *Ibid.* p. 164

The seven inferential marks and their relation in *vyāpti*, recorded by Vācaspatiśra, are not found mentioned in the available texts of Sāṃkhya. The *Jayamaṅgalā*,³⁸⁹ however, refers to seven kinds of relation in *Vyāpti*. These are not the same as recorded by Vācaspatiśra. The relations like master and servant, association, opposition, and cause and effect are common to both. Instead of measurement, contact and killer and killed, the *Jayamaṅgalā* mentions modification and its source, pot and its possessor, and object and the being for which it is meant. Vācaspatiśra and the *Jayamaṅgalā* might have recorded these relations from some ancient text which is lost to us. Vācaspatiśra enumerates the seven varieties of relation in *vyāpti* but does not illustrate them. The *Jayamaṅgalā* illustrates them from which it is possible to deduce a few possibilities. Firstly, forms of *vyāpti* are those which cannot be favourably applied to basic Sāṃkhya assumptions, as for instance, *prakṛtivyākāra* or *nimitta-naimittika*, etc. The illustrations, however, offered by the *Jayamaṅgalā* also are notable for their unusual and primary character, e.g., instead of milk and curds or clay and jar or gold and ornaments, i.e., very favourable illustrations with Sāṃkhya, the *Jayamaṅgalā* mentions *yava* and *saktu*. Even for the causal relation which is universally acknowledged, it speaks of cow and calf which displays lack of logical depth.

389, *Jaya*. 5

CHAPTER III

SĀMĀKHYA AS PRESENTED IN PŪRVA-MĪMĀṢĀ

The Mīmāṃsakas, like other systematists, extensively criticise the doctrines of Sāṃkhya which appear to be irrational or which are unacceptable from the view-point of Mīmāṃsā. It is, however, interesting to note that the earlier works on Mīmāṃsā like the *sūtras* of Jaimini and the commentary of Śabara do not refer to the theories of Sāṃkhya. It is not that the doctrines of Sāṃkhya had not gained influence at that time, but it is due to the difference of subject-matter of these two systems. Mīmāṃsā is primarily devoted to the analytical study of acts-especially ritualistic, that are broadly divided into duties enjoined and the acts prohibited. It also concerns itself with attainment of material ends through propitiation of deities by means of ritual and sacrifice as based on Vedic texts. Therefore, it incidentally develops into a science of interpretation of the *śruti* texts. On the contrary, Sāṃkhya is basically a Mokṣa-Śāstra, attaching more importance to rational approach to problem of reality and means of liberation through the analysis of worldly objects and the knowledge of that reality. Thus, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the commentary of Śabara pre-occupied as they were with their own topics did not feel obliged to refute the theories of the philosophical schools opposed to their own system. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, a commentator of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Śabarabhāṣya* undertakes the task of refuting the theories of Sāṃkhya. It is due to the fact that in that period different schools of philosophy came in direct mutual contact. The conflict arose because the various theses about reality to be worshipped and to be known put forth by different systems seemed to question the validity of self-complacent beliefs of Mīmāṃsā. Consequently, they had to reconsider them and to present them in the manner as suited the demands of metaphysics, logic and epistemology. Kumārilabhaṭṭa

achieved this important task by supplying broad basis of logical and epistemological theories to the Mīmāṃsā hypotheses and at the same time by protecting them through refutation of opponents amongst whom the Sāṃkhyas figured prominently. That is why, he objects to the Sāṃkhya theories of subtle body, cause of bondage, origin of the universe, means of liberation, nature of sense-organs and perception of sound. Kumārilabhaṭṭa also criticises the theories of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge as well as definition of Dharma. These are ascribed to Sāṃkhya by his commentator Sucaritamiśra. Kumārilabhaṭṭa's presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory is valuable since he refers to Vārṣaganya and Vindhyavāsin whose views are quoted at length in the *Yuktidīpikā* and since the works of these teachers are no more available to us. Sucaritamiśra further criticises the Sāṃkhya theories of pre-existence of effect in cause, Pradhāna as cause of universe, and source of organs. The criticism of these theories is discussed below and the discussion is based on the *Ślokavārttika* and its commentaries, viz., the *Tātparyāṭika* of Bhaṭṭabekka, the *Kāśikā* of Sucaritamiśra and the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathimiśra.

(1) Theory of Causation

Sucaritamiśra states that the Sāṃkhya view that knowledge is intrinsically valid or invalid is rooted in the theory that effect exists in its cause prior to causal operation. Hence, he proceeds to criticise the causation theory of Sāṃkhya to invalidate the basis of their theory of intrinsic validity or invalidity of knowledge.

In the form of *pūrvapakṣa*, Sucaritamiśra presents following arguments in favour of the theory of pre-existence of effect in cause. An object which does not exist (in cause) cannot be produced. The horns of hare cannot be brought into existence.¹ There is a fixed relation (*niyama*) between the material cause and effect. It is commonly observed that certain object has a specific material as its material cause. A jar, for example, has clay only as its material cause. Hence, jar should be considered to be existent in its latent form in

1. *Kāśikā*, Chod. 35

clay alone. If the presence of effect in its material cause in pre-production state is not admitted, one cannot account for this sort of fixed relation. It is also not possible to reject this sort of fixed relation as it will involve the undesired contingency of production of everything from everything. The agent desirous of anything would select any material as cause. If it is argued that restriction of a particular cause to be particular effect is due to potency of cause to produce particular effect only, it will imply the existence of effect in its cause, since this potency is nothing but the effect in its latent form.² The theory of non-existence of effect in cause cannot account for the specification with reference to the material (*upādāna*), non-inherent (*aśamayāī*) and the efficient (*nimitta*) cause. Material cause cannot be differentiated from other causes as effect is equally non-existent in all causes and as such there is no ground to trace out the material cause from other causes.³

Sucaritamīśra records some arguments of the opponents of the theory alleviated by Sāṃkhya. The objector of the theory argues that admission of pre-existence of effect in causes implies futility of efficient causes. In reply to it, the Sāṃkhyas state that efficient causes serve the purpose of manifesting the object which is already existing in cause.⁴ The objector again argues that the supposition that every object is made manifest by efficient causes will make the term 'production' (*utpatti*) meaningless. To explain, the view of Sāṃkhya does not account for difference between manifestation of a jar by means of lamp and production of a jar by the potter. The Sāṃkhyas obviate this difficulty by interpreting production as a variety of manifestation since both production and manifestation signify removal of obstruction. Manifestation is of two kinds. The first reveals the object by removing obstruction to knowledge just as a lamp reveals the object hidden by darkness. The second reveals the form of object by removing obstruction to manifestation of the form just as the form of pot is revealed by the help of instrumental causes by removing the form of clay.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

Thus, the so-called production is a form of manifestation just as *Kaṭha*, etc., are particular species of *brāhmaṇa* class only.⁵ The objector again argues that manifestation should also be considered to be already existent and it will lead to futility of causal operation. The Sāṃkhyas alleviate this objection by stating that manifestation is brought about by causal operation. This, however, does not contradict pre-existence of effect. The manifestation of knowledge of effect is brought about by instrumental causes. Similarly, manifestation of the form of object is also brought about by causal operation. The object pre-exists in both the cases. Though manifestation of jar does not exist prior to causal operation, yet the jar exists. The effect, in this way, exists in its material cause and is manifested by causal operation.⁶

Sucaritamīśra criticises the theory of Sāṃkhya on the following grounds.

The argument that only the object which exists in cause is brought into existence does not stand before logic. The thesis of existence of effect in cause is contradicted by other means of knowledge, viz., '*abhāva*' and '*anupalabdhi*'. The existence of jar is never perceived in clay. The attempt of the Sāṃkhyas to establish the existence of effect in cause with the help of inference is not fruitful. Inference is employed to prove an object which is situated at a distance. Hence, it cannot prove existence of an object like a jar, etc., in cause, i.e., clay, because existence of such an object is disproved by *anupalabdhi*.⁷

The argument regarding restriction of a certain effect to a particular cause does not necessarily prove the existence of effect in cause. This restriction cannot be explained on the basis of difference in potency (*Śaktibheda*). The Sāṃkhya theory is based upon a wrong identification of two different concepts viz., that potency exists in cause and that effect exists in cause. The notion of the existence of effect in a cause is contradicted by a means of knowledge like *abhāva* while the

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

existence of potency is supported by it.⁸ The Sāṃkhyas are mistaken in holding that effect exists in the form of potency (*Śakti*), but it is imperceptible because of the absence of its manifestation. Jar is not perceived in darkness even when it is present in its actual form. It is illogical to say that the form of object remains imperceptible and veiled in its cause. Material cause cannot conceal effect, as otherwise, it may lead to the undesired contingency of concealment of effect even subsequent to manifestation because the material cause will be ever present. Here, the Sāṃkhyas may argue that the form of material cause veils an effect. The form of jar is veiled by the form of clay. It will, however, not solve the problem. The form of clay may be interpreted either as the genus clay-ness or the earlier arrangement of parts of lump of clay. The former will cause impossibility of the removal of the veil insofar as the clay-ness cannot be dissociated from the object made of clay. The latter will also lead to impossibility of removal of the veil for the arrangement of parts will always veil an object because nothing can be absolutely destroyed or produced in the theory of Sāṃkhya. Moreover, the arrangement of parts of lump of clay being subtle cannot veil the jar which is bigger in size.⁹

The argument of Sāṃkhya that distinction among material (*samavāyī*), non-inherent (*asamavāyī*) and efficient (*nimitta*) causes cannot be established without admitting existence of effect in cause is not satisfactory. The causes can be differentiated from one another on the basis of difference in potency (*śaktibheda*). Some causes are capable of themselves being modified into objects while there are others having the capacity to assist the modification from outside. The difference in capacities is observed whenever there is production of effect. Hence, it is not controverted by any means of knowledge.¹⁰

The Sāṃkhyas cannot alleviate the objection regarding futility of causal operation. The Sāṃkhya view that causal operation serves the purpose of manifesting the object is not satisfactory. This view involves several absurdities.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

Firstly, the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of manifestation. If it is considered to be an act of manifestation, it will imply non-existence of effect prior to its manifestation. Secondly, if manifestation is considered to be present in cause, causal operation will be futile and if manifestation is considered to be non-existent in cause, it will involve the undesired contingency of production of everything from everything.¹¹

It is commonly observed that an effect that is produced is totally new. The effect is not perceived to be existing in its causal form even when conditions of its perception are fulfilled. If it is argued that effect is not perceived in its causal state because of its non-manifestation, it will involve the above mentioned difficulties, viz., inability to explain the nature and earlier existence of manifestation. Moreover, recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) contradicts notion of pre-existence of effect in cause. The introduction of fresh properties proves that effect is not the same as existed earlier. Consequently, it may be deduced that effect is non-existent prior to its production.¹²

The Sāṃkhya arguments in favour of their theory of pre-existence of effect are summed up in the following *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Asadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt
Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam.

Sucaritamīśra's reiteration of arguments of Sāṃkhya in favour of pre-existence of effect resembles Vācaspatimīśra's interpretation of the above mentioned *Kārikā*. Vācaspatimīśra considers the expression *sarvasambhavābhāvāt* and *Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt* as directed against the objections against *upādānagrahaṇāt*.¹³ The other commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* consider them as independent arguments. The arguments of the opponent regarding futility of instrumental causes, as recorded to be alleviated by Sāṃkhya, is put forth by Uddyotakara¹⁴ and answered by Vācaspatimīśra in his *Sāṃkhyatattvaśaṅkha*.¹⁵ The argument that prior non-existence of manifestation would

11. *Kāśikā Chod* 35

12. *Ibid.*

13. *STK* 9

14. Cf. *NV*, p. 489

15. *STK* 9

contradict the Sāṃkhya theory of prior existence of effect, reported by Sucaritamīśra as alleviated by Sāṃkhya, is also raised by Uddyotakara¹⁶ and answered by Vācaspatimīśra.¹⁷ Vācaspatimīśra admits this fault in the theory of Sāṃkhya. He, however, points out that this objection is equally applicable to the theory of Naiyāyikas for it will lead to the infinite regress with reference to manifestation. Sucaritamīśra's answer to this objection that manifestation is fresh and yet the object is existent¹⁸ is intelligent. The argument regarding difference between manifestation and production referred to by Sucaritamīśra as alleviated by Sāṃkhya is not found to be raised or answered by any other author.

The Sāṃkhya plea for non-production of non-existence and restriction of a particular effect to a particular cause are refuted by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, such as Uddyotakara,¹⁹ Jayantabhaṭṭa²⁰ and Śrīdhara.²¹ Sucaritamīśra refutes these arguments from Mīmāṃsā point of view. He refutes the first argument on the basis of *anupalabधि* which is posited as a means of valid knowledge by the Mīmāṃsakas only. The argument regarding restriction of a particular effect to a particular cause is refuted by Uddyotakara²² on the ground that a particular cause is endowed with capacity of producing a particular effect only. This, according to Sāṃkhya, implies existence of effect in cause, for this capacity is nothing but the effect in its causal form. Sucaritamīśra refutes this also from the standpoint of Mīmāṃsā maintaining that capacity cannot be identical with effect in its causal state.

2. Definition of Dharma

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa criticises the notion and definition of *dharma* as put forth by Sāṃkhya.

In the form of *pūrvapakṣa*, Kumārīlabhaṭṭa states that *dharma*, according to some, is function (*vṛtti*) of internal

16. Cf. *NV*, p. 486

17. Cf. *STK* 9

18. *Kāśikā Chod.* 35

19. *NV*, p. 487

20. *NM* Part II, p. 64

21. *NK*, p. 342-3

22. *NV*, p. 486

organ.²³ Sucaritamīśra²⁴ ascribes this view to Sāṃkhya and adds that the internal organ refers to *Manas*.

The view of Sāṃkhya is criticised on the following grounds. Firstly, the term *dharma* is not commonly used in the sense of function of internal organ. It is usage which determines the meaning of a term. Hence, function of internal organ cannot be signified by the term *dharma* in absence of such a usage.²⁵ Sucaritamīśra²⁶ states that the Sāṃkhyas may alleviate this objection by stating that the term *dhar.na* is used in the sense of function of internal organ, viz, *Manas* because determination to perform any ritual is the function of *Manas* only. This argument of Sāṃkhya, states Sucaritamīśra, cannot avoid the objection as *Manas* is not the agent of determination. The scriptures teach that determination is the function of *Ātman*. Secondly, *dharma* is generally understood to be the means of accomplishing the highest end of life. The function of internal organ, however, is not recognised in the scriptures to be such means of the accomplishment of the highest end of life. Besides, function of internal organ being supra-sensuous (*atīndriya*) are not directly perceived as leading to the highest end of life.²⁷

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa's statement that the Sāṃkhyas consider *Dharma* as function of internal organ is in conformity with the Sāṃkhya theory.²⁸ It should, however, be noted that Īśvara-kṛṣṇa²⁹ considers *dharma* as function or form of *Buddhi*, which is one of the three internal organs, and not that of *Manas* as understood by Sucaritamīśra. Kumārīlabhaṭṭa's criticism implies acceptance of single internal organ by the Sāṃkhya. This reiteration of the Sāṃkhya views is nearer to the theory of Vindhyavāsin³⁰ who accepts *Manas* as the only internal organ.

23. *Sl. V. Chod.* 195

24. *Kāśikā Chod.* 195

25. *Sl. V. Chod.* 196

26. *Kāśikā Chod.* 196

27. *Sl. V. Chod.* 196

28. *SK* 23

29. *Ibid.*

30. *YD* 22

3. Theory of Evolution

The Mīmāṃsakas criticise the Sāṃkhya thesis about (i) absence of an extraneous instrumental agency inspiring the Guṇas to evolve and (ii) the nature of primary cause of evolution. Kumārilabhaṭṭa raises objections against the first thesis and the second is criticised by Sucaritamiśra and Pārthasārathimiśra.

(i) The Mīmāṃsakas present the Sāṃkhya view thus. In the beginning of creation, there exist two principles the Puruṣa and the Guṇas (in their state of equilibrium). Puruṣa is inactive by nature and as such does not operate the Guṇas towards the creation of universe.³¹

This view of Sāṃkhyas is criticised on the following grounds :

The theory of Sāṃkhya implies impossibility of initial creation. The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of cause of initial activity of the Guṇas. Puruṣa, being inactive, and the Guṇas, being insentient, cannot cause initial activity.³² There is no other factor to initiate the creative activity of Pradhāna. The Karmas being non-existent in the state of initial evolution cannot be regarded as the cause of first activity of Pradhāna.³³ The false cognition (*mithyājñāna*), attachment or aversion also cannot be supposed to initiate the creative activity of Pradhāna, because they are functions of Manas which does not exist in the state of equipoise of the Guṇas.³⁴

Here, Pārthasārathimiśra³⁵ states that Kumārilabhaṭṭa presents the Sāṃkhyas as arguing that bondage is caused by karmas in their state of latent potentiality. Hence, Karmas in their state of latent potentiality cause the Guṇas to evolve into universe. Thus, Pārthasārathimiśra relates the issue of instrumental agency of universe to the cause of bondage. This view of Pārthasārathimiśra is unsupported. Firstly, there is no textual indication to substantiate this relation of two issues. Secondly, Kumārilabhaṭṭa raises the objection against the

31. *Sl. V. Sap.* 87

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. *NR. Sap.* 89

initial evolution of the Pradhāna. That is why, he himself states that Karmas do not exist in this state. Pārthasārathimiśra takes it as an issue of secondary evolution. Thirdly, the Sāṃkhyas themselves do not hold that Karmas activate the Guṇas.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa's criticism reveals that there might have been different causes of evolution prevalent amongst different followers of Sāṃkhya. That is why, he refutes causality of Karmas, attachment, etc., and false cognition, etc., as the causes of initial activity of the Pradhāna. The objection raised by Kumārilabhaṭṭa can be set aside by the Sāṃkhya theory that the Guṇas, though non-sentient, are active by nature. The cause of the initial creation is the inherent nature of Pradhāna to evolve and to serve the purpose of Puruṣa.³⁶

(ii) Regarding the Sāṃkhya theory of source of the universe, Sucaritamiśra states that the Sāṃkhyas have postulated Pradhāna, constituted of the subtlest form of material elements like earth and others, as cause of the universe because the gross world, according to them, cannot come out of the non-existent entity.³⁷

Sucaritamiśra criticises the theory on the ground that the principle of Pradhāna, posited by Sāṃkhya, is a mere hypothesis and its existence cannot be proved through available means of knowledge. Pradhāna, in fact, is imperceptible subtle element. The imperceptibility of subtle elements has led Sāṃkhya to postulate Pradhāna as distinct from subtle elements.³⁸

The statement of Sucaritamiśra and Pārthasārathimiśra that Pradhāna, according to Sāṃkhya, is cause of universe is in conformity with the Sāṃkhya texts.³⁹ The explanation of the nature of Pradhāna offered by them deserves further consideration. They think that Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya is the subtle form of material objects.⁴⁰ The available texts of the Sāṃkhyas

36. Cf. *SK* 21, 57, 51

37. *Kāśikā Nir* 113 also *NR* thereon

38. *Kāśikā Nir* 113

39. Cf. *SK* 3, 57, 58

40. *Kāśikā Nir* 113

nowhere hint at the view that Pradhāna is constituted of elements.

The statement of the two Mīmāṃsaka commentators is, therefore, either as a reminiscent of a view, not recorded in any texts or their own paraphrase of the original Sāṃkhya view. If the latter, and as it perhaps appears to be from its connection with the theory of *satkārya*, it is again a misunderstanding of the Sāṃkhya hypothesis or a purposeful distortion thereof. That is so because the Sāṃkhyas deduce from the ultimate principle not only the material elements and the material gross world but also psychic principles like *Manas*, *Ahaṃkāra*, *Buddhi*, and assign cognitive and conative functions to them. These psychic principles are neither gross nor material, as matter is their subsequent evolute.

4. Theory of organs (*indriyas*)

Like the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas also object to the Sāṃkhya theory of (i) all pervasive nature of organs and of (ii) *Ahaṃkāra* as their source. The former thesis is criticised by Kumārilabhaṭṭa, while the latter is rejected by Sucaritamīśra. The discussion is restricted to organs of sense, since the Mīmāṃsakas, like the Naiyāyikas, do not consider organs of action (*karmendriyas*) as organs (*indriyas*).

(i) Kumārilabhaṭṭa states in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* that organs are regarded as all-pervasive by the followers of Kapila.⁴¹

Kumārilabhaṭṭa remarks that this theory is illogical. He cites the example of ear and points out the following absurdities involved in the notion of all-pervasive nature of organs. Firstly, this theory implies the undesired contingency of perception of sound from a great distance. The ear, being all-pervasive, would come into contact of sound produced at a great distance too.⁴² Secondly, this theory implies that sound heard by one will be heard by all.⁴³ Thirdly, the ear being all-pervasive, would come in contact with all the sounds and consequently, all sorts of sound would be heard simultaneously.⁴⁴

41. *Sl. V. Śabda* 60

42. *Sl. V. Śabda* 57

43. *Sl. V. Śabda* 58

44. *Sl. V. Śabda* 60

(ii) As regards the Sāṃkhya view of source of organs, Sucaritamīśra quotes the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and states that organs, according to the followers of Kapila, originate from the *Ahaṃkāra*.⁴⁵

Sucaritamīśra objects to this theory of the Sāṃkhyas on the following grounds.

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of *Ahaṃkāra* which forms the source of organs. *Ahaṃkāra* may be considered either to be a form of knowledge or to be a separate entity. The former alternative cannot be accepted. Knowledge, which is located in the soul, cannot give rise to external organs. If *Ahaṃkāra* is supposed to be a separate entity, it will involve other absurdities. Firstly, the existence of such an entity is not proved by any available means of knowledge. Secondly, it will contradict the Sāṃkhya theory of perception. *Ahaṃkāra*, according to Sāṃkhya, is all-pervasive. In that case, organs coming out of *Ahaṃkāra* would also be all-pervasive as the nature of effect follows the nature of cause. It will, however, contradict the fact that organs go to the perceptible object. Such a movement is not possible in the case of the all-pervasive entity. Here, the Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing that an organ does not move. The movement belongs to *vytti* of organs. Sucaritamīśra objects to this stating that the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the nature of *vytti* of organs. *Vytti* cannot be held to be the capacity to know, because capacity being formless cannot be said to be agent of the act of going. Moreover, the existence of such a *vytti* cannot be proved by any available means of knowledge.⁴⁶

Besides, *Ahaṃkāra* is considered to be one of the internal organs (*karāṇa*) by Sāṃkhya. One *Karāṇa*, however, cannot be the source of some other *Karāṇa* just as *Manas* is not the source of any organ.⁴⁷

The view of the Sāṃkhyas that organs originate from *Ahaṃkāra* is refuted by their own argument adduced to prove the existence of *Puruṣa*. The Sāṃkhyas prove the existence of

45. *Kāśikā Pratyakṣa* 51

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*

Puruṣa on the ground that conglomeration (*saṃghāta*) of objects exists for the other just as bed, etc., are meant for the one who uses them. The organs are also meant for Puruṣa for they are also conglomeration (*saṃghāta*). Conglomeration is found in the case of material objects only. This leads to the conclusion that organs are material in nature and consequently, not the evolutes of Ahaṃkāra.⁴⁸

It can be deduced from our common experience also that organs are constituted of the elements. The qualities of elements are revealed by elements only. The colour is revealed by light of lamp, taste by water and so on. The organs also reveal qualities of different elements. Hence, the organ should be composed of the element, the quality of which is revealed by it.⁴⁹

The all-pervasive nature of organs is explicitly neglected in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, but the statement of the *Yuktidīpikā*, that Vindhyavāsin⁵⁰ held that organs are all-pervasive in nature corroborates Kumārilaḥṭṭa's reference to such a view.

Sucaritamīśra's presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory of Ahaṃkāra as the source of organs is based upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that organs originate from Ahaṃkāra as dominated by Sattva.⁵¹ Some other teachers of Sāṃkhya differ from Īśvarakṛṣṇa in this respect. pañcādhikaraṇa, as recorded by the *Yuktidīpikā*,⁵² is of the opinion that organs come out of elements.

The Sāṃkhya view that organs originate from Ahaṃkāra is severely criticised by the Naiyāyikas⁵³ also. The argument, viz., organs are composed of elements as they reveal qualities of elements is employed by Vātsyāyana⁵⁴ also.

The Sāṃkhyas also tried to defend their theory.⁵⁵ In fact, the theory of Sāṃkhya that organs come out of Ahaṃkāra is

48. *Kāśikā Anumānapariccheda* 107

49. *Kāśikā Pratyakṣa* 51

50. *YD* 22

51. *SK* 25

52. *YD* 29

53. For details see pp. 109ff.

54. *NB* 1.1, 12 and 3.1.6

55. see pp. 109ff.

rooted in their pre-supposition that cosmological position of every object depends upon quantity of Sattva in it. The elements, therefore, being possessed of less quantity of Sattva than organs cannot be the source of the latter.

5. Subtle body (*sūkṣma śarīra*)

Kumārilaḥṭṭa⁵⁶ justifies the view of Vindhyavāsin who rejects the existence of subtle body. This, however, implies the criticism of other teachers of Sāṃkhya like Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁵⁷ who strongly advocates the existence of subtle body.

Kumārilaḥṭṭa rejects the existence of subtle body on the following grounds. The existence of subtle body is not proved by any available means of knowledge.⁵⁸ There is no proof for the sudden coming into existence and sudden disappearance of subtle body. To say that the subtle body is endowed with all sorts of subtle forms, etc., is a figurative exaggeration and not a statement of fact.⁵⁹ The subtle body cannot be assumed as a medium of conveying the impressions of knowledge, etc., acquired in past body, to the body of future birth. There is no proof for entrance of these impressions into subtle body.⁶⁰ The impressions, being non-material, cannot enter the subtle body posited by Sāṃkhya.⁶¹

The view of Vindhyavāsin regarding rejection of subtle body quoted by Kumārilaḥṭṭa is found in the *Yuktidīpikā*⁶² also. The other teachers of Sāṃkhya think that transmigration of soul into another body is not possible without some receptacle of external and internal faculties like Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas and organs as also past impressions, in the state intervening between death and future birth. The argument of Kumārilaḥṭṭa against sudden appearance and disappearance of subtle body throws further light on one of the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa concepts regarding subtle body. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not believe in

56. *Sl. V. Ātma*. 62

57. Cf. *SK* 40-41

58. *Sl. V. Ātma*. 62

59. *Sl. V. Ātma*. 63

60. *Sl. V. Ātma*. 64

61. *NK Ātma*. 64

62. *YD* 39

destruction of subtle body in each birth. The concept of destruction of subtle body defeats the very purpose of the assumption of subtle body, viz., linking up our life with another life of a soul, in the state intervening between death and subsequent birth. On the contrary, Īśvarakṛṣṇa opines that Subtle body is permanent insofar as it accompanies *Puruṣa* till liberation.⁶³ The theory criticised by Kumārilabhaṭṭa was propounded by Patañjali,⁶⁴ an ancient teacher of Sāṃkhya, according to whom subtle body pushes internal organs from behind at the time of death so that they may get themselves in touch with the parental seed of next birth and disappears. A fresh subtle body appears in each birth.

6. Cause of bondage

The Sāṃkhyas are presented as holding that bondage is caused by Karmans in their state of latent potentiality.⁶⁵

Kumārilabhaṭṭa objects to this view of Sāṃkhya on the following grounds.

It is illogical to hold that cause abiding in its state of latent potentiality produces effect. Firstly, for no effect is found to be produced from the latent power of cause.⁶⁶ A cause can be effective only when it exists in its manifest form. Kumārilabhaṭṭa further explains the phenomenon of causation with the illustration of milk and curds favourite with Sāṃkhya. Curds is present in milk in its potential form. Curds in the state of latent potentiality, however, cannot bring about special substance produced out of curds (*dādhika*). If the cause in state of latent potentiality were capable of bringing about the effect, substance, i.e., buttermilk produced out of curds could be prepared directly out of milk. Thus, the potential form of curds lying in the milk is cause of curds while cause of substance prepared out of curds is the potential form of that substance lying in curds.⁶⁷ Secondly, this theory of Sāṃkhya implies impossibility of release. If the potential form of Karmans is supposed to produce the effect, the Karmans will continue to produce their

63. SK 43

64. YD 39

65. *Sl. V. Sap.* 89

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Sl. V. Sap.* 90

effects even after release. The Karmans will not be destroyed in the state of release even when their effects are already experienced because the effect, according to Sāṃkhya, continues to exist in its potential form.⁶⁸ Thirdly, the supposition implies futility of all actions. The Karmans always continue to exist in their potential form and this form would itself bring about the result for the sake of which the act is performed.⁶⁹ Fourthly, the theory further involves undesirable contingency of acceptance of attachment (*rāga*), etc., as the cause of bondage. There is no reason to exclude attachment, etc., from the domain of causality of bondage.⁷⁰ If it is argued that the Karmans are considered to be cause of bondage for they exist in their state of potentiality to produce their effects, it will not improve the case. The postulation of the state of potentiality of Karmans does not serve any purpose since it is held by Sāṃkhya that even the latent form of cause produces effect.⁷¹ Moreover, attachment, etc., can also exist in their state of potentiality to cause bondage.⁷²

The view of Sāṃkhya contradicts the fundamental doctrine that knowledge is the cause of liberation. Liberation is opposed to bondage. The cause of liberation should also be contradictory to that of bondage. Knowledge, however, is not contradictory to Karmans in their state of potentiality.⁷³ Here, the Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing that Karmans are destroyed by knowledge and, thus, one gets liberation through knowledge. Hence, the Sāṃkhya theory of cause of bondage and liberation is not inconsistent. The argument of Sāṃkhyas, states Kumārilabhaṭṭa, cannot alleviate the objection. The potentiality of Karmans cannot be destroyed by knowledge. This potentiality will always cause bondage, for Sāṃkhya holds that cause produces effect even when existing in latent form.⁷⁴ Moreover, the view that Karmans are destroyed by

68. *Sl. V. Sap.* 91-2

69. *Sl. V. Sap.* 92

70. *Sl. V. Sap.* 93

71. *Ibid.*

72. *NR Sap.* 93

73. *Sl. V. Sap.* 93

74. *Sl. V. Sap.* 95

knowledge is not supported by any available means.⁷⁵ The Sāṃkhyas are further presented as arguing that knowledge reduces Karmans to a state of minimum capacity so that they produce the effect of smallest degree, just as a crime committed by royal prince is remedied by a nominal punishment inflicted upon him.⁷⁶ Kumārilabhaṭṭa objects to this plea of Sāṃkhya on the ground that it will again lead to impossibility of release. The causal efficacy of Karmans will be present even in the state of liberation and will always cause bondage, for the state of potentiality of Karmas is accepted by Sāṃkhya to be effective enough to cause bondage.⁷⁷

The Karmas cannot cause bondage in the initial state of creation, since it is admitted by Sāṃkhya that Karmans are function (*vyrtti*) of Manas and the function of Manas does not exist at the time of equilibrium of the three Guṇas. If it is argued that functions of Manas also exist in their state of latent potentiality, it will lead to the absurdity of co-mingling of all Karmans. All the Manas are supposed to dissolve into Pradhāna. All Karmans belonging to all Manas, therefore will be co-mingled. Consequently, it will not be possible to attach a particular Karma to a particular Manas.⁷⁸

As the cause of bondage, the Sāṃkhyas cannot postulate the capacity of Prakṛti to be enjoyed and the capacity of Puruṣa to enjoy because it would also involve absurdity of impossibility of liberation. Prakṛti and Puruṣa can never be severed from this capacity and, thus, cause of bondage will be present at all the time.⁷⁹

The Sāṃkhyas are presented as arguing further that bondage is due to Karmans and the Karmans are performed through ignorance when the knowledge of distinction between Puruṣa is attained, ignorance is destroyed and consequently, Karmans also cease to bear fruits. This leads to attainment of liberation. Kumārilabhaṭṭa objects to the supposition of Sāṃkhya by stating that it will also lead to impossibility of

75. *Sl. V. Sap.* 96

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Sl. V. Sap.* 97

78. *Sl. V. Sap.* 98

79. *Sl. V. Sap.* 100

release. The cessation of ignorance might stop appearance of more Karmans and subsequent bondage, but knowledge will not be able to stop reactions of past Karmas, the seed of which has already started bearing fruits. The results of these Karmas are not due to ignorance but the effect of past acts.⁸⁰

This criticism also reveals that Kumārilabhaṭṭa might have come across some Sāṃkhya teachers propounding Karmans abiding in their potential form or the capacity of Prakṛti to be enjoyed and capacity of Puruṣa to enjoy as the causes of bondage. In the available texts of Sāṃkhya, however, we find ignorance only as the cause of bondage.⁸¹ As regards Karmans, the Sāṃkhyas state that Karmans cannot bind Puruṣa for they are properties of Buddhi.⁸²

7. Means of liberation

After criticising the Sāṃkhya view of cause of evolution and of bondage, Kumārilabhaṭṭa proceeds to criticise the Sāṃkhya theory of means of liberation.

In the form of the *pūrvapakṣa* Kumārilabhaṭṭa states that the Sāṃkhyas hold that liberation is attained through knowledge.⁸³ The knowledge, clarifies Pārthasārathimīśra, is discriminative knowledge (of Prakṛti and Puruṣa).⁸⁴

Kumārilabhaṭṭa objects to the view of the Sāṃkhyas by saying that it is mere hypothesis of Sāṃkhya and is not supported by any means of knowledge. It is neither known through sense-perception nor declared in the *śruti* that liberation is attained through knowledge.⁸⁵ The statements of the *śruti* like 'ātman should be known' and others do not enjoin knowledge of ātman as a means of liberation. They indicate that knowledge of ātman induces men towards certain activity.⁸⁶

The statements of the *śruti* describing results of knowledge should be taken as valedictory statements (*arthavāda*) and

80. *Sl. V. Sa* p. 101

81. *SK* 44

82. *SS* 1.16; also *YD* 15

83. *Sl. V. Sap.* 102

84. *NR Sap.* 102

85. *Sl. V. Sap.* 102

86. *Sl. V. Sap.* 103

should not be accepted at their face value. As far as the real result of knowledge is concerned, there can be no result of knowledge other than heaven, etc., mentioned as result of various sacrifices.⁸⁷ Pārthasārathimiśra⁸⁸ adds that the Upaniṣads recommend knowledge of *ātman* from two points of view corresponding to the aim in view. In order to realise the non-identity of *ātman* with material objects like body, etc., which forms the basis of self-notion, knowledge of *ātman* as different from them is prescribed due to its unique qualities like indestructibility, etc. The other form of knowledge is of *ātman* as the object or ideal of worship associated with *prāṇāyāma*, etc. The Vedas never prescribe as means of liberation that sort of discriminative knowledge as is favoured by Sāṃkhya.

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa's statement that the Sāṃkhyas hold that liberation is attained through knowledge is in accordance with the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*⁸⁹ which prescribes knowledge of truth as the only means of liberation. The nature of this knowledge is variously explained by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Gauḍapāda⁹⁰ holds that knowledge of truth refers to that of the twenty-five categories of Sāṃkhya. The *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*⁹¹ states that this knowledge is true knowledge of *Puruṣa* while Vācaspatimiśra⁹² thinks that this knowledge is realisation of distinction between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Pārthasārathimiśra's explanation comes nearer to that of Vācaspatimiśra.

Here, the problem naturally arises as to whether these three forms of knowledge are indeed some mutually distinct but reconcilable, or are they completely irreconcilable or whether they signify an identity of final state of knowledge expressed in different terms when the ultimate duality of the two principles is accepted. Is it not that knowledge of twenty-five principles includes knowledge of distinction of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and again when 'Self' is said to be known, is it not that knowledge has two aspects viz., a positive aspect of what

87. *SI. V. Sap.* 104

88. *NR Sap.* 102

89. *SK* 44

90. *GB* 44

91. *SC* 44

92. *STK* 44

'Self' is and a negative aspect, viz., negation of exclusion of non-self? In other words, is a positive knowledge of 'Self' alone possible without any reference to *Prakṛti* which is not Self? We may hypothetically say that these explanations emphasise different aspects of the same state. If, however, considered as a process of knowledge, it is possible to say that they may signify gradations, if knowledge of *Puruṣa* is the ideal. This our suggestion is based on the statement of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*⁹³ that remedy for complete extinction of suffering is the knowledge of *vyakta*, *avyakta*, and *jñā*, where *jñānavijñāna* is put at the end of the list in order to indicate supremacy of that knowledge.

The remark of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa that the knowledge favoured by Sāṃkhyas as means of liberation has no scriptural foundation is indicative of his intention of disclosing that the Sāṃkhya view is unsupported by the Vedas and secondly, if they try to interpret Vedic texts in that way, they are imposing their own theory on the Vedas. That may again suggest that the Sāṃkhyas perhaps tried to justify their view by claiming Vedic authority.

The means of knowledge is a crucial point in Sāṃkhya philosophy, since it starts with the claim of being a system which finds out solution to the problem of suffering and release from bondage which is the cause of suffering. Kumārīlabhaṭṭa wants to show discrepancies in the means and end and if any critic of Sāṃkhya showed that there is no connection between these two as professed by Sāṃkhya, it would defeat the *śāstra* on its own ground. Unfortunately, Kumārīlabhaṭṭa does not employ any argument showing depth of reasoning, but takes recourse to *śruti* and calls the Sāṃkhya view as a technicality and tries to refute it with an argument which is little less than another technicality.

Incidentally, it is worthwhile to make following observation. When Jaimini and Śabara speak of heaven alone, without any reference to the issue of release, it is evident that the problem of meaning and aim of human life fails to grip their mind. Kumārīlabhaṭṭa, however shows his awareness of the same

93. *SK* 3

and it is certainly to his credit that he is able to conceive of a state which is beyond both merit and demerit—the primary considerations of the Mīmāṃsā. He also goes further in acknowledging the importance of knowledge. By means of his theory of balanced combination of acts and knowledge and concept of neutral and pure state Kumārilabhaṭṭa also gives a metaphysical basis to the discussions in the system, as he has supplied the basis of epistemology and logic to it. Thereby, he certainly contributes immensely to advancement of Mīmāṃsā thought and brings it into the arena of philosophy.

8. Perception of sound

Kumārilabhaṭṭa agrees with Sāṃkhyas in holding that auditory sense, like other organs of sense, come into contact of the object in the act of perception. However, he objects to the Sāṃkhya theory of process of contact of auditory sense with sound.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa states in the form *Pūrvapakṣa* that auditory sense, according to Sāṃkhya, travels to the sounding object in course of perception of sound.⁹⁴

Kumārilabhaṭṭa points out following absurdities in the view.

It is not proper to assume that one single organ goes in all directions at the same time. It is commonly experienced that sounds from all sides are perceived simultaneously. The single organ, however, cannot reach all sounds at a time.⁹⁵

The Sāṃkhyas try to avoid this difficulty by stating that auditory sense does not travel to the sound-producing object, but it is the function (*vytti*) of the auditory sense which goes to the sound-producing object.⁹⁶ Kumārilabhaṭṭa points out following flaws in the argument of the Sāṃkhyas. Firstly, it will imply acceptance of two imperceptible factors, viz., function of organ and its movement to object, which are unproved. Secondly, the Sāṃkhya will have to admit modification of auditory sense by sound produced at a distance only. The sound produced near the ear, therefore, would not be audible. If it is argued that auditory sense will be modified in the form of sound produced at near place on account of the

94. *Sl. V. Śabda* 106

95. *Sl. V. Śabda* 113

96. *Ibid.*

all-pervasive nature of organs, it will involve the undesired contingency of perception of sound produced at a very distant place too. The auditory sense, being all-pervasive would equally reach very distant place also. Thirdly, modification of auditory sense brought about by all sounds produced at near or distant place would be equal and consequently, there would be no difference in perception of sounds produced at a near or distant place. It, however goes against common experience. Even if it is argued that auditory sense is modified by the sound which has no particular relation with it, difference between sound produced at a distant and near place will not be explained. It will again imply the absurdity of perception of sound produced at a very distant place.

The theory of Sāṃkhya cannot account for non-perception of the sound interrupted by material objects like a thick wall, etc., because the function of auditory sense, not being concrete, would not be obstructed by material objects.

The theory of Sāṃkhya again cannot account for commonly experienced fact of greater reach of sound in the direction towards which the wind flows. If the auditory sense is considered to be all-pervasive, it would come into contact with the sound in each direction. Thus, the sound would not be interrupted by wind blowing in opposite direction.

Here, it may be noted that the process of perception is not fully explained in the extant texts of the Sāṃkhyas. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that perception is definite knowledge (*adhyavasāya*) of an object. This is explained by Vācaspati-miśra as “the knowledge of an object brought about through contact of sense-organ with it.” The process of the contact, however, is left unexplained. Kumārilabhaṭṭa throws a considerable light on the Sāṃkhya view of perception of sound in particular and of the objects of other organs of sense in general.

9. Validity of Knowledge

Kumārilabhaṭṭa takes up for discussion the theory that validity or invalidity are inherent in knowledge. Sucaritamīśra ascribes this view to Sāṃkhya and states that the Sāṃkhyas propound this theory on the basis of the theory of existence

of effect in cause prior to causal operation (*satkārya*). The effect, according to Sāṃkhya, remains latent in cause. The validity or invalidity of knowledge, being causally determined effects of knowledge, should be regarded as inherent in knowledge itself. Thus, validity or invalidity of knowledge can be known by conditions of knowledge itself and do not require some extraneous factor to test it.

Kumārilaḥṭṭa raises following objections against the theory of Sāṃkhya.

Validity or invalidity, being mutually contradictory properties, cannot subsist simultaneously in the same cognition just as heat and cold, being contradictory, cannot subsist simultaneously in the same substance.

The Sāṃkhyas may controvert this argument on the ground that this argument applies to genus of knowledge. Validity or invalidity, on the other hand, can subsist simultaneously in different individual knowledges just as heat and cold can subsist in different substances like fire and water at a time. This solution of Sāṃkhya is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas. Sucaritaśra argues that contradictory qualities can subsist in different substances like fire and water at a time because they are different in nature and as such form different genus. The individual cognitions, however, are identical in nature and form one genus. Hence, we cannot postulate at a time different individual knowledges which may possess contradictory qualities.

The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions is intrinsic. Some cognitions are intrinsically valid and the others are intrinsically invalid. Thus, there is no self-contradiction since individual knowledges can be characterised by validity or invalidity. Kumārilaḥṭṭa states that this argument of Sāṃkhya does not stand before logic. Apart from any external conditions it will be difficult to ascertain which cognition is valid or which cognition is invalid, for all cognitions are covered by the same genus cognition. Cognition cannot determine itself to be either valid or invalid. The difference between valid and invalid individual cognitions can be ascertained on the basis of extraneous factors only but the upholders of intrinsic validity of knowledge admit on

external factor to test the cognition. Hence, valid cognition cannot be differentiated from invalid one without admitting some external condition.

If knowledge is considered to be intrinsically valid or invalid, there will be no difference between invalid and valid knowledge. All sorts of knowledge will be considered to be valid. Consequently, invalid knowledges like the knowledge arising in dream will be considered to be valid, for they are also the forms of knowledge. No one will suffer from invalidity of these knowledges.

Sucaritaśra adduces the following additional arguments.

The Sāṃkhya theory of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge is based upon the wrong notion of existence of effect in cause. Hence, it is not tenable.

The intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge implies the impossibility of all practical activities. The agent proceeds to activity after ascertaining truth or falsehood of the object cognised and this ascertainment is possible only through determination of validity and invalidity of their knowledge on the basis of some external criterion. The Sāṃkhyas, however, do not admit any external factor to discriminate between validity and invalidity of knowledge.

The early available texts of the Sāṃkhyas do not mention the Sāṃkhya view of test of validity of knowledge. Vācaspatiśra speaks of intrinsic validity of knowledge with reference to the Vedas. The *Sāṃkhyasūtras* prescribe intrinsic validity of knowledge. This statement is restricted to the Vedic testimony by Vijñānabhikṣu, but Aniruddha considers it to be general statement regarding intrinsic validity of knowledge. It may, however, be noted that Aniruddha speaks of the extrinsic validity of invalid knowledge. He states that invalid knowledge depends upon something different from totality of factors generating knowledge for the fault in the factor of generating knowledge is additional to them. Kumārilaḥṭṭa, however, states that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic according to Sāṃkhya. It is Mādhavācārya, the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, who explicitly states that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic in the

theory of Sāṃkhya. Sucaritamīśra explains the reason as to why the Sāṃkhyas believe in intrinsic validity of both valid and invalid knowledge. He states that the view of Sāṃkhya is based upon the theory of existence of effect in cause. Govardhana P. Bhaṭṭa remarks that the attempt of Sucaritamīśra is far-fetched. He does not, however, suggest better reason as to why the Sāṃkhyas hold the view of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge. The concept of intrinsic validity of Vedic testimony, according to Vācaspatimīśra, is rooted in the Sāṃkhya view of lack of human authorship of the Vedas. The knowledge derived from the Vedic injunctions is self-sufficient and there is no means like virtues of speaker to test it.

From the entire discussion about validity of knowledge as set forth by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Sucaritamīśra it appears that there is some sort of confusion of two issues which are related but altogether different. The valid or invalid nature of a particular cognition invariably depends on faultless or otherwise character of causal material of that particular cognition. If there is some defect in the sense-organ, it vitiates trustworthy character of that particular cognition. If on the other hand, totality of causal conditions is faultless, the cognition that will arise from them will be naturally valid. This is one issue. Now suppose a faulty totality of causal conditions gives rise to a wrong cognition. Then, with the help of some other reason we judge that it is not a valid cognition. Thus, determination of validity or otherwise of a particular cognition with the help of a factor external to causal material of that cognition, is another issue. The first issue pertains to pre-production state and the very character of knowledge, i.e., totality determines or influences the make up of a cognition. In the second case, it merely informs us whether a particular cognition is valid or otherwise, that only, subsequent to the rise of knowledge, i.e., it deals with post-production state and has no capacity to affect a change in the character of knowledge, e.g., an authoritative person may tell us that since there are no two moons, cognition of two moons is not valid, but that *āptavākya*, which is extraneous to causal material, cannot change the sense-cognition which will be same so long as the eye-defect continues to be. The Sāṃkhyas, as presented by Kumārilabhaṭṭa, forward the

first issue when they say that validity and invalidity is intrinsic to knowledge. This is further supported by Sucaritamīśra's comment that the Sāṃkhyas base their view on another theory of presence of effect in cause in pre-production state. This clarifies the Sāṃkhya position beyond doubt. But Kumārilabhaṭṭa confuses two issues and criticises Sāṃkhya basing his argument on the second issue. So it is all a misdirected criticism. Unfortunately, subsequent Sāṃkhya writers also do not clarify that matter. When Vācaspatimīśra mentions Sāṃkhya view about self validity of knowledge arising from the Vedas, he appears to lose sight of the distinction between the two issues. The knowledge arising out of the Vedas is intrinsically valid. How do we know it? Because we take recourse to the assumption that "being free from human agency they are free from faults accruing thereof." That means, we ascertain externally that causal material of that knowledge is faultless, then inform ourselves that it is valid. In short, 'producing knowledge', and 'informing or knowing about knowledge produced' are two different stages, with which the two aspects of validity of knowledge are concerned. With this background, the attempt of Sucaritamīśra cannot be dismissed as far-fetched but needs to be valued as an important guideline. In the same way Aniruddha's modification of the view is far from being satisfactory. By saying that *prāmāṇya* is *parataḥ* because the faults are extraneous he not only confuses the issue all the more, but displays his own lack of insight into the problem.

CHAPTER IV

SĀMĀKHYA AS PRESENTED IN UTTARA-MĪMĀṂSĀ

(Sāṃkhya has encountered the most severe criticism at the hands of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. Bādarāyaṇa's special efforts to refute Sāṃkhya prove that prior to the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa Sāṃkhya had attained a high status as a full-fledged philosophical system, based upon powerful rational thought. The points on which Bādarāyaṇa criticises Sāṃkhya are further elaborated by his commentators. Śaṃkara is the chief critic of Sāṃkhya. The criticism of Sāṃkhya as offered by other commentators of the *Brahmasūtra* does not display any excellence of arguments in comparison to that by Śaṃkara.)

Śaṃkara's interest in firmly establishing the philosophy of Vedānta prompted him to criticise the other systems. Besides, Śaṃkara belonged to a period in Indian philosophy when criticism and counter criticism was the vogue of the day and one could not remain complacent simply by making a straightforward statement of one's own views. (Śaṃkara wants to establish that Brahman is the first order reality in the form of cause of universe.) Hence, any system which speaks of something other than Brahman as cause of universe is not only in opposition to what Śaṃkara considers to be the right faith, but is also the one to be rejected¹. The strong fervour of expounding and establishing his own position and of criticising the theories of others go hand in hand in the commentary of Śaṃkara. Whereas the first positively establishes his position, the second aspect strengthens it by challenging and refuting the doctrines propounded by others. Śaṃkara is further interested in proving that the Upaniṣads unanimously propound Brahman as cause of universe. He suspects that there are some passages in the Upaniṣads which can be resorted to by Kapila

and others as lending support to the theory that Pradhāna is cause of universe and that, consequently, his own position is likely to be contradicted. Hence, he does not consider his mission fulfilled until and unless the Upaniṣadic passages are proved as speaking of Brahman only as cause of universe.² Śaṃkara further holds that it is the science of Vedānta only which shows the right path to liberation. Hence, he not only wants to propound his own system but also guards the common man from becoming a prey to other systems. He thinks that the weaknesses of other systems should be brought to light. Otherwise, some people having little critical power, may develop faith in these systems considering them to be right means for perfect knowledge on the ground that these are accepted by great men in society and are founded by omniscient sages because of their depth of reasoning³.

By the time of Śaṃkara, it is to be noted that all philosophical systems have assumed definite forms and gained distinguishing features. The course of logical development of the ideas and doctrines is almost certain and through a criticism and counter-criticism of them fallacies in arguments and faults in the assumption are laid bare. As a result, the picture of each system becomes clear so as to display strong and weak points of each system. It is, therefore, possible for Śaṃkara to have a review of the spectrum of philosophical thought and to choose such points as strengthen the system, and minimise the weaknesses. He aims at formation of a very comprehensive and yet elastic system without any apparent absurdities. That is why, when he refutes other systems, the criticism is confined only to certain points and is not a pointwise criticism of the system as a whole. This becomes clear when we compare the interrelations of other systems during that period and the topics of each system that are criticised by Śaṃkara.

These are the reasons which prompt Śaṃkara to criticise other systems of thought. There are some additional reasons which led Śaṃkara to utilise logic, grammar and his power of eloquence, especially against allied systems of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. At the time of Śaṃkara, Sāṃkhya and Yoga were

1. SB 3.4.2 and 2.2.1

2. SB 1.4.1

3. SB 2.2.1

widely known as expounding the means of accomplishing the highest end of human life and were favoured by great men in society. Moreover, their position was strengthened by the Vedic passages referring to the systems.⁴ Śaṃkara further thinks that the theory of Pradhāna as cause of universe, being nearer to the creation theory in the scriptures, resembles the thesis of Vedānta in many respects. It is supported by profound logic and hence is partly accepted by Vedāntins too. Therefore, Śaṃkara finds it obligatory to show that Sāṃkhya is wrong in the parts where it differs from the position of Vedānta⁵ and, thus, highlights the importance of Vedānta as the only system aided by logic which adopts proper line of interpretation of scriptures. In view of these reasons, Śaṃkara considers Sāṃkhya as chief opponent (*pradhānamalla*)⁶.

Śaṃkara does not totally reject the Sāṃkhya position. He has no objection in accepting the Sāṃkhya theories such as the nature of soul which do not contradict the position of Advaita Vedānta⁷.

(The other Vedānta commentators mainly follow Śaṃkara in their remarks against Sāṃkhya, though they differ in respect of their own philosophical position. Rāmānuja directs three more *adhikaraṇas* in addition to those directed by Śaṃkara against scriptural basis of Sāṃkhya. Like Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja also states that Sāṃkhya is not to be totally rejected. He holds that the Sāṃkhya doctrines are set aside insofar as they contradict the *śruti* and reasoning. They are partly accepted by the followers of Vedānta in certain respects, as for instance, the theory of *satkārya*.⁸ (It is interesting to note that Śaṃkara states that the Sāṃkhya doctrine of nature of soul is in accordance with the *śruti* and, hence, acceptable to the followers of Vedānta but Rāmānuja criticises the same doctrine on the ground that it contradicts the *śruti*⁹. Rāmānuja further states that he does not want to reject the 'object'-character of the

4. SB 2.1.3

5. SB 2.1.12

6. Ibid.

7. SB 2.1.3

8. RB 2.2.16

9. RB 3.2.19

Sāṃkhya categories. What is refuted is the view that they are not constituted of Brahman¹⁰. Madhva is not so keen on criticising Sāṃkhya. He directs only a few *adhikaraṇas* out of those directed against Sāṃkhya by Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja. Nimbārka and Vallabha generally follow Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja in their review of Sāṃkhya.)

The arguments put forth by Vedāntins against the theories of Sāṃkhya can be classified under three broad heads : (i) arguments based on the particular interpretation of the *śruti* passages and words, (ii) arguments based upon the authenticity of the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* and (iii) purely logical arguments independent of *śruti* and *smṛti* levelled against the Sāṃkhya view in general. These sets of arguments are considered below.

1. Arguments based on interpretation of the *śruti* passages and words

The exponents of Vedānta like Bādarāyaṇa and his commentators criticise the Sāṃkhya theory basically for what they regard as its anti-Vedic and anti-Vedāntic spirit. From the statements of the Vedāntins, it appears that the Sāṃkhyas claim support of the Upaniṣads for their theories. If it is not disproved by the Vedāntins that the passages of Upaniṣads adumbrate the doctrine of Pradhāna as cause of universe (*Pradhānakāraṇavāda*), it would be impossible for them to establish firmly the theory of Brahman as cause of universe (*Brahmakāraṇavāda*). The Vedāntins, therefore, contend that only the doctrines of Vedānta have support of the *śruti*, and whatever the Sāṃkhyas teach is without authority of *śruti* and their interpretation of *śruti* is not a correct interpretation. However, in the authentic Sāṃkhya texts available the Sāṃkhyas are nowhere found as interpreting the Upaniṣads so as to support the Sāṃkhya point of view. Perhaps, at the time of Śaṃkara who belongs to considerably late date from the point of view of origin and development of Sāṃkhya a Sāṃkhya writer or thinker actually claiming Upaniṣadic support may be a rarity and it is possible to say that here he mainly follows the *sūtrakāra*. But, when Bādarāyaṇa formulates so many *sūtras* for special purpose of disproving claim of Sāṃkhya the possibility of the Sāṃkhya attempts, oral or written, to interpret the Upaniṣadic passages.

10. RB 2 2.42

as favouring Sāṃkhya position cannot be absolutely precluded. Also, the *sūtras* can be looked upon as a device to safeguard against possibility of such an interpretation by the Sāṃkhya opponent. Hence, the following discussion takes into consideration as to how far Sāṃkhya interpretation recorded by the Vedāntins in the form of opponent's view (*pūrvapakṣa*) is in accordance with the system of Sāṃkhya, and how far the Vedāntins succeed in proving that the Upaniṣadic passages under consideration do not contain the theories of Sāṃkhya. Generally, the discussion regarding different passages is found in a particular set of *sūtras* constituting one *adhikaraṇa*. For the present purpose, we have accepted Śaṅkara's scheme of division of the *sūtras* into particular *adhikaraṇas*.

*Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*¹¹

In this *adhikaraṇa*, the Vedāntins attempt to disprove scriptural basis of Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya in the following passages of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* :

“Sadeva somyedamagraā sīdekamevādvitīyam”¹²

“In the beginning, my dear, this was being, only one, without a second”¹³.

“Tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tattejo asijata”¹⁴

“It conceived, may I become many; may I grow forth and it created fire”¹⁵. Here, Śaṅkara primarily aims at disproving scriptural basis of Pradhāna and raises the issue of denotation of the term *sat* in some *sūtras* only. Whereas Rāmānuja and Nimbārka are primarily engaged throughout the *adhikaraṇa* in establishing that the term *sat* does not denote Pradhāna. Madhva and Vallabha do not direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya.

In the beginning of his commentary on this *adhikaraṇa* Śaṅkara gives the following reasons which Sāṃkhya may adduce to show that passages of scriptures describing source of universe refer to Pradhāna. (1) In the Upaniṣads cause of universe is inferred from effects. This is in complete conformity with

11. BS 1.1.5-11

12. Ch. up 6.2.1

13. Tr. Ganganath Jha

14. Ch. up. 6.2.3

15. Tr. Ganganath Jha

doctrines of Sāṃkhya, for, according to it, Pradhāna, Puruṣa and their connection can be known through inference only.¹⁶ (2) Pradhāna is endowed with all qualities like omnipotence and omniscience which the scriptures necessarily attribute to cause of universe. Pradhāna is omnipotent in respect of its modifications into worldly objects. The quality of omniscience also can be attributed to Pradhāna because of its having Sattva as its component. (The fact that Sattva is source of knowledge is mentioned in the *smṛtis* and is experienced in our daily life too. The *smṛtis* declare ‘knowledge springs from Sattva’. The Yogins are known to be omniscient on account of their possessing a high quantity of sattva. Thus, due to presence of Sattva Pradhāna can also be omniscient. (As in case of Brahman of Vedānta, Pradhāna can be omniscient in figurative sense of the term, i.e., in the sense of having potentiality of knowing everything. Otherwise, how can Brahman also be omniscient without having means of knowledge, viz., organs, etc. ?¹⁷ (3) Pradhāna, being composed of the three Guṇas, is capable of undergoing modifications while Brahman which is non-composite and homogeneous by nature is unable to undergo these modifications. Hence, quality of being material cause can be more correctly and convincingly applied to Pradhāna.¹⁸

In case of the term *sat*, standing for cause of universe in the passage of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, the Sāṃkhyas may argue, states Rāmānuja, that proper construction of the passage indicates that the term *idam* denotes modifications of ultimate cause conditioned by names and forms. The passage implies that the world was existent in form of *sat* before its evolution. The term *sat* denotes, therefore, causal form of manifold world. (This can be explained on the basis of Sāṃkhya theory of identity of cause and effect. The effect, according to this theory, is attainment of another condition by a causal substance. The statements like ‘As, my dear, by one clod of earth, etc., prescribing knowledge of everything by knowledge of one can be accounted for on the basis of Sāṃkhya theory of identity

16. SB 1.1.5

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

of cause and effect only. Thus, the scriptures intend to propound Pradhāna alone as cause of universe¹⁹.

The Vedāntins criticise these arguments of Sāṃkhya on following grounds. (1) Though cause of universe is inferred, yet causality of Pradhāna is refuted by the fact that Pradhāna is not taught in the *śruti*. Moreover, it is also possible to establish with the help of reasoning that Brahman is cause of universe.²⁰ (2) It is not logical to hold that Pradhāna is endowed with all those qualities which are attributed to cause of universe in the Upaniṣads. The contention of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna may be omniscient does not stand before logic. Though knowledge is attributed to Sattva which is one of the components of Pradhāna, yet it is illogical to say that Pradhāna is omniscient. (No knowledge can arise in the state of equilibrium of the three Guṇas, for, dominance of Sattva over Rajas and Tamas, which is a necessary condition for knowledge, is not present in this state.) Nor can it be maintained that Pradhāna is omniscient because it has the capability of knowing everything. In that case, we may likewise term it as little-knowing with reference to its other components, viz., Rajas, Tamas which possess the power of impeding knowledge. Moreover, modification of Sattva when not connected with witnessing intelligent principle, cannot give rise to knowledge. That is why, the example of Yogins given by Sāṃkhya does not fit in with the position of Sāṃkhya itself. The Yogins have intelligent principle, which is independent of Pradhāna and which knows everything. If the Sāṃkhyas maintain that act of seeing is transferred to Pradhāna on account of its connection with some observing principle (i.e., Puruṣa) just as act of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire, it would not improve the case. It would be better to ascribe this act to primary principle and not to the secondary one. It is also illogical to say that Brahman is omniscient in figurative sense of the term. (Brahman is omniscient in primary sense only. Knowledge of Brahman is permanent and does not depend upon any external factor such as instrument or object of knowledge just as natural heat and light of Sun is not

19. RB 1.1.5

20. SB. 1.1.5

dependent upon any agency or object.²¹) (3) The argument that Pradhāna, being composite of the three Guṇas and capable of undergoing modifications, deserves to be cause of universe and not Brahman which is immutable by nature is not conclusive. The causality of Pradhāna is refuted by the fact that it is not based on *śruti*. Moreover, it is only the causality of Brahman which can stand the test of logic.²² (4) The argument that context favours the thesis of Pradhāna as cause of universe also is not logically sound. There is no inferential syllogism to support the theory of Sāṃkhya. The statement propounding knowledge of all by knowledge of one, merely indicates that knowledge of one object can lead to knowledge of all even when there is no *vyāpti* to support this statement.²³ It is also wrong to suppose that Pradhāna alone, being similar in nature to world, deserves to be cause of universe. The omniscient omnipotent highest Puruṣa (*puruṣottama*) with sentient and non-sentient objects as its body, is not different from worldly objects in nature.²⁴

(The Vedāntins proceed to adduce following arguments to prove that the term *sat* does not stand for Pradhāna and that there is no scope for causality of Pradhāna in scriptures.)

The scriptures ascribe the act of seeing or deliberating to cause of universe. Thinking, being an act of sentient being, cannot be ascribed to Pradhāna. Pradhāna, in this way, is not known to scriptures.²⁵

The Vedāntins anticipate that the Sāṃkhyas try to convince the Vedāntins of the propriety of their position on the basis of following argument based on analogy. Pradhāna, when about to create the world, may metaphorically be spoken of as thinking. Sometimes, qualities of sentient beings are figuratively spoken of as belonging to non-sentient objects. Seeing a non-sentient river bank about to slide down, people usually say that the river bank is inclined to fall. In scriptures

21. SB. ✓

22. *Ibid.*

23. RB. 1.1.5

24. *Ibid.*

25. SB 1.1.5 also RB, Ni B 1.1-5

also qualities of sentient beings are figuratively ascribed to water, etc.²⁶

Here, the Vedāntins state that this argument cannot obviate the objection. The scriptures speak of *sat* as *jīva*. The *sat* is said to be the divinity which enters into objects in form of *jīvātman*. Hence, *sat*, being *jīvātman*, is *jīva* itself, since *ātman* is nothing but essence or nature (*svarūpa*). (Pradhāna, being non-sentient, cannot be of the nature of *jīva* which is essentially sentient.²⁷) The act of seeing may be metaphorical in case of water, bank of river, etc., because the primary sense is not applicable to them. In case of *sat*, however, the primary sense of thinking is not barred. The act of thinking is spoken of with reference to water, etc., in scriptures, for they are dependent upon Brahman.²⁸ Rāmānuja establishes divinity of world and states that the act of thinking on the part of water, light, etc., is not metaphorical but primary and natural. The highest self is the self of water, light, etc. The words water etc., therefore, denote the highest self only.²⁹

The Sāṃkhyas may try to refute this objection also on the ground that *ātman* can be used in the secondary sense as one person is figuratively called *ātman* of another man whose purpose is accomplished by the former. A king calls the servant, who stakes his life for the king, as his own *ātman*. In the same way, Pradhāna which executes all the purposes of Puruṣa by way of contributing to its enjoyment (*bhoga*) and release (*apavarga*), may be called *ātman* in the secondary sense. Or the same word *ātman* may refer to sentient as well as non-sentient objects. In the expressions like '*ātman* of element', etc., the term *ātman* stands for non-sentient objects.³⁰

The Vedāntins criticise this device also. *Ātman*, cause of universe, is identical with the *ātman* of man. Otherwise, the counsels as 'thou art that' given to disciple for attainment of liberation through knowledge of non-difference between disciple and the first order reality, i.e., the Brahman, would be falsified.

26. SB 1.1.6 also RB., Ni B 1.1.6

27. Ibid.

28. RB 1.1.6

29. Ibid.

30. SB 1.1.7

If the term *tat* standing for cause of universe in the expression *tattvamasi* is taken to refer to Pradhāna, the teacher would be falsely equating the two, i.e., non-sentient Pradhāna and sentient disciple which are diametrically opposed to each other in nature. Consequently, the scriptures establishing the fact contradictory to experience and reason would be unauthentic. If the Sāṃkhya view were true, the scriptures would be regarded as teaching that soul is non-sentient and, thus, would prevent the possibility of release. The term *ātman* can be used in figurative sense by the king with reference to the servant for difference between the two is clearly visible. The word is sometimes used in figurative sense. It can, however, not lead to assume that figurative sense of word is applicable everywhere. Otherwise, it will lead to a general want of confidence. It is also not plausible to say that the same term *ātman* denotes sentient as well as non-sentient objects, because a word does not have many meanings. Hence, the term *ātman* primarily denotes sentient objects and is applied to elements by a figurative attribution of sentience to them. Even if, the word *ātman* is used in two senses, the sense applicable in certain context cannot be ascertained without some determining attributive word. The fact that *ātman* is spoken of as the self of Śvetaketu is sufficient to decide that it does not refer to Pradhāna which is non-sentient in nature.³¹

2. Pradhāna cannot be denotation of the term *sat* as liberation is characterised by attainment of the highest reality, i.e., the ultimate cause of universe denoted by *sat*. Even those who maintain that Pradhāna is cause of universe do not hold that at the time of final release one gets merged into Pradhāna.³²

3. The treatment of the subject does not favour the view that Pradhāna is denotation of the term *sat*. If it had been intended to be so, the teacher might have made an endeavour to tell the disciple that Pradhāna is different from what is denoted by '*ta*' in '*tat-tvamasi*' so that the confusion of taking Pradhāna as the proper referend of the term *tvam* should not arise in the disciple. He might have asked the disciple to

31. SB. 1.1.7

32. RB 1.1.7 also Ni B 1.1.7

discard Pradhāna and to take his stand on his own self. The stand on *sat* or Pradhāna is taught as the helping stage to reach the correct connotation just as a person intending to inform another as to which star is Arundhati draws his attention to nearby star and asks him to shift his attention to real Arundhati which is adjacent to the one seen first. On the contrary, in the present case, identity between denotation of the term *tat* and the self is established. Thus, Pradhāna cannot be denotation of the term *sat*.³³

4. The acceptance of Pradhāna as ultimate cause of universe denoted by the term *sat* would imply falsity of the statements like 'all is known by knowing one'. The Upaniṣads prescribe that through knowledge of one cause, all its effects become known. The knowledge of Pradhāna, however, can give rise to knowledge of its effects, i.e., objects of experience only. The entity coming under the category of experimenter, i.e., subject of experience, which is not the modification of Pradhāna, will still remain unknown since through the knowledge of non-sentient Pradhāna there cannot arise the knowledge of the intelligent soul.³⁴

5. The scriptures declare that in the state of deep sleep the *jīva* gets unified with its own self (*ātman*) called *sat*. Pradhāna cannot be this self as sentience cannot be unified with non-sentient Pradhāna. The difficulty cannot be overcome by interpreting self (*sva*) as Pradhāna because it will lead to the absurdity of resolving sentient self into non-sentient Pradhāna. Moreover, it will contradict the scriptural statements that the soul in the state of dreamless sleep is resolved into sentient entity. The term *sat*, therefore, denotes the sentient entity in which all souls are resolved.³⁵

Pradhāna could have been spoken of as cause of universe provided various contradictory and contrary theories about cause of universe were advocated in the Upaniṣadic texts. All the Upaniṣads however, unequivocally assert that ultimate

33. SB 1.1.8 also RB, Ni B 1.1.8

34. SB 1.1.8 also RB, Ni. B 1.1.9

R and Ni. take *Pratijñāvirodhāt* as a separate *sūtra*.

35. SB 1.1.9 also RB and Ni B 1.1.10

cause of world is something sentient.³⁶

7. The All-knowing Brahman is explicitly stated to be cause of universe in the texts dealing with the cause. The scriptural passages provide no scope for assuming that insentient Pradhāna is cause of universe.³⁷

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* states that evolutes of Pradhāna are dependent, in contrast to Pradhāna which is independent in nature.³⁸ The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* further state that the evolutes are dependent upon Prakṛti for their existence³⁹ or in producing their effects⁴⁰ or insofar as they are controlled by Prakṛti.⁴¹

Śaṅkara seems to have in mind this dependent nature of evolutes and the independent nature of Pradhāna when he says that Pradhāna is omnipotent. This omnipotence has twofold aspect, viz., it has the potency to produce every material object, as the prime source of evolution, and secondly for the actual process of evolution, no extraneous agency as the governing or regulating factor is needed. The omniscience of Pradhāna also, is to be understood in metaphorical sense. Sattva, one of the components of Pradhāna, is illuminator of objects.⁴² That is why, Buddhi, which abounds in Sattva, has knowledge as its form.⁴³ Pradhāna is the storehouse of Sattva which illuminates objects but it is not capable of knowing everything directly without its association with the sentient being. This is, however, at best the way, omniscience of Pradhāna can be interpreted since the Sāṃkhya texts do not directly claim omniscience for Pradhāna. It is Śaṅkara who gives these statements as the possible ones in case the Sāṃkhyas were to explain the term 'omniscience' in context of Pradhāna, and are, hence, all a hypothetical case.

Rāmānuja's statement that the Sāṃkhyas believe in identity of cause and effect is not in conformity with the

37. SB 1.1.11 also RB and Ni B 1.1.12

38. SK 10

39. SSS 10

40. STK 10

41. SC 10

42. SK 13

43. SK 23

*Sāṃkhyakārikā*⁴⁴ which maintains that cause and effect are distinct as they serve different purposes. Perhaps, his statement is based on Vācaspati's exposition of the Sāṃkhya view, who is his immediate Sāṃkhya predecessor.

Casually, it may also be observed that the *sūtrakāra* does not intend to criticise the Sāṃkhyas in this *adhikaraṇa*. This is deduced from following reasons. (i) The *sūtrakāra* has not yet expounded his own standpoint. There is, therefore, no textual urgency to raise the issue of criticism of Sāṃkhya. The *sūtrakāra* is engaged in establishing his own system rather than criticising the theory of Sāṃkhya. If he had really to direct these arguments against Sāṃkhya as in view, he would have included it in the *ānumānika* and other *adhikaraṇas* where he directly refutes Sāṃkhya. It is not keeping with the Sūtra-system to refute the chief adversary in the detached *adhikaraṇas* as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja would like to have it. If some passing reference to the criticism of Sāṃkhya is considered to be necessary, it would be given immediately after the second *sūtra* where Brahman alone is defined as cause of universe.⁴⁵ (ii) To direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya is to go against the spirit of whole of the first *adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtras*. The opening *adhyāya* is called *samanvayādhyāya* for it aims at reconciling apparently different views of *śrutis* into one. After defining Brahman as the material as well as efficient cause of universe, the *sūtrakāra* seems to intend to prove that the description of Brahman as cause of universe in some *śrutis* and as pure existence (*sat*), sentience (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) in others, is not mutually contradictory.⁴⁶ (iii) The *sūtra* in its form becomes cumbersome if directed against Sāṃkhya. It will involve *vākya-bheda* and unauthorised importation. Śaṅkara and Nimbārka introduce a change in the case endings of the word *aśabdam* to suit their own interpretation. The construction according to them will be as *Pradhānam na (jagatkāraṇam) aśabdatvāt, (kāraṇasya) Ikṣat eḥ*. Rāmānuja has to insert *sadśabdavācyam* to direct the *sūtra*

44. SK 15

45. M.G. Shastri, *An Examination of Śaṅkara's Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Theory*, p. 19.

46. *op.cit.* p. 16.

against Sāṃkhya.⁴⁷ (iv) The interpretation of the first *sūtra* also becomes far fetched if it is directed against Sāṃkhya. Śaṅkara takes *aśabdam* as a reason but there is no fifth case ending with it.⁴⁸ Rāmānuja and Nimbārka take it in the sense of nickname of Pradhāna which is totally unfounded. (v) If the *adhikaraṇa* is directed against causality of Pradhāna, it will give scope to possibility of assuming *jīva* as cause of universe. The absence of denial of causality of *jīva* proves that the *sūtrakāra* does not intend to direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya.⁴⁹

Some of the ancient and modern writers have made an attempt to furnish answers to the arguments in criticism.

The argument that at the time of deep sleep *jīva* cannot merge back into insentient principle like Pradhāna is not final. It is experienced in our daily life that *Jīva* returns to the insentient at the time of sleep.⁵⁰ Or the Sāṃkhyas may defend their theory otherwise thus. The statement that *jīva* attains to its real nature at the time of deep sleep means that the *pramātṛcaitanya* takes its refuge into the *sākṣicaitanya* which is its real form. The *pramātṛcaitanya* symbolizes mind and the *sākṣicaitanya* symbolizes *Prāṇa*.⁵¹

Vijñānabhikṣu points out that the Upaniṣads themselves do not understand the statements about Brahman as cause of universe in a primary sense, but accepts them metaphorically. This means the statements have no value either to prove the direct causality of Brahman alone, nor are they competent to disprove causality of Pradhāna. This also disproves the argument that the Upaniṣads declare Brahman only as cause of universe.⁵²

It is not logical to argue that acceptance of Pradhāna as cause of universe will falsify the statements like "by knowing

47. B.N.K. Sharma, *The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries*, Vol. I, p. 19

48. *Ibid.*

49. VA 1.1.11

50. *Ibid.*

51. Anima Sengupta, *Chāndogyopaniṣad, Sāṃkhya point of View*, p. 18

52. VA 1.1.11

one everything becomes known".⁵³ The full knowledge of Pradhāna will confer the knowledge of consciousness too. The object of knowledge requires the subject of knowledge too. Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas hold that liberation is attained through knowledge of distinction of Prakṛti from Puruṣa whose consciousness is reflected through Prakṛti. Hence the knowledge of Prakṛti requires knowledge of Puruṣa too just as the full knowledge of glass in which red colour is reflected requires the knowledge of glass and red colour as well.⁵⁴ Udayavira Shastri tries to defend the Sāṃkhya theory stating that the statement, viz., knowing one everything becomes known does not emphasise the knowledge of cause but simply prescribes that knowing one object all the objects similar to it become known. The position of the Sāṃkhyas also does not go against it.⁵⁵

The passages under discussion when considered without Sāṃkhya or Vedantic bias indicate that the *sat*, the cause of universe, is the ultimate real entity, the ultimate object of knowledge. From the cosmological point of view, it is not only the objective principle (matter) but the subjective principle (conscious entity) also as it is spoken of as giving rise to the object—world and performing act of thinking. The objects signified by three entities, i.e. light, water and food are real and not the illusory manifestations of the ultimate cause. The knowledge of the ultimate cause out of which they are produced leads to knowledge of the three entities. Thus, the passages do not represent exclusively the doctrine of any particular school. Reviewing the characteristics of the *sat* it can easily be stated that the passage indicates reality of material objects. The three colours are indicative of the three Guṇas of the Sāṃkhyas as Jacobi remarks, "The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* text regarding origin of the universe from *sat* through its tripartite division into light, water and food is the closest anticipation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of real and eternal Pradhāna."⁵⁶ Apart from it, the passage indicates the Sāṃkhya theory of

53. VA 1.1.11

54. *Anima Sengupta*, op.cit. pp. 11-12

55. Udayavir Shastri, *Sāṃkhya-Siddhānta*, p. 48

56. cf. R.D. Ranade and S.K. Belvalkar, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 418

creation and the means of liberation. The passages, however, cannot be taken as representing exclusively the Sāṃkhya doctrines. The cause of universe, as described in the passages, is not only matter but the sentient principle too. The sentient nature of this cause is not explained from Sāṃkhya point of view. To reconcile this sentient nature of cause with the position of Sāṃkhya, *Anima Sengupta*⁵⁷ believes that cause of universe, according to the Sāṃkhyas is Prakṛti permeated by consciousness (*cetanāviṣṭaprakṛti*). This assumption is, however, not supported by the extant texts of Sāṃkhya.

The problem of interpretation of the term *sat* in *sadeva soṃya*, etc. seems to be this—viz., does that refer to a sentient or a non-sentient principle, and secondly to what does the negation of a second existence refer to? Śāṃkara would prefer that it is sentient principle, and without anything else to co-exist with it. The Sāṃkhyas would very well claim that it is the non-sentient principle, and the denial of a second existence means there is no other material cause present, but Pradhāna which forms the first source of material world. Naturally, the passage would exclude any reference to Puruṣa who is to be accepted on the basic assumption of ultimate duality. If the non-duality spoken of is to be understood not in this limited sense, for which there is no indication in the Upaniṣad, and if it is to be understood in direct sense, the negation would imply that there is only one principle. Now, with the exception of Cārvākas, all schools of Indian philosophy believe in the axiom that a 'sentient' entity cannot be produced out of non-sentient one and so do the Sāṃkhyas who posit the principle of Puruṣa symbolising sentient part of existence. Hence, it would be in the fitness of things to accept that if it is '*sat*' which is absolutely 'one without second', it is sentient and the position would then favour Śāṃkara.

Anandamayādhikaraṇa⁵⁸

Śāṃkara, followed by Vallabha, directs two *sūtras* of this *adhikaraṇa* against the Sāṃkhyas who hold that Pradhāna is described in the following passage of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* :

57. *Anima Sengupta*, loc. cit., p. 14

58. BS 1.1.12-19

*Tasmād vā etasmād vijñānamayāt Anyo'ntara ātmā'nandamayaḥ*⁵⁹, i.e., 'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.'

In the present *adhikaraṇa*, Śaṃkara considers refutation of Sāṃkhya as a side issue and does not explicitly state the view of Sāṃkhya in the form of *prima facie* (*pūrvapakṣa*). Vallabha gives following reason which may be adduced by the Sāṃkhyas to assume that the term *ānandamaya* denotes Pradhāna. It is not the sentient entity which is denoted by the term *ānandamaya*. At the same time, the *ānandamaya* being described as internal (factor) can denote cause only and not an effect. Pradhāna, in this way, finds scope in the *śruti* as cause of universe denoted by the term *ānandamaya*.⁶⁰

Śaṃkara and Vallabha adduce following arguments to prove that the term *ānandamaya* does not denote Pradhāna.

1. The scriptural texts speak of the act of desire with reference to the *ānandamaya*. Desire is quality of a sentient being. Hence, the act of desiring cannot be ascribed to non-sentient Pradhāna.⁶¹

2. The scriptural passages speak about union (*yoga*) of the individual Self with the *ānandamaya* in state of liberation. The individual Self, however, cannot merge into non-sentient Pradhāna.⁶²

3. Vallabha adds that the word *ca* in the *sūtra* '*kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā*' indicates another reason to prove that the term *ānandamaya* does not stand for Pradhāna. The act of practising penance attributed to the *ānandamaya* cannot be spoken of with reference to non-sentient entity like Pradhāna.⁶³

As regards the presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory by Vallabha, which appears to be in the mind of Śaṃkara also, it can be stated that Pradhāna is the storehouse of *ānanda* insofar as it has the Sattva which is of the nature of joy (*prīti*) as its component.⁶⁴ The Sāṃkhyas, however, do not explicitly

59. *Tait. up* 2.5

60. *VB* 1.1.17 (1.1.18 according to *S*)

61. *SB* 1.1.18, also *VB* 1.1.17

62. *SB* 1.1.10, also *VB* 1.1.18

63. *VB* 1.1.17

64. *SK*. 12

state that Pradhāna is *ānandamaya*. The use of the term *ānumānika* as signifying Pradhāna is indicative of the fact that Pradhāna is established through inference and has got no scriptural support.

It is still not clear as to whether the *sūtrakāra* really intends to criticise the position of Sāṃkhya in these *sūtras*. There is no strong ground to direct these *sūtras* against Sāṃkhya. Śaṃkara's explanation that these *sūtras* discuss scriptural passages speaking of act of desire with reference to cause of universe⁶⁵ is not satisfactory. The root *īkṣa* in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* is taken in its cognate sense even by Śaṃkara and includes desire also.⁶⁶ By directing the *adhikaraṇa* against attributing the quality of *ānanda* to *Jīva*, Rāmānuja seems to approach nearer the intention of the *sūtrakāra* for it brings uniformity in contents of the *adhikaraṇa*.

It is remarked by some that the first objection adduced against Sāṃkhya is applicable to the position of Śaṃkara too. The act of desiring cannot be attributed to Brahman also which is of the nature of pure consciousness and bliss. If the act of desiring is taken as figurative, it can equally be ascribed to Pradhāna.⁶⁷ In this context of the first remark it is to be submitted that Śaṃkara's criticism aims at showing that desire being a property of sentient, cannot belong to non-sentient Pradhāna. In case the question of attributing desire, etc., arises, it is more reasonable to attribute it to the sentient principle. The second argument goes against the spirit of the philosophy of Śaṃkara and Vallabha. They do not accept union (*sāyujya*) of the Self with Brahman in the state of liberation. Śaṃkara advocates for mere embodied existence and Vallabha believes in distinctness of the Self from Brahman in the state of liberation.

The passage when considered independently of Sāṃkhya and Vedantic bias, does not appear to lend support to the theory of Pradhāna. The *ānandamaya* is not only an objective principle but a subjective entity, the agent of desiring, too. This, however, is not possible in case of Pradhāna. The

65. *SB*. 1.1.18

66. *M.G. Shastri, op. cit.* p. 21

67. *M.G. Shastri, op. cit.* p. 22

desire, even according to the Sāṃkhyas cannot appear in Buddhi without its association with Puruṣa.

Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa (BS. 1.2.18-20)

Śaṃkara, followed by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha directs the *sūtra* viz. 'na ca smārttataddharmābhilāpāt',⁶⁸ against the Sāṃkhya to establish that the *antaryāmin* described in the following passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* cannot denote Pradhāna :

*Ya imāṃ ca lokam param ca lokam sarvāṇi ca
bhūtānyantaro yamayati
Br. Up. 3.7.1*

i.e. 'He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings'.⁶⁹

Giving a brief account of the position of Sāṃkhya, Śaṃkara states that the Sāṃkhyas hold that the *antaryāmin* refers to Pradhāna as being devoid of the visual appearance, etc. Pradhāna is endowed with the quality of invisibility which is ascribed to the internal ruler (*antaryāmin*). Moreover, Pradhāna may be called internal ruler with reference to its modifications.⁷⁰

This position of Sāṃkhya is criticised on the ground that the qualities mentioned with reference to internal ruler are not found in Pradhāna. Pradhāna, being non-sentient, cannot be endowed with quality of a seer, etc.⁷¹ Moreover, the characteristics of Pradhāna like being the composite of the three Guṇas are not mentioned in the passage under discussion.⁷²

M.G. Shastri remarks that the *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) given by Śaṃkara is groundless as the qualities which cannot be ascribed to Pradhāna are also mentioned in the same passage, and they being more important, cannot be ignored. The Sāṃkhyas cannot have one word only as the basis of their theory.⁷³ In this respect, it may, however, be

68. BS 1.2.19 (according to S. M. and V) and BS 1.2.20 (according to R. and Ni.)

69. Tr. G. Thibaut

70. SB 1.2.19

71. SB 1.2.19 also RB and Ni B 1.2.20

72. MB and VB 1.2.19

73. M.G. Shastri, *op. cit.* p. 23

stated that though there is no textual evidence for the interpretation of the passage from Sāṃkhya point of view, yet it can be supposed that the Sāṃkhyas might have attributed the internal rulership to Pradhāna. That is why the Vedāntins try to prove that attempt of Sāṃkhya to ascribe the internal rulership to Pradhāna is having no scriptural basis and the passages ascribing the character of internal ruler to the highest reality do not refer to Pradhāna. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* states that Pradhāna is independent in contrast with the evolutes which are dependent.⁷⁴ The character of internal ruler is not explicitly ascribed to Pradhāna but the idea is reflected in the interpretation of the dependence of the evolutes given by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.⁷⁵ Thus, the *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) given by Śaṃkara is not totally unfounded.

As a matter of fact, the qualities of a seer, etc., attributed to the *antaryāmin* prove that the *antaryāmin* stands for some sentient entity and not merely the non-sentient objective principle like Pradhāna.

Adṛśyatvādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.2.21-3)

In this *adhikaraṇa*, Śaṃkara followed by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha attempts to prove that the following passages of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* do not refer to Pradhāna.

*Atha parā yayā tadakṣaram adhigamyate;
Yat tad adṛśyam agrāhyam agotram avarṇam
acakṣuḥśrotram tad apāṇipādam
Nityam vibhum sarvagatam susūkṣamam
tad avyayam yadbhūtayonim paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ
Muṇḍ. up. 1.1.5-6*

"The higher knowledge is this by which the indestructible is apprehended. That cannot be seen nor seized, which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings."⁷⁶

74. SK 10

75. See note 39-41 of this chapter

76. Tr. G. Thibaut

The Vedāntins present the Sāṃkhyas as arguing that 'the source of all beings, characterised by invisibility, etc., refers to Pradhāna because the parallel examples of a spider drawing the thread, hair springing forth on head and body, and the plants growing on earth, occurring in the immediately subsequent passages, refer to non-sentient objects as the source of other objects. If it is argued that the man and the spider quoted as parallel instances refer to the sentient object, the Sāṃkhyas reply that the entity which gives rise to the thread and hair is not the soul but the body ruled over by the conscious principle. If it is further argued that there are other qualities like knowing and perceiving everything spoken of with reference to the source of universe in the complementary passages which cannot be applicable to Pradhāna, the Sāṃkhyas reply that these qualities may be interpreted with reference to the sentient entity (i.e., the Puruṣa) which is spoken of as higher than the high imperishable.⁷⁷

Rāmānuja adds that the Sāṃkhyas may further argue that the expression '*akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ*' refers to Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The term *akṣara* denotes Prakṛti because no attribute applicable to the sentient entity is spoken of as devoid of grossness and visible form of gross objects, but possessing subtle form should be understood as non-sentient homogeneous form of subtle elements which is the same as Prakṛti itself. Rāmānuja further states the principle spoken of as higher than this entity is known as the cosmic-puruṣa (*samaṣṭipuruṣa*) and Pradhāna evolves into Mahat and the rest when supervised over by this cosmic puruṣa (*samaṣṭipuruṣa*).⁷⁸ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue, adds Vallabha, that *akṣara* and Puruṣa are spoken of as distinct entities and creation is said to ensue from the combination (*saṁśleṣa*) of the two. The world is of combined nature of the two. Such a double aspect of creation cannot be explained by considering Brahman as cause of universe.⁷⁹

This position of Sāṃkhya is criticised on following grounds.

77. SB 1.2.21

78. RB 1.2.21

79. VB 1.2.21

The argument of Sāṃkhya that the parallel instances of non-sentient object prove the non-sentient nature of cause of universe is not valid. It is not necessary that one thing should be absolutely of the nature of the other with which it is compared. The things quoted as the parallel instances of universe are gross in nature which goes against the nature of source of all beings.⁸⁰

It is also not sound to argue that Pradhāna is endowed with qualities like invisibility, etc. All objects are modifications of Prakṛti and the Prakṛti is visible in objects. It cannot be said that jar is visible but its cause, viz., clay is not visible.⁸¹

The passage speaks of qualities like all-knowing and all-perceiving with reference to cause of universe. These are not true in case of Pradhāna which is non-sentient in nature. It is also not admissible to say that the qualities like knowing all and perceiving all are spoken of with reference to the entity which is said to be higher than *akṣara* because the qualities are ascribed to the source of universe itself.⁸² Śaṅkara further states that the statement regarding the 'higher than the high imperishable' does not refer to anything different from *akṣara* the source of beings which is the general topic under discussion.⁸³ The *akṣara* denotes Brahman with limiting adjuncts and the higher *akṣara* is Brahman without limiting adjunct.

The scriptures themselves declare the source of universe to be different from Pradhāna. The source of universe is spoken of as higher than the high imperishable. Here the imperishable (*akṣara*) being the power of the higher imperishable is not different from the latter. The entity spoken of as higher than the high imperishable refers to Brahman without its limiting adjuncts. Thus, the source of universe is spoken of as different from Pradhāna in nature and as such there is no reference to Pradhāna which is independent of sentient entity. Even if the potential state of beings is understood as Pradhāna, it does not lead to the conclusion that Pradhāna is cause of

80. SB 1.2.21

81. VB. 1.2.22

82. SB 1.2.21 also VB also RB and Ni B 1.2.22

83. SB 2.1.21

universe because the nature of source of universe is different from that of Pradhāna.⁸⁴

The form (*rūpa*) of source of universe mentioned in the passage subsequent to that under discussion cannot be applicable to Pradhāna. The source of universe is stated to be the self of all beings. This is, however, not possible in case of Pradhāna.⁸⁵ Madhva understands *rūpa* as colour and states that the passage mentions the colour (*rūpa*), i.e. purity of Viṣṇu. Hence, it cannot refer to Pradhāna.⁸⁶

The source of universe is an object of higher knowledge and is described as that which is the highest Brahman established in the highest sky and having the nature of unlimited and unsurpassable bliss. These qualities are not found in Pradhāna.⁸⁷ Moreover, source of universe is stated to be different from the unmanifest *akṣara* and the cosmic Puruṣa spoken of as higher than *akṣara*. The source of universe is spoken of as even higher than cosmic Puruṣa. This cannot be Pradhāna.⁸⁸ Madhva states that the expression *akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ* speaks of three *akṣaras*—the *jaḍa* Prakṛti, spiritual Prakṛti dependent upon Viṣṇu and called higher Prakṛti, and imperishable *akṣara* even higher than the higher Prakṛti. Thus, there is no mention of Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya.⁸⁹

Neither the qualities spoken of with reference to *akṣara* can be attributed to Pradhāna nor those spoken of with reference to Puruṣa are applicable to Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya. The omniscience, etc., spoken of as qualities of *akṣara* are not found in Prakṛti of Sāṃkhya. Puruṣa also is stated to be endowed with the celestial nature (*divyatva*), etc., which are not spoken of with reference to Puruṣa even by Sāṃkhya. Puruṣa of Sāṃkhyas not being present in all the objects of world cannot be called the internal self of all objects. Puruṣa mentioned in the *śruti* is source of *Prāṇa*, etc. while Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya is not source of anything. The passage speaking of

84. *SB* 1.2.22

85. *SB* 1.2.23 also *VB* 1.2.23 and *RB* and *NiB* 1.2.24

86. *MB* 1.2.23

87. *RB* 1.2.23

88. *Ibid.*

89. *MB* 1.2.22

Vidyā cannot refer to the Prakṛti and Puruṣa. It does not speak of the knowledge of twenty-five categories of Sāṃkhya; on the contrary, it refers to the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, Brahmā would not impart to his eldest son the knowledge of the form of the *smṛti*.⁹⁰

The presentation of the Sāṃkhya theory of cause of universe given by Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and Vallabha deserves our consideration. Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja state that the Sāṃkhyas regard Pradhāna as controlled by Puruṣa to be cause of universe. According to the *Śaṣṭitantra*⁹¹ Prakṛti evolves when it is controlled by Puruṣa. The statement of exactly similar view is ascribed to Vārṣaganya by Keith.⁹² The term *adhiṣṭhāna*, however, is likely to be favourable to the idea of Puruṣa, being an active agent or governor, who directs the evolution like a potter. So, perhaps aware of this difficulty and hence, to retain inactive nature of Puruṣa, Mahādeva Vedāntin⁹³ states that this control is not through the activity of Puruṣa but through a special kind of its connection with Prakṛti. Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁹⁴ also utilises the notion of control of a sentient principle over non-sentient objects, as a basis for inferential argument to prove the existence of Puruṣa. This control, according to the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, refers to control of Puruṣa over the evolutes of Prakṛti. It is Māṭhara⁹⁵, only who interprets it as control of Puruṣa over Prakṛti on account of which Prakṛti evolves into manifold evolutes. The statement of Māṭhara shows that the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* expression is capable of rendering twofold meanings and that Māṭhara, in dissenting from the other commentators appears to favour the view of the *Śaṣṭitantra* which represents the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa tradition. Moreover, in the light of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's remark⁹⁶ that his text is based on the *Śaṣṭitantra*, Māṭhara may perhaps be supposed to reveal to us real sense

90. *Ibid*

91. *GB* 17

92. *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 77 note

93. *VM* 1.1.42

94. *SK* 17

95. *MV* 17

96. *SK* 17

of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Here, it may be observed that in place of understanding word *adhiṣṭhāna* in the sense of control, it may be more justifiable to understand by the term 'superintendence' insofar as the intention or final aim of Puruṣa is the motive behind evolution of Prakṛti. In their commentaries on BS. 2.2.1, Śāṃkara⁹⁷ and Rāmānuja⁹⁸ themselves argue that non-sentient objects like Pradhāna cannot act without the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the sentient principle. It shows that Śāṃkara and Rāmānuja think that the Sāṃkhyas consider Prakṛti as free from instrumentality of Puruṣa. In other words, *adhiṣṭhāna* is understood by both these writers in the sense of direct active control.

There appear three ideas in the *Sāṃkhyakārikās*, which are different and apparently irreconcilable, viz. that the sentient principle 'superintends' the activity of non-sentient principle,⁹⁹ that it is itself inactive,¹⁰⁰ and that there is independence of Prakṛti in respect of evolution and auto-motion exemplified by milk of a cow for the purpose of calf.¹⁰¹ The best way of reconciling these three is to say that because of mere presence in vicinity for which Puruṣa does not do anything, evolution starts, i.e., in other words, it is a modified dependence. Mahādeva Vedāntin's explanation, therefore, may be taken as possibly a response to the criticism of Sāṃkhya by Śāṃkara and Rāmānuja.

The notion of cosmic Puruṣa (*Samaṣṭipurūṣa*) ascribed to Sāṃkhya by Rāmānuja is not found to be stated in majority text of Sāṃkhya. So also, the term '*Samaṣṭipurūṣa*' is not at all to be found in any Sāṃkhya text. But there are two Sāṃkhya writers whose statements allow us to suggest that some such concept was not totally foreign to Sāṃkhya. They are Gauḍapāda¹⁰² and Māṭhara¹⁰³ who state that Puruṣa is one. Commenting on :

97. SB 2.2:1

98. RB 2.2.1

99. SK 17

100. SK 19, 20

101. SK 57

102. GB. 11

103. MV 11

'*tadviparītaḥ, tathā ca pumān*' (Sk 11)

Māṭhara observes that Puruṣa is 'one' in contrast to '*vyakta*' which is many, perhaps not only numerically, but also from the point of view of nature as the word *bahuvridha* may indicate. The question naturally presents itself as to the oneness of Puruṣa, viz., whether this is oneness or uniformity of nature, or whether it is numerical oneness (without a second) of Puruṣa. The expression of Māṭhara, viz., '*Pradhānasadharmā puruṣaḥ*'¹⁰⁴ gives us the key to the solution. The 'oneness' of Pradhāna is numerical and it is the totality and the prime source of '*vyakta*'. Similarly, 'puruṣa is one' numerically and may be regarded as the 'prime source' of individual puruṣas. Granting the suggestion, this 'one Puruṣa' may have been the basis of Rāmānuja's use of the term *samaṣṭipurūṣa*. Vallabha in his presentation of the Sāṃkhya position, states that the Sāṃkhyas hold that through the 'conjunction' of Prakṛti and Puruṣa evolution proceeds and in virtue of indispensibility of each for such a union, either Prakṛti or Puruṣa may be equally regarded to be cause of universe.¹⁰⁵ Here, Vallabha appears to base his account on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* where it is stated '*saṃyogaḥ, tatkr̥taḥ sargaḥ*'.¹⁰⁶ Vallabha, while subsequently criticising Sāṃkhya makes one remark that non-sentient Pradhāna alone cannot be cause of universe¹⁰⁷ in the context of which it is desirable for us to point out that there is complete difference in the status of causes, viz. *saṃyoga* as the cause of universe, Pradhāna as the cause of world, and inactive Puruṣa as cause of world. Further, if Puruṣa is cause of the world actively, it evidently contradicts the Sāṃkhya assumption that Puruṣa is not liable to change. In the light of '*ubhayātmaka*' (sentient and non-sentient) nature of world, pointed out by Vallabha,¹⁰⁷ are we to suppose 'Puruṣa' to be the prime source of the individual Puruṣas, as is suggested also by Rāmānuja? The *pūrvapakṣa* as presented by the commentators of the *Brahma-sūtras* further indicates the fact that the Sāṃkhyas prove exis-

104. *Ibid*

105. VB 1.2.22

106. SK 21

107. VB 2.2.1

tence of cause of universe with the help of arguments based on analogy.

The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* speaks of origin of world from Puruṣa who is above *akṣara*. The Sāṃkhyas can, therefore, lay the least claim on these passages.

Dyubhivādyadhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.3.1-7)

Śaṃkara, followed by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha, directs the *sūtra* 'nārumānam atacchabdāt'¹⁰⁸ against Sāṃkhya to prove that the abode of heaven and earth mentioned in the following passage of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* cannot refer to Pradhāna.

"Yasmin dyauḥ pṛthivī cāntarikṣam
Otam manāḥ saha prāṇaiśca sarvaiḥ
Tam evaikam jānathātmānam anyā
vāco vimuñcathāmyasyaiśa setuḥ."

Muṇḍ. up. 2.2.5.

e.g. He, in whom sky, earth, and middle region are woven, the mind also with all vital airs, know him alone as the self, and leave off other words. He is the bridge of the immortal.¹⁰⁹

Śaṃkara states that the Sāṃkhyas may argue that the abode of heaven and earth is declared to be the bridge of immortality. The bridge presupposes something else beyond it. Brahman cannot serve as the bridge for there is nothing to be known beyond it. Pradhāna being the cause of everything can be the general abode.¹¹⁰ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue, states Vallabha, that there are examples of many non-sentient objects which go in favour of Pradhāna as the meaning of the abode of sky and earth.¹¹¹

The Vedāntins criticise the stand of Sāṃkhya on the ground that there is no word in the passage to denote Pradhāna. On the contrary, there are several words indicating that this abode is sentient principle.¹¹² Vallabha adds that doubtful words which

108. BS 1.3.3

109. Tr. G. Thibaut

110. SB 1.3.3

111. VB 1.3.3

112. SB 1.3.3

seem to favour qualities of non-sentient object should also be interpreted in the sense of qualities of Brahman only.¹¹³

M.G. Shastri remarks that the arrangement of the *prime facie* view is faulty because the same *prime facie* view based on bridge (*setu*), is again utilised in the *Brahmasūtra* 3.2.31. It is illogical to discuss the same topic at two places since the difficulty once resolved cannot be brought forth again.¹¹⁴ Here, it should, however, be observed that the example is the same, viz., bridge (*setu*), but the context is different and also the contents of discussion. Rāmānuja does not include Pradhāna in the *prima facie* view. He thinks that the term *anumāna* which otherwise denotes Pradhāna is here used in the sense of *jīva* which is the illustration of Pradhāna. If Pradhāna is also criticised on the same ground, there seems to be no purpose in excluding it from the *prima facie* view.¹¹⁵ Though it is not explicitly stated in the extant texts of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna can be called the general abode, yet all objects exist in their potential state in Pradhāna.

As a matter of fact, the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* describes *akṣara* Brahman as the abode of heaven and earth. The same is called the bridge of immortality because it is knowledge of the *akṣara* Brahman which leads to liberation.

Akṣarādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.3.10-12)

In this *adhikaraṇa* Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka attempt to prove that the term *akṣara* in the following passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* does not refer to Pradhāna :

"Kasmin nu khalvākāśa otaśca protaśceti
sa hovāca'tad vai tad akṣaram
Gārgi brāhmaṇā abhivadanty
asthūlam ananū" etc. (*Br up.* 3.8.7-8).

O Gārgi, the Brāhmaṇas call this the *akṣara* (the

113. VB 1.3.3

114. Op cit; p. 25

115. B.N.K. Sharma. *The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries* Vol. I. pp. 210-11

imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine, and so on.¹¹⁶

Śaṅkara states that the Sāṃkhyas may argue if the *akṣara* is said to be support of everything on account of its being cause of everything, the description may be applicable to Pradhāna which is the general cause and as such can be said to be support (*ādhāra*) of everything.¹¹⁷ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue, adds Rāmānuja, that the term *akṣara* conventionally denotes Pradhāna in the expressions like '*akṣarāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ*'. If it is contended that the term *akṣara* does not denote Pradhāna in the expression like '*yayā tadakṣaram adhigamyate*', the Sāṃkhyas reply that between the two meanings, viz., that which is established by other means of knowledge and that which is established by *śruti*, the former comes to one's mind first because of its non-contradiction with what is generally apprehended. In case of the term *akṣara*, which is spoken of as the supporter of *ākāśa*, etc., Pradhāna comes to one's mind first as the denotation of the term *akṣara* since Pradhāna, being the source of its modifications, can serve as a support for them.¹¹⁸

This position of Sāṃkhya is criticised on following grounds :

As to the argument that the term *akṣara* refers to Pradhāna which is its sense established by means of knowledge other than *śruti* and as such it comes to one's mind first, Rāmānuja states that the meaning of the term *akṣara* gives its sense by the force of its component parts (*avayavaśakti*) and does not stand in need of any other means of knowledge for imparting its sense.¹¹⁹

Pradhāna cannot be the denotation of the term *akṣara* for the *śruti* speaks of the act of command with reference to *akṣara* and such an act is not possible in the case of Pradhāna which is non-sentient in nature. The non-sentient objects like clay are not capable of commanding the effects, jar and the like.¹²⁰

116. Tr. G. Thibaut

117. SB 1.3.10

118. RB 1.3.9

119. Ibid.

120. SB 1.3.11 also RB 1.3.10 and Ni B. 1.3.11

The passage which speaks of *akṣara* negates qualities of principles other than Brahman. Pradhāna may be designated as unseen, etc., but qualities like seeing point to the sentient principle and consequently, negate Pradhāna which is non-sentient in nature.¹²¹

The term *ākāśa* does not refer to gross *ākāśa* since it is also included in the modifications of Prakṛti. Hence, the *ākāśa* stands for subtle elements. The *akṣara* spoken of as support of subtle elements cannot be Pradhāna since Pradhāna itself is the same as subtle elements. The passage, subsequent to the one, here under discussion, repudiates the entities other than Brahman to be called as the highest reality. The *akṣara* is spoken of as itself not seen by others but the seer of others and the support of everything other than itself. Thus, it negates the existence of Pradhāna, etc., as the highest reality.¹²²

Śaṅkara's statement in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* that the Sāṃkhyas consider Pradhāna to be support of all objects deserves consideration. We do not come across this sort of statement in the texts of Sāṃkhya available to us. The *Sāṃkhyakāraika*¹²³ states that Prakṛti is independent in contrast to the evolutes which are dependent on Prakṛti. This dependence of the evolutes is variously explained by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Vācaspatimiśra¹²⁴ understands dependence with reference to the act of producing. The *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*¹²⁵ understands it in the sense of being controlled, and Paramārtha¹²⁶ takes it with reference to existence. Śaṅkara seems to favour none of these interpretations completely. He thinks that all evolutes depend upon Prakṛti because they are produced out of it and consequently controlled by it.

B. N. K. Sharma tries to prove that the passage can more logically be interpreted in the light of Sāṃkhya than that of Śaṅkara. The *nirviśeṣa* Brahman of Śaṅkara also cannot be

121. SB 1.3.12 also RB 1.3.11 and Ni B. 1.3.12

122. RB 1.3.11

123. SK 10

124. STK 10

125. SC 10

126. SSS 10

the ruler. Hence, even Śaṃkara will have to take the act of command as illusory. Such a device can be resorted to by the Sāṃkhyas also.¹²⁷ The *Kalpataru* tries to overcome this difficulty and argues that commanding is an act of the sentient being. It can be superimposed on Brahman but not on Pradhāna. The royal status, for example, can sometimes be superimposed on the minister who is surrounded by similar paraphernalia but not on walls etc.¹²⁸ This argument is weak defence of Śaṃkara. The example is not applicable to *nirviśeṣa* Brahman because it can never have any similarity of attributes with any knowing self. The act of ruling can be attributed to *antaḥkaraṇa* by the Vedāntins. Since *antaḥkaraṇa* and Pradhāna are non sentient in nature, it is more logical to superimpose this rulership on Pradhāna than on *nirviśeṣa* Brahman.¹²⁹

In fact, the *śruti* itself speaks of act of seeing, hearing, knowing, etc., with reference to cause of universe. These acts are, however, not applicable to Pradhāna. Hence the Sāṃkhyas can have the least claim for their doctrine of Pradhāna over the passages under consideration

Anumānikādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.4.1-7)

In this *adhikaraṇa* Śaṃkara, followed by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha, attempts to establish that the following passage of the *Kāṭhapaniṣad* does not refer to the Sāṃkhya theory of Pradhāna :

“Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ”

Kāṭh. Up. 1.3.11.

e.g., “Beyond the Great there is the undeveloped, beyond the undeveloped there is the Person.”¹³⁰

The Vedāntins state the position of the Sāṃkhyas (in the form of *pūrvapakṣa*) as follows : The Sāṃkhyas argue that the term *avyakta* denotes the material cause of universe, viz., Pradhāna, otherwise called Prakṛti, firstly because *avyakta* as well as the other technical terms like *Mahat* and *Puruṣa* are

127. *The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries*, p. 234

128. *Kalpataru* 1.3.12

129. cf *B.N.K. Sharma*, op cit. p.215

130. Tr. G. Thibaut

spoken of by the same names and in the same order as they are known from the Sāṃkhya texts. Thus, the term *avyakta* is conventionally used in the sense of Pradhāna. Secondly, derivation of the term supports the view of Sāṃkhya. Etymologically, it means ‘that which is not manifest’ (*na vyaktam*). This corresponds to Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya which is devoid of sound and other qualities in its state of equilibrium of the three Guṇas.¹³¹ Thirdly, the technique of mentioning the categories confirms the view of Sāṃkhya. *Puruṣa* is mentioned as the highest principle. This is in complete conformity with the theory of Sāṃkhya.¹³²

The Vedāntins demolish these arguments of Sāṃkhya and argue that the terms mentioned in the *Kāṭhapaniṣad* do not refer to the existence of categories in Sāṃkhya. The first and the second arguments recorded in the *pūrvapakṣa* are objected on the ground that the Sāṃkhyas are misled in finding out their particular principles by the use of these expressions. The meaning of the word can be understood in two ways – through etymology and through convention. The word *avyakta* is neither etymologically nor conventionally applicable to Pradhāna. Etymologically, the word *avyakta* simply means that which is not *vyakta* or manifest. It is applicable to anything which is subtle or imperceptible and, thus, cannot be restricted to Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya. The convention to use it in the sense of Pradhāna is device of Sāṃkhya. This convention of Sāṃkhya has no force to determine the sense of the scriptures. As regards the order of mentioning the categories, Śaṃkara states that the identity of objects cannot be proved by similarity of order of treatment (*Kramamātrasāmānyāt*) unless the identity is recognised independently. No sensible person who comes to perceive a cow in place of a horse comes to ascertain that what he is perceiving is, in fact, a horse.¹³³ The passage, states Rāmānuja, cannot be understood as referring to the technicalities of the Sāṃkhya theory. It mentions that some objects are higher than the others. The Sāṃkhyas

131. *SB* 1.4.1

132. *RB* 1.4.1

133. *SB* 1.4.1

wrongly try to interpret the term higher (*para*) in the sense of causal relation. Even in the theory of Sāṃkhya the sound and other objects are not cause of sense-organs. The Manas also which is spoken of as higher than the objects is not the cause of objects.¹³⁴

The Vedāntins put forth following arguments to strengthen their argument that the term *avyakta* does not denote Pradhāna.

The view of Sāṃkhya is not in accordance with general context itself. The immediately preceding parts of the chapter under discussion give the simile in which Self, body, Buddhi, Manas, sense-organs and their objects are compared successively to the warrior in chariot, chariot, charioteer, reigns, horses and roads. The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, etc., are not well controlled enter into *saṃsāra* while he who has controlled them reaches the end of journey, the highest place of Viṣṇu. The questions naturally arise what is the destination of this journey and what are the means of attaining it. This is explained with the help of a metaphor (*rūpaka*). The objects to be compared are taken from the previous passages only. The entities like sense-organs (*indriyas*) objects (*arthas*), Manas, Buddhi and the supreme soul (*paramātman*) are mentioned by their general names. Only the object to be compared with chariot remains uncomparated. In this scheme of comparison, body (*śarīra*), which has been compared to chariot, is mentioned by the term *avyakta*. Thus, it is clear that the word *avyakta* denotes body (*śarīra*). It is the context that must determine the connotation of the word and reviewing the general context we come to the conclusion that there is no room for Pradhāna in the passage under consideration.¹³⁵ According to Madhva, the term *avyakta* primarily stands for *Paramātman* but secondarily denotes Pradhāna, etc., also for they serve as the body in which *paramātman* dwells.¹³⁶

The Sāṃkhyas consider Pradhāna as something to be cognised (*jñeya*) since the Sāṃkhyas hold that liberation ensues

134. *RB* 1.4.1

135. *SB* 1.4.1 also *RB* *Ni B* and *VB* 1.4.1

136. *MB* 1.4.1

from knowledge of the distinction between *Guṇas* (components of Prakṛti) and *Puruṣa*. Sometimes, the Sāṃkhyas teach that Pradhāna is to be known by a person desirous of obtaining supernatural powers. The passage under discussion, however, does not prescribe that *avyakta* is to be known or worshipped. Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya, therefore, has not been mentioned in the scriptures. Consequently, knowledge of the object which is not mentioned in scriptures is of no advantage to a man for the highest bliss.¹³⁷

The Sāṃkhyas are presented as controverting this argument by stating that the *Kāthopanishad* itself speaks of Pradhāna as the object of knowledge. The qualities attributed to the object of knowledge in the *śruti* are the qualities which are ascribed to Pradhāna by Sāṃkhya.¹³⁸

This plea of the Sāṃkhyas, argue the Vedāntins, is feeble. That which is referred to in such passages is not Pradhāna but the highest Self. This becomes clear if the context is taken into consideration. The subject-matter of this passage is the supreme self and not Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya. In all the statements of the Upaniṣads such attributes as soundless, etc., are connected with the Self alone. Pradhāna, in this way, is neither spoken of as object of knowledge nor is said to be endowed with qualities mentioned in the *śruti* texts. Even if the passage is regarded as referring to Pradhāna, it will not improve the position of Sāṃkhya. Release from the jaws of death is declared in the *śruti* as the fruit of knowledge. The Sāṃkhyas, however, do not mention that one becomes free by knowing Pradhāna only but they connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent self (*Puruṣa*). Thus, the *śruti* passages in no way prescribe knowledge of Pradhāna for attainment of liberation.¹³⁹

Pradhāna is out of context and there is no scope for it in the passage since three questions only are asked and there is no question regarding Pradhāna. The nature of these questions differs according to different *ācāryas*. According to

137. *SB* 1.4.1 also *RB*, *MB*, *Ni B* and *VB* 1.4.5

138. *SB* 1.4.5

139. *SB* 1.4.5 also *RB*, *Ni B* and *VB* 1.4.5, and *MB* 1.4.5-6

Śaṃkara¹⁴⁰ and Vallabha¹⁴¹ these three questions are about sacrificial fire (*agni*), individual self (*jīva*) and supreme soul (*paramātman*). Rāmānuja¹⁴² and Nimbārka¹⁴³ holds that these questions pertain to means (*upāya*), i.e., worship, (*upeya*), i.e., salvation and agent (*upeti*), i.e., worshipper. Madhva¹⁴⁴ relates the three questions with the three boons themselves. Hence, according to him the questions pertain to pacification of father of Naciketas, sacrificial fire leading to heaven and the highest Self. Thus, neither any boon nor any question pertains to Pradhāna. Hence, Pradhāna cannot find scope in the Upaniṣads.

The Sāṃkhyas, anticipates Śaṃkara, may come forward with the objection that the questions asked by Naciketas exceed the boons granted to him. Hence, if the Vedāntins do not hold it to be a fault to assume a question in excess of number of boons granted, they should not object Sāṃkhyas if they assume an explanation about Pradhāna in excess of number of questions asked.¹⁴⁵ Śaṃkara controverts this objection of Sāṃkhya by maintaining that the questions do not exceed the boons granted to Naciketas. Apparently, it seems that the request of Naciketas is concerned to four demands, viz., pacification of his father, knowledge of fire, inquiry about individual Self, and question about the highest reality. As a matter of fact, the questions regarding the nature of individual Self and the highest reality are asked in response to one boon only. It is not illogical to ask these two for one boon because there is no difference between the individual and the supreme Self.¹⁴⁶

The word *avyakta* does not denote Pradhāna for the terms in *śruti* are not used in technical sense as decided upon by Sāṃkhya. For instance, we may take the case of 'Mahat' which is interpreted by Sāṃkhya as the first evolute of Pradhāna. In

140. SB 1.4.6

141. VB 1.4.6

142. RB 1.4.6

143. Ni B 1.4.6

144. MB 1.4.6

145. SB 1.4.6

146. Ibid.

the scriptures, however, it is used in quite a different sense as the term is used in connection with the highest Self. Similarly, the term *avyakta* also cannot denote the technical sense of Pradhāna in *śruti*.¹⁴⁷

(Pradhāna is non-sentient and consequently incapable of producing anything. Hence, it cannot be stated to be the cause of anything.¹⁴⁸ Nimbārka further states that the insentient principle mentioned in the Upaniṣad is having a meaning. Being completely dependent upon the supreme Self, it can be helpful in creation of universe while Pradhāna of Sāṃkhya serves no purpose.¹⁴⁹ Being independent of the sentient principle, it cannot give rise to any effect. In our ordinary life also we experience that non-sentient (*acetana*) objects without being operated by some sentient (*cetana*) being cannot produce anything. Jump of clay cannot form a pot by itself. Such a meaningless principle like Pradhāna cannot be taught in the Upaniṣads.¹⁵⁰

The presentation of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna is cause of universe is in accordance with Sāṃkhya texts of Śaṃkara's opinion that the Sāṃkhyas prescribe knowledge of Pradhāna for the attainment of supernatural powers is not found in the extant literary records of Sāṃkhya. The term *ānumāna* used as a synonym of Pradhāna even in the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa¹⁵² indicates that the Sāṃkhyas believe in the superiority of logic (*tarka*) in philosophical discussions while the Vedāntins hold that the ultimate reality is known from *śruti* only.)

Casually, it may be noted that Vijñānabhikṣu does not consider the above mentioned passage of the *Kāthopaniṣad* as the statement under discussion (*viśayavākya*) in this *Adhikaraṇa*. He discusses the passage of the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, viz., *ajāme-kām lohitaśūklakṛṣṇām*, and criticises the Sāṃkhya theory on

147. SB 1.4.7 also RB, NiB and VB 1.4.7 and MB 1.4.8

148. MB 1.4.3

149. NiB 1.4.3

150. Vedānta Kaustubha 1.4.3

151. cf SK 3, 22, 58, 60

152. Cf. BS 1.3.3, 2.2.1

the ground that non-sentient Pradhāna is not stated as the cause of universe. The choice of *viśaya-vākya* seems to be nearer the intention of the *sūtrakāra*.¹⁵³

The arguments adduced by the Vedāntins to disprove reference to the Sāṃkhya theory of Pradhāna in the passage of the *Kāthopaniṣad* are not final. Some of them are open to following criticism.

The argument that context does not favour mention of Pradhāna in the passage of the *Kāthopaniṣad* is based upon the assumption that the verse cannot be properly interpreted if it is not connected with the metaphor of chariot given in the earlier passage. The verse, however, can be interpreted in a better way without relating it to the metaphor of chariot. The metaphor of chariot is used to show the highest abode of Viṣṇu. The passage under discussion indicates the form of meditation for attaining that highest abode. The objection that Pradhāna is not mentioned as an object of knowledge in the passage under consideration is not reasonable. (Though there is no clear statement that *avyakta* should be known, yet the very statement that *avyakta* is above Mahat and Puruṣa is above *avyakta* is sufficient to indicate that Pradhāna is an object of knowledge.) This knowledge suffices to distinguish *avyakta* from its effects on the one hand, and from Puruṣa on the other. The inconsistency indicated by the Vedāntins can be removed in another way also. One attains knowledge of the Self only when he comes to realise that Prakṛti which is the hindrance in the path of liberation is of inferior value and should be given up in favour of the soul which is of supreme value.¹⁵⁴ The argument that Mahat is not used in the sense intended by Sāṃkhya is not conclusive. There are terms like Puruṣa and Manas, etc., used in the sense ascribed to them by Sāṃkhya. (In the Upaniṣadic passage also the term Mahat denotes the principle accepted by Sāṃkhya.¹⁵⁵) Moreover,

153. For details see Shiv Kumar, "Criticism of the Sāṃkhya Theory in Brahmasūtra 1.4.1—6". *CASS Studies* Number 2.

154. Cf *Anima Sengupta, Kātha Upaniṣad Sāṃkhya Point of View* p. 30.

155. *Maitryup.* 6.10

there is the controversy regarding connotation of the term Mahat even in the schools of Vedānta. Śaṅkara¹⁵⁶ takes it in the sense of *Buddhi* of *hiranyagarbha* while Rāmānuja¹⁵⁷ interprets it as the individual soul. It is not final to say that the term Mahat denotes only one particular entity and not the other. The objection raised by Mādhva which is further elaborated by Nimbārka is based upon the assumption that Pradhāna being non-sentient cannot act to evolve into universe. In reply to this objection commonly raised by all the Brahmanical systematists, the Sāṃkhyas can only re-state their fundamental assumption that a non-sentient principle as guided by its intrinsic potency can evolve into manifold world.

The consideration of denotation of the term *avyakta* irrespective of any Sāṃkhya and Vedāntic bias will be helpful to ascertain the sense of the term *avyakta* in the passage of the *Kāthopaniṣad* and as to how far the passage indicates the theory of Sāṃkhya. The term *avyakta* consists of two parts, the negative particle 'a' meaning negation and *vyakta* denoting manifest, differentiated or revealed. The term is often used as an adjective in the sense of non-manifest. For the first time, the term is used in some technical sense in the *Kāthopaniṣad*. Here, it means the subtle form in which Mahat can merge. At the same time, it should be an objective and non-sentient principle because conscious principle, e.g., the Puruṣa is mentioned separately. This indicates the emphasis on reality of objective principle. The passage under consideration indicates the form of meditation. Starting from outward life of sense, the aspirant moves inward till he reaches the central and the highest reality. The term *avyakta* denotes a stage where the aspirant comes to meditate on the subtlest form of material world and finally realises the conscious self. (The term *avyakta* is equated with the term *akṣara* in the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*.) There also the conscious self is stated to be different from it. (In the *Bhagavadgītā* also the term *avyakta* denotes non-manifest matter.) The *Kāthopaniṣad* passage aims at describing the passage of the spiritual aspirant from gross to the most subtle form of matter and then to the

156. *SB* 1.4.1

157. *RB* 1.4.1

Soul. The fact is that the passage instead of advising a stop at the end of matter lays down a progress 'from matter to sentient.' This means that it does not lay equal emphasis on the two principles - sentient and non-sentient as '*paratva*' may be understood to signify. It is difficult to say either, in favour of the monists that there is no sequence of knowledge of non-sentient and sentient, especially, unless it is granted on the basis of other Upaniṣad texts that from sentient originates non-sentient, or that the latter merges back into the former. It is true that many terms utilised later on by Sāṃkhya are formally identical with those in the passage, one may not be wrong if one understood the passage as suggesting supremacy of conscious self.

Camasādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.4. 8-10)

Sāṃkara, followed by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha disproves the scriptural authority for the Sāṃkhya doctrines in the following passage of the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* :

*Ajāmekāṃ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām
bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ
Ajo hyeko juṣamāṇo anuśete
jahātyenām bhuktabhogāmajo anyah
Śvet. up. 4-5*

"There is one *ajā*, red, white and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one *aja* who loves her and lies by her; there is another *aja* who leaves her after having enjoyed her."¹⁵⁸

The *Vedāntins* state that the Sāṃkhyas adduce following reasons to prove that the term *ajā* stands for Pradhāna. The three adjectives of *ajā* denote the three Guṇas of Pradhāna. *Rajas* is symbolised by *lohita* on account of its colouring and influencing quality. The *Sattva* is indicated by *śukla* because it is of the nature of light, and *kṛṣṇa* signifies *Tamas* on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise i.e. *Prakṛti* is expressed through qualities of its components (*avayavadharma*). The word *ajā* means unborn and refers to Pradhāna in its derivative sense because Pradhāna, which

158. Tr. G. Thibaut

produces manifold effects of uniform nature insofar as they are endowed with the three Guṇas is uncaused cause of everything. Though the term *ajā* is conventionally used in the sense of she-goat, yet this conventional sense is not accepted in the present context since the subject under discussion is true knowledge. (The second half of the verse under consideration speaks of two unborn (*Puruṣas*). One deluded by indiscrimination falsely identifies itself with *Prakṛti* and considered itself the experiencer of pleasure and pain. This *Puruṣa* loves *ajā* (*Prakṛti*) and indulges in worldly existence (*saṃsāra*). The other *Puruṣa* whose power of discrimination has been aroused after enjoying her discards *ajā* (*Prakṛti*) and attains liberation. This provides scope for the scriptural basis of Sāṃkhya.¹⁵⁹ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue adds Rāmānuja,¹⁶⁰ that *ajā* is mentioned as bringing forth the multitude of creatures similar to herself independently of any external cause. This independent causality of cause goes in favour of Pradhāna.

Against this position of Sāṃkhya, the *Vedāntins* adduce following arguments to prove that the import of the passage does not lend support to the theory of Pradhāna, etc.

The passage in itself is incapable of justifying any philosophical position. The meaning of the term *ajā* can be reconciled with any doctrine by means of one or the other supposition. The passage contains no special characteristic to enable the term *ajā* to signify Pradhāna and to exclude its other possible connotations. The cause is analogous to *Camas* occurring in the *Bṛhadārṇyakopaniṣad* where there is no mention of any special quality to ascertain the form of *Camas*.¹⁶¹

The attributes *lohita*, *śukla* and *kṛṣṇa* are assigned to fire, water and food in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*. In the present context also, the three qualities should refer to elemental substances of light, water and food. The *ajā* should, therefore, be understood as comprising of elementary substances and not as the composite of the three Guṇas. Generally a doubtful passage should be interpreted in the light of the passage the sense of which is beyond doubt. The unambiguous passage of the

159. SB 1.4.8

160. RB 1.4.8

161. SB 1.4.8 also RB, Nib and VB 1.4.8

Chāndogyaopaniṣad should be used for interpretation of the passage under discussion. Moreover, sense of the terms *lohita*, *śukla* and *kṛṣṇa* cannot directly be interpreted in the sense given by Sāṃkhya. These terms primarily denote particular colour and it would be necessary to resort to the secondary sense (*gaunī vr̥ti*) to understand them in the sense of three Guṇas.¹⁶²

The purpose and the context of the passage do not favour Sāṃkhya view.¹⁶³ No special sense can be assigned to *śruti* without consideration of its context, purpose, etc. The passage preceding it speaks of power of the highest lord. The subsequent passages also describe the same. On the ground of general context, we may conclude that no entity independent of *prameśvara* can be indicated by the term *ajā*.¹⁶⁴

It is also not sound to say the passage favours the doctrine of plurality of souls. The plurality is caused by limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) and is conjured up by ignorance (*avidyā*), because oneness of soul and unreality of its multiplicity is propounded in *śruti* itself. The passage under discussion is the comparative study of a man under the spell of ignorance with the liberated (*mukta*).¹⁶⁵ According to Vallabha the two *ajās* in masculine are individual soul and supreme self.¹⁶⁶

It is also not tenable to hold that the expression *bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjāmānām* conveys the characteristics of Pradhāna, i.e., its power of independent creation. The statement simply means the quality of being a mere creating agent.¹⁶⁷

It is difficult to find the trace of ultimate reality like Pradhāna in the passage describing *ajā*. The scripture declares that *ajā* has light (*jyoti*) as its source. The term *jyoti* denotes Brahman in the Upaniṣads.¹⁶⁸ It is not contradictory to describe this *ajā* as unborn and at the same time as having Brahman

as its source. Prakṛti exists in two stages i.e., the state of cause and that of effect. It is unborn in the former but in the latter it can very well be said to have Brahman as its source.¹⁶⁹ The etymology of the term cannot obstruct this way of explaining the term *ajā* because etymology is not the only consideration to determine the sense of *śruti* passages.¹⁷⁰

In the *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* the same passage of the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* is found in context of creation of the world by the supreme Brahman. It should convey the same sense in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* also.¹⁷¹

The exposition of Sāṃkhya doctrines given by Sāṃkara and others regarding the independent nature of universal cause,¹⁷² plurality of souls¹⁷³ and liberation ensuing from discriminating knowledge¹⁷⁴ is in conformity with Sāṃkhya text. Sāṃkara's statement regarding the nature of the three Guṇas needs further consideration. Sāṃkara calls these Guṇas the components (*avayavas*) of Prakṛti. The Guṇas are, however, not components of Prakṛti in the real sense of the term. Otherwise, Prakṛti would be composite (*sāvayava*) and it would contradict the doctrine of Sāṃkhya that Prakṛti is non-composite (*niravayava*).¹⁷⁵

Casually, it may be noted that Madhva does not direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya. It is also doubtful whether the *sūtrakāra* himself wants to direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya. There is no indication of the issue of meaning of the term *ajā* in the opening *sūtra* of this *adhikaraṇa*. Sāṃkara does find place for an entity possessing three Guṇas in his own system. Rāmānuja also admits the existence of the category of Prakṛti in his own way. The point of difference between Prakṛti of Sāṃkhya and the entity accepted by Sāṃkara and Rāmānuja is regarding the possibility of independent metaphysical existence which leads to either monism or dualism. However,

162. SB 1.4.9

163. SB 1.4.9

164. SB 1.4.9

165. SB 1.4.10

166. VB 1.4.9

167. RB 1.4.8

168. RB 1.4.9

169. RB 1.4.10

170. VB 1.4.10

171. RB 1.4.9

172. Cf SK 58

173. Cf. SK 18

174. Cf. SK 44

175. Cf. SK 10

Śaṃkara uses it as an opportunity for achieving his own aim. He is certainly interpreting the scriptures so as to favour his thesis of Brahman, but at the same time he is anxious to show that the passages which are most likely to yield different interpretations and thus favour opponents' position do not do so. Hence, his efforts. Herein Rāmānuja also follows the work of Śaṃkara. Śaṃkara purposes to establish causality of Brahman and to disprove causality of Pradhāna. The latter aim is achieved but the causality is ascribed to other direction by identifying *ajā* with *tejobanna* which etymologically means that which is not produced. To overcome this difficulty Śaṃkara takes *ajā* in the sense of she-goat by way of imagery (*Kalpanopadeśa*). This device however, may equally be availed of by Sāṃkhya in respect of interpreting the three colours as representatives of three Guṇas.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, there is no strong ground to reject the etymological sense in order to explain it in the metaphorical sense.¹⁷⁷ All this effort on the part of Śaṃkara suggests the likelihood that the passage could be favourable to Sāṃkhya. The interpretation of Rāmānuja also is open to the same incongruity. *Ajā*, according to him, is born of Brahman. This goes against the derivative meaning of the term. To reconcile his interpretation with the derivative sense of the term, Rāmānuja postulates two stages of *ajā*. In its unmanifest form *ajā* is identical with Brahman and is unborn but in its manifest state it is of the form of light, water and food.¹⁷⁸ There is, however, no indication of this interpretation in the text.

The objections raised by the Vedāntins in this context are not final. The example of *Camas* cannot properly be cited to discomfit the Sāṃkhyas. The identity of *Camas* is ascertained then and there and as such cannot be the example of a doubtful passage.¹⁷⁹

The Vedāntins except Vallabha accept that the passage

176. Cf. B.N.K. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p.280

177. Y.K. Wadhvani, Some Controversial passages in the Śvet-āśvataropaniṣad," *CASS Studies* Number 1

178. *RB* 1.4.9

179. Cf. B.N.K. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 279

describes more than one soul. Vallabha holds that the passage describes individual soul and supreme self.¹⁸⁰ The view of Vallabha can hardly be convincing. The statement *jahātyenām bhuktabhogāmajoanyah* cannot be reconciled with the supreme Self because the renouncement implies contact and the enjoyment in the former state, which is not possible in the case of the supreme Self.¹⁸¹ Śaṃkara explains that plurality of souls is caused by ignorance and holds that the passage establishes the thesis of monism.¹⁸² The passage, however, furnishes no evidence for it. On the contrary, the *Svetāśvataropaniṣad*¹⁸³ itself states that souls are many. This plurality of souls clearly favours the theory of Sāṃkhya.

In short, the wording of the verse is such that the Sāṃkhyas are at best advantage to derive their theories from it, viz. unborn Prakṛti as cause of world, multiplicity of individual souls, and cause of bondage and release. Among later Sāṃkhya writers, it is Vācaspati Miśra who understands the significance of this verse for the Sāṃkhyas, perhaps subsequently to and as noted by Śaṃkara and opens his comments on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* with a quotation of the verse. According to Deussen¹⁸⁴ this verse expresses the fundamental thought of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

Sāṃkhyopasaṃgrahādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.4.11-13)

Śaṃkara, followed by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha undertakes to disprove the scriptural authority for the numerical mention of the twenty-five principles of Sāṃkhyas in the following passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* :

“*Yasmin pañca pañcajanā ākāśaścī pratiṣṭhitāḥ*

Tamevamanya ātmānam vidvān brahmāmṛto amṛtam”

Br. Up. 4.4.17

“He in whom five groups of the five-people” and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the self; I who know believe him to be Brahman.”¹⁸⁵

180. *VB* 1.4.9

181. Y. K. Wadhvani *op. cit.*

182. *SB* 1.4.10

183. *Śve U.* 1.9

184. Tr. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 251

185. G. Thibaut

The Vedāntins state in form of *pūrvapakṣa* that the Sāṃkhyas may argue that their doctrines rest on scriptural authority because there is scriptural basis for the twenty-five principles in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. The five groups of five meant by *pañcajanāḥ* qualified by *pañca* refer to the aggregate of the twenty-five principles. It fully corresponds to the scheme of Sāṃkhya which believes in twenty-five principles.¹⁸⁶ Rāmānuja adds that the compound in '*pañcajanāḥ*' is in the sense of group (*samāhāra*) and equivalent to *pañcapūlyāḥ*. The change in gender (i.e. masculine for neuter) is due to Vedic usage. The set of five is again qualified by five and the expression *pañcajanāḥ* refers to the twenty five principles as it is the case with *pañcapañcapūlyāḥ*.¹⁸⁷

The Vedāntins adduce following arguments to prove the Sāṃkhyas are mistaken in understanding that the expression *pañcapañcajanāḥ* refers to the twenty-five principles accepted by Sāṃkhya.

The categories of Sāṃkhya are diverse in nature and there are no five common qualities to divide them into five groups of five constituents each. The grouping of objects is not possible without common qualities applicable to each group.¹⁸⁸ The Sāṃkhyas may suggest the possibility of classifying the principles into following five sets of five constituents each : (i) five organs of action, (ii) five organs of knowledge, (iii) five gross elements, (iv) five subtle elements and (v) the remaining five. This classification is not logical since *ākāśa* is mentioned separately and as such gross elements cannot form one group of five.¹⁸⁹ Though the Sāṃkhyas may group their principles in this way explaining the fifth group as consisting of five internal elements, viz. Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and Manas, yet the Sāṃkhyas themselves do not maintain this classification. They classify their principles as productives, productive products, products, and neither productive nor product.¹⁹⁰ Due to this diversity, the expression *pañcapañca-*

186. *SB* 1.4.11

187. *RB* 1.4.11

188. *SB* 1.4.11 also *RB*, *NiB*. and *VB* 1.4.11

189. *RB* 1.4.11

190. *VB* 1.4.11

janāḥ cannot be compounded in the sense of collection (*samāhāra*).¹⁹¹

The expression *pañcapañca* grammatically cannot denote twenty-five. The Sāṃkhyas may argue that the expression *pañcapañca* denotes twenty-five without any sense of grouping as the term *pañcasapta* in the statement '*pañca sapta ca varṣāṇi na vavarṣa śatakratuḥ*' denotes twelve.¹⁹² This argument of the Sāṃkhyas is not tenable. Firstly, because it will lead to indirect indication (*lakṣaṇā*) since it may be considered as only an indirect mention of the twenty-five principles. Secondly, the second *pañca* is not an independent word. On the contrary, it is compounded with *jana* as it is clear from one accent and one case termination in the whole word *pañcajanāḥ*. The first *pañca* cannot qualify the second *pañca*, because the latter is a subordinate member of compound (*upasarjana*) and as such cannot have other adjective.¹⁹³ On account of compound the expression *pañcapañca* cannot be taken in the sense of repetition (*vīpsā*) also.¹⁹⁴ If the expression is taken in the sense of repetition (*vīpsā*) and as an uncompounded word, it will mean ten and not twenty-five.¹⁹⁵

The principles referred to in the passage cannot be interpreted as twenty-five in number because *ākāśa* and soul are enumerated separately in addition to the twenty-five. In the theory of Sāṃkhya, however, *ākāśa* and soul are included in twenty-five only.¹⁹⁶

Mere mention of number cannot lend support to the specific twenty-five principles. The term *jana* has not the settled sense of 'a principle'. The number can be justified in relation to other senses as well.¹⁹⁷

The nature of the principles mentioned in the passage is different from that of the principles of Sāṃkhya. The passage

191. *RB* 1.4.11

192. *SB* 1.4.11

193. *Ibid.*

194. *Ibid.*

195. *Bhāmātī* 1.4.11

196. *SB* 1.4.11 also *RB*, *NiB*. and *VB* 1.4.11

197. *SB* 1.4.11

explicitly mentions that these principles have a resort in Brahman, which serves as their *ātman*. The principles of Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, are independent of a supreme Soul.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, acceptance of principles of Sāṃkhya which are independent of Brahman will lead to ultimate plurality which is contradictory to *śruti*.¹⁹⁹

We may observe here that in absence of any written explanation of the passage from Sāṃkhya point of view it is not evident as to how the Sāṃkhyas would have established scriptural authority for the twenty-five principles on the basis of this passage. The *pūrvapakṣa* as recorded here does not set forth any distinctive reason to prove that the passage refers to the categories of Sāṃkhya.

It may be noted that Madhva does not direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya and tries to establish the *samanvaya* of the term *pañcapañcajanāḥ* with Brahman. According to some modern scholars²⁰⁰ the interpretation of other commentators goes against the import of the entire *pāda* which aims at establishing the *samanvaya* of the upaniṣadic passages with Brahman. Moreover, the Vedāntins also accept almost all these principles of Sāṃkhya. There is, therefore, no point in denying the scriptural authority of all these principles. The dependence of all these principles on Brahman is already established in B.S. 1.4.3. It is, therefore, not necessary to raise this issue at this stage. We may, however, point out that the arguments brought forth by Śaṃkara as regards conventional usage of certain words as well as the problem about conforming to the exact number of 25 appear to be very sound. Besides, it is difficult to see to what does 'yasmīn' refer when Puruṣa is included in the 25 'janas'. It is not also the question whether the Vedāntins accept 25 principles of Sāṃkhya or do not do so. They do accept them so as to be not inconsistent with their system. What Śaṃkara is really interested in showing is that, this particular passage cannot have the meaning the Sāṃkhyas would like to have and, therefore, the remark, viz., the

198. RB 1.4.11 also VB and Nib. 1.4.11

199. Vedāntakaustubha 1.4.11

200. Cf. M.G. Shastri, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5 and B.N.K. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p.286

purport of criticism is not so much to disclose the inconsistencies of Sāṃkhya texts as to forward right interpretation of *śruti* some of which may occasionally appear to contain potencies for unfavourable explanation, applies well here also.

As far as the criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory is concerned, the Sāṃkhyas do not have any strong reason to controvert the arguments of the Vedāntins. B.N.K. Sharma tries to refute the argument that the categories of the Sāṃkhyas have no five common qualities to divide them into five groups of five each. He suggests that the principles of Sāṃkhya can be divided into following groups : (i) five organs of action, (ii) five organs of sense, (iii) objects (*viśayas*), (iv) Sattva, Rajas, Tamas, Mahat and Ahaṃkāra (all having the common quality of being above Manas), (v) *prthivī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu* and *Manas* (having the common attribute of being other than the twenty already mentioned).²⁰¹ This classification, however, is not logical. The manner of grouping is far-fetched. The Guṇas are not distinct principles in the scheme of categories of Sāṃkhya.

Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.4.14-15)

Unlike the other commentators, Rāmānuja followed by Nimbārka directs the *Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇa*, *jaḍadvācitvādhikaraṇa* and the *Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya.

In the present *adhikaraṇa*, Rāmānuja followed by Nimbārka tries to prove that the *avyakta* state which is spoken of as cause of universe in the following passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* does not refer to the Sāṃkhya theory of Pradhāna :

taddhedam tarhyavyākṛtam āsit.....

tannāmarūpābhyām vyākriyata

(Br. Up 1.4.7)

'Now all this was then undeveloped'... 'that developed itself by form and name'.²⁰²

Rāmānuja presents the Sāṃkhyas as arguing that the Upaniṣads do not unanimously refer to one and the same cause of universe. At some places, universe is said to come

201: *Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries*, p. 287

202. Tr. G. Thibaut

ut of *sat*, and at other places it is again stated as produced from *asat*. Hence, it cannot be ascertained definitely that Brahman only is cause of universe. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* declaring that world was unmanifest and became manifest variously into name and form, refers to *avyakta* (unmanifest) as cause of universe. The *avyakta* is nothing but Pradhāna. The terms *sat* and *asat* referring to the same cause of universe are in opposition to the doctrine of Brahman as cause of universe but they can easily be reconciled with the causality of Pradhāna. Pradhāna is essentially eternal as well as resort of modifications. The act of seeing, etc., spoken with reference to cause of universe should be understood in the sense of 'being eager to create', so that these also may be applicable to non-sentient Pradhāna. The terms Brahman and *ātman* can also be applicable to Pradhāna when understood in their derivative sense of vast and pervasive respectively.²⁰³

This view of Sāṃkhya is criticised on following grounds :

The passages dealing with creation speak of omniscient, lord of all (*sarveśvara*), with thoughts fulfilled (*satyaśaṅkalpa*), without tinge of imperfection (*nirastanikhiladoṣagandha*), all-pervasive highest Brahman as cause of *ākāśa*, etc.²⁰⁴ The term *asat* also refers to Brahman only. The discussion regarding Brahman in the earlier passages of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* continues and as such the context implies Brahman as denotation of the term *asat* too. The term unmanifest (*avyākṛta*) also denotes Brahman because there is no distinction of name and form prior to creation. Brahman enters into effects and modifies itself of its own accord into name and form. Such an act of entering into effects for the purpose of ruling them is not possible in case of Pradhāna which is non-sentient in nature. The acts of seeing, etc., should be taken in their primary sense so that they may be reconciled with the established fact that Brahman which is sentient in nature is cause of universe. The terms Brahman and *ātman* also cannot denote Pradhāna since Pradhāna has limited vastness and pervading capacity. Moreover, it does not have the power to control from within.²⁰⁵

203. RB 1.4.14

204. RB 1.4.14 also *NiB*. 1.4.14

205. RB 1.4.15 and *NiB* 1.4.15

The attempt of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka to direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya is not convincing. There is no urgency to direct this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya. It is established in the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa* that the term *sat* does not denote Pradhāna. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka would have been able to say more far *samanvaya* of passages in Brahman which is the chief aim of the whole *pāda* had they not wasted their energy to dispose of the causality of Pradhāna. Rāmānuja further states that the Sāṃkhyas try to interpret the terms Brahman and *ātman* also in the sense of Pradhāna. In the extant texts of Sāṃkhya, however, we do not come across such a statement.

Jagadvācivādhikaraṇa (B.S. 1.4.16-18)

Rāmānuja, followed by Nimbārka, carries on the polemics against Sāṃkhya to prove that the entity prescribed to be known in the following passage of the *Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa* does not refer to Puruṣa and consequently Pradhāna supervised by Puruṣa is not the cause of universe :

“Yo vai bālaka eṣāṃ kartā yasya caitat karma sa vai veditavyaḥ”

(*Kau. Brā.* 4.18)

“He who is the maker of these persons and of whom this is the work (or “to whom this work belong”) he indeed is to be known.”²⁰⁶

Rāmānuja presents the Sāṃkhya as arguing that the scripture prescribes knowledge of no other entity than Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The entity to be known is described as the enjoyer of the *Karmans* and the supervisor of Prakṛti. The *Karmans* stand for merits and demerits, and the entity associated with *Karman* is none but Puruṣa. Thus, the passage under consideration prescribes knowledge of Puruṣa as distinct from Prakṛti. The subsequent description of the entity as ‘going to a sleeping person, striking him with a stick and arousing him, etc.’ is again indicative of the nature of the enjoyer. Moreover, the act of residing in the states of dream, deep sleep and waking spoken of with reference to this entity to be known are applicable to the individual soul and as such are applicable in case of Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya.²⁰⁷

206. Tr. G. Thibaut

207. RB 1.4.16

This stand of Sāṃkhya is criticised on following grounds.

The view of Sāṃkhya is based upon an incorrect interpretation of the term *Karman*. The term *Karman* denotes the world which is the result of the creative activity of supreme Puruṣa and not merits and demerits as understood by Sāṃkhya. The context points out to Brahman as the entity to be known. Puruṣas associated with merits and demerits are already known to Bālāki. Hence, the passage under discussion sets forth Brahman as an entity to be known which was not already known to him.²⁰⁸ As to the argument that the entity to be known is the Puruṣa on account of certain characteristics applicable to it, Rāmānuja states that proper attention should be paid to the beginning, middle and the end of the description. In the present case, Brahman is intended as an entity to be known. The conclusion also refers to the same. Hence, the other characteristics should be understood with reference to Brahman alone and the passage as a whole should be considered as describing Brahman alone.²⁰⁹

The way in which Rāmānuja introduces the Sāṃkhya theory for the purpose of refuting it, reveals that there is no urgency of directing this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya. Rāmānuja chiefly aims at disproving causality of Pradhāna but he introduces this subject indirectly. He first suggests that the Sāṃkhyas may find reference to the Sāṃkhya concept of Puruṣa and deduce from it that Pradhāna supervised by Puruṣa is cause of universe. There is no reference to the Sāṃkhya theory of Pradhāna in the passage under discussion. The subject which is introduced in such an indirect way cannot be taken as the chief subject matter of discussion.

Rāmānuja describes the Sāṃkhya Puruṣa in terms of those characteristics which are not ascribed to him by Sāṃkhyas themselves. The *Kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* of Puruṣa are restricted to his embodied existence under the spell of ignorance, so that it is a metaphorical description whereas in reality pure Puruṣa is not contaminated by any of those. So Puruṣa, as featured out by Rāmānuja is not free Puruṣa on trans-empirical

208. RB 1.4.16 also NiB 1.4.16

299. RB 1.4.17 also NiB 1.4.17

plane but only individual soul entangled in pairs of 'punya' and 'apunya' and least powerful to govern the root cause of the world. One may wonder here as to why Rāmānuja does not make a reference to the *samaṣṭi* Puruṣa whom Rāmānuja understands as true and supreme superintendent of Prakṛti. *Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa* (B.S. 1.4.19-22)

Rāmānuja, followed by Nimbārka, tries to prove that the following passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* does not refer to Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya and consequently, does not lend support to causality of Pradhāna supervised by Puruṣa.

Na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo

bhavatyātmanstu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati...

Na va are sarvasya kāmāya sarvaṃ priyaṃ bhavati...

Ātmā vā are dṛṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyā-

sitavyaḥ Maitreyyātmani khalvare dṛṣṭe śrute

mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditaṃ

Br. Up. 4.5.6

"Verily, a husband is dear not for the love of the husband, but for the love of the self a husband is dear and so on...Everything is dear, not for the love of everything, but for the love of the Self everything is dear. The Self should be seen, should be reflected on, should be meditated upon. When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon, and meditated upon, then all this is known."²¹⁰

Rāmānuja presents the Sāṃkhyas as arguing that the passage refers to Puruṣa as fit to be seen etc., because there is apprehension of Puruṣa in the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the passage. To say that the passage aims at attainment of immortality and as such cannot refer to Puruṣa is not logical. The knowledge of the nature of Puruṣa as separated from superimposing characteristics of non-sentient objects leads to the attainment of immortality. The statement that everything becomes known when *ātman* is known is fully reconciled with the theory of Sāṃkhya. All Puruṣas, in absence of a connection with Prakṛti, are of homogeneous nature. The *ātman* in all beings beginning with the gods and ending with immobiles is of the nature of knowledge. Hence, knowledge of one will confer knowledge of all. Moreover, the same Upaniṣad

201. Tr. G. Thibaut

repudiates multiplicity. This is in conformity with the theory of Sāṃkhyas who hold that the manifold character caused by varieties in transformations of Prakṛti is false; and ātman is of a uniform nature. When this passage is understood as describing Puruṣa, all similar passages should be supposed to have the same meaning. It can be upheld, therefore, that Prakṛti as supervised by Puruṣa is cause of universe.²¹¹

This position of Sāṃkhya is criticised thus.

The interrelation of parts of the passage becomes consistent only when the passage is understood with reference to *Īśvara*. The injunctions like 'by knowing one, everything is known' fits in the context of *paramātman* who is *ātman* of everything.²¹² The claim of Sāṃkhya that the statement holds good in case of Puruṣa is baseless because even after knowing Puruṣa the non-sentient objects remain unknown.²¹³

The context favours *paramātman* only as the subject matter of the passage here. This is derived from two preceding equations, viz., that world which comprises of sentient and non-sentient is the same as *ātman* and that *ātman* is essentially identical with *paramātman*. This is not possible in case of the Sāṃkhya Puruṣa.²¹⁴ The qualities, magnitude, etc., are also possible in case of *paramātman* alone.²¹⁵

It is also wrong to say that the entity for the sake of which husband, wife, son, wealth and cattle are dear refers, in fact, to *paramātman* itself. Otherwise, it cannot be reconciled with the further statement that everything becomes dear for the sake of *ātman*. Briefly, the passage prescribes knowledge of *paramātman* who is dearest and not that of husband, wife, etc.²¹⁶

Rāmānuja cites the views of *ācāryas* accounting for the reasons as to why *jīva* also denotes *paramātman*. Aśmarathya states that *jīva* should be taken as indicative of *paramātman* so that the assertion such as 'by knowing one, everything becomes

211. RB 1.4.19

212. RB 1.4.19 also Nib 1.4.19

213. RB 1.4.19

214. Ibid

215. Ibid.

216. Ibid.

known' may be true.²¹⁷ According to Auḍulomi, the *jīva* attains to the nature of *paramātman* when about to depart from body. *Jīva*, therefore, may denote *paramātman*.²¹⁸ Kāśakṛtsna thinks that *jīva* can denote Brahman because *jīvātman* serves as body for Brahman.²¹⁹

Rāmānuja's presentation of the Sāṃkhya view of Puruṣa is interesting as it tells us something which we do not know from any other source. Rāmānuja states that Puruṣa is essentially of the nature of knowledge and Puruṣa is present in the beings right from gods down to plants. It is difficult to verify Rāmānuja's statements because the extant texts of Sāṃkhya do not give anywhere this sort of positive description of nature of Puruṣa. Rāmānuja's presentation of the Sāṃkhya view of plurality of Puruṣas deserves further consideration. Rāmānuja seems to opine that Puruṣa is essentially one but appears to be many as it comes in contact with evolutes of Prakṛti. The Sāṃkhyas, however hold that plurality of Puruṣa is real and ultimate. Rāmānuja's statement that Prakṛti evolves into universe when supervised by Puruṣa is also corroborated by texts like the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*.²²⁰

Rāmānuja's manner of directing this *adhikaraṇa* against Sāṃkhya is far-fetched as it is clear from the fact that he primarily aims at refutation of causality of Pradhāna but does not introduce the subject directly. There is a casual reference to it in the *pūrvapakṣa* and its criticism.

(2) Arguments against authenticity of Sāṃkhya smṛti.

In their commentaries on the first *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra* the Vedāntins have adduced various arguments to disprove the scriptural basis for the doctrines of Sāṃkhya in terms of interpretation sought to be given to the sentences and certain terms from the Vedic lore. The Sāṃkhyas, however, are not prepared to leave the ground easily. They maintain that their doctrines are having the support of *smṛtis* whose authority in the field of valid knowledge is only next to that of the Vedas. By 'Smṛti' the Sāṃkhyas mean the philosophical

217. RB 1.4.20

218. RB 1.4.21

219. RB. 1.4.22

220. MV 17

treatise of Kapila, and the other works following it. In the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa*, the Vedāntins attempt to remove the apparent defect arising from contradiction of their theories with the *smṛti* of Sāṃkhya and to prove that the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* is invalid in so far as it contradicts Vedānta.

The Sāṃkhyas advocate far validity of Sāṃkhya *smṛti* on following grounds :

If the theory that Pradhāna is the cause of universe is forsaken in favour of the theory that Brahman is the cause of universe, the *smṛtis* which teach the former view will be meaningless and consequently there will be no room for them. The *smṛtis* of Manu, etc., find their aim fulfilled in laying down the rules regarding religious duties and moral conduct. Hence, the Vedic passages should be interpreted in the light of the *smṛti* of Kapila which is primarily concerned with philosophical knowledge.²²¹ The *smṛtis* composed by eminent men, like Kapila etc., are the authentic source of interpretation of Vedic passages for those who are unable to understand the meaning of the Vedas themselves.²²² The sage Kapila is extolled in *śruti* as possessing unobstructed knowledge. His opinion about the philosophical doctrines, therefore, should not be doubted.²²³ Moreover, the views of authors of the *smṛtis* are supported by reason.²²⁴ The theories propounded in the *smṛti* of Kapila, therefore, should be accepted and the *śruti* passages should be interpreted in light of these *smṛtis*.

These arguments of Sāṃkhya, according to the Vedāntins, are ill founded. The argument based on *smṛti* can be refuted on the same basis. If the *Smṛtis* which propound causality of Pradhāna are accepted, rest of the *smṛtis* which declare causality of Brahman will be without application.²²⁵ In case of conflict of views among the *smṛtis*, those which conform to *śruti* should be rejected.²²⁶ *Śruti* is the absolute authority regarding matters not cognised by perception and other means of empirical knowledge. The Sāṃkhyas are not right in clinging

221. SB 2.1.1 also RB and VB 2.1.1

222. SB 2.1.1 also RB 2.1.1

223. SB. 2.1.1

224. Ibid.

225. SB 2.1.1 also RB, Ni B and VB 2.1.1

S22.B 26.1.1

fast to one thesis and holding that the entire bulk of *śrutis* and *smṛtis* should be interpreted in light of that view. The argument that the views of eminent sage like Kapila should surely be accepted is also slippery. It is not reasonable to question *śruti* on the basis of words of men even though they may possess super-sensuous powers because obtainment of these powers depends upon religious duties enjoined by *śruti*.²²⁷ Though Kapila attained knowledge by Yogic practices, yet it does not strengthen the case of Sāṃkhya. There are other sages also who have attained the vision through Yogic practices, but their theories do not correspond to those of Kapila.²²⁸ As regards the inclination of common men to follow the interpretation of *śruti* offered by eminent sage like Kapila, Śaṅkara states that ordinary people also should not be attached to any *smṛti* without reasoning and should ascertain the truth on the basis of *smṛtis* based on *śrutis*. Otherwise, final decision regarding ultimate reality will be unstable because there are different *smṛtis* holding different views.²²⁹ As regards the mention of Kapila in *śruti* as possessing unobstructed knowledge, Śaṅkara argues that there are several Kapilas in Indian tradition. It cannot be ascertained as to which Kapila is praised in *śrutis*. Kapila the exponent of Sāṃkhya is criticised in the *Mahābhārata* for multiplicity of souls. Moreover, Kapila cannot be allowed to monopolize learnedness. Manu, the author of a *smṛti*, is also praised in the *śruti* and emphasises unity of self which condemns by implication Kapila's view of multiplicity of souls.²³⁰ The authority of the Veda, being direct and final, requires no further proof. Hence, *smṛti* of Kapila deserves no consideration insofar as it contradicts *śruti*.

There is no proof for validity of what is imagined by Sāṃkhya. The modifications of Pradhāna, like Mahat, etc., are neither mentioned in *śruti* nor experienced in our daily life. Thus, the part of Sāṃkhya *smṛti* regarding the effect has no authority. Hence, the part with reference to *cause*, i.e.,

227. Ibid.

228. RB and NiB 2.1.2

229. SB 2.1.1

230. Ibid.

Pradhāna, also should equally be unacceptable.²³¹ Having lost sight of the fundamental thesis, the Sāṃkhyas have accepted some crudities as genuine truth. The contradiction with the Sāṃkhya *smṛti*, therefore, is not a fault for any other system of doctrine.

The other sages who are declared as having known reality have not realised it in the manner Kapila has done it. Hence, the way of realisation adopted by Kapila is opposed to *śruti* and as such is rooted in misconception.²³²

It may be noted that Madhva does not restrict the *adhikaraṇa* to refutation of Sāṃkhya *smṛti* only. He seems to take for refutation all the *smṛtis* which are non-Vedic in origin. Śaṃkara restricts the *adhikaraṇa* to Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the ground that these *smṛtis* are widely known as offering the means of liberation, are favoured by many competent persons and are profound in logic.²³³ B.N.K. Sharma²³⁴ observes that these arguments are applicable to other *smṛtis* as well and there is no special reason to restrict the *adhikaraṇa* to refutation of Sāṃkhya and Yoga only. Here, B.N.K. Sharma overlooks implication of another reason given by Śaṃkara that the Sāṃkhyas strengthen their position by scriptural references to their theories and argue for the validity of their *smṛti*.²³⁵ Hence, Śaṃkara finds it logical to direct this *adhikaraṇa* only against the Sāṃkhyas to disprove the authority and scriptural basis of the Sāṃkhya *smṛti*.

It seems that Śaṃkara slightly distorts the position of Sāṃkhya when he summarises the Sāṃkhya argument about relation of *smṛti* and *śruti* as follows. Even granting that there are no *śrutis* to support Sāṃkhya, the *smṛtis* in themselves can form an independent and authentic source of information. So, it is reasonable to start with *smṛtis* first then going to *śruti* to interpret them on the basis of *smṛtis* so that the

231. SB and VB 2.1.2

232. RB and VB 2.1.2

233. SB 2.1.3

234. *The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries Vol. I.* p. 333

235. SB 2.1.3

passage need not only be from *śruti* to *smṛti*. As a matter of fact Sāṃkhyas would argue that their *smṛti* does interpret *śrutis* in the right way and can show that *smṛtis* are foundation for the system of Sāṃkhya. They would challenge Śaṃkara who claims that the scriptural passages refer only to Śaṃkara's theory. There are the passages of the *śruti* which teach the tenets of Sāṃkhya *smṛti* of Kapila and the ambiguous passages should be interpreted in light of *smṛti* of Kapila.²³⁶ The argument that the principles like Mahat, etc., are not mentioned in the *śruti* suggests the possibility of this sort of *pūrvapakṣa*.

The argument that Mahat, etc., are not found in *śruti* is baseless. The *Kāthopanīṣad* refers to Mahat and the other categories of Sāṃkhya.²³⁷ The next half of the argument that the part of *smṛti* regarding effects being unacceptable the part regarding cause should also be renounced, has a logical flaw. It is not necessary that a position, faulty and unacceptable in one respect, should be regarded to be so in other respects too. Even Śaṃkara does not criticise such Sāṃkhya theories as nature of Puruṣa and theory of causation, which concur with his own system though he discerns the Sāṃkhya theory of Pradhāna.²³⁸

It can also be stated that Śaṃkara's doctrine of Māyā is mentioned neither in *śruti* nor in *smṛtis* of Manu, etc. It is not clear how Śaṃkara claims that his theory is mentioned in *śruti* and *smṛtis* following it.²³⁹

The mention of Kapila in *śruti* gives an opportunity to the Vedāntins to comment upon the founder of Sāṃkhya. Kapila is unanimously accepted as the founder of Sāṃkhya. There is, however, the controversy regarding the identity of Kapila. Nimbārka and Vallabha are silent about it. Śaṃkara holds that Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, is other than the one found mentioned in *śruti*. Rāmānuja does not support this view but states that Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, is

236. M.G. Shastri, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61

237. *Ibid.*

238. S.P. Verma, *Evaluation of Śaṃkara's Criticism of Rival Metaphysical Systems*, Ph. D. Thesis BHU, p. 157

239. M.G. Shastri, *loc. cit.*

āpta but not *āptatama*. Thus, Rāmānuja questions authority of the founder of Sāṃkhya while Śaṃkara questions its antiquity as well.

(3) Inferential Arguments against Sāṃkhya

In the first *adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtra*, the Vedāntins have made an attempt to disprove the scriptural basis for theories of Sāṃkhya. They have further proved that Sāṃkhya *smṛti* also is unacceptable and consequently, *śruti* cannot be interpreted in light of Sāṃkhya *smṛti*. The Sāṃkhyas may, however, take recourse to reasoning as the foundation of their doctrines. In the *Racanānupapattiyadhikaraṇa*, the Vedāntins criticise the Sāṃkhyas on purely logical grounds to prove that the Sāṃkhyas cannot defend their theories on the basis of reasoning too. The main target of criticism is the theory that Pradhāna, which is non-sentient but active and productive by nature, is cause of universe.

In the form of the opponents' view, the Vedāntins give a detailed account of the theory of Sāṃkhya. Śaṃkara states that the Sāṃkhyas infer cause from common properties of effects. All the outward and inward effects are endowed with common qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence, they should have pleasure, pain and indifference as their cause; just as jar, dishes, etc., having clay as their common property, have clay in general as the material cause. The pleasure, pain and indifference together constitute the threefold Pradhāna. The existence of Pradhāna is sought to be proved through other inferential arguments also as for instance, limitation of all effects, and the like. The Pradhāna which is essentially non-sentient and productive spontaneously evolves into its modifications without being activated by some external agency to serve the purpose of sentient entity (Puruṣa).²⁴⁰

Rāmānuja extensively quotes the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and gives a comprehensive account of the Sāṃkhya theory in form of explanation of the *Kārikās*. The categories of Sāṃkhya can be divided into four groups : (i) productive, (ii) both productive and product, (iii) product only and (iv) neither productive

nor product. The first is ultimate cause of universe called Prakṛti which is one, eternal, all-pervasive, always subject to modification and meant for enjoyment of many sentient principles. Prakṛti is equilibrium of three Guṇas, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The Guṇas are substances possessing nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. The effect (*Kārya*) of these are lightness, light, movement, firmness, heaviness and covering. The Guṇas being extremely supra sensuous are known through their effects only. The difference among them is also noticed through their effects only. The seven principles, viz., Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and five subtle elements (*tanmātrās*), being modification of Prakṛti and cause of other objects, form the second group. Out of these, Ahaṃkāra is of three kinds—*vaikārika*, *taijas* and *bhūtādi* according as it is dominated by Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. The *vaikārika* Ahaṃkāra is cause of organs, the *bhūtādi* is cause of subtle elements and the *taijasa* is auxiliary to the two. The sixteen products, forming the third group, are—the five great elements (*mahābhūtas*), five sense-organs, five organs of action and Manas. Puruṣa forms the last group because, being immutable, it is neither cause nor effect of anything. Puruṣa is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is eternal, all pervasive, without activity, devoid of all attributes and different in different bodies. Being devoid of all modifications and activities, Puruṣa is neither doer nor enjoyer. The bondage is caused by ignorance and liberation ensues from knowledge. Ignorant people, superimposing consciousness belonging to Puruṣa on Buddhi, and activity belonging to Buddhi on Puruṣa, wrongly consider Puruṣa as doer and enjoyer just as redness of flower is wrongly held to be of white crystal on account of their close proximity. The Sāṃkhyas establish their theory on the basis of three means of knowledge. They infer the existence of Pradhāna on following grounds : (i) The cause, though similar to effect, is different from the latter. (ii) The objects merge back into the cause from which they emerge. (iii) The effects, having the common property of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas should have a common cause constituted of these Guṇas. (iv) Respective objects are produced from the cause which has the power to produce them. (v) Finite objects should have the infinite

cause.²⁴¹

The Vedāntins argue that the existence of Pradhāna cannot be established inferentially. The arguments given by Sāṃkhya to infer the existence of Pradhāna as final source of the universe are fallacious.

The main argument of Sāṃkhya rests on the similarity of properties of cause and effects. It is, however, not conclusive enough to establish non-sentient cause of universe. On the contrary, it proves sentient nature of ultimate cause of universe. The order found in universe itself demands sentient nature of cause. Pradhāna, being non-sentient, cannot create orderliness in universe. The lump of clay cannot transform itself into a pot. No non-sentient object without being guided by some sentient being can produce special form for accomplishment of the purpose of the sentient being. On the other hand, design presupposes designer. It is noticed that houses, palaces, etc., are created by sentient agents. The world with different arrangement and variegated objects etc., cannot be created by sentient Pradhāna. The manifold yet special orderliness in universe leads to the conclusion contrary to the position of Sāṃkhya.²⁴² The cause is twofold constituent and efficient. Consequently, the effect has two sorts of properties – viz., those derived from the material cause, e.g., *acetanatva* and *mṛdāt-makatva*, and those caused by the efficient cause, e.g., the *viśiṣṭaracanā* in case of jar. The Sāṃkhyas take their stand on the properties of material cause and argue in favour of non-sentient nature of cause. We are not, however, bound to rely upon the properties of material cause only. Relying upon the properties of efficient cause, we may argue for sentient nature of cause.²⁴³ Moreover, logical reason, forwarded by Sāṃkhya, is not valid. It is not proved that individual objects are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. The feeling of pleasure, pain, etc. is internal, and is occasioned by the objects according to the mental disposition of sentient being. This is why, even though the objects like sound, etc., remain the same, the particular feeling of pleasure, pain, etc., is experienced

241. *RB* 2.2.1

242. *SB* 2.2.1

243. *Ibid.*

differently by different people.²⁴⁴ If the objects are considered as possessing the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, sandal wood, being naturally pleasurable in summer, should give pleasure in winter also and saffron, being pleasurable in winter should give pleasure in summer too.²⁴⁵ The Guṇas of Sāṃkhya, being qualities, need not be invariably associated with the nature of cause. It is also illogical to say that Sattva, etc., are substances and not qualities, because Sattva, etc., are of the nature of lightness etc., which are well known as qualities only.²⁴⁶

The reason, viz., 'all finite objects originate from combination of many materials' does not prove the existence of Pradhāna as ultimate cause of universe. It involves the undesired contingency of admitting some cause for the Guṇas also, as they are separate and finite.²⁴⁷ Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas cannot prove finite nature of objects. The finiteness is in dimension (*deśataḥ*) or in duration (*kālataḥ*) or differentiation in characteristics (*vastutaḥ*). The first alternative is not acceptable to Sāṃkhya because it is not applicable to space (*ākāśa*) which is finite in nature. The second alternative cannot be accepted since the Sāṃkhyas do not recognise *kāla* as a distinct entity. The third alternative involves the undesirable contingency of production of Guṇas too. The Guṇas, being different from each other, would be looked upon as conjunction of several antecedents and consequently, as products.²⁴⁸ Moreover, finiteness of Guṇas has to be admitted. If the Guṇas are held to be unlimited in magnitude and consequently, omnipresent, there will be no disturbance in them in the state of equilibrium. Hence, to explain the possibility of evolution, the finite nature of Guṇas must be admitted.²⁴⁹ The reason, viz., 'that alone which is capable produces the effect', also proves sentient nature of cause because no activity can be found in non-sentient objects.²⁵⁰ The reason based on relation of cause and effect

244. *SB* 2.2.1

245. *Bhāmātī* 2.2.1

246. *RB* 2.2.1

247. *SB* 2.2.1

248. *Ratnaprabhā* 2.2.1

249. *RB* 2.2.1

250. 2.2.2

also is equally applicable to causality of sentient being. The relation of cause and effect exists in case of things like couches, bed, etc., which can be created only with the help of sentient agent.²⁵¹ In the same way, the similarity of properties between cause and effect does not prove non-sentient nature of cause. Even if Pradhāna, as supervised by sentient being, is regarded to be cause, the similarity between cause and effect may easily be explained.²⁵²

The non-existence of Prakṛti can be proved by other arguments. Pradhāna as postulated by Sāṃkhya, and not having Brahma as its cause does not exist, because it is not perceived. Whatever is not perceived is non-existent like sky-flower.²⁵³

The Vedāntins raise following objections against the theory of Sāṃkhya that non-sentient Pradhāna evolves into universe independently of sentient principle.

The theory of non-sentient nature of cause of universe cannot account for the orderly arrangement in worldly objects which can be accomplished only by a sentient principle.²⁵⁴ The orderliness found in the universe presupposes the instrumental cause. However, it contradicts the Sāṃkhya theory of modification of material cause. The modification and construction are contradictory. If the theory of modification of cause is admitted, every evolute of a single cause would cling to others.²⁵⁵

The initial creative activity (*pravṛtti*) is not possible in a non-sentient principle like Pradhāna. The effects are produced, according to Sāṃkhya, when equilibrium of the three Guṇas is disturbed. Such activity tending to disturb this state of the Guṇas to place them in the state of mutual subordination cannot be understood on the part of non-sentient Pradhāna. The non-sentient object like clay or chariot is not observed as having self motivated activity.²⁵⁶ Vallabha offers an alternate

251. SB 2.2.1

252. Ratnaprabhā 2.2.1

253. Vedāntakaustubhā 2.2.1

254. Ni. B. and VB 2.2.1

255. VB 2.2.1

256. SB 2.2.2 also MB, Ni. B and VB 2.2.2 and 2.1.1

explanation according to which activity is not restricted to the initial activity of Pradhāna but it refers to activity of non-sentient objects of Pradhāna to evolve into other objects.²⁵⁷ (This explanation is preferable because the issue of initial activity of Pradhāna recurs in the eighth sūtra). The Sāṃkhyas may rebut this argument on the ground that the activity is observed in non-sentient objects. Hence, it should be considered as belonging to them only. This argument of Sāṃkhya is controverted on the basis of instances found in the world. Though activity is observed in non-sentient objects, yet it is caused by sentient being only. The non-sentient objects are moved to action only when supervised by some sentient being and not otherwise.²⁵⁸ The creative activity may be ascribed to Pradhāna but it will contradict our common experience. The objects of the universe are divided into two categories – sentient and non-sentient. It is commonly observed that the activity is found in sentient being only.²⁵⁹ The Sāṃkhyas are presented as controverting this argument of the Vedāntins on the basis of analogy. Pradhāna can be activated by itself just as milk and water are activated by themselves.²⁶⁰ The nature of activity of milk and water is variously explained by the Vedāntins. The activity of milk, according to Sāṃkhya,²⁶¹ is compared with the spontaneous flow of milk for calf. According to Rāmānuja²⁶² and Nimbārka²⁶³ the activity of milk refers to change of milk into curds and, according to Vallabha,²⁶⁴ it refers to change of milk into bubbles, etc. The activity of water, according to Śaṅkara²⁶⁵ and Vallabha²⁶⁶ refers to flow of water and, according to Rāmānuja,²⁶⁷ refers to change of water into different tastes as it comes into contact with different trees as cocoanut

257. VB 2.2.2

258. SB 2.2.2

259. VB 2.2.2

260. BS 2.2.3

261. SB 2.2.3

262. Ibid.

263. Ni. B. 2.2.3

264. VB 2.6.3

265. SB 2.2.3

266. VB 2.2.3

267. RB 2.2.2

and the like. These examples also, hold the Vedāntins, cannot prove activity in case of non-sentient objects like chariot, etc. The non-sentient objects as milk and water are activated by sentient being. The scriptures declare that activity in universe is due to the control of *Īśvara*.²⁶⁸ Sāṃkara and Vallabha further argue that it can be proved by commonsense experience also that activity of milk and water is not completely independent. The flow of milk is caused by sentient cow out of her motherly affection for calf and the flow is aided by the calf voluntarily sucking milk from her udders.²⁶⁹ Even if it is argued that cow yields milk even after death of the calf, it will not disprove the position of Vedānta. At this time also cow yields milk since she remembers the calf or since she wants to benefit her master on account of her love towards him.²⁷⁰ The modifications of milk into bubbles, etc., is caused by the person who milks.²⁷¹ The flow of water requires sloping ground, etc.²⁷² According to Vallabha, flow of water is instigated by sentient clouds.²⁷³ Thus, activity of Pradhāna is not possible without guidance of sentient being.

The Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the double fact of evolution and dissolution of universe. Pradhāna is expectant and Puruṣa is neutral. There is no directing and controlling sentient agent of activities of Pradhāna. Consequently, it is not possible to explain as to why Pradhāna sometimes evolves into its effects and sometimes not. Without controlling agent, Pradhāna may evolve in one way now and in the other afterwards or not evolve at all. If it is once set in motion, its activity may always continue and there would be no dissolution.²⁷⁴ Rāmānuja further explains that deeds of beings cannot control creation and dissolution since fruits of deeds depend upon *Īśvara*.²⁷⁵

268. *SB* 2.2.3 also *MB* and *Ni B* 2.2.3

269. *SB* 2.2.3

270. *Vedāntakaustubha* 2.2.3

271. *VB* 2.2.3

272. *SB* 2.2.3

273. *VB* 2.2.3

274. *SB*, *Ni. B.*, *VB* 2.2.5 and *Ni. B* 2.2.5

275. *RB* 2.2.3

The thesis of spontaneous modification (*svābhāvika Parīṇāma*) of Pradhāna is also not tenable. The Sāṃkhyas hold that Pradhāna is automatically transformed into effects just as grass, independent of any instrumental cause, is transformed into milk. This analogy, according to the Vedāntins, is not effective. The grass itself cannot transform into milk. It changes into milk due to some other cause, i.e., when it is supervised by sentient being. This is evident by the fact that grass transforms into milk only when it is eaten by cow and not when it is eaten by a bull or not eaten at all.²⁷⁶ Moreover, grass eaten by cow does not change into milk in horns of cow.²⁷⁷ The Sāṃkhyas are misled in accepting this change as natural simply because it is not accomplished by men. They do not attend to the fact that the things not worked out by human beings are brought by divine activities.²⁷⁸ The analogy of grass in this way, does not prove spontaneous modification of Pradhāna.

Even if, for the sake of argument, spontaneous modification of Pradhāna is admitted, it will controvert the very enunciation of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. As it is independent of any instrumental cause, it should equally be independent of any purpose.²⁷⁹

It is also not sound to argue that the absence of auxiliary cause is admitted and the purpose is still required. If Pradhāna is supposed to evolve the purpose of Puruṣa, there would again be no creation since the very enunciation of Sāṃkhya regarding the purpose of evolution is absurd. The Sāṃkhyas themselves fail to explain the nature of the purpose. The Sāṃkhyas may postulate three possibilities as regards the purpose. The purpose may be (i) enjoyment of Puruṣa, or (ii) release of Puruṣa, or (iii) both enjoyment and release of Puruṣa. None of these is possible. Puruṣa, being incapable

276. *SB* 2.2.5 also *RB* 2.2.4 and *Ni. B* 2.2.5

277. *VB* 2.2.5

278. *SB* 2.2.5

279. *SB* 2.2.6

of any accretion (of pleasure and pain) has no regard for enjoyment. Moreover, enjoyment will never culminate into the release of Puruṣa. Release of Puruṣa cannot be the purpose since Puruṣa is liberated even before activity of Pradhāna. The Purpose cannot be enjoyment and release of Puruṣa, since the objects to be enjoyed being innumerable, liberation would be impossible.²⁸⁰ Moreover, Pradhāna, being non-sentient, cannot understand the Purpose of Puruṣa because the purpose can be fulfilled by some sentient being only.²⁸¹ It is also not tenable to hold that Pradhāna undergoes modifications out of curiosity (*autsukya*) which serves as Pradhāna's motive for evolution because it is impossible to speak of curiosity with reference to non-sentient Pradhāna. Nor can the curiosity be attributed to Puruṣa, which is pure and passionless. It is also inadmissible to hold that Pradhāna has got the inherent power to evolve (*sargaśakti*) as Puruṣa has got the power to see (*dṛkśakti*) because in that case also, the inherent power being permanent on each side, there would be no possibility of release.²⁸²

The view of Sāṃkhyas that Puruṣa can inspire activity in Pradhāna through mere contact is also absurd. The Sāṃkhyas give two analogical instances to explain their position. Puruṣa can inspire activity in Pradhāna just as a lame man mounted on shoulders of a blind man can direct the movement of blind, or just as a magnet, though inactive, can make the iron active. It involves several absurdities. Firstly, it will contradict the fundamental position of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna is independent in its activity and Puruṣa is not an active agent.²⁸³ Secondly, the instances do not strictly conform to the position of Sāṃkhya. Both the lame and blind men are sentient and active. Puruṣa being inactive and without characteristics cannot activate non-sentient Pradhāna. The analogy of magnet also is not apt. The proximity of Prakṛti and Puruṣa being eternal, there will

280. SB 2.2.6 also RB 2.2.8 and Ni. B and VB 2.2.6

281. Ni. B 2.2.6

282. SB 2.2.6

283. SB 2.2.7 also Ni B 2.2.7

be eternal activity and consequently, no dissolution. Moreover, magnet requires an adjustment in its position to move iron. In the theory of Sāṃkhya, however, Pradhāna is non-sentient and Puruṣa is inactive. There is no third entity to relate the two. If Puruṣa and Pradhāna are supposed to have the capacity to be mutually related, the capacity, being eternal, implies impossibility of release.²⁸⁴ The question naturally arises as to whether Puruṣa's inspiration to Pradhāna to evolve is natural or Puruṣa is instigated by Pradhāna to inspire the latter. There is inconsistency in both the cases. The first alternative, contradicts the fundamental position of Sāṃkhya that Pradhāna voluntarily evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. The second alternative implies dependence of Puruṣa on Pradhāna. Moreover, this sort of contact between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, being everlasting, implies impossibility of dissolution.²⁸⁵

The state of dissolution is equilibrium of the three Guṇas. There is no external factor to excite them. How can, thus, the creation start all?²⁸⁶ The Sāṃkhyas may argue that the Guṇas are active by nature as they are observed in evolutes of Pradhāna.²⁸⁷ This supposition involves following defects; Firstly, the postulation of mutual dominance in the state of the Guṇas will imply negation of absolute independence of the Guṇas. The Guṇas would not come out of the state of equilibrium because of the fear of disturbance in these pure and un-mixed form.²⁸⁸ Secondly, the Guṇas will continue in their state of mutual dominance. Consequently, there will be incessant creation, and no dissolution and no release because there is no factor to stop activities of Guṇas.²⁸⁹ Thirdly, the postulation is inadequate to account for the idea witnessed in universe.²⁹⁰

284. SB 2.2.7, RB 2.2.5 and Ni B and VB 2.2.7

285. VB 2.2.7

286. SB 2.2.8 also RB 2.2.6 and Ni B and VB 2.2.8

287. SB 2.2.9

288. SB 2.2.8

289. SB 2.2.9 also VB 2.2.9

290. SB 2.2.9

The model which the Sāṃkhyas propose for evolution is not acceptable on account of certain internal contradictions regarding number of organs, number of internal organs and process of evolution of certain principles. Sometimes the Sāṃkhyas maintain that *tanmātrās* evolve from Mahat, and sometimes they regard them as proceeding from Ahaṃkāra.²⁹¹ Sometimes the Sāṃkhyas speak of three internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇas*) and sometimes of one only.²⁹² Sometimes the Sāṃkhyas enumerate seven sense-organs and sometimes eleven.²⁹³ The seven organs referred to by Śaṅkara are, according to Vācaspati-miśra, one organ of sense, viz., skin, five organs of action and Manas.²⁹⁴ The contradiction of the Sāṃkhya theory with *śruti* and *smṛti* is well known.²⁹⁵

In addition, Rāmānuja points out to following internal inconsistencies in the theory of Sāṃkhya. (i) Describing the nature of Puruṣa, the Sāṃkhyas state that Puruṣa is eternal, without modifications, non-agent and always free on account of its nature of pure consciousness. On the other hand, the Sāṃkhyas hold that Puruṣa is enjoyer, supervisor and witness of Prakṛti. Both the statements regarding Puruṣa are mutually contradictory since Puruṣa possessing the above-mentioned nature cannot be seer and enjoyer. Prakṛti is described as forming the means of liberation. At the same time, liberation and bondage are said to pertain to Prakṛti. The same Prakṛti, however, cannot serve as means as well as subject of liberation. The Sāṃkhyas opine that evolution begins due to superimposition of qualities of Prakṛti over Puruṣa through erroneous knowledge. There is no possibility of superimposition of qualities of Prakṛti over Puruṣa and vice versa. The illusion is a kind of modification and Puruṣa immune to it. It is not possible in case of Prakṛti also which is non-sentient in nature. (iii) The Sāṃkhyas state that Prakṛti is bound and released to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. How can Prakṛti benefit Puruṣa who is eternally free? Regarding the theory of bondage and

291. SB 2.2.10

292. Ibid.

293. Ibid.

294. Bhāmatī 2.2.10

295. SB 2.2.10 also Ni B and VB 2.2.10

release, the Sāṃkhyas hold that Prakṛti turns away (stops its activity) from Puruṣa who sees the true nature of Prakṛti. The act of seeing, however, is not applicable to Puruṣa. Puruṣa being always released and immovable, can neither see nor superimpose qualities of Pradhāna upon him. Prakṛti also, being non-sentient, cannot see.²⁹⁶

The theory of natural modification of non-sentient objects goes against common experience. If the Sāṃkhya theory would be correct, there would have been no need of activity of parents in production of human body.²⁹⁷

Thus, the Vedāntins attempt to prove that the theory of Sāṃkhya is chiefly significant for the analysis of physical world while metaphysically, it is far from being satisfactory.²⁹⁸ The theory of Sāṃkhya is based upon the analysis of physical experience which does not hold good in explaining the truth about the highest reality. That is why, all analogical instances, given by Sāṃkhya, are severely criticised by the Vedāntins.

Reviewing the criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory in general, it becomes evident that the Vedāntins mainly attach to concepts of Sāṃkhya the self-motivated evolution of the non-sentient principle like Pradhāna and the purpose of Puruṣa served by evolution. The absurdities involved in these concepts are the result of the Sāṃkhya act of dividing the universe into two contradictory halves—matter (denoted by the term Pradhāna) and consciousness (denoted by the term Puruṣa). The Vedāntins establish that non-sentient material cause is not fit to be regarded as the sole cause as in the theory of Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhyas must admit the existence of an instrumental cause to instigate Pradhāna and to supervise over its activities.

It is difficult to ascertain the authentic texts of Sāṃkhya utilised by Śaṅkara for his exposition of the Sāṃkhya theory. No existing text of Sāṃkhya mentions only seven organs. The exposition, however, mainly resembles the Sāṃkhya as in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* from which he quotes one *Kārikā*. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* propounds that Pradhāna is the independent

296. RB 2.2.9

297. VB. 2.2.2 and Prakāśa Thereon

298. Cf. Shanti Joshi, *The Message of Śaṅkara*, p. 47

cause of universe²⁹⁹ and Puruṣa does not serve as an instrumental³⁰⁰ as it is recorded by Śaṃkara. Śaṃkara's statement that Pradhāna evolves simply for its desire to evolve can be traced to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.³⁰¹ The nature of the Guṇas recorded by Śaṃkara is in conformity with the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.³⁰² The remark of Śaṃkara that the Sāṃkhya infers Pradhāna on the basis of the reasons like finiteness of the objects has its reference to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* itself.³⁰³ Śaṃkara's statement that Pradhāna evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa is also based on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.³⁰⁴ The analogies recorded by Śaṃkara explain the position of Sāṃkhya are also found in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The analogy of a blind and a lame man recorded by Śaṃkara to explain the contact of Pradhāna and Puruṣa occurs in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.³⁰⁵ Śaṃkara's favourite example of the magnet attracting the iron is not found in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Māṭhara³⁰⁶ however, gives this illustration. It is still doubtful whether Śaṃkara takes it from Māṭhara or both of them have taken it from a common source extinct now. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* contains the analogy of the milk flowing from udders of cow for nourishment of calf.³⁰⁷ The analogy of modification of grass into milk seems to be based on the same Kārikā. Śaṃkara interprets the same *kārikā* as containing two analogies mentioned above. The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* also interpret the same *kārikā* in identical ways. Vācaspatiśra³⁰⁸ offers the first and Gaudapāda³⁰⁹ offers the second. The analogy of water flowing for the use of beings seem to be based upon the *Sāṃkhya-*

299. SK 3

300. SK 19

301. SK 58

302. SK 12-13

303. SK 15-6

304. SK 57

305. SK 21

306. MV 2

307. SK 57

308. STK 57

309. MV 57

*kārikā*³¹⁰ The explanation of these analogies given by other commentators of the *Brahmasūtra* is different in some respect from that of Śaṃkara. Rāmānuja³¹¹ interprets the analogy of milk as referring to change of milk into curds. He³¹² explains the analogy of water as water coming from cloud changes into different tastes. Vallabha³¹³ thinks that the analogy of milk refers to modification of milk into bubbles, etc. He³¹⁴ follows Śaṃkara in his interpretation of analogy of water. It may be observed that the interpretation of milk given by Śaṃkara is nearer to the intention of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* since the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* itself states that milk flows for nourishment of calf. The transformation of milk into curds, as the analogy is understood by Rāmānuja and others, does not fit in the wording of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the analogy of water goes nearer to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and its commentators.

It is evident from Śaṃkara's record of the contradictory views held by Sāṃkhya with reference to number of organs—internal and external and evolution certain of objects that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is not the only source of Śaṃkara's exposition of Sāṃkhya. He might have come across some works of Sāṃkhya which are no longer available to us. Regarding the source of *tanmātrās*, the *Yuktidīpikā* states that Patañjali, Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vārṣaganya hold that *tanmātrās* come out of Ahaṃkāra while Vindhyavāsin thinks that they emanate from Mahat.³¹⁵ As regards the contradiction about number of internal organs the *Yuktidīpikā* does not mention the contradictory views directly. It, however, refers to the difference of opinion regarding number of functions of internal organs. According to Vindhyavāsin, the function of observation (*saṃkalpa*), determination (*adhyavasāya*) and self-consciousness (*abhimāna*) is one while the other teachers of Sāṃkhya take them to be different.³¹⁶ Relying upon this statement, we may infer that Vindhyavāsin

310. SK 16

311. SK 62

312. RB 2.2.2

313. VB 2.2.3

314. RB 2.2.2

315. YD 22

316. *Ibid.*

might have taken the three internal organs as one. As regards number of organs, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* speaks of eleven organs only. We do not come across the view of seven organs in the extant texts of Sāṃkhyas. *Udayavira Shastri*³¹⁷ opines that the theory of seven organs is not held by Sāṃkhya. There is, however, no evidence for this conclusion. The work from which Śaṃkara derives this information might have been lost to us.

Besides the unfamiliar information about the Sāṃkhya tenets which Śaṃkara supplies, he also uses some expressions which do not bear an exclusive Sāṃkhya stamp. An outstanding example of this is the use of the expression '*vivarta*'³¹⁸ with reference to evolution of Pradhāna. Does it mean that Sāṃkhyas believe in the illusory manifestations of Pradhāna? Śaṃkara has used the term '*parinamate*'³¹⁹ also in the context of Pradhāna. The term *vivartate*, therefore, should be interpreted as *vividham vartate* in the present context. It is customary perhaps, with Śaṃkara to use a terminology for the other systems which is not their original terminology, but a paraphrase of the original.

The above discussion makes it clear that for Śaṃkara, *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is one among the many Sāṃkhya sources of authentic information. For the commentators subsequent to Śaṃkara and headed by Rāmānuja, *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is the chief source of information, occasionally coupled with the commentaries thereof. That is why, by *vipratishedha*, Śaṃkara understands the contradiction in thought of different Sāṃkhya thinkers, Rāmānuja concentrates on showing the internal inconsistencies of thought of a single work like the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* while rest of commentators interpret contradictions as general opposition of Sāṃkhya to scriptures.

Rāmānuja appears to give mutually contradictory account about the character of enjoyer, the Puruṣa. Sometimes he states that Puruṣa is enjoyer,³²⁰ sometimes he points out that he is

317. *Sāṃkhya Siddhānta*, pp. 288-4

318. *SB* 2.2.1

319. *SB* 2.2.5

320. *RB* 2.2.9

not the enjoyer³²¹ and equally criticises both these positions. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* contains only a positive assertion that Puruṣa is enjoyer³²² without classifying whether '*bhoktṛtva*' is metaphorical or real. We may however, note that a real enjoyment is not reconcilable '*a-vikāritva*' of Puruṣa, which means he understands it in metaphorical sense. However, perhaps in response to Rāmānuja's criticism, the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras*³²³ make an explicit statement that '*bhoktṛtva*' of puruṣa is not real, but only metaphorical. Rāmānuja's criticism of 'enjoyer Puruṣa' without agency seems to be chiefly directed against the notion of 'passive reception' on the part of Puruṣa in the manner of a child, a tree or fire, which are (in a sense active, but) not active in the sense of 'international agency' as described by *Jayamaṅgalā*.³²⁴

Rāmānuja gives noteworthy clarification regarding the nature of Guṇas. He states that according to Sāṃkhya the Guṇas are substances and not qualities.³²⁵ The view is further propounded by *Vijñānabhikṣu*.³²⁶

The term '*ānumāna*' used even in the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa³²⁷ as a synonym of Pradhāna seems to be an invention on the part of Vedāntins. According to them the existence of Pradhāna is sought through inference and it has got no scriptural basis. The word *smṛta*³²⁸ used for Pradhāna, leads to the same conclusion.

Almost all the commentators hold that there is no external cause to regulate the course of creation in the theory of Sāṃkhya. This objection applies to the initial creation. In the subsequent stages of creation, the *Karmavāsanās* serve as cause of evolution. It is justifiable to say that the purpose of Puruṣa also cannot be the external factor for the initial evolution of

321. *RB* 2.2.1

322. *SK* 17

323. *SS*. 1-104, 6.28

324. *Jay* 19

325. *RB* 2.2.1

326. *SPB* 1.61

327. *BS* 1.1.18, 1.3.3 and 1.4.1

328. *BS* 1.2.19

Pradhāna. The purpose finds no place in the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution if evolution is accepted as the self motivated process of Pradhāna. It corroborates that the concept of 'purpose' was subsequently introduced in order to obviate the difficulties of continuous evolution or absolute cessation of evolution.³²⁹

Some of the arguments raised against Sāṃkhya are of little consequence and can be easily refuted by the Sāṃkhyas.

The arguments of 'design' and 'activity' are not fully decisive to disprove the causality of non-sentient element like Pradhāna. Mere reasoning cannot finally decide that design cannot be found in non-sentient objects. It is difficult to decide whether design is present in Pradhāna or it is projected by human mind. The orderly arrangement is observed even in non-sentient objects. S.K. Belyalkar³³⁰ remarks, "The argument from design or *racanā* can convince only those that do not need to be convinced." The same holds good regarding the argument of activity. The Sāṃkhya is the first system to recognise the fact that every object undergoes change and possesses inherent activity. They have accepted Pradhāna as active by nature.

The objection based upon absence of purpose is equally applicable to all systems of Indian Philosophy. No system can better explain the motive of world creation. Brahman in the Vedānta, for example, is pure by nature and need not get involved into miseries of worldly existence. How can Brahman evince a desire for creation? If creation is the sport resulting from the nature of Brahman, what harm is there in regarding creation as the nature of Pradhāna evolving into universe out of curiosity? If creation is sought to be beginningless, why should the Sāṃkhyas not adopt this view?

The *Yuktidipikā* defends theory of modification on the ground that the existence of sentient instrumental cause of universe is not established. As regards the analogy of milk, it states that the argument of the Vedāntins that activity in milk,

329. For details see, pp.

330. S.K. Belyalkar's note on BS 2.2.1

is inspired and controlled by Īśvara is fallacious. The Īśvara being devoid of activity cannot activate milk. Thus, there is no sentient agent. The only cause of the flow of milk is the purpose of nourishing the calf.³³¹

Vācaspatimiśra alleviates the objection based on the absence of sentient instrumental cause thus. The existence of such an instrumental cause like *Īśvara* cannot logically explain the beginning of creation. The activities of sentient beings are found either due to selfishness or due to pity on others. Neither of the two is possible in case of *Īśvara*. *Īśvara*, being perfect has no selfish motive for creation. Creation cannot be meant for pity because pity presupposes desire to remove miseries while the beings are without bodies and consequently, without miseries prior to creation. Moreover, if the *Īśvara* would create the beings for pity, he might have created only happy mortals and not miserable world. If miseries are considered to be the result of past deeds, there is no need of postulating the intelligent controller of creation.³³²

Rāmānuja's objections that the Guṇas of Sāṃkhya are not substances and that the plurality of Guṇas will lead to the plurality of cause are not so serious. Vijñānabhikṣu disproves that the Guṇas are qualities in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the term. He establishes that the Guṇas are substances. The qualities of the Vaiśeṣikas cannot have further quality, but the Guṇas of Sāṃkhya possess qualities.³³³ The Guṇas are described as luminosity, movement and heaviness. The use of the same term '*guṇa*' in spite of different connotations attributed to it has been responsible for the wrong notion that the Guṇas are qualities. It should, however, not be overlooked that the Sāṃkhyas believe in non-difference (*abheda*) between substance and quality. Luminosity, etc., do not denote qualities but are indicative of substances. The light, for instance, is not different from lamp. As such, light is indicative of lamp.³³⁴ The plurality of Guṇas also will not harm the oneness of the cause. Though Prakṛti is one, it is *nānātma* in nature and possesses manifold capacities to create this multifarious

331. YD 57

332. STK 57

333. SPB 1.61

334. Cf. Anima Sengupta, *Classical Sāṃkhya—A Critical Study*, p. 85-6

universe.³³⁵ There is, in fact, no difference between Guṇas and Prakṛti. Prakṛti is a name given to the state of equilibrium of Guṇas. Thus, Prakṛti, though composed of several Guṇas, is one.

Śaṅkara's allegation that Sāṃkhya is unacceptable on account of internal discrepancies is not sound. Though there are discrepancies regarding number of internal organs (*antaḥ-karāṇas*), the organs, and source of *tanmātras*, yet it does not mean that the entire bulk of the doctrines of Sāṃkhya should be discarded. The view which is cogent should be accepted.³³⁶ Even Śaṅkara has partially accepted the theory of Sāṃkhya. Moreover, there are inconsistencies in the system of Śaṅkara himself. Śaṅkara gives inconsistent views regarding number of Prāṇas.³³⁷ What Śaṅkara regards as inconsistencies are changes and modifications of the viewpoints or differences of the viewpoints or differences of opinion of authors of the same system from historical point of view provided he derives them from authoritative sources. However, if Śaṅkara's system is not free from faults, it cannot deprive him of his right to point out the weakness of other systems.

Some of the internal inconsistencies indicated by Rāmānuja need consideration. Rāmānuja's opinion that the Sāṃkhya view regarding subject of bondage and release involves inconsistencies is not sound. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* mentions at different places both Puruṣa³³⁸ and Prakṛti³³⁹ as bound and released. But, it does not result into contradiction. From practical standpoint, Puruṣa is stated to be bound or released, but from the real standpoint it is Prakṛti which is bound or released. Puruṣa is essentially free and cannot be bound or released. It is also not sound to state that Prakṛti is inconsistently described as means as well as the subject of liberation. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*³⁴⁰ holds that Prakṛti binds itself by self. It is also not logical to say that Pradhāna which is bound and

335. *Anima Sengupta*, loc. cit, p. 85

336. *Udayavir Shastri*, *Sāṃkhya Siddhānta*, pp. 281-2

337. Cf. *SB* 2.4.5

338. *SK* 56, 57, 58

339. *SK* 62

340. *Ibid.*

liberated by itself cannot serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Pradhāna binds itself through undergoing modifications and the purpose of Puruṣa is served thereby. While pointing out inconsistencies regarding superimposition of qualities of Prakṛti on Puruṣa and the liberation, Rāmānuja has ignored the role of ignorance (*avidyā*) in the theory of Sāṃkhya. The qualities of Prakṛti are superimposed on Puruṣa on account of ignorance. Prakṛti benefits and binds Puruṣa who is under the spell of ignorance. The act of seeing is spoken of with reference to Puruṣa in the state of bondage only. The act of seeing should be understood in the sense of Puruṣa's realisation of difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The realisation leads Puruṣa to liberation.

From the above discussion, two things emerge clearly, one is that the Sāṃkhyas, even though realists otherwise, have to resort to the distinction of empirical and the real, and hold that *bandha* is not real, but only from worldly point of view it exists. This leads to the second derivation that bondage and release do not mean any real difference of state for Puruṣa, but signify understanding of and attitude towards the world around. This absence of specific perspective is ignorance in the terminology of Sāṃkhyas and the presence of it is the knowledge having liberating efficiency.

It is difficult to point out the grounds of criticism of Sāṃkhya which the *sūtrakāra* had in mind. All the prominent *ācāryas*, except Madhva direct these *sūtras* against Sāṃkhya. It appears plausible that the *sūtrakāra* intends to direct these *sūtras* against Sāṃkhya in a single *adhikaraṇa* since the last *sūtra* also attacks the theory of Sāṃkhya. The division of the *sūtras* into several *adhikaraṇas*, as proposed by Madhva, is hardly convincing. Madhva divides the *sūtras* into five *adhikaraṇas*. He directs the first four *sūtras* against Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya, the fifth against Seśvara Sāṃkhya, sixth against Cārvāka, seventh and eighth against the view that non-sentient Prakṛti evolves into universe by presence of Puruṣa and ninth and tenth *sūtras* against those who maintain that Prakṛti is subordinate to Puruṣa in the act of evolution of universe. *B. N. K. Sharma*³⁴¹ argues in defence of Madhva that the *sūtras*

341. *The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries*, Vol. II, p. 22-9

should be taken as refuting several distinctive types of Sāṃkhya thought. If these *sūtras* are taken as forming one *adhikaraṇa* directed against Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya only, the argument adduced in the second *sūtra* would recur in the eighth *sūtra*. Moreover, there is no need of disproving so many analogies for a single purpose. These arguments of B. N. K. Sharma are the weak defence of Madhva. The first and the tenth *sūtras* are directed against Sāṃkhya. It seems plausible, therefore, to consider the rest of *sūtras* also as directed against Sāṃkhya. It is not sound to say that these *sūtras* refute various shades of the Sāṃkhya thought since all the views criticised in the *adhikaraṇa* belong to Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya. It is also not logical to say that there is no need of refuting various analogies for a single purpose. These analogies are offered by the Sāṃkhyas and the system cannot be taken as fully refuted if some analogical argument remains unrefuted. It is also not sound to say that the argument adduced in the second *sūtra* recurs in the eighth *sūtra* because the second *sūtra* is meant to disprove the activity of Pradhāna while the eighth *sūtra* aims at disproving that the Guṇas cannot be motivated by themselves. The wording of the *sūtras* indicates that in the first *sūtra* the *sūtrakāra* seems to argue that non-sentient Pradhāna cannot be inferred through objects of universe because such an orderliness cannot be brought about by some non-sentient principle. P. M. Modi³⁴² is of the opinion that *ca* in the *sūtra* indicates intention of the *sūtrakāra* to direct all the arguments adduced here against Prakṛti of the *Gītā-smṛti*. He thinks that the first *sūtra* of B. S. 2.1. also criticises Prakṛti of the *Gītā-smṛti*. It is, however, not logical. If the *sūtrakāra* has already refuted the *Gītā-smṛti* in the *smṛtipāda*, it is not sound to raise the same problem once more. Such a repetition of subject matter is not expected from a *sūtrakāra*. The second *sūtra* proposes to disprove activity in case of non-sentient Pradhāna. In the subsequent *sūtras* from third to eighth, the *sūtrakāra* finds faults with the analogical and other arguments adduced by Sāṃkhya in defence of their theory. In the fourth and the sixth *sūtra* he points out the

342. "Refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory of Creation in the Brahmasūtras 2.2.1-10", *Journal of the Gujarat Research Society*, Vol. XXII, October, 1960.

absurdities like impossibility of dissolution and internal contradiction of considering activity as inherent in Pradhāna and supposing the same as meant for serving the purpose of Puruṣa. The ninth *sūtra* again lays stress on the fact that spontaneous activity of Pradhāna cannot explain the orderliness found in the universe. The tenth *sūtra* suggests contradictions which the *sūtrakāra* might have observed in various *ākhyānas* of the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas, giving an exposition of Sāṃkhya.³⁴³

The criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory gives an impression that the Sāṃkhya view of assuming absolute distinction between Pradhāna and Puruṣa is not feasible. On the one hand, the Sāṃkhyas consider Puruṣa and Pradhāna as inter-dependent insofar as Prakṛti requires Puruṣa as an enjoyer and Puruṣa requires Prakṛti as an object of enjoyment. On the other hand, the Sāṃkhyas establish the absolute distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. This sort of inter-dependence is not possible in case of two unrelated and absolutely distinct realities. Here arises the fundamental problem as to how and why the two absolute distinct entities come into contact. This ultimate distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti creates the appearance that Puruṣa is superfluous entity. Anima Sengupta³⁴⁴ attempts to prove that the objection is not applicable to the theory of the Sāṃkhyas since they hold that the relation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is beginningless (*anādi*). Consequently, there arises no question as to how the relation took place. The suggestion of Anima Sengupta is a weak defence of Sāṃkhya. In the texts of Sāṃkhya they prefer the term *samyoga* to explain the association of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.³⁴⁵ A question may present to us whether the *samyoga* presupposes any prior separation. As for the early Sāṃkhya texts upto the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the Sāṃkhyas do not appear to be seriously concerned with these questions. It is only later writers³⁴⁶ who forward the argument of beginningless character of the relation which may be a new suggestion or an explicit statement of

343. For details see M.P. Modi, *loc. cit.*

344. *Classical Sāṃkhya : A Critical Study*, p. 93.

345. *SS* 3.62, 6.67

346. *SB* 2.1.3

what was silently implied by the earlier texts. It is fact, however, that at some stage or other of the explanation, every system of Indian philosophy has employed *anāditva* as a safe means to escape invincible attack of an opponent. The Sāṃkhyas may get over the difficulty of explaining 'when' the contact took place; they are, however, faced with another problem, viz., how the two principles get united.

Theory of Puruṣa

Śāṃkara sides with Sāṃkhya on the point of the nature of Puruṣa as pure consciousness. This view of the Sāṃkhyas, states Śāṃkara, is in accordance with *śruti*. However, he criticises the theory of infinite number of Puruṣas. Nimbārka criticises the all-pervasiveness of Puruṣa.

Śāṃkara gives brief account of the Sāṃkhya view of Puruṣa thus. Puruṣas are many and identical in nature. All Puruṣas are of the nature of pure consciousness, devoid of qualities and of unsurable excellence (*niratiśaya*) and all pervasive in nature. Pradhāna, which is common to all Puruṣas, provides enjoyment and liberation to all of them.³⁴⁷

The Sāṃkhya view is criticised on following grounds :

The theory of Sāṃkhya implies confusion of the acts done by the beings and their fruits. The impressions of acts as well as their fruits inhere in Pradhāna. All Puruṣas are equally connected with Pradhāna. Consequently, every Puruṣa will equally be associated with happiness and sorrows of all Puruṣas.³⁴⁸ The Sāṃkhyas may object to it by saying that Pradhāna, which evolves for providing enjoyment and release to all Puruṣas, will evolve in a certain direction to cause the difference of actions in assigning them to different Puruṣas. The Pradhāna will evolve for Puruṣas who are bound and will not affect the released. It will, thus, desist from a particular activity for a particular Puruṣa. In this way, there will be difference in respect of happiness and sorrow of Puruṣas.³⁴⁹ This solution of the problem is not correct since Pradhāna,

347. *SB.* 2.3.50

348. *Ibid.*

349. *Ibid.*

being non-sentient, cannot have discretion to restrict a particular act to a particular Puruṣa.³⁵⁰ Moreover, the difference is not meant for explaining the motive of Pradhāna's evolution. There should be some proof for the difference too. In absence of such a proof we cannot think of release also which presupposes such a difference.³⁵¹ (The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that unseen results of actions in potential form (*adrṣṭa*) will regulate the experience of pleasure and pain. This is, however, equally absurd from Śāṃkara's point of view. The potential results of acts abiding in Pradhāna will cling to all Puruṣas, since Pradhāna is common to all.³⁵²) The resolution (*abhisandhi*), etc., also cannot restrict the particular potential result of action to a particular person because they are produced from contact of internal organ with soul. The soul, being pervasive, will come into contact with all internal organs.³⁵³ The Sāṃkhyas may further argue that the limitation can be furnished by space (*pradeśa*). The *ātman* is all pervasive, but the particular experience of pleasure and pain will pertain to that part of the soul which comes into contact with the internal organ and is environed by a physical body. It will, however, involve further absurdities. All the souls, being all pervasive, will permeate with all bodies because there is nothing to restrict a particular body to a particular soul. Consequently, there will be the confusion of acts and their fruits.³⁵⁴ The supposition of parts of soul implies that two souls having the same potential results of acts may experience the results of acts by one body.³⁵⁵ The supposition of soul will further lead to the impossibility of enjoyments in heaven, etc. since, the *adrṣṭa* is effective in a particular place, i.e. body, and enjoyment in heavenly world, etc., is at different place. The soul being devoid of *adrṣṭa*, cannot experience the fruit of *adrṣṭa* in the heaven, etc.³⁵⁶

Moreover, there is no proof for all-pervasiveness and plurality of souls. There cannot be many all-pervasive entities

350. *Ratnaprabhā* 2.3.50

351. *SB.* 2.3.50

352. *SB.* 2.3.51

353. *SB.* 2.3.52

354. *SB.* 2.3.53.

355. *Ibid.*

356. *Ibid.*

at the same time. Otherwise, many entities will limit each other and will cease to be all pervasive. The souls cannot be many as they do not have distinct character to be differentiated from one another. It is also not reasonable to presuppose the ultimate inherent differentia (*viśeṣa*) for each soul to determine their multiplicity because it involves the defect of mutual dependence. The inherent differentia (*viśeṣa*) will depend upon multiplicity and the latter presupposes the former.³⁵⁷

Nimbārka criticises the all-pervasiveness of soul thus. All-pervasiveness of soul has no scriptural basis.³⁵⁸ All pervasiveness will further imply confusion of all actions and their fruits since the soul will be associated with all bodies. Nimbārka criticises the possibilities, thought out by Sāṃkhya, to restrict a particular fruit of action to a particular soul.³⁵⁹ The 'unseen principle' cannot be the regulating factor since the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the ground to restrict a particular 'unseen principle' to a particular soul.³⁶⁰ The space also cannot be a factor to assign a particular act to a particular soul for the soul, being all pervasive, will be equally related to all bodies.³⁶¹

It is difficult to ascertain the text resorted to by Śaṃkara for his account of the Sāṃkhya theory. The extant texts of the Sāṃkhyas are silent about the nature of soul in state of liberation. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*³⁶² states that Puruṣa attains to its intrinsic nature of an indifferent witness from the taints of Prakṛti. The intrinsic nature, is however, left unexplained. It is the *Yogabhāṣya*³⁶³ which explains that Puruṣa is of the nature of pure consciousness (*cit*). All-pervasive nature of Puruṣa is described in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.³⁶⁴

As regards the multiplicity of Puruṣas, Śaṃkara seems to hold that Puruṣas are many in both the states of bondage and

release. Some scholars think that the Sāṃkhyas believe in plurality of Puruṣas at empirical level only. They think that Puruṣa in its transcendental state is one. Śaṃkara's presentation seems to be akin to the original position of Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhyas believe in the multiplicity of Puruṣas as it is experienced in worldly life. They consider no difference in the nature of Puruṣa in both the states.

Śaṃkara's objection, viz., there is no worldly example to support all-pervasiveness of many entities can be controverted on the basis of common experience. There is possibility of multiplicity and all-pervasiveness in case of non-concrete objects. If ten bulbs are lit in a room simultaneously, the light issuing from each is different from the rest, but pervades the whole room. Similarly, Puruṣas may be all-pervasive and manifold at the same time.

357. *Ibid.*

358. *Ni. B.* 2.3.40

359. *Ibid.*

360. *Ni. B.* 2.3.50

361. *Ni. B.* 2.3.52

362. *SK.* 65

363. *YB.* 1.3, 1.9 and 3. 35

364. *SK.* 10

CHAPTER V

SĀMĀKHYA AND YOGA

Among the systems of Indian philosophy, Yoga is closest to Sāṃkhya. The general metaphysical standpoints and the conception of ideal of life of both the systems are the same, traditionally, Sāṃkhya is supposed to be propounded by Kapila and Yoga by Hiraṇyagarbha. The close relationship between Sāṃkhya and Yoga from a remote past led the scholars like Hariharānanda Āraṇya¹ to believe that the two systems are aspects of one and the same system and both of these are founded by Kapila who is called Hiraṇyagarbha also. R. D. Ranade² also thinks that Hiraṇyagarbha and Kapila occurring in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* refer to one and the same Ṛṣi. It may, however, be suggested that the tradition of ascribing Sāṃkhya to Kapila and Yoga to Hiraṇyagarbha is very strong. In the vast literature of Epics Purāṇas and the Dharmaśāstras, Sāṃkhya is nowhere connected with Hiraṇyagarbha and nor is Yoga connected with Kapila. On the contrary, both the sages are described as propounders of different doctrines. This further disproves the opinion that Sāṃkhya and Yoga represent one system or two aspects of one and the same system.³

Both the systems took a long course of development. However, the historical relation between the two is not definitely known. The doctrines of the two are found mentioned in the ancient literature prior to their systematisation. We can postulate three stages in the development of Yoga which hold good in case of Sāṃkhya also—(i) beginning stage, (ii) pre-systematisation stage and (iii) stage of complete systematisation.

1. *Bhāsvatī* 1.1
2. R.D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of the Upanisadic Philosophy*.
3. For details see G.T. Kenghe "Kapila and Hiraṇyagarbha" *Śāradaṇṇa Pradīpa*, August, 1960.

tion. The first stage can be found in the Upanisadic period, the second in the *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature and the third is its present form as embodied in the *sūtras* of Patañjali as elaborated by their commentators. We do not have any authentic information regarding the relation of the two systems in their beginning stage. Jacobi⁴ thinks that the original Yoga was completely independent of Sāṃkhya and it was Vārṣaganya who associated Yoga with Sāṃkhya. Dasgupta⁵ is of the opinion that both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga developed out of a common source. At the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to say something definite regarding the relationship of the two in their stage of beginning. The *Mahābhārata* and its contemporary literature reveals that Yoga, like Sāṃkhya, had attained some form, though it does not provide their systematic exposition. The *Mahābhārata*⁶ calls Sāṃkhya and Yoga as different viewpoints. However, they are considered to be inter-related. The differences do not concern to their basic doctrines. The *Mahābhārata* states that the metaphysical concepts regarding the categories are common to both the systems.⁷ Both the systems hold that objects can be divided in to two categories—manifest (*vyakta*) and unmanifest (*avyakta*). The manifest is that which is subject to birth, growth, decay and death. The latter is devoid of them.⁸ Both the systems recommend purity, compassion towards all creatures and observance of vows to attain the highest end of life.⁹ There is, however, a clear picture of difference between these two allied systems. Unlike Sāṃkhya, Yoga believes in Īśvara. The followers of Yoga argue that liberation is impossible without admitting the existence of Īśvara. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, find no need of Īśvara to explain their concept of liberation. They hold that a man gets detached to the object through

4. "On the Original System of Yoga," summarised in English by G. Krishanan Pai, *Yoga mīmāṃsā*, Vol. III, No. 4.
5. *Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian Thought*, p. 2
6. *Mbh.* XII. 337.59
7. *Mbh.* XII. 228.229
8. *Mbh.* XII. 228.29
9. *Mbh.* XII. 289.8

knowledge and gets liberated.¹⁰ The attitude of the two systems towards knowledge leading to liberation is also not the same. The disciplines of Yoga are the direct cause of mystic perception while the essence of Sāṃkhya is ascertainment of system of tenets (which form the basis of disciplines). There are several statements about the oneness of Sāṃkhya and Yoga.¹¹ These, however, refer to the similar results attained by the followers of the two systems. V. M. Bedekar¹² thinks that the *Mahābhārata* does not speak of Īśvara as accepted by the followers of Yoga. The term *anīśvara*, according to him, means the weak man who is not the master of himself. He holds that the main difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga lies in the fact that Yoga aims at directly visualizing the self through concentration and meditation while the Sāṃkhya aims at discrimination, between Prakṛti and Puruṣa through rational knowledge. A reading of the Sāṃkhya, however, leaves a different impression on our mind. Though the treatment of certain topics appears unsatisfactory from our point of view, and though we miss an extensive account of the practical measures to be followed for liberating knowledge, we can never think that the system is willing and satisfied to leave the aspirant at the threshold of intellectual analysis and conviction only. It aims at something different, and more lasting and effective in unusual manner. Through 'knowledge' one is supposed to have victory over repeated birth and death also at the end of suffering which also has not the common form. The *Yuktidipikā*¹³ would define *duḥkha* as "the close contact of sentient power with internal organ" which is really suffering. This is all the more significant when the authors of the system unanimously discard knowledge of other means of removing suffering. The knowledge as aspired for has also the power of nullifying influence of *dharma* and *adharma*. From all this, it is difficult to equate ultimate discriminative knowledge with rational knowledge. The *Ahīrbuddhnyā-*

10. *Mbh.* XII. 298.3-5

11. *Mbh.* XII. 298.7

12. V.M. Bedekar, "Theism is no Differentia of Yoga", *Oriental Thought*, Vol. 5, No. 1

13. *YD.* 1

*saṃhitā*¹⁴ also speaks of the difference of contents between the original Sāṃkhya and Yoga and ascribes their authorship to Kapila and Hiranyagarbha. The *Nyāyabhāṣya*¹⁵ also gives a list of distinct doctrines peculiar to Sāṃkhya and Yoga which throws light on the pre-systematised form of Yoga. The Sāṃkhyas hold absolute existence, nothing can be absolutely destroyed, intelligence (*cetanā*) is immutable and modifications belong to body, organs, Manas and their causes, viz., Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra and five subtle elements (*tanmātras*). The doctrines peculiar to Yoga are : creation is due to *Karmas*, intelligences are endowed with qualities, non-existent entity only is brought into existence and that which is produced is liable to destruction. Udyotakara¹⁶ adds that followers of Yoga hold that organs originate from elements (*bhūtas*), but the Sāṃkhyas maintain that they originate from Ahaṃkāra. Here, the doctrines spoken to be upheld by Yoga do not belong to Yoga, but are maintained by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. P. B. Chakravarti¹⁷ remarks that the doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are attributed to Yoga due to the prominent place of Yogic practices in the circles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. In their systematised or present form both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga are handed down to us as two separate but interrelated systems. The two systems are so alike in their essentials that their doctrines are referred to as interlinked.

The earliest systematic record of the doctrines of Yoga is found in the *sūtras* of Patañjali followed by various commentaries and sub-commentaries. It is still controversial whether this Patañjali is identical with the one who wrote the *Mahābhāṣya* on Paṇini *sūtras* or the writer on medicine. Patañjali does not primarily aim at metaphysical theorising but grafts his doctrines on the background of Sāṃkhya metaphysics. The system of Patañjali accepts twenty-five principles of Sāṃkhya without forwarding any argument to establish them and also the other

14. *AS.* 12.18.38

15. *NB* 1.1.29

16. *NV* p. 105

17. *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 75

features of Sāṃkhya like three means of knowledge, insentient Pradhāna as cause of universe, and plurality of Puruṣas which are by nature pure, eternal and immutable but become indirectly the subject of experience of joy and sorrows and assume innumerable embodied forms in the course of *saṃsāra*. Thus, the metaphysical position of Sāṃkhya and Yoga is fundamentally the same. That is why, the *Yogabhāṣya*¹⁸ claims to be an exposition of Sāṃkhya.

Both the systems prescribe discriminative knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa for attainment of liberation. However, they differ in the method of acquiring this knowledge. According to the Sāṃkhyas, discriminative knowledge is attained through reasoning and analytical study of the nature of twenty-five categories with the purpose that sentient principle may be distinguished from insentient material elements, i.e., the modifications of Prakṛti.¹⁹ Yoga, on the other hand, emphasises complete arrest of internal organs for realisation of distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.²⁰ Hence, Yoga primarily aims at expounding *samādhi*, the method of controlling the activities of internal organs which being a stage in Yoga is an *aṅga* of Yoga and is also called Yoga because of non-difference between *aṅga* and *aṅgin*.²¹ Vijñānabhikṣu²² considers *samādhi* as an independent means of liberation too. That is why, Yoga explains the means and different stages of internal organs and different conditions when the activities are not arrested. The Yoga describes some miraculous powers and miraculous experiences of Yogins to convince the aspirant of Yogic method of liberation. Thus, Sāṃkhya is busy in logical investigations while Yoga discusses the mental discipline and devotional exercises. This difference of approach between Sāṃkhya and Yoga led to the other differences in respect of psychology, cosmology and methodology.

In India, every system has two aspects—theoretical and practical. The Advaita Vedānta or the schools of

18. Cf. Vyāsa's concluding remarks on each chapter.

19. Cf. SK 64

20. YB 2

21. TV 2

22. YV 1

Buddhism and Jainism as well as the Tantras are essentially characterised by them. Each of them has its own system of discipline for which Patañjali's Yoga provides a fundamental basis. It is however specially related to Sāṃkhya insofar as it implicitly takes for granted the Sāṃkhya doctrines and insofar as the exposition of the one ends where that of the other starts. In a way it is not an exaggeration that for most of the purposes theory is Sāṃkhya, practice is Yoga. It does not, however, mean that we neglect the contribution of Yoga which forms its distinction from Sāṃkhya.

Yoga attaches supreme importance to *samādhi* as a means of valid knowledge too. The knowledge arising through meditation, called *ṛtambharā*, has no trace of untruth. Moreover, the three means of knowledge, viz., Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony lead to knowledge of generality in objects while knowledge of particulars—whether pertaining to subtle elements or Puruṣa is amenable to *samādhi* alone.²³ The Sāṃkhyas do not prescribe *samādhi* for liberation.²⁴

Since Yoga lays more stress on psychical discipline, it explains the psychic faculties more elaborately. In addition to the psychic faculties of Sāṃkhya, Yoga postulates the concept of *citta*. *Citta*, however, is not a separate category in Yoga. There is no mention of *citta* in the evolution-process. Like Sāṃkhya, Yoga also considers Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra and Manas only as the three internal faculties. Vācaspatimiśra²⁵ states that *citta* denotes Buddhi and taking in its comprehensive sense it denotes internal faculties. Thus, *citta* which stands for sum-total of internal faculties in general is sometimes replaced by Buddhi and sometimes by Manas. Buddhi replaces *citta* when the aspect of consciousness is stressed and Manas replaces *citta* when psychical aspect is stressed.²⁶ Yoga prescribes control over five kinds of psychic functions, viz., correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*), false knowledge (*viparyaya*) fancy (*vikalpa*), deep sleep (*nidrā*) and memory (*smṛti*).²⁷ These

23. YB. 1.49

24. YV 1.51

25. TV 1

26. G.M. Koelman, *Pātañjala Yoga*, p. 100

27. YS 1.6

psychic functions are said to be contaminated and uncontaminated.²⁸ The notion of classification of psychic functions is not found in Sāṃkhya. Yoga feels a practical need to give a single name to the three internal faculties. The functions to be controlled do not pertain exclusively to any one of the internal faculties but include functions of all the three. Hence, Yoga attains the benefit of precision by this sort of postulation. The stress of Yoga on psychological discipline led it to explain more elaborately the practical and ethical sides also. Yoga prescribes various practical methods like physical postures (*āsanas*), etc., to control *citta*. It also explains more vividly the ethical concepts of *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., which are accepted by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* too.

Yoga again holds that *citta* is eternal and consequently all-pervasive²⁹ while Sāṃkhya maintains the non-eternity and limited magnitude of internal organs.³⁰

Yoga does not accept the existence of subtle body.³¹ Sāṃkhya,³² on the other hand, advocates the existence of subtle body as a medium of carrying past impressions in course of transmigration.

The most glaring difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga metaphysics is the acceptance of *īśvara* as an independent reality in Yoga. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* does not mention *īśvara*. Vācaspatiśra³³ finds 'logical incongruity in' the acceptance of *īśvara*. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*³⁴ criticises the existence of *īśvara*. Though Vijñānabhikṣu³⁵ thinks that the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* does not disprove *īśvara* but negates the proof for its existence, yet *īśvara* serves no purpose in the metaphysics of Sāṃkhya. Yoga accepts *īśvara* as an independent reality in addition to *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Though *īśvara* is similar to *Puruṣa* in respect of being sentient in nature, yet it cannot be included in the

28. YB. 1.5

29. YB. 4.10

30. SK. 10

31. TY. 4.10

32. SK. 39-42

33. STK. 57 ✓

34. SS. 1.92-4

35. SPB. 1.92

category of *Puruṣa*. Patañjali describes *īśvara* as the *Puruṣa-viśeṣa*, untouched by affliction, actions, deserts and impressions.³⁶ Patañjali does not consider liberated *Puruṣa* as *īśvara* for *īśvara* is omniscient³⁷ while *Puruṣa* is of the nature of pure consciousness. He postulates *īśvara* as an object of meditation in *śamādhi* and remover of obstacles coming in the way of arresting the activities of *citta*.³⁸ Vyāsa associates *īśvara* with the characteristics of *saṃyama* by introducing the idea of mercy for creatures³⁹ and the connection of *īśvara* with pure *Sattva* to make him possessor of supreme consciousness.⁴⁰ *īśvara* as postulated by Patañjali and upheld by Vyāsa has no important role in metaphysics. (Vācaspatiśra⁴¹ relates *īśvara* to metaphysics and holds that *īśvara* causes *Pradhāna* to come out of the state of equilibrium and to evolve into the universe.) As regards the concept of *īśvara* in Yoga, Garbe⁴² thinks that the conception of *īśvara* in Yoga is loosely inserted in the metaphysics of Sāṃkhya merely to satisfy the theists and to facilitate the propagation of the theory of universe expounded in Sāṃkhya. Haridas Bhattacharya⁴³ also thinks that the idea of devotion to *īśvara* was introduced into Yoga under the influence of theistic religions like Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism and since the *Yogasūtra* underwent revisions at theistic hand, devotion to *īśvara* was regarded to be powerful enough to bring about the highest kind of *śamādhi*. It may, however, be observed that the conception of *īśvara* is neither loosely inserted nor is there any proof to regard it as an addition at later time in the original system of Yoga. It serves a practical need there. Patañjali has put forth various means of *śamādhi* which results into the arrest of activities of *citta* and to cognise thereby distinction between *Puruṣa* and non-sentient objects. The meditation on *īśvara*, however, is considered to be the best among them

36. YS 1.24

37. YS 1.25

38. YS 1.29

39. YB 1.23

40. YB. 1.24

41. TV 4.3

42. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* Vol. XII, p. 833

43. *Cultural Heritage of India* Vol. III, p. 87

because it is most helpful to bring about the difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.⁴⁴ Patañjali realises that discriminative knowledge between Prakṛti and Puruṣa cannot be attained by mere repetition of the notion of difference as the Sāṃkhyas prescribe. The discriminative knowledge can be attained by realising the true nature of the two. Hence, the contemplation upon īśvara which is not essentially different from Puruṣa may be most helpful to the knowledge of true nature of Puruṣa and to realise thereby its distinction from insentient objects. Moreover, Patañjali realises the difficulty of arresting the activities of *citta* also. The *citta* will, by nature, always be modified into the form of objects presented to it. Hence, it is difficult to arrest the modification of *citta* into form of objects without some other alternative. When *citta* is concentrated upon īśvara, it does not modify into the form of other objects. Yoga attaches supreme importance to cessation of all mental activities because among the thinkers who understood the significance of mind as a storehouse of energy, the exponents of Yoga were among the foremost. So, the idea behind checking the activity of mind is of not allowing that energy to flow into different channels. When its flow is thus stopped, a tremendous energy is reserved; which when given one outlet only flows so powerfully that it can reach far and penetrate forcefully into 'Truth'. It is exactly like water-stream, to which a dam is put and there is a huge storage of power. This only channel or outlet for mind is in direction of 'Truth', of which īśvara is a concrete form. All the qualities and virtues are supposed to emanate from 'Truth' and, therefore, the symbol of 'Truth' is īśvara who possesses all qualities in their perfect form. To give him a human figure and a name is a subsequent stage which also has an intention behind it. These are the qualities and virtues which form the best aspiration of man. It is they who make human life full of value. Naturally, if mind is directed to such a cluster of perfect qualities whom we conveniently call īśvara, mind may travel far and penetrate 'Truth'. The idea of an image as object of meditation has another advantage. The abstract notion a cluster of perfect qualities cannot serve well as the substratum for fixa-

44. YB 1.23

tion of mind. So the image.

Among qualities of īśvara, which may be said to be his special possessions, compassion is stressed by the author of *Yogabhāṣya* which reminds us of 'Karunā' one of the four exalted states of Hinayāna and the 'Mahākaruṇā' of the Mahāyānist. It is possible to try to interpret this as a borrowing on either side or to say that it is through the influence of theistic sects. But it may be better if we look at it from the following points of view. 'Karunā' is a notion which comes forward from which corner we do not know and it catches the fancy of all those who come to know of it and then each of them tries to incorporate it in one's own system. For the religions of Jainism and Buddhism which have one person as the founder, the knower, the leader and the centre of the cult, it was most natural to develop the notion of personal relation, and devotion to one who was as if the saviour. The introduction of *Karuṇā* into Yoga may, therefore, be understood as synchronising with its popularity in such other contemporary religious sects. So, īśvara as the cluster of good qualities and values is the concrete manifestation of reality. This reality, if it remains secluded has no attraction and use in our life as a means of elevating ourselves. It is 'Karunā' which relates reality to the human beings. It has also a relation with the world. This relation is expressed in terms of the character of a creator ascribed to īśvara because the phenomena come out of reality. Whereas in the theistic systems, the creator's character is prominent, in Yoga system īśvara is propeller of activity in Pradhāna as Vācaspatiśra would describe him and herein lies the contribution of Vācaspatiśra to the system of Yoga, whereby he seeks an advance over Sāṃkhya. The critics of Sāṃkhya rightly pointed out that the pair of 'a conscious but inert' and 'an unconscious but active' principles cannot suffice to explain the creation and realising the sense of this objection, Vācaspati puts īśvara above the two so that the two principles become meaningful. The Sāṃkhyas had earlier tried at the solution of the same problem in a different way. The evolution is a self motivated activity of Pradhāna, but the Sāṃkhyas connect it with the twofold aim of Puruṣa and bring in a third factor calculated to induce the activity of the unconscious

Pradhāna. A middle stage between the position of the Sāṃkhyas and of Vācaspati is to be found in the *Yogabhāṣya* which does not approve of 'puruṣārtha' as a motive force of activity, and which also does not allot īśvara that place and importance which Vācaspati assigns to it.

Sāṃkhya and Yoga differ in their account of evolution of universe. Sāṃkhya holds that Prakṛti evolves into Mahat which develops into Ahaṃkāra. Ahaṃkāra evolves into Manas, cognitive and conative organs and *tanmātras*. *Tanmātras* develop into *Mahābhūtas*.⁴⁵ According to Yoga, however, *tanmātras* develop from Mahat.⁴⁶ There are two parallel lines of evolution from Mahat. On the one side, Mahat develops into the subjective side like Ahaṃkāra, Manas and cognitive and conative organs and on the other, it develops into the objective side, i.e. five *tanmātras* which develop into five *mahābhūtas*. The difference is due to the fact that Yoga emphasises the individual aspect of Ahaṃkāra and gives more validity to the objective world while Sāṃkhya emphasises universal or cosmic aspect of Ahaṃkāra. The ego sense in Ahaṃkāra is dissolved at the state of embodied release. Consequently, all evolutes of Ahaṃkāra should also be dissolved. It is, however, generally observed that the objective world still exists. Hence, Yoga makes *tanmātras* as independent of Ahaṃkāra. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, think that the ego sense is dissolved but Ahaṃkāra as a cosmic entity still exists in the state of embodied release too.⁴⁷ Vijnānabhikṣu states that Vyāsa does not propound that *tanmātras* originate from Mahat independently of Ahaṃkāra, but simply describes modifications of Mahat into two classes.⁴⁸ The statement, however, do not harmonize, with the *bhāṣya* of Vyāsa. Vācaspatimiśra gives one more difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga regarding the disruption of Prakṛti state. The Sāṃkhyas maintain that the disruption of Prakṛti state is due to the innate teleology of the three Guṇas to evolve into

45. SK 22

46. YB. 2.19

47. Cf. Francis V. Catalina. *A Study of Self Concept of Sāṃkhya Yoga Philosophy*, p. 59

48. YV 2.19

universe and to serve thereby the purpose of Puruṣa.⁴⁹ (Vācaspatimiśra,⁵⁰ however, holds that equilibrium of the three Guṇas is disturbed by īśvara. īśvara realises the purpose of Puruṣas and removes obstructions in the activity of Prakṛti in order to set it in motion. The purpose of Puruṣa is, in fact, a motive which is stated to be a cause.⁵¹ Thus, there is unconscious teleology in the cosmic evolution in Sāṃkhya but conscious teleology in Yoga.

Sāṃkhyas describe the forward progress of evolution from Prakṛti upto gross physical elements and technically divide it into three distinct stages. The first stage corresponds to the basic principle which is starting point of evolution, and therefore, the name of the stage is identical with the name of the principle, viz., Prakṛti. The third stage corresponds to the stage of 'perceptibility' of evolutes which are called *Kevalavikṛtis*. This term does not mean that these do not undergo further modifications. It means that the stage being within the reach of senses, no philosophy is necessary to explain the process in terms of cause and effects. So it is from the fact that this is the last point where the need of the philosophical explanation stops and from where the region of Perception starts that they are called so. The middle stage of *Prakṛti-vikṛtis* signifies the enumeration of limits between the two ends, which facilitate the evolution or dissolution. However, when Yoga⁵² describes evolution further than the *Kevalavikṛtis* of Sāṃkhya, it appears to have a purpose in view, viz., to state explicitly that the subsequent products are members of the same chain of modifications, i.e., in other words, modification is continuous. The *Yogasūtra*⁵³ uses the word '*guṇaparva*' in context where '*parva*' means 'a joint' and thus brings out the idea that the three stages are separated by these joints, and make a progress from *avyakta* to *vyakta* and from *vyakta* to *dṛśya*.

Unlike the basic texts of Sāṃkhya, the *Yogabhāṣya* explains more vividly the nature of *tanmātras*. The *tanmātras*,

49. SK 21,56-8

50. TV 4.3

51. Ibid.

52. Cf. YS 3.13 and 2.19

53. YS 2.19

viz., sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are possessed of one, two, three, four and five characteristics respectively. The sound has characteristic of sound alone, the touch has characteristics of sound and touch; colour has characteristics of sound, touch and colour; taste has characteristics of sound, touch, colour and taste, and smell has characteristics of smell and the four other *tanmātras*.⁵⁴ Since each of the *tanmātra* is considered to be endowed with the qualities of its respective *mahābhūta*, Vyāsa does not feel the necessity of postulating combination of *tanmātras* for their evolution into *mahābhūtas*. Each of the *tanmātras* singly gives rise to its respective *mahābhūta*.⁵⁵ Though Vijñānabhikṣu⁵⁶ seems to hold that *Mahābhūtas* result from combination of *tanmātras*, yet it is not corroborated by the wording of the *Yogabhāṣya*. The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* do not uniformly accept this view. The *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra* and Gauḍapāda follow Vyāsa but the other commentators hold that the *mahābhūta* evolves from its own *tanmātra* while compounded with the preceding *tanmātras*.⁵⁷

Casually, it may be mentioned that the *Yogabhāṣya*⁵⁸ mentions *paramāṇus* which are not found mentioned in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. It does not, however, lead to the difference between the two systems. The *paramāṇus* should not be taken in the *Naiyāyika* sense of the term. In the system of Yoga also they are not considered to be ultimate realities different from *mahābhūtas* as is the case with the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. The *paramāṇus* are evolutes of *tanmātras*,⁵⁹ and thus, form the smallest size of *Mahābhūtas*. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* also mentions *paramāṇus* as non-eternal⁶⁰ and partite.⁶¹

The *Yogabhāṣya*⁶² quotes Pañcaśikha to explain more

54. *Ibid.*

55. YB 1.45

56. YV. 1.45

57. See pp. 50-51

58. YB 1.45

59. *Ibid.*

60. SS 5.87

61. SS 5.88

62. YB 3.15 and TV Thereon

clearly the mutual relation of contradictory qualities of the three Guṇas abiding in the same substance. The forms and functions contradict one another only when they are in height of their power and those in ordinary condition co-operate those that are in excess. Hence, Buddhi can be the substratum of qualities like virtue and vice, and the single object can be pleasurable, painful and delusive at the same time.

Yoga explains more logically the differentiation among Puruṣas leading to their plurality. There are qualities like *viśeṣa* in Puruṣa.⁶³ The negation of the qualities refers to the special qualities such as *dravyatva*, etc.⁶⁴ Sāṃkhya, however, believes in homogeneous nature of all Puruṣas.

There is a difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga regarding the nature of *avidyā* which forms the cause of bondage. The Sāṃkhyas hold that *avidyā* is the absence of true knowledge, i.e., Puruṣa's failure to perceive the distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. In the Yoga, however, *avidyā* is a positive misconception arising from accepting non-eternal, impure, evil and non-ātman to be eternal, pure, good and *ātman* respectively.⁶⁵

Thus, Yoga presupposes the essentials of Sāṃkhya metaphysics and drafts its practical method of attaining discriminative knowledge on the same. That is why, Yoga texts do not aim at discussing the metaphysical problems. The Sāṃkhya doctrines find place in Yoga. Yoga does not indulge in discussing their pros and cons and adds a little wherever it feels necessary.

63. YB 1.49

64. YV 1.49

65. YV 1.8

CHAPTER VI

RÉSUMÉ

In the foregoing pages a detailed and critical account of the Sāṃkhya views on metaphysical, logical and epistemological matters as presented by certain outstanding authors of the brahmanical systems of Indian philosophy was given. Here follows a brief retrospect of the whole in its essentials.

Traditionally, Sāṃkhya is included in the group of orthodox systems but it is the chief representative and the precursor of the dualistic line of thought which has a continuous history in India covering decades of centuries. In gradation of philosophies according to number of ultimate principles, viz., the monists, the dualists, the pluralists and the nihilists, Sāṃkhya occupies a place next only to monism. Looking to the fact that, at least for the sake of explanation of duality, the importance of Sāṃkhya is self evident. It is a very brilliant system of thought which has penetrated important branches of Indian philosophy and facilitated metaphysical explanations. It forwards a bold dualism, and especially on the background of the monistic tendency reflected in the Upaniṣads, Its attempt to stand firmly on independent, logical arguments than on *śruti*, and the courage it has displayed in placing *smṛti* over *śruti* is highly appreciable. In spite of its indebtedness to individual exponents and its close relation with author of *smṛti*, Sāṃkhya gives an impression of being an outcome of independent thought. The system weaves a net of different concepts which appear to originate from different data. Sometimes, it constantly refers to the common experience, sometimes to the tradition based on revelation of its first exponents and sometimes it shows a nearness to logic. The present texts of Sāṃkhya allow us a wide knowledge of Sāṃkhya position,

but in spite of the help derived from them, one is baffled while reconciling these three aspects as parts of a consistent system. This kind of feeling we develop, when we read the presentation and the criticism of the orthodox opponents of Sāṃkhya. In the absence of extensive source material at their disposal and limitations on the sense of a historical development, the opponents appear to us as making contradictory statements which cannot be reconciled with the scheme of Sāṃkhya thought as known to us.

In spite of the admission of Sāṃkhya into *āstika darśanas*, it betrays certain trends which are not palatable for other systematists. Its stark dualism and the relevant explanations have been a subject of continuous discussion, criticism and counter arguments. This has helped clarification of Sāṃkhya thought on the one hand, and has been responsible for modification of views and theories on both sides – Sāṃkhya and non-Sāṃkhya. Here, we are more concerned with the first two issues, viz., clarification and modification or progress of Sāṃkhya views. This is revealed to us from portions of the brahmanical texts which can be classified as follows: (i) presentation or exposition of the Sāṃkhya views, (ii) brahmanical criticism of Sāṃkhya, (iii) Sāṃkhya supplying answers to the objections and (vi) Sāṃkhya criticising the antagonists.

Theory of satkārya

This theory advocating existence of effect in cause prior to causal operation is the arch stone of Sāṃkhya. It is severely and severally criticised, especially by Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. The Sāṃkhyas employed the theory to explain what is known in common parlance as cause-effect relationship. The reasons to prove prior existence of effect in cause, as forwarded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, were current among the Sāṃkhyas long before Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory is formulated with the help of perception but presented as a deduction from a number of inferential arguments. Thus, for example, Vātsyāyana thinks that the Sāṃkhyas arrive at this theory of *satkārya* on the basis of causal relation between specific objects only. Uddyotakara adds the Sāṃkhya argument that non-existent cannot be brought into existence, both these arguments are subsequently recorded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The varied

interpretations of a single case of causal relation, viz., thread and cloth as listed by Uddyotakara proves that many attempts were made before the Sāṃkhyas arrived at a standard statement of *satkārya* and that several views prevailed among the advocates of the theory. Uddyotakara's record of such views is a fine specimen of how one common fact of experience can be interpreted variously and how the use of different verbal expressions is responsible for different philosophical concepts.

In different works of brahmanical authors, we come across a variety of arguments, some of which are corroborated and some of which are not recorded by the Sāṃkhya texts. The second category can be further classified into : (i) arguments faithful to and consistent with the main line of thought, and (ii) arguments of the nature of a distortion either through ignorance or for some purpose. From the first group of arguments the opponents of Sāṃkhya appear to have a sound knowledge of the Sāṃkhya theories. Together with the original Sāṃkhya texts, they present a more comprehensive picture of the Sāṃkhya thought, sometimes almost complete in details and sometimes suggesting guidelines for further investigation and a comparative study with other systems of philosophy. The argument recorded by Jayantabhaṭṭa, viz., non-admission of pre-existence of effect in cause involves absurdities of absence of satisfactory explanation regarding difference between *prāgabdhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, absence of substratum for causal operation and the production of effect after destruction of cause is not found in the texts of Sāṃkhya. Śrīdhara and Sucaritamīśra explain the Kārikā of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* containing the arguments in favour of theory of *satkārya* on the lines of Vācaspatimiśra. The Sāṃkhya argument based upon identity of cause and effect raised and refuted by Jayantabhaṭṭa and Śrīdhara is not hinted at by *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. On the contrary, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* speaks of the difference and similarity between cause and effect. It is the *Yuktidīpikā* and Vācaspatimiśra who stress the identity aspect in such a way that continuity of essence is maintained and the differences are overlooked. This is the result of non-admission by the Sāṃkhyas of a relation, like *samavāya* (inherence), between two inseparable entities, which is admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Sucaritamīśra further records the argument that

non-acceptance of pre-existence of effect in cause cannot explain the specification with reference to material, non-inherent and efficient cause. The argument is not found mentioned in the extant texts of Sāṃkhya. Sucaritamīśra explains the Sāṃkhya concept of production more vividly that production is of two kinds, viz., removal of obstruction in knowledge, and removal of obstruction on the form of object. The latter is called production. This statement of the twofold removal of obstruction reminds us of an exactly parallel concept in Buddhism for comparison. The twofold obstruction technically called *Kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa* signify the same variety of obstructions, to knowledge of reality and obstruction in the form of knowables. The charge of futility of causal operation is not applicable because such an operation is necessary for removal of obstruction in form and manifestation is brought about by causal operation, but it does not go against pre-existence of effect.

As regards the criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory of *satkārya*, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas adduce a variety of arguments. Vātsyāyana's arguments against *satkārya* are based upon experience as it is commonly interpreted. The Naiyāyikas say that the statement regarding 'necessity of a cause' or simply 'that there is a cause', and the notion conveyed by the word 'production' presupposes non-existence of effect prior to production. Uddyotakara's arguments lay more stress on reality of production. The causal operation or activity of agent is meant for producing some object. The production does imply coming into existence of a fresh thing. The manifestation also implies production of something. Vācaspatimiśra proves that theory of pre-existence of effect is neither capable of avoiding the undesirable contingency of production of everything from everything nor is it supported by scriptures. Jayantabhaṭṭa lays more stress on finding out logical flaws in the theory of *satkārya*. The Sāṃkhyas hold that effect exists in cause but they cannot explain the form of effect while it abides in cause. The effect cannot exist in the form of capacity for they are quite different in nature. The Sāṃkhyas further hold that effect is manifested but they cannot properly explain the nature of manifestation in harmony with their own theory. The Naiyāyikas appear to be unjust when they point

out that manifestation cannot be either pre-existent or cannot come into existence subsequently because the Sāṃkhyas do not understand by manifestation any accomplished entity like a jar from earth, but denote by the word a process through which the non-manifest becomes manifest. Śrīdhara strongly criticises the Sāṃkhya arguments adduced in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* in favour of *satkārya*. He points out one more logical flaw in the theory of *satkārya* that effect is not perceived in its causal form in spite of presence of conditions favourable for its perception. He puts forth a substantial point that non-production cannot be due to non-manifestation because if non-manifestation is of the product entity, it is *asatkāryavāda* only. His other alternative, however, viz., 'non-manifestation is of causal operation' does not materially differ from Jayantabhaṭṭa's argument as stated above. Few commentators of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* like Vācaspatimiśra and the author of the *Sāṃkhya-candrikā* show signs of awareness of the opponents' criticism and make stray remarks applicable against it. Vācaspati holds that the absurdities involved in the Sāṃkhya concept of manifestation are equally applicable to the Nyāya theory of prior non-existence of effect and completely fresh origination, e.g. non-existence of origination and infinite regress of origination. The *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* states that causal operation is required for manifestation of capacity of cause held in check by Tamas. The argument, however, turns on some presupposition about the nature of Guṇas and is not forceful against the other systematists, whereas a writer like Vācaspati defending the Sāṃkhya, accepts the fault. Even a Mīmāṃsaka critic like Sucaritamiśra forwards an ingenious explanation on behalf of the Sāṃkhyas which he later criticises. Sucaritamiśra takes note of Udyotakara's argument regarding 'production of manifestation' and Vācaspati's reply to it from the Sāṃkhya side. He goes a step further in boldly declaring from the Sāṃkhya point of view that manifestation is fresh but it does not contradict the theory of *satkārya*. He further points out that the Sāṃkhyas cannot alleviate the objection regarding manifestation and futility of causal operation. Sometimes, in common with other writers, he criticises the opponents by resorting to the technicalities of his own system. He criticises the Sāṃkhya regarding the fixity of relation between a particular cause and

effect on the basis of the concept of *śakti* as an independent entity. Thus, the criticism and the counter criticism reveals the exact positions of the two on identical points. Sucaritamiśra, for example, presents the Sāṃkhyas as interpreting 'production' as a variety of manifestation which assumes different character in different contexts. Though this sort of defence with a similar wording is not to be found in Sāṃkhya texts, it may be said to fall in line with the Sāṃkhya thought. In contradiction to this view, Nyāyavaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā interpret production in the extreme sense of the term. Theses of *satkārya* and *asatkārya* are different approaches to one common problem of 'change'. If 'change' is real and total, it means absolute momentariness. The Sāṃkhyas avoid this position by the notion of continuous diversity. Since the principle continues in its 'essence identity' a forward emergence of new appearance and a merging of them back into the causes is possible. This helps the Sāṃkhyas to advocate 'modified eternity' or 'second grade eternity'. The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, however, opt for permanence for a specific period which is in the least for three moments. This is more or less a dilute statement of momentariness, a technicality, satisfying them to have stood against extreme momentariness. They assume a complete break in between two successive entities and believe in the reality of relation which alone saves them from being '*pūrṇavaināśikas*'. The series of sequential entities proceed only in one direction. That is why, destruction of a jar is not 'going back of the jar to earth' but the rise of a totally new series of potsherds which differ from jar. There is, thus, no change but a series of originations.

The Naiyāyikas raise two more issues related with Sāṃkhya theory of causation, viz., eternity of all objects and meaning of non-eternity. The *Nyāyavāda* raises for refutation the theory that all objects are eternal which is ascribed by Vācaspatimiśra to Sāṃkhya. Vātsyāyana discards it as it contradicts our experience. The fact of production proves non-eternality of objects. The Sāṃkhyas cannot place production and manifestation on a par with dream as it will contradict common experience. However, it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhyas have never utilised the dream argument anywhere and are rarely

inclined to allot an inferior status to Matter at any stage of evolution. Uddyotakara splits the issue into two alternations, viz., eternity of objects and eternity of the knowledge that objects are eternal. The first alternative, he says, is contradicted by common experience. The second alternative is absurd since for the Sāṃkhyas, rise of knowledge means modification of Buddhi. From the position of the Sāṃkhya, however, objects are eternal in the sense that the essence continues in its identity. They are non-eternal in the sense that they can merge into their causes. Vācaspati also connects the discussion of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* with the Sāṃkhya theory that there is identity of essence between cause and effect. He, however, explains the Sāṃkhya theory in terms of the Nyāya concepts, which is not justifiable. He thinks that the eternity of all objects is deduced from eternity of *paramāṇus*. The Sāṃkhyas, however, do not consider the *paramāṇus* as the ultimate eternal entity. Here, Vācaspati affords us a specimen of how the opponents of a particular philosophy present it in terms of their own concepts and then criticise it.

Uddyotakara refutes all the Sāṃkhya interpretations of non-eternity. The Sāṃkhyas do not believe in absolute destruction of anything. Hence, destruction, according to them means extreme concealment from view. This is implied by the theory of evolution. This sounds illogical to the Naiyāyikas. Disappearance, according to these theorists, is rise of new entities and, thus, the view is opposed to the *satkārya-vāda*.

Cause of evolution

Next to the theory of *satkārya*, the Sāṃkhya view of an absence of an extraneous agency instrumental to the evolution of the Guṇas and nature of primary source of universe have claimed attention of all other systems of Indian philosophy and invited severe criticism from them.

Uddyotakara points out impossibility of initial creative activity in Pradhāna. Pradhāna, being insentient, cannot evolve without some regulating sentient principle like Puruṣa, etc. Besides, the purpose of Puruṣa cannot instigate Pradhāna to evolve since it does not exist prior to Pradhāna's evolution. Moreover, Sāṃkhyas cannot explain as to how the insentient

Pradhāna can come out of the state of equilibrium of the three Guṇas. The demand for a sentient principle governing activity of an insentient is universal so far as the orthodox systems are concerned.

If, for the sake of argument, it is put forth that the purpose exists even prior to the activity of Pradhāna, it will not be logical to say that Pradhāna evolves to serve the Purpose of Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhya supposition of such a purpose is full of logical absurdities. The enjoyment of Puruṣa cannot be the purpose since it leads to impossibility of release. Nor can the liberation of Puruṣa be the motive as Puruṣa is liberated by nature, and he is so even prior to the activity of Pradhāna. Moreover, the insentient pradhāna cannot be aware of the purpose of Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhya theory also fails to account for the 'order' found in the universe. An insentient object, not guided by some sentient principle, cannot of itself evolve into the orderly arrangement with all its intricacies. Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the double process of evolution and involution. The Sāṃkhyas cannot convincingly explain as to why Pradhāna sometimes evolves into universe and sometimes not. The arguments against the double purpose of *bhoga* and *mokṣa* chiefly come from the side of Vedāntins amongst whom Śaṅkara is prominent.

Śaṅkara also elaborates the arguments of impossibility of initial activity and creation even on the supposition of supervision of Prakṛti by Puruṣa. He states that a passive entity like Puruṣa cannot activate Pradhāna. Even if it is argued that even inactive objects can activate other objects, as for example, a magnet, a piece of iron, it does not solve the basic problem because in any such example introduction of a sentient agency at some stage or other is an inevitable necessity. If the Sāṃkhyas admit Puruṣa to be in some way responsible for evolution on account of association or contact with Prakṛti, it being always there, there will be incessant activity and no dissolution nor release. The *autsukya* (desire or curiosity) cannot be postulated as the cause of evolution because Prakṛti, being insentient, cannot have 'curiosity' which is a property of sentient entity.

If Pradhāna is supposed to possess an inherent power to

evolve, it will lead to impossibility of release as the evolution is a part of its nature. Hence, the opponents try to prove that the Sāṃkhya theory is weak in its foundation though it gives the appearance of a systematic analysis of physical world. The entire controversy arises since the Sāṃkhyas attribute activity to non-sentient objects only. The Sāṃkhyas are not inclined to apply the notion of identity, through and in spite of modification, to the sentient principle called Puruṣa. Somehow, they appear to comply with the axiom of Indian philosophy that activity entails deviation from absolute identity or that it is disastrous for eternity beyond change (*kūṭasthānityatā*). Therefore, Puruṣa is held to be inactive and transcendent. In case of Prakṛti in the form of evolutes, which is known to us as Matter, the modification and recognition of continuous identity are held to be facts of common experience. Therefore, it is not without grounds to hold that non-sentient objective principle is characterised by 'modified eternity'. This sort of observation and analysis of experience coupled with reasoning make the Sāṃkhyas dualists believing in opposition between the two ultimate entities. The Sāṃkhyas dispense with the idea of a God as controller of sentient and non-sentient entities which is a fault of the system from the point of view of its opponents. The absolute opposition between Prakṛti and Puruṣa on the one hand and their interdependence on the other insofar as Prakṛti is meaningless without an enjoyer like Puruṣa, and Puruṣa requires Prakṛti as an object of enjoyment is not possible in case of two unrelated and absolutely distinct realities. The Sāṃkhyas are unable to explain the contact between two such absolutely opposite entities which is the basis of interdependence. The statement of the *Carakasāṃhitā* may give us a suggestion as to how the Sāṃkhyas might solve the problem. The *Carakasāṃhitā* states that the contact of the *vyakta* Puruṣa (i.e., Puruṣa involved in empirical existence) with physical apparatus is beginningless. An extension of this solution may be possible on the place of the first contact between Puruṣa and Pradhāna. This postulation also does not satisfy the other systematists. If, however, the relation is beginningless, the question 'when and how the two got united' appears to be meaningless to Sāṃkhya.

The issue of the purpose of evolution needs a deeper

investigation. Since the Sāṃkhyas describe evolution as a natural process, the early Sāṃkhyas may not have found it necessary to speak about the purpose of evolution. It is the stage in which Puruṣa comes to be encircled by evolutes and wrong notion of 'I' and 'mine' when Prakṛti may be stated to have a purpose for evolution.

According to the statement of Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja, Pradhāna as controlled by Puruṣa is the cause of universe. An exactly similar view is held by *Śaṣṭitantra* and also ascribed to Vāṛṣaganya. In order to exclude from the connotation of *adhiṣṭhāna*, the idea of Puruṣa being an active controller like a potter, Mahādeva Vedāntin specifically states that this control is not through the activity of Puruṣa but through a special kind of his connection with Prakṛti. Īśvarakṛṣṇa also utilises the notion of control of sentient principle over the non-sentient objects as a basis of inference to prove the existence of Puruṣa. This control, according to the commentators of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* refers to the control of Puruṣa over evolutes of Prakṛti. It is Māṭhara only who interprets it as the control of Puruṣa over Prakṛti on account of which Prakṛti evolves into manifold evolutes. The statement of Māṭhara shows that the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* expression is capable of rendering twofold meanings and that Māṭhara, in dissenting from the other commentators, appears to favour the view of the *Śaṣṭitantra* which represents the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa tradition. Moreover, in the light of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's remark that his text is based on the *Śaṣṭitantra* Māṭhara may perhaps be supposed to reveal to us the real sense of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Here, it may be observed that in place of understanding the word '*adhiṣṭhāna*' in the sense of control, it may be more justifiable to understand it by the term 'superintendence' insofar as the intention or final aim of Puruṣa is the motive behind evolution of Prakṛti. In their commentaries on *B.S.* 2.2.1, Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja themselves argue that non-sentient objects like Pradhāna cannot act without the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the sentient principle. It shows that Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja think that the Sāṃkhyas consider Prakṛti as free from the instrumentality of Puruṣa. In other words, *adhiṣṭhāna* is understood by both these writers in the sense of direct active control.

An analysis of the presentation and criticism of the Sāṃkhya view by its opponents reveals many strands in the concept of cause of evolution or the motive force of evolution. They are as follows : (i) evolution is a self-motivated process on the part of Pradhāna, (ii) the presence of Puruṣa in vicinity of Pradhāna because of which the evolution starts, (iii) the superintendence of Pradhāna by Puruṣa, (iv) the purpose of Puruṣa, viz., enjoyment and liberation, and (v) *autsukya* of Prakṛti. Any of these factors which are different among themselves is employed for the sake of explanation according to the convenience or the need created by the criticism of the opponent.

The next issue of extensive discussions is the Sāṃkhya principle of Pradhāna. Vedāntins, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas amongst whom the accounts of Śaṃkara, Jayanta and Sucarita are comprehensive unanimously try to prove that Pradhāna as described by Sāṃkhya is a mere technicality. It cannot be proved by any means of knowledge. The Sāṃkhyas study the characteristics of the objects and arrive at the conclusion about single causal entity in which all the characteristics are centred. This, they call Pradhāna. Sucarita understands Pradhāna as constituted of the subtle form of the material elements. The constituents of Pradhāna are termed Guṇas by Sāṃkhya, a term from common use which has led to a number of wrong notions and misinterpretations by other systematists. Jayanta understands Guṇa in the sense of quality when he remarks that gross objects cannot come out of the qualities. Śaṃkara states that pleasure, pain and infatuation are mental dispositions and cannot be ascribed to material and non-sentient objects, nor can they be the source of the latter. Jayanta also follows him very closely and points out that these are reactions to objects, arising in mind and the Sāṃkhyas reverse the position when they say that mental dispositions give rise to gross objective existence while the matter of fact is just the opposite. It is Rāmānuja who appears to have sensed the Sāṃkhya concept of Guṇas as *dravyas*. The later Sāṃkhyas like Vijñānabhikṣu clearly describe the Guṇas as *dravyas*. Here, it may be observed that the Sāṃkhyas have assumed the three Guṇas as the material cause for gross material world. This means that the categories of 'attributes' and 'substance' are united in

them. Or in other words, it is the common source of both of them. In consequence, the Guṇas do have a substance aspect which is, however, not expressly stated. There is no reason why it should be exclusively emphasized to the neglect of equally important and balancing quality aspect. All the Sāṃkhya writers preceding Vijñānabhikṣu have implicit understanding about this thing. It is only when some critics misled by the word Guṇa looked at them from quality point of view that Vijñānabhikṣu might have felt it necessary to point out the substance aspect.

The Sāṃkhyas might have arrived at the notion of Pradhāna as cause of world and constituted of three Guṇas on the basis of observation of worldly things. They observed that the characteristics of objects though infinite can be classified and grouped together after neglecting minor variation in manifestation. These groups of qualities displayed an interrelation among their constituent qualities, e.g., luminosity is related to lightness and conducive to ease. On the basis of these interrelations and their absence in some cases they formed three main sets of qualities which they call Guṇas. The separate existence of these sets in a state of balance may be a notional ideality, while in actual experience we see that they are intermixed in different degrees. That is why, perhaps, Vijñānabhikṣu says that Guṇas are infinite (corresponding to degrees of manifestations) and that it is only for the sake of convenience that we group them under three main heads. Since the Guṇas combine substance and quality aspect, the distinction between the two categories is obliterated at this stage and helps Sāṃkhya to obviate the difficulty in explaining their relation. Pradhāna is source of matter and material, and mind and mental of the common usage.

The origin and formulation of the Sāṃkhya appear to be inspired by three factors—revelations of its authors handed down through tradition, analysis of worldly experience and application of logic. In the system of explanations there is sometimes a harmony of these three and sometimes there is a lacuna in their interrelation which appears like a logical flaw. A case in instance is the supposition of two independent entities characterised by knowledge. The Sāṃkhyas differentiate between empirical knowledge and the transcendental conscious-

ness which for ordinary appearance are forms of knowledge only. The locus of the first is *Buddhi* and the other is identical with the very being of *Puruṣa*. Excepting a few remarks of *Vācaspati*, the *Sāṃkhyas* are not seriously bent upon explaining the factors which necessitate such a distinction.

Sequence of evolutes

Among the brahmanical critics of *Sāṃkhya* only *Jayanta* has provided attention to this aspect, first, from the causality point of view. He makes an appeal to common experience that cause is less in magnitude than effect and points out that the *Sāṃkhyas* are wrong in presupposing a cause like *pradhāna*, greater in magnitude. Secondly, the supposition that *tanmātras* which represent fine matter originate from *Ahaṃkāra* and that *Ahaṃkāra* proceeds from *Buddhi* is confusing because *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra* are forms of knowledge. Thirdly, it is also wrong to say that the gross material objects come out of a composite of pleasure, pain and infatuation. While adducing these arguments *Jayantabhaṭṭa* perhaps ignores the very basic principles of *Sāṃkhya*. *Pradhāna* is non-manifest and the question of its magnitude does not arise at all. Further, *Jayantabhaṭṭa* appears to understand the principles of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra* exclusively in their knowledge aspect and overlooks their significance in the scheme of evolution as devised by the *Sāṃkhyas*. The *Guṇas* are also not simply the qualities as understood by him. It is noteworthy that whereas all the orthodox writers have centred their criticism on the problem of initiative activity for creation, they do not show concern about the interrelation of the sequential stages in evolution.

Buddhi

The *Sāṃkhya* concept of *Buddhi* is vehemently criticised by the *Vedāntins* and the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas* on the ground of *śruti* and logic. *Śaṅkara*, for instance, states that this sort of principle is neither mentioned in the *śruti* nor experienced in our daily life. *Śaṅkara*'s remark may suggest two things (i) that the *Sāṃkhyas* really intended to set forth a concept of a principle which was highly philosophical and not a part of worldly experience and (ii) that *Śaṅkara* was aware that the

Sāṃkhyas conceived of such a principle. *Vātsyāyana* differs from the *Sāṃkhyas* in interpreting *Buddhi* as the 'impermanent cognition' whereas the *Sāṃkhyas* understand by it a cosmological principle. Therefore, *Vātsyāyana* criticises the notion of its eternity. *Vātsyāyana* records three *Sāṃkhya* arguments in favour of eternity of *Buddhi*. (i) It is the agent in the act of recognition. (ii) It is the source of knowledge of the object, i.e., object cognition which is a sort of modification of *Buddhi* and, hence, not different from the latter. (iii) It is an internal organ like *Manas* of the *Naiyāyikas*. *Vātsyāyana* discards all these three reasons in the light of following considerations. (i) *Buddhi* is non-sentient. Hence, it cannot be agent of recognition which is a form of knowledge. (ii) If *Buddhi* and object-cognitions are non-different, there will be simultaneity of cognitions, and (iii) disappearance of *Buddhi* along with cognition. Thus, there is twofold fault of contradiction with experience and disowning one's own thesis. (iv) Even in the capacity of an *antaḥkaraṇa*, i.e., an instrument of knowledge *Buddhi* need not be eternal. Subsequent commentators of *Vātsyāyana* do not add any new argument.

No extant text of *Sāṃkhyas* claims eternal and all-pervasive character for *Buddhi* as mentioned by *Vātsyāyana*. Looking to the number of *Sāṃkhya* arguments in favour of eternity and their general consistency with the *Sāṃkhya* position restrains us from treating them as merely conjectures. The possibility may be that *Vātsyāyana* derives them from some *Sāṃkhya* source preceding *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*. Commentators of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, i.e., the authors of the *Yuktidīpikā* and the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* appear to have taken note of *Vātsyāyana*'s criticism and tried to supply answers to his points regarding the modification and the modified even though they do not refer to him by name. They maintain the identity with the help of illustrations of waves and water to do away with the fault of simultaneity of cognition on the basis of presence of *Sattva* or otherwise.

In this context, another much discussed problem is as to who possesses knowledge. *Vātsyāyana* expresses his disagreement with the *Sāṃkhya* theory that the awareness belongs to *Puruṣa* and the desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain to *Buddhi*. *Vātsyāyana* makes a distinction between the knowledge

faculty of a sentient principle and the actual cognitive activity of the non-sentient *Buddhi*. This statement of Vātsyāyana contains no specific reference to the theory of reflection. It can be directly interpreted as follows. The *Buddhi* as instrument acts upon the data and deciphers it with its own judgement and the resultant knowledge is owned by *Puruṣa*. Vācaspatiśra, however, interprets the possession of knowledge by *Puruṣa* metaphorically. *Puruṣa* is not actually related to *Buddhi* but through his reflection therein. It is to the credit of Vācaspati to explain the contact of *Puruṣa* with *Buddhi* with the idea of reflection because Īśvarakṛṣṇa's words only hint at that the relation is not real but how it is actually made possible is neither explained by him nor by commentators preceding Vācaspati. Udayana observes that this theory helps the Sāṃkhyas to retain the inactive nature of *Puruṣa*. He further divides the organs of knowledge and the internal organs and points out that they form the link between *Puruṣa* and external world in the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The sense-organs and mind function in waking state, *Ahaṃkāra*, in the dream and *Buddhi* in the deep sleep. Thus, *Puruṣa* is associated with activity and enjoyment apparently. The bifurcation of activity and Sentience between *Buddhi* and *Puruṣa* goes against the experience of their co-existence in one substratum. This criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas implies that identity of knower and doer is a must for purposeful activity. *Buddhi* cannot be active simply because it is a product of active and insentient *Pradhāna* because a total qualitative correspondence between cause and effect is neither possible nor desirable. Moreover, the desire, etc., will not be cognised as qualities of internal organs and they do not form the data for sense-perception. The postulation of the Sāṃkhyas involves twofold absurdity—impossibility of release if *Buddhi* is eternal and impossibility of creation if it is perishable. In fact, the Sāṃkhyas ascribe activity to non-sentient principle and retain immutable and transcendental nature of *Puruṣa*. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, make a clear distinction between substance and attribute and hold that the change in attribute does not affect the substance. As a matter of fact, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *pariṇāma* allows little scope for a real distinction between substance and attribute. All

this helps us to grasp in more clear way otherwise not explained in the texts of the Sāṃkhyas. The statements of Vācaspati and Jayanta are further instances in point. Vācaspati states that *Buddhi*, though insentient, knows the objects through the sentience of *Puruṣa* as the moon illumines the other objects through the light of the Sun. - Against this also Vācaspati and Jayanta remark that *Puruṣa* being non-modifiable, cannot be modifiable and, hence, its sentience cannot be transferred to *Buddhi*. It further suggests that the Sāṃkhyas differentiate between the locus of empirical knowledge (*Vṛttijñāna*) and the transcendental consciousness. This view according to the Naiyāyikas, implies simultaneous presence of two sentient entities in one and the same substratum and, hence, makes it difficult to explain the specific nature of *Puruṣa*. *Buddhi*, being an instrument of knowing, according to the Naiyāyikas, cannot be the agent of that act. They assign a lower status to *Buddhi* in relation to the principal knower. From all the above discussion *Buddhi* of the Sāṃkhyas as depicted by its opponents and adherents emerges as a non-sentient active principle knowing the object with the luminosity of sentient principle. It is the distinction of the Sāṃkhyas to describe the knowing principle as a derivate of matter.

The organs

The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas show disagreement with the Sāṃkhya view regarding the organs on four main points, viz. origin, definition, number of external organs and that of internal organs. The issue of the nature of organs is connected with the Sāṃkhya theory of their origin. The Sāṃkhyas think that since the organs perceive the objects of all magnitude and from a distance, they must be all-pervasive. Consequently, they come out of *Ahaṃkāra* which is all-pervasive. The view seems to be the result of another doctrine, viz., *prāpyakāritā* since for complete perception an all-sided contact of the sense organ with the object is deemed necessary. The Sāṃkhyas in their early stage might have upheld the thesis of their all-pervasive character amongst whom Vindhyavāsin is one. The position is, however, given up by Īśvarakṛṣṇa who favours limited magnitude of senses, perhaps, duly realising that for perception it is not necessary that the sense be all-pervasive. Kumārila criticises the thesis of Vindhyavāsin

on the score of a confusion of functions of senses belonging to different persons and absence of limitations of space. Vātsyāyana points out that the perception of objects of all magnitudes does not necessarily presuppose all-pervasive nature of eye. The rays of the eye pervade the entire object. There are many proofs for existence of rays, positive and negative, for example, their perception in case of animals, obstruction by wall, etc., proving their materiality and non-manifestation of their colour leading to occasional non-perception. Each of the senses is constituted of one element and, therefore, able to grasp the special quality of that element only. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas opt for elemental source of senses. A similar view was also held at some stage of Sāṃkhya by teachers like Pañcādhikaraṇa. This may be the result of a reflection on the development of the foetus through stages where it comes to be associated with the sense organs; secondly, through the location of organs on body which is visible and it is probable that the idea of senses as the visible marks of the centres of powers had not yet developed.

The Sāṃkhya theory that the organs emanate from Ahaṃkāra is also criticised by Sucaritamiśra. He points out that Ahaṃkāra is accepted as an independent entity only by the Sāṃkhyas and they cannot explain its nature satisfactorily. It is not proved by any means of knowledge. Moreover, senses will be all-pervasive so that many other absurdities may follow. Ahaṃkāra is a *karana* and cannot be the material cause of anything. Sucarita also points out that the Sāṃkhyas cannot maintain non-material nature of senses when they call them conglomerations meant for Puruṣa.

The *Yuktidīpikā* defends the Sāṃkhya position against the Nyāya argument about specification of one sense to one element dogmatically. It points out that the Nyāya supposition implies production of water from earth when water manifests smell. Material objects like pot, cloth, etc., are not capable of perceiving the object whereas the senses do possess this capacity. In other words, if the senses are products of elements, there is nothing to distinguish senses from the gross objects. That is why, the Sāṃkhyas connect the senses with Ahaṃkāra and not with elements. The theory of the Sāṃkhyas is based on

another Sāṃkhya hypothesis that the position of every object in the scheme of evolution depends upon the quantity of Sattva and secondly each preceding evolute is subtler than the subsequent one because it is a process from subtle to gross. Compared to *mahābhūtas*, senses possess more Sattva and are subtler so that they cannot succeed elements. Uddyotakara attributes a theory of eternity of senses to Sāṃkhya which is not owned even by Sāṃkhya. We are at a loss to know from where he takes this reference.

Udayana finds fault of technicality that *indriya* is that which comes out of *Sāttvika* form of Ahaṃkāra. He unnecessarily criticises Vācaspati's etymological explanation of the term *indriya* mistaking it as definition.

Vācaspati and Jayanta also criticise the Sāṃkhyas for their theory that organs of action are *indriyas*. Jayanta also informs us of the reason behind such a view, viz., that they perform specific functions. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and other Sāṃkhya texts do not mention this reason. In fact, the Naiyāyikas consider 'being a direct means of knowledge' as the test of a sense-organ while the Sāṃkhyas consider the evolute of the *Sāttvika* Ahaṃkāra to be an *indriya*.

Jayantabhaṭṭa objects to the Sāṃkhya theory of postulating three internal organs, viz., Manas, Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi. He points out that Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi are forms of knowledge and not the organs. The psychic aspect of Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi and their importance on cosmic plane are imagined by the Sāṃkhyas overlooked by Jayanta.

Sound and world

The Naiyāyikas criticise the Sāṃkhya view that the sound inheres in the substance which vibrates because when the vibration stops, there is no sound. This theory is not found stated in the available texts of Sāṃkhya. Jayanta points out that sound is not perceived as co-existent with other qualities like colour, etc. Experience proves that it inheres in intangible substance. The different degrees of intensity and the series of sounds prove that the sounding object is not the locus of sound. Vātsyāyana also criticises the view that sound embodied in letters (*varṇātmaka*) is eternal. The view is not to be traced in the available Sāṃkhya texts, but appears to be based on

extended application of the theory of *pariṇāma*. This presents an aspect of Sāṃkhya which is not known so far from any other source. The view is as follows. Letters undergo 'modifications' in case of grammatical operation like rule of *sandhi*, etc. Vātsyāyana rejects the view on various grounds. Difference of letters, non-subsistence of the one in the other, difference of place of pronunciation, identity of pronunciation in modified and original form, absence of relation between the original and modified, absence of recognition and absence of merging back are the reasons against Sāṃkhya thesis. Besides, there is no regularity regarding the original and the modified form in case of letters.

Non-difference between Components and Composite

The Naiyāyikas show their deep concern about this theory of Sāṃkhya as it is opposed to their own which is the basis of their theory of causation. The Sāṃkhyas contend that the relation of composite and components cannot subsist in two entities of entirely different nature. The Naiyāyikas criticise the theory by pointing out logical flaws involved in the reasons employed by Sāṃkhya. The controversy as regards the relation of composite and components has deeper roots and is embedded in the problem of causation. The Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas try to interpret it from different standpoints, basing their arguments on certain characteristics of the phenomenon called causation. For instance, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas completely analyse a certain totality of causes and conditions that produces a particular effect and in spite of different degrees of their invariability accord them a status of equal importance. Naturally, they attach more significance on different planes which they claim to be a fact of experience. Thus, from their criticism of the Sāṃkhya view following varieties of difference emerge, as the basis of their explanation of causation—(i) conceptual difference relating to the concept of composite and components, (ii) difference of verbal denotation corresponding to concepts, (iii) functional difference which has an important bearing on practical activity, (iv) difference as proved by perception, and (v) Qualitative difference. Because of these manifold differences, which belong to the different planes such as mental, verbal, practical and the

like, it is more sound to forego the idea of identity and to make a statement of causality as based on relations. Causality without relation is not possible. It is also because of these differences or the appearance of something different from the preceding one. Causality can be described as a process involving activity of existent to bring about non-existent.

The Sāṃkhyas, however, realise the difficulties in explaining satisfactorily as to how composite and components come to be related. The very necessity of supposition of a unique relation called *samavāya* which is an "eternal relation of the never separated" proves the absurdity in the thesis maintaining the difference. To say that it is a relation, that it is eternal, but having a beginning, and that the two are never joined or never separated is either to miss the essential nature of the relation or to stand by a product of imagination.

The Sāṃkhyas, therefore, uphold the identity of the essence. A thing or a product can be looked upon as constituted of the essential and secondary or variable factors. By emphasising the continuity of essence and importance of non-difference of the material cause, the Sāṃkhyas advocate relationless causality which is a continuous forward process and by eliminating difference explain a backward movement, viz., return to the cause. As a result, there being no relation, the terms composite and component do not carry for them that significance which they do for the Naiyāyikas. They say that even in effect state it is possible to look deeper and to identify the causal material. They are, consequently saved from the troubles of regarding potsherds after the destruction of a jar as a totally new product and a net of relations among the primary and secondary categories as well as difference of space occupied by cause and effect. The Sāṃkhyas do not deny difference altogether. Rather, they appear to be opposed to absolute difference. This is clear from the illustration of mat and cloth, cow and horse, wheel and jar, which they forward as exponents of the *prima facie* view. The quantitative agreement of cause and product also supports their case as also the occupation of the same space. The later theory of the threefold '*pariṇāma*', viz., *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā* displays their standpoint as regards the clear-cut division of the essentials and the secondary factors.

It is not difficult to guess which set of arguments, viz., that in favour of identity or that in favour of difference is logically prior, though chronologically, the Sāṃkhyas may be said to be the predecessors of the Naiyāyikas. The series of reasons which the Sāṃkhyas adduce against difference definitely show that the Sāṃkhyas had given deep thought to the thesis which subsequently came to be central idea in the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and which formed the *prima facie* view for the first enunciation of the Sāṃkhya theory.

Generality

The Sāṃkhyas understand by generality (*sāmānya*) 'similarity of form'. The view is ascribed to Vindhyavāsin. Jayantabhaṭṭa argues 'that generality and similarity of form are mutually distinct and are not always co-existent, as for example, in the case of *go* and *gavya*. This shows the difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Naiyāyika regarding the same fact of experience and its interpretation. The Sāṃkhyas would sanction notional existence to generality because of the possibility or otherwise of finally reducing it to Prakṛti. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas, being pluralists can accept as many entities to be real as they are convinced about on the basis of 'experience'. The Sāṃkhyas do not appear to have given considerable thought to the problem of universal.

Number of ultimate realities

Vātsyāyana criticises the Sāṃkhya theory of extreme dualism upholding only two ultimate realities, viz., Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Vātsyāyana thinks that such a dualism leaves no scope for a *pramāṇa* as a distinct category. All knowledge, activities, according to him, presuppose the existence of the *pramāṇas* which determines the number of categories. In tune with his pluralistic trend, Vātsyāyana shows disapproval for including it in some other category. If experience gives us an infinite diversity, it is not necessary to minimise the number. From the point of view of Sāṃkhya, *pramāṇa* can be assigned a status below Prakṛti as it is a modification of Buddhi and, hence, a secondary evolute. The Sāṃkhyas speak of Puruṣa and Prakṛti whose existence precedes the function of *pramāṇas* and the resultant knowledge of the two. Since Buddhi finally merges into Prakṛti, the ultimate number is two.

The Unseen

According to Vātsyāyana's version, the Sāṃkhyas do not accept 'unseen' in the form of *dharma* and *adharma* as a factor responsible for the evolution of Prakṛti into the world consisting of the individual bodies and the other objects of enjoyment. Prakṛti evolves through its inherent nature, aided by non-perception of objects in a proper perspective and non-realisation of distinction between the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa, on the part of the Puruṣa. Vācaspati refers to the *Yogaśūtra* view that the 'unseen' removes the obstacle to evolution but does not activate Prakṛti.

The Naiyāyikas on the other hand, accept the factor of 'unseen' to account for the distinctions in the living beings when all souls are homogeneous and all substances alike and criticise the Sāṃkhyas as follows. In the denial of the 'unseen' the Sāṃkhyas lose a factor which checks Pradhāna from continuous evolution and invite the flow of impossibility of release. The 'non-perception of objects and non-discrimination is common to both the states of bondage and release so that their presence and absence cannot be said to account for bondage and release. Even after the realisation of distinction between the two principles, the elements are seen to produce the body. So, the fulfilment of purpose of being seen by Puruṣa is not an invariable cause of release.

The 'non-perception' cannot inspire in Prakṛti the urge to be seen because the urge is absent in the state of equilibrium. If Pradhāna, being omnipotent, has this urge in the state of equilibrium, there will be evolution only without a chance for dissolution. If Pradhāna be omnipotent and hence able to perceive, there will be purposeless evolution.

The non-perception cannot be ignorance as either the absence of knowledge or perverted knowledge. Absence of knowledge of objects is present in the state of release also. Perverted knowledge belongs to Buddhi which is the first stage of evolution so that it cannot exist prior to evolution. It may be pointed out that some of these arguments are hypothetical. The Sāṃkhyas make a distinction between the absence of knowledge in bondage state and in release state. The first is the absence of right metaphysical perspective and the second absence of awareness of objects on empirical plane. The Sāṃ-

khyā texts do assert that Pradhāna evolves in order to be seen by Puruṣa and after being seen desists from evolution in the context of that Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhyas accord a status of causal factor to the 'unseen' in the *bhāvasarga* as it determines the next birth. The Sāṃkhyas are aware that the 'unseen' cannot be present before evolution and, therefore, they do not associate it with the initial activity of creation.

A side issue of the discussion on the 'unseen' is about *dharma*. The Sāṃkhyas are supposed to hold that *dharma* is the function of internal organ. As this view is not in tune with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concept of *dharma*, Kumārila criticises it from his own point of view. He says that the Sāṃkhya view is not confirmed by usage. *Manas* cannot be the substratum of *dharma* because it is the *ātman*, and not *Manas*, which is the determinant of the act. *Dharma* cannot be the function of internal organ as *śruti* recognises *dharma* and not the function of organs as the means of accomplishing the best aim of life. Kumārila seems to criticise here the view of Vindhyavāsin who accepts *Manas* as the only internal organ. According to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, *dharma* is a function or form of *Buddhi* which is one of the three internal organs. We observe here that, whether it is Vindhyavāsin or Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *dharma* is a function of the internal organ; secondly, according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, it is *Buddhi* that decides to act. Therefore, *dharma* is ascribed to *Buddhi* and thirdly, as it appears here, the essence of *dharma* is the determination to act.

Bondage and Release

Since the Sāṃkhya claimed for itself the status of a *mokṣasāstra*, critics of the system direct their heavy attack at the Sāṃkhya theory of bondage and release. Kumārila criticises various theses about the cause of bondage which were, perhaps, held by different teachers of Sāṃkhya. He is chiefly opposed to the view that the *karman* in the state of latent potentiality cause bondage. Kumārila's entire criticism is a result of wrong understanding of the Sāṃkhya notion of causation and a wrong linking of this theory of bondage and release with that notion. Kumārila points out that, if the cause in its latent form is effective, the *karmans* existing in their latent form in the state of release will cause bondage even for a

released soul. The knowledge supposed to lead to liberation cannot destroy the *karmans* totally, because, according to very theory of Sāṃkhya, nothing is destroyed totally. Besides, *karman* is a function of *Manas*, and being absent prior to creation, cannot cause bondage. The capacity to enjoy and to be enjoyed, of Puruṣa and Prakṛti respectively cannot be a fit substitute for 'unseen'. Insofar as the capacity is ever present, there will be bondage always.

Ignorance is not the exclusive reason for creation and bondage. Ignorance produces some *karmans* and past acts give rise to some other *karmans*. A totality of these two signifies the life in bondage. 'Unseen' is the same as the past acts which are bound to bear fruit, in spite of knowledge. This criticism reveals that some Sāṃkhya teachers perhaps believed in past acts as the cause of bondage. In the extant texts of Sāṃkhya, ignorance alone is said to be the cause of bondage. These two views are not completely irreconcilable insofar as ignorance binds through acts. When the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* criticises the notion that *karmans* are cause of bondage, its intention is to show that *karmans* in themselves have no binding force, but only when they are rooted in ignorance and perverted knowledge.

Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas utilise the idea of 'unseen' as a regulating factor for creation and no-creation. The Sāṃkhyas accept its importance at the level of empirical existence of an individual and his transmigration, so that they willingly admit that the 'unseen' has nothing to do with initial creative activity.

Like other systems of Indian Philosophy, the Sāṃkhyas also believe in the redeeming force of knowledge. Once one is free through knowledge, one is never bound again. Kumārila, as a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka, characteristically opposes this theory on two grounds. The *śruti* speaks about the knowledge of *ātman* only to induce people to activity, and the result of knowledge calculated is not liberation, but attainment of heaven. There is no other substantial proof for the Sāṃkhya view. Compared to Kumārila, Pārthasārathimīśra's remark displays a better philosophical inclination. He realises the importance of the knowledge of *ātman* and says that this knowledge aims at awareness of the distinction between soul and body, and of

the ideal of worship. He makes no reference to the attainment of heaven as seriously as Kumārila does it. Kumārila's argument suggests the possibility that the Sāṃkhyas tried to justify their views on the basis of *śruti*. Kumārila aims at showing that there is no invariable causality between knowledge and freedom as the Sāṃkhyas hold. In this context, however, his arguments lack in depth of reasoning and his repeated recourse to *śruti* is little less than a technicality.

While Kumārila says that knowledge cannot destroy acts, Udayana points out that knowledge cannot destroy ignorance, because total destruction of ignorance does not harmonise with the Sāṃkhya idea of non-eternity. Udayana's argument is a result of distortion or wrong understanding of the Sāṃkhya position regarding the status of ignorance in the scheme of evolution and liberation. He also wrongly links it with the idea of non-eternity. According to Sāṃkhya, ignorance is one of the constituent properties of Tamas just as Sattva and Rajas have their own peculiar properties. When evolution proceeds, ignorance gets associated with the subsequent evolutes in proportion to the Tamas involved in the combination of the three Guṇas and is, thus, also associated with Buddhi. When Puruṣa comes into contact with such a Buddhi, constituted of three Guṇas, he is said to be in contact with ignorance and hence, in a state of bondage. The liberation of Puruṣa means his freedom from contact with Buddhi and naturally the separation from ignorance. Looked at from this point of view, the question of destruction or origin of ignorance does not at all arise for the Sāṃkhyas, because the Tamas neither arises nor is destroyed.

The nature of the liberating knowledge or rather its contents are variously explained by the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. According to Gauḍapāda, it is the knowledge of twenty-five categories. According to the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, it is the true knowledge of Puruṣa. Vācaspati interprets it as the realisation of the difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and criticises it. He points out that a wrong notion of Prakṛti, preceded by the wrong hypothesis of *satkārya*, is at the basis of the Sāṃkhya view. These three explanations may be hypothetically understood as emphasising different aspects of the same state. If, however, considered as a process of knowledge,

it is possible to say that they signify gradation, if the knowledge of Puruṣa is the ideal. This our suggestion is based on the statement of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* that a remedy for the complete extinction of suffering is the knowledge of *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā*, where *jñā* is put at the end of the list in order, perhaps, to indicate supremacy of that knowledge.

Jayantabhaṭṭa states the Sāṃkhya view that the independent Prakṛti binds and liberates the inactive Puruṣa. In criticism, he points out impossibility of release in absence of any factor restraining Prakṛti. Even if Puruṣa has no inclination towards Prakṛti, Prakṛti may always have the desire to bind Puruṣa. As Puruṣa is the seer in both the states, perception and non-perception of Prakṛti by him can have no effect on the activity of Prakṛti. Prakṛti, being non-sentient, cannot exercise restraint in its activity after discriminating between liberated and non-liberated soul. Moreover, there is no factor to bind Puruṣa in the pre-creation state.

The Sāṃkhyas look at the problem of bondage and release from two angles. When they say that Puruṣa is bound and released, they mean by it following things—the wrong notions of agency, possession, retribution and involvement in bondage are the notions under which Puruṣa is working at the empirical level. All the disciplines and efforts to remove these notions are prescribed in the context of Puruṣa in that state only. Therefore, he is the one to be released. As a matter of fact, he is naturally free. Knowledge does not create freedom but produces an awareness of being free. At this stage, it is possible to say that it is Prakṛti which is bound and released and Puruṣa is uncontaminated. Jayanta and Śrīdhara look at the problem from only the first perspective while Rāmānuja finds contradictions in these two angles either as a superficial argument or through a failure to co-relate the two view-points consistently.

Śaṅkarācārya enumerates two possibilities of perpetual bondage on the score of two Sāṃkhya assumptions. If *bhoga* is the purpose of evolution, the objects of enjoyment being infinite, the purpose can never be fulfilled. Secondly, the *sargaśakti* of Pradhāna, being inherent, the evolution may proceed non-stop so that there is no cancellation of bondage.

In this context, the following point deserves our consideration. Though the Sāṃkhyas say that Prakṛti evolves to serve the purpose of Puruṣa, Prakṛti is not totally independent to bind Puruṣa. 'Ignorance' on the part of Puruṣa is a pre-condition for Prakṛti to be effective as a binding agency. The Sāṃkhyas posit the factor of presence and absence of knowledge as the determining factor for the activity and the non-activity of Prakṛti. Knowledge is, thus, the barrier to the flow of Prakṛti. As regards the assumption of the inner urge to evolve, the Sāṃkhyas say that it is always present in Prakṛti. This relieves them from the necessity of pre-supposing some extraneous cause giving rise to initial action for which the Naiyāyikas posit the factor of *adr̥ṣṭa* and Īśvara.

Puruṣa

The description of Sāṃkhya Puruṣa, as given by the orthodox writers, conforms to the one as found in the Sāṃkhya texts. Puruṣas are many, homogeneous in nature of pure consciousness, devoid of empirical qualities, all-pervasive, uncontaminated by the acts and the results in the transcendent state. At the empirical level, however, Puruṣa does not display these characteristics. Not only that, but because of its concealment from direct view, its existence is also sometimes doubted by heterodox critics. Hence, the Sāṃkhyas employ many inferential arguments to prove that there is Puruṣa.

The Sāṃkhya concept of Puruṣa fails to win universal approval on all points. For example, Jayantabhaṭṭa points out that consciousness is not a permanent characteristic of the soul. It is an adventitious quality of the soul when it comes into contact with the mind-body-conglomeration exactly in the same way as the awareness of pleasure and pain. In the state of release, Puruṣa cannot be conscious as the Sāṃkhyas mistakenly suppose. According to the Naiyāyikas, state of release means loss of contact with the body and the media of knowledge like mind and the senses, etc., and, therefore, Puruṣa cannot know anything. According to the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṃkhya 'consciousness' is the same as 'the capacity to see' or 'know' and there is no distinction between knowledge of the object and pure consciousness. In other words, there

is nothing like pure consciousness devoid of any reference to the knowledge and the knower.

Śaṅkarācārya, on the other hand, states that the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the soul being constituted of pure consciousness is in perfect harmony with the *śruti*. Śaṅkara finds fault with the Sāṃkhya theory that many Puruṣas derive worldly experience from a single object-entity, viz., Prakṛti. The theory of Sāṃkhya is faulty as it leads to the confusion of acts and their results because all beings are equally connected with the same Prakṛti—the store-house of all the fruits of acts. It is wrong to say the Pradhāna will evolve only for the bound Puruṣas and will not affect the released ones. Pradhāna, being insentient, cannot have discretion to distinguish the two categories of Puruṣas. The unseen results of acts which inhere in Pradhāna or the resolutions (*abhisam̐dhi*) etc. also cannot restrict a particular act to a particular Puruṣa. Space cannot be a limiting adjunct as it is equally connected with all the all-pervasive souls. Śaṅkara's additional point of criticism is the absurdity of the assumption that Puruṣas are infinite and all-pervasive at the same time. According to Śaṅkarācārya, there is self contradiction here. Many entities cannot be all-pervasive when they are supposed to maintain their identity. Moreover, in the absence of distinguishing characteristics, one soul cannot be distinct from another soul so that a real plurality of them cannot be upheld. Nimbārka criticises the all-pervasive character on the ground that it has no scriptural support. The theory further entails the confusion of acts and the fruits because the all-pervasive souls pervade all the bodies.

Śaṅkara seems to understand the plurality of the Puruṣas at both the levels, the empirical and the transcendental.

Some statements of the orthodox writers offer us important suggestions for the clarification of certain issues about which the Sāṃkhya texts are not so explicit, for example, the statements of Śaṅkara and Jayanta that the Puruṣas are many, of the homogeneous nature of pure consciousness, having unsurpassed excellence and all-pervasive. More significant, however, is the notion of the cosmic Puruṣa, ascribed to the Sāṃkhyas by Rāmānuja. Neither the notion of, nor the term *Samastīpuruṣa*, is to be found in majority texts of the Sāṃkh-

yas. But there are two Sāṃkhya writers, Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara, whose statements indicate that some such concept was not totally foreign to Sāṃkhya. They state that Puruṣa is one. Māṭhara observes that Puruṣa is one in contrast to the *Vyakta* which is many, perhaps, not only numerically, but also from the point of view of nature, as the word *bahuvridha* may indicate. The expression of Māṭhara, viz., *Pradhāna-sa-dharma Puruṣaḥ* gives us that the oneness of Pradhāna is numerical and it is the totality or the prime source of the *Vyakta*. Similarly, the Puruṣa is one numerically, and may be regarded as the prime source of the individual Puruṣas. Granting the suggestion, this one Puruṣa may have been the basis of Rāmānuja's use of the term *samaṣṭīpuruṣa*.

Rāmānuja appears to give mutually contradictory accounts about the character of enjoyer, of Sāṃkhya Puruṣa. Sometimes he states that Puruṣa is enjoyer; sometimes he points out that he is not enjoyer and equally criticises both the positions. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* contains only a positive assertion that the Puruṣa is enjoyer without clarifying whether the *bhoktṛtva* is metaphorical or real. We may, however, note that a real enjoyment is not reconcilable with the *a-vikāritva* of Puruṣa. Śaṅkara nowhere criticises the *bhoktṛtva* of Puruṣa, which means that he understands it in metaphorical sense. However, perhaps, in response to Rāmānuja's criticism, the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* make an explicit statement that the *bhoktṛtva* of Puruṣa is not real, but only metaphorical. Rāmānuja's criticism of the enjoyer Puruṣa without agency seems to be chiefly directed against the notion of passive reception on the part of Puruṣa in the manner of a child, a tree or fire, which are (in a sense active, but) not active in the sense of 'intentional agency' as described by the Jayamaṅgalā.

Vallabha states that through the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa evolution proceeds and as either of the two is indispensable for such a union, Prakṛti or puruṣa may be equally regarded to be the cause of universe. Vallabha makes another remark that non-sentient Pradhāna alone cannot be the cause of universe. If Puruṣa is the cause of world activity, it contradicts the Sāṃkhya position that Puruṣa is beyond change and inactive. Here it is worthwhile to note that

Vallabha describes the nature of the world as *ubhayātmaka*, i.e. sentient and non-sentient. Can this be regarded as another ground for supposing Puruṣa to be the prime source of individual Puruṣas as is suggested by Rāmānuja?

Sāṃkhya and the Śruti

This is a special field of controversy between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedāntins. A number of the *Brahmasūtras* and quite a large number of the additional passages of the Upaniṣads are employed for discussion of the Sāṃkhya tenets by the *sūtrakāra* and his commentators. The bone of contention is whether the Sāṃkhyas can claim scriptural origin for their system or whether the Vedāntins are the rightful inheritors of the legacy. In other words, the Vedāntins try to prove that theirs is the most proper mode of the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. Among the points of controversy, whether Pradhāna fits in with the Upaniṣadic description of the first cause, is the pivot, and the order of evolutes and their nature as well as Puruṣa form secondary issues. The Vedāntins contend that the Sāṃkhya theories are not only not found in the *śruti* but involve contradiction with it. The Vedāntins further hold that the experience of the seers who visualised the reality are expressed in the Upaniṣads, which are to be interpreted by mutual help as well as with the help of reasoning and *smṛtis*. The Sāṃkhya view is primarily based on *smṛti* and reasoning, and does not find support in the passages of the Upaniṣads.

We do not come across any Sāṃkhya text interpreting the Upaniṣads so as to support the Sāṃkhya point of view. However, the extensive efforts of Bādarāyaṇa and his commentators suggest the possibility of oral or written attempt of the Sāṃkhyas to interpret the Upaniṣadic passages on Sāṃkhya lines. Or their efforts may be regarded as a safeguard against such a possibility; but, the fact that commentators try to direct more and more *sūtras* in which no reference is meant to Sāṃkhya theories, adds more weight to the first possibility.

This further shows that all the chief commentators of the *Brahmasūtras*, headed by Śaṅkara, show more concern and anxiety than the *sūtrakāra* with the Sāṃkhya theories. Their criticism is more detailed and comprehensive, sometimes to the extent of a purely biased criticism, and imposing views on

Sāṃkhya never acceptable to them. Their criticism shows certain common features in their approach to Sāṃkhya. They start with two basic assumptions, viz., that the Upaniṣads unanimously speak of a sentient cause, and that they favour only the Vedānta position—of course, as interpreted by each commentator. More significant for them, however, is the ideological affinity of the Sāṃkhya to the Upaniṣads with a dualistic trend. Barring the only problem of the relation of sentient and non-sentient, the Sāṃkhya appears to be a very convenient explanation of the constitution of the world. That is the chief reason of their anxiety. The remarks of Śaṃkara as regards the wide-spread popularity, wise use of logic, acceptance by eminent persons and, hence, the possibility of Sāṃkhya being regarded as the most proper interpretation of the *śruti* throws light on this fact. That is also why, instead of the Buddhists and the Jains, Śaṃkara takes the Sāṃkhya as the most powerful opponent because it was easy for him to deprecate the former schools in one single term 'anti *śruti*'. In the heat of this anxiety, the commentators sometimes even go to the extent of ascribing some positions which are never claimed by the Sāṃkhyas; for example, the qualities of the omnipotence which they attribute to the Sāṃkhya Pradhāna. The omnipotence may have two-fold aspect, viz., the potency to produce every material object, and secondly, absence of necessity of an extraneous regulating factor for the actual process of evolution. Śaṃkara seems to have in his mind the latter aspect when he ascribes omnipotence to Pradhāna. The Sāṃkhyas themselves never describe Pradhāna as omnipotent in either sense. The Vedāntins' description of Pradhāna as *ānandamaya*, not corroborated by any Sāṃkhya text, seems to be an outcome of the Sāṃkhya notion that Sattva characterised by joy is a constituent of Pradhāna. The character of *antaryāmin*—internal regulator—appears to be deduced from the commentaries of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, contrasting the independent Pradhāna with the dependent evolutes. The idea of Pradhāna being the abode of everything, is not a Sāṃkhya concept even though it is possible to explain it by giving it a Sāṃkhya tinge in the context of *satkāryavāda*. Same is the case with the concept of support as Pradhāna is the ultimate cause. Again, the knowledge of Pradhāna as a means for attainment of

supernatural powers is never prescribed by the Sāṃkhyas. As against 'Śaṃkara's statement Sāṃkhyas are not found anywhere to correlate their Guṇas with the colours. They call their Prakṛti unproduced, but certainly not in terms of *ajā*. The extant Sāṃkhya texts do not say that the Guṇas are the components of prakṛti. Though some of the concepts and the doctrines attributed to the Sāṃkhyas are not found stated by the Sāṃkhyas themselves, the way in which the Vedāntins trace them in the Upaniṣadic passages is notable for ingenuity though not convincing. For example, we may cite Rāmānuja's presentation of the Sāṃkhya concept of individual soul. Rāmānuja ascribes an all-time *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* to Puruṣa, whereas the Sāṃkhyas would restrict it only to the state of ignorance. A positive description of Puruṣa as given by Rāmānuja, viz., that Puruṣa is of the nature of knowledge, present in the immobile things like plants, etc., basically homogeneous in nature but becoming manifold because of the varied transformations in Prakṛti, is not explicitly found in Sāṃkhya texts. According to Rāmānuja, the plurality of Puruṣas is not ultimate.

Sāṃkhya and the smṛtis

The Vedāntins, after discussing the problem of scriptural support, proceed to take away another plank of the Sāṃkhya system, viz., the authenticity of the Sāṃkhya *smṛti*. According to Śaṃkara, the Sāṃkhyas are bold enough to let go the *śruti* support and to claim authority for the *smṛti* laid down by an individual. They are also prepared to place *smṛti* above *śruti* as the *smṛti* serves the guideline for a proper interpretation of *śruti*. Śaṃkara seems to arrange the causes of the universe numerically and holds that the *smṛtis* propounding one sentient cause should be placed above the *smṛtis* speaking of two causes. He is not prepared to accept verdict of persons even though they possess supra-sensuous powers, when they are in conflict with the *śruti*. The Sāṃkhya *smṛti* contains many concepts and hypotheses for which neither *śruti* nor the empirical *pramāṇas* can serve as a proof and, therefore, it is to be accepted after proper consideration and, that too, only partially. To this statement of Śaṃkara, which is a slight distortion, the Sāṃkhya would very well reply that comprehending

the *smṛti* first, it is possible to proceed to *śruti*. Secondly, the Sāṃkhya *smṛti* does interpret the *śruti* in the right way and in absence of such a *smṛti* the intricacies in *śrutis*, which cannot be independently followed, may remain obscure for ever. Śāṃkara, however, flatly rejects the Sāṃkhya stand by putting Sāṃkhya *smṛti* below those which are more favourable to vedic tradition.

Sāṃkhya Epistemology

The Nyāya-aiśeṣika and the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā criticism and presentation of the Sāṃkhya theories in this field reveal to us some very important features of the Sāṃkhya epistemology. Our knowledge in this respect as derived from the Sāṃkhya texts is much limited in scope and details in comparison with that of other systems of philosophy.

The Naiyāyika criticism provides information regarding some of the epistemological concepts in the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya. Besides, they also deal with *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and its commentaries. Jayantabhaṭṭa cites the Sāṃkhya definition of *Pramāṇa* offered by Vācaspati, viz., *Pramāṇa* is the function of Buddhi. Jayantabhaṭṭa explains the definition in such a way that it marks an advance over the statements of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. He says that the function of Buddhi refers to its modification in the form of the object and the act of tinging the Puruṣa as he comes into the contact of Buddhi. Cakradhara here finds the reference to the two forms of knowledge—the indeterminate and the determinate. This is in consequence of the awareness of such a distinction following Diṇnāga. Jayantabhaṭṭa criticises the definition that it leads to the impossibility of the rise of knowledge. The awareness belongs to the Puruṣa who cannot know, and knowledge belongs to the insentient Buddhi which cannot be aware. Thus, a single cognitive act is divided between two knowing agents. Moreover, the knowledge arises through the appearance of Buddhi as sentient and the appearance of Puruṣa as active; but valid knowledge cannot arise from such a false appearance and a mistake. Here, Jayantabhaṭṭa accuses the Sāṃkhyas of joining the groups of the *sākāravādi* Buddhists. The Naiyāyikas object to the Sāṃkhya attempt to distinguish between Puruṣa as

the knower with permanent consciousness and the Buddhi assuming fleeting objective forms.

Jayantabhaṭṭa states the Sāṃkhya opinion that there are only three *pramāṇas* viz., *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna* and *Śabda*. They are the basic *pramāṇas* since they cover all other varieties of the source of knowledge. The commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* have made an attempt to show this. Jayanta criticises the Sāṃkhyas as they do not accept *upamāna* as an independent *pramāṇa* though it differs from the above three in respect of the causal conditions and the resultant knowledge. We may observe that though the number varies, the process for such a knowledge is accepted by the Sāṃkhyas and classed under one of the three *pramāṇas*.

Udyotakara, followed by Vācaspati, criticises Vārṣaganya's definition of *Pratyakṣa* viz., that 'it is the function of the senses such as the ear and the like.' Udyotakara criticises it for its overwide application to doubtful knowledge also.

Jayanta cites the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* definition, viz., the ascertainment with regard to respective objects. Because of the use of *prati* the definition is overwide and fails to exclude other forms of *pramāṇa* like *Anumāna*, according to Jayanta. Further, the qualifications of the other *pramāṇas* cannot be supposed to define the limits of *Pratyakṣa* because, in that case, the knowledge of *Pratyakṣa* will presuppose knowledge of other *pramāṇas* which is contrary to the fact.

Vācaspati's explanation suggests that Vārṣaganya considers *Pratyakṣa* as the means of indeterminate knowledge only, while Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition, as it stands, covers the determinate knowledge only. It is not clear as to why the Sāṃkhya teachers do not make explicit statement of the sense-object contact in their definition of *Pratyakṣa*. The works like *Jaiminīsūtras* display an awareness of the importance of this contact in the process of perception. So we cannot say that the early Sāṃkhya teachers did not know this concept or that they could not phrase the phenomenon properly. The omission, therefore, appears to be intentional, though it is a matter of deep probing and the question yet unsolved. The later Sāṃkhyas themselves also do not approve of these definitions.

As regards the perception of sound, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsākas and the Naiyāyikas are in perfect agreement with the

Sāṃkhyas on the issue of *prāpyakāritā*. They, however, criticise the Sāṃkhya idea that the function of the auditory sense, non-different from the all-pervasive sense-organ, goes to the sounding object. They criticise it in the light of their own theories and bring into light the process of perception of sound which is unexplained in the Sāṃkhya texts.

In the context of the Nyāya criticism by (Udyotakara) of a certain Sāṃkhya definition of inference, it will not be out of place to record few of our observations on the Sāṃkhya view of inference as successively revealed in different Sāṃkhya texts. The *Yuktidīpikā* makes a statement that as the *pūrvācāryas* have dealt with the problem of inference extensively, it is not found necessary any more to dilate upon the same at length.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his successors are seen to give a cursory thought to the topic of inference. *Sāṃkhyakārikās* define inference as that which is based on the mark and the marked and *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* comments, viz., that 'from either of the two, the other is inferred' tell us two things, viz., that, as the illustration cited by the author shows, he had in his mind only that variety of inference which is based on *sama-vyāpti* or 'co-extension' though he is not explicit on the point and perhaps, therefore, he was neither aware nor concerned with the question of *vyāpti*, and its side issues. *Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra*, a commentary probably contemporary with *Mātharavṛtti* only emphasises the positive aspect of the *Vyāpti*, viz., the association of *liṅga* and *liṅgī* and makes a conflicting statement that from the perception of the mark, inference is obtained. The discussion relating to inference as contained in the *Mātharavṛtti* is of the sort of a digest of the prevalent views of the Sāṃkhyas as well as the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. It delineates an extensive system of inference and inferential arguments which do not, however, add anything new to our knowledge of the Sāṃkhya view of inference. The long discussion about the nature of the *svārtha* and the *parārtha* Anumāna reveals the fact that the author is still preoccupied with proving those points which are taken for granted and improved upon in Diṇnāga and post-Diṇnāga texts on logic. Same remark well applies to a similar discussion in the *Yuktidīpikā* which covers a large space. It is only the names of the five constituents of the *Anumāna vākya* in the *Mātharavṛtti* which sound different and unusual. The seven

varieties of Anumāna as cited and illustrated by *Jayamaṅgalā* are important for two reasons. One is that they show us the course of development which the Indian thought on inference might have followed. Secondly, they show us the utility and the mode of application of each kind of inference for proving a certain Sāṃkhya tenet. From this standpoint, we can see why the Sāṃkhyas throughout clung fast to the three varieties of Anumāna which proved useful for their scheme of metaphysical and cosmological explanations, in spite of the fact that different Sāṃkhya authors put forth many alternative explanations of the terms *Pūrvavat*, *Śeṣavat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and no one was certain about their exact connotation. The *Sāṃkhyasūtras*, the *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*, and the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* form a group by themselves from chronological standpoint. Even though the latter two texts have before them comprehensive system of the conclusions about inference, they do not go beyond making a few stereotype remarks. It is again Vācaspati Miśra only who displays his sense of propriety in modifying the primary standpoint of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* just as he does in the context of Udyotakara's criticism of the Sāṃkhya view. He suggests that the statement '*liṅga-liṅgi pūrvakam*' should be extended with the repetition of the term '*liṅgi*' so that besides a prior knowledge of *vyāpti*, a knowledge of *pakṣadharma*, i.e. the mark as characterising the subject which is an invariable prerequisite, is also included in the definition. Here, Vācaspati Miśra is not contributing new to the theory of inference in general but he certainly improves the Sāṃkhya idea and makes it up-to-date. Secondly, he borrows the two terms '*svalakṣaṇa*' and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* from the Buddhist logic of Diṇnāga and interprets them in such a different way that they fit in well in the dimension of the Sāṃkhya realism. In the Buddhist ideology *svalakṣaṇa* is the real and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the conceptual. But the *svalakṣaṇa* for the Sāṃkhyas is neither the unique momentary individual nor is *Sāmānya* a pure concept without any substantive.

These observations help us to understand one thing. Though the Sāṃkhyas utilised inference extensively as an effective means of proving both of their fundamental principles, viz., Prakṛti and Puruṣa, they did not spend their energies in specially developing a system of logic as did the Buddhists or

the Naiyāyikas. That is perhaps why of all the orthodox systems of philosophy, it is only the Nyāya system which takes a passing note of the Sāṃkhya view of inference.

Kumārila-bhaṭṭa attacks the Sāṃkhya view that since the effect exists in the cause and the character of the cause determines the nature of the effect, the validity or invalidity of a given piece of knowledge can be tested by the conditions of knowledge without any reference to external factors.

Here we come to the end of our account of the Sāṃkhya as derived from the selected brahmanical texts and as repeatedly compared with the original Sāṃkhya texts. In conclusion, we make a few general observations besides the particular conclusions stated in respective places. Though the Sāṃkhya thought has a very long history, its notices are taken when it assumes the definite form of something like a system in the teachings or writings of a particular author like Vārṣaganya, Vindhyavāsin, Pañcādhikaraṇa, etc. Excepting the *Brahmasūtras*, the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, the *Nyāyavārttika* and the *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumārila almost all the brahmanical writers deal mostly with the Sāṃkhya as expounded by Īśvara-kṛṣṇa and his commentators. The Nyāya system is the earliest to take a note of the Sāṃkhya on purely logical grounds. The Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas have more reliance on the scriptural authority in common with the Uttara-mīmāṃsakas. Insofar as Kumārila himself is the first formulator of a Mīmāṃsā system dealing with logic and epistemology, his criticism chiefly pertains to the metaphysical problems of Sāṃkhya. The Vedāntins equally emphasise in their criticism the three foundations of the system, viz. the *śruti*, the *smṛti* and reasoning. This speciality is witnessed even as early as the *Brahmasūtras*. In this criticism, the Vedāntins have directed all the energies against the contradictions in the Sāṃkhya metaphysics and have completely left out of consideration Sāṃkhya logic and epistemology. When they speak of these metaphysical contradictions, a few more points become clear to us. In case of Śaṅkara, the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is one among the many Sāṃkhya sources of authentic information. For the commentators subsequent to Śaṅkara and headed by Rāmānuja, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is the chief source of information, occasionally coupled with the commentaries thereof. That is why, Śaṅkara points out to the contradictions

in thought of the different Sāṃkhya thinkers, Rāmānuja concentrates on the internal inconsistencies in thought of a single work like the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, while rest of the commentators interpret contradictions as the general opposition of the Sāṃkhya to the scripture. That is, perhaps because each commentator later than Śaṅkara is further removed from the live tradition. Among the orthodox writers, the position of Vācaspati is singular. He is an exponent of Sāṃkhya and Yoga with his own contributions and also a critic of it as a Naiyāyika. He is in a better position to understand the weaknesses of the system as an opponent and interpreter. Jayanta's treatment of the Sāṃkhya is noteworthy for two things; one is the exposition of the Sāṃkhya concept of Puruṣa. Far more important, however, is his account of Sāṃkhya epistemology. Since Yoga accepts the basic tenets of Sāṃkhya and modifies them according to its own needs, it has nothing to offer as a criticism against the Sāṃkhya system. On the whole, the orthodox writers seem to assign more importance to the Sāṃkhya as a system of metaphysics rather than as a system devoted to problems of logic and epistemology.

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CHRONOLOGY

The chronology followed here is generally the one given by Karl H. Potter in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. I (Bibliography).

Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini	4th Cent. B.C.
Mahābhārata	4th Cent. B.C.—4th Cent. A.D.
Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda	100 A.D.
Carakasamhitā	2nd Cent. A.D.
Nyāyasūtras of Gautama	250-350 A.D.
Yogasūtras of Patañjali	3rd-4th Cent. A.D.
Īśvarakṛṣṇa	350-400 A.D.
Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana	350-525 A.D.
Śābara	400 A.D.
Praśastapāda	450-500 A.D.
Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa	5th-6th Cent. A.D.
Yuktidīpikā	6th Cent. A.D.
Udyotakara	550-625 A.D.
Māṭhara	600-700 A.D.
Kumārīlabhaṭṭa	620-80 A.D.
Gauḍapāda	700 A.D.
Uṇṇekabhaṭṭa	750-800 A.D.
Śaṃkarācārya	788-820 A.D.
Vācaspatimiśra	900 A.D.
Śrīdhara	991 A.D.
Jayantabhaṭṭa	1000 A.D.
Pārthasārathimiśra	1025-1075
Rāmānuja	1050-1137
Udayana	1050 A.D.
Madhva	1238—1317
Nimbārka	13th Cent. A.D.
Sāṃkhyasūtra	14th Cent. A.D.
Vallabha	1481-1533
Aniruddha's S.S.V.	15th Cent.
Vijñānabhikṣu	16th Cent. (Second half)
Mahādeva Vedāntin	17th Cent.
Nārāyaṇatīrtha	17th Cent. (First half)

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. br.	Aitareyabrāhmaṇa
Ait. up.	Aitareyopaniṣad
AS	Ahirbudhnyasamhitā
Ātma	Ātmavāda
AV	Atharvaveda
Br. up	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
BS	Brahmasūtra
Chod	Chodanāsūtra
Ch. up	Chāndogyopaniṣad
CS	Carakasamhitā
GB	Gauḍapādabhāṣya
G. br	Gopathabrāhmaṇa
Jay	Jayamaṅgalā
Ka. up	Kāthopaniṣad
Kir	Kirapāvalī
M	Madhva
Mait. up	Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad
MB	Madhvabhāṣya
Mbh	Mahābhārata
MS	Mīmāṃsāsūtra
Muṇ. up	Muṇḍakopaniṣad
MV	Mātharavṛtti
NB	Nyāyabhāṣya
Ni	Nimbārka
Ni B	Nimbārkabhāṣya
Nir	Nirāmbanavāda
NK	Nyāyakandali
NKu	Nyāyamañjarī
NM	Nyāyamañjarī
NMGB	Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga
NR	Nyāyaratnākara
NS	Nyāyasūtra

NV	Nyāyavārttika
NVTT	Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā
Pratyakṣa	Pratyakṣasūtra
Pr. up	Praśnopaniṣad
R	Rāmānuja
RB	Rāmānujabhāṣya
RV	Rgveda
S	Śaṅkarācārya
Sabda	Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa
Sap	Sambandhākṣepaparihāra
Sār	Śārīrasthāna
Sat. br	Śatapathabrāhmaṇa
SB	Śaṅkarabhāṣya
SC	Śaṅkhyacandrika
SDS	Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha
SK	Śaṅkhyakārikā
Slv	Ślokavārttikā
SPB	Śaṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya
SS	Śaṅkhyasūtra
SSS	Sūvarṇasaptatiśāstra
SSV	Śaṅkhyasūtravṛtti
STK	Śaṅkhyatattvakaumudī
Sve. up	Śvetāśvataropaniṣad
Tait. up	Taittirīyopaniṣad
TV	Tattvavaiśārādī
VA	Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya
VB	Vallabhabhāṣya
VM	Vedāntimādhva
VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtra
YB	Yogabhāṣya
YD	Yuktidīpikā
YV	Yogavārttika

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